The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
MONGOLIA AND TEM0JIN 341
way, agreeing, tentatively at least, to his own son's proposal to kill the
ambitious Mongolian chieftain. Senggiim thereupon set his plans in motion.
He announced in the spring of 1203 that he was no longer opposed to his
sister's wedding to Jochi, in order to lure Temiijin to a celebratory feast at
which he intended to assassinate his unwanted new "brother." Temiijin,
however, learned of the plot on his way to the celebration and escaped before
Senggiim's agents could strike.
The sequence of events at this point is somewhat jumbled in the sources
but can plausibly be reconstructed in the following fashion.
22
Upon receiving
information of the plot against his life, Temiijin and a few followers took
refuge on the Baljuna (variously reported as a river or a lake) located south of
the Khalkha River. Though greatly outnumbered by the pursuing Kereyid
forces, his retainers never wavered. Moved by their loyalty, Temiijin drank
from the bitter waters of the Baljuna and swore an oath to remember always
their steadfastness and fidelity. From there they moved to a nearby locality,
the Khalakhaljid sands, where, reinforced by Mongolian contingents, Temii-
jin engaged the Kereyid troops. The Mongols emerged victorious but suf-
fered heavy casualties. Perhaps still outnumbered, they withdrew down-
stream along the Khalkha River.
23
Temiijin passed the summer in northeast
Mongolia searching out new recruits, rallying his forces and parleying with
his opponents, whom he reproached for their double dealing. In the autumn
he moved back to the west, established his camp between the Onan and
Keriilen rivers, and prepared for a decisive encounter with the Kereyid. He
surprised his foes, who were camping, it appears, somewhere in the southern
Bayan Ula Range and, after a three-day battle, overwhelmed them. Ong
khan escaped, only to perish later at the hands of the Naiman. The whole of
his people were made dependents and distributed among the victorious army.
With central Mongolia, that is, the former Kereyid territories, in his
grasp,
Temujin now controlled the strategic Orkhon River valley, which gave
his nomadic armies easy access to the Ordos Desert and China beyond, as well
as to the migration and invasion routes leading through the Altai to Jungaria
and thence to the western Eurasian steppes.
24
Mongolian dominion over Ong
khan's former lands also meant that the Naiman had a new and menacing
22 My description of the events from the time of Chinggis khan's flight from Senggiim to the Mongolian
leader's final defeat of Ong khan some months later is based on Francis W. Cleaves's exhaustive study,
"The historicity of the Baljuna covenant," Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies,
18 (1955), pp. 357-421,
particularly pp. 378—81, 387—92.
23 See also the reconstruction by Ratchnevsky in dnggis-khan, pp. 64—8, who argues that Temujin, on
discovering Senggiim's plot, first fled to the Khalakhaljit sands, where he was defeated by the
Kereyid; then, with his few remaining supporters, he took refuge at Baljuna, where the oath was
sworn.
24 On the strategic importance of this region in steppe history, see Larry Moses, "A theoretical approach
to the process of Inner Asian confederation," ttudes Mongols, 5 (1974), pp. 115—17.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
342 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
neighbor on their eastern frontier. The Naiman khan, Tayang, feeling threat-
ened, proposed an alliance with the Onggiids, hoping to interest the latter in
a two-pronged attack against the Mongols. However, the Onggiid ruler, Ala
Khush Digid Khuri, wisely declined and soon informed Temiijin of the
Naiman's intentions.
Despite hesitation on the part of
some
of
his
advisers, Temiijin insisted on
war with the Naiman, and set about reorganizing his forces on a decimal
basis,
creating units often, a hundred, and a thousand, for the forthcoming
campaign. In May 1204, after appropriate shamanist ceremonies in honor of
their battle standard
(tugb),
the Mongolian contingents marched west to do
battle with the Naiman. The armies met on the southern slopes of the Altai
Range. The Naiman and their allies
—
the Merkid and Oyirad, as well as
Jamugha and his Jadarans - suffered a major defeat, and the Mongols added
many new recruits to their ranks.
Tayang fell in the fighting, but Jamugha, who seems always to have
abandoned his allies on the eve of
a
crucial battle, did so again and temporar-
ily avoided capture. He remained at large, wandering in the steppe for
several months until he was betrayed by his few remaining followers and
brought to Temiijin. After personally inquiring into the prisoner's actions
and attitudes, the Mongolian chieftain had Jamugha, his
anda
and rival, put
to death.
CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE,
1206-
1227
The
khuriltai of
1206
Although dissident elements among the Merkid and Naiman continued to
resist
25
and the forest tribes had yet to be subjugated, Temujin was effectively
the master of the Mongolian plateau by 1205. To formalize his status and to
proclaim the formation of this new and powerful confederation, a great
khuriltai
was convoked in the following year, the Year of the Tiger. The site
selected for this solemn occasion was the source of the Onan. No further
geographical details are provided, but it seems certain that the diet was held
in the vicinity of Burkhan Khaldun, the holy mountain of the Mongols,
where their mythical progenitors, the blue-gray wolf and the fallow doe,
begat Batachikhan, the founder of all the Mongolian lineages.
Unfortunately, there is no authoritative register of the participants. How-
ever, from a lengthy roster of individuals appointed to high military office at
25 Merkid and Naiman resistance continued in various forms until 1219, when it was
finally
suppressed.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 343
the conclusion of the khuriltai, which is perserved in the
Secret
history,
it is
apparent that representatives of
all
the recently submitted tribes and lineages
were in attendance, as well as Temiijin's
n'o'kod
and immediate kinsmen.
Once assembled, the first order of business was raising Temiijin's white
battle standard flying nine horses or yak tails, an act full of symbolic meaning
to the steppe
peoples.
White, perhaps under Manichaean influence, was consid-
ered the most auspicious color among the nomads, and the number nine,
following indigenous tradition, had long been associated with good luck and
other magical properties. Thus the unfurling of the tugh signified and adver-
tised Temiijin's personal good fortune, or charisma, the possession of which,
according to the political notions of the steppe, gave him the right to exercise
sovereignty over the "peoples of the felt tent." If Rashid al-Din's account of the
proceedings is accepted,
26
the khuriltai then granted Temiijin the title of
Chinggis khan, usually interpreted to mean "Oceanic Ruler," that is, universal
sovereign. The title, according to the Persian historian, was publicly conferred
on Temiijin by Teb Tenggeri, the chief shaman.
27
Now formally enthroned,
Chinggis khan addressed his ethnically diverse adherents - henceforth to be
known collectively as Mongols
28
—
and expressed his gratitude for their aid
and loyalty. The ceremonies at an end, Chinggis khan turned to the crucial
business of organizing his domain.
Administration
When on the eve of the Naiman campaign of 1204, Chinggis khan organized
his armies on the decimal system, he also created a personal bodyguard
(kesig).
As initially constituted, the guard consisted of a day watch (turgha'ud) of
seventy men, a night watch
(kebte'ud)
of eighty, and a detachment of braves
(ba'atud) numbering one thousand. The kesig as an institution emerged di-
rectly out of the household establishment that Chinggis khan had first formed
in the late 1180s. Its personnel, like that of the household, was recruited from
26 The
Secret
history,
sec. 123 (p. 55), notes that Temiijin received this title long before the
khuriltai
of
1206.
If this is correct, the latter diet simply reconfirmed a long-held title. However, I prefer Rashid
al-Din's version of events, for two reasons: First, it seems more logical that Temiijin would have
received such a grandiose title after, rather than before, his unification of Mongolia, and second, the
Secret history
often employs titles anachronistically.
27 Rashld/Kariml, vol. 1, p. 308. A Mongol of the Khongkhotan lineage, Teb Tenggeri, also known as
Kb'kdchii, was an early supporter and influential adviser of Temiijin. He fell from grace shortly after
the
khuriltai
of 1206, when his efforts to provoke discord between Chinggis khan and his brother Jochi
Khasar were exposed. By Chinggis khan's explicit order, the once-powerful shaman was killed in a
wrestling match with another of the Mongolian ruler's brothers, Temiige Odchigin. On this episode,
see
Jean-Paul Roux, "Le chaman gengiskhanide,"
Anthropos,
54 (1959), pp. 424-7.
28 It is typical of nomadic polities that the leading tribe of the confederation gives its ethnonym (which
has become politicized) to the whole, even though its membership includes many heterogeneous,
unrelated ethnic groupings.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
344
THE RI
SE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
his
nokod.
And organizationally, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish
between the two bodies, as guardsmen
{kisigden)
served simultaneously as
protectors of the khan's person and as domestics who tended his private needs
and looked after his possessions. In this latter capacity,
kisigden
held appoint-
ments as chamberlains
(cherbi),
stewards
(ba'urchi),
quiver bearers
(khorchi),
doorkeepers
(e'utenchi),
and grooms
(aghtachi).
The guards, moreover, super-
vised the activities of the female attendants and minor functionaries such as
camel herders and cowherds; took care of the khan's tents, carts, weapons,
musical instruments, and regalia; and prepared his food and drink.
29
As Chinggis khan's power and possessions continued to grow, so naturally
did the
kesig's
administrative and economic responsibilities. His dramatic
expansion of the
kesig
from 1,150 to ten thousand men in 1206 was not
therefore motivated exclusively by considerations of security or prestige; it
was primarily designed to meet the growing administrative needs of the
nascent Mongolian empire. And because the guard/household establishment
provided both personal service and the machinery through which Chinggis
khan administered his rapidly multiplying subjects, territories, and eco-
nomic interests, it accompanied him wherever he went
—
on a campaign or
on a hunting trip. Thus the "central government" of the early Mongolian
state,
in essence the imperial guard, was located wherever its sovereign chose
to alight.
Chinggis khan also created at this time a new office, that of chief judge
iyeke
jarghuchi),
to supervise and coordinate the activities of the recently
expanded administrative system. He selected for this post the Tatar found-
ling Shigi Khutukhu, a member by adoption of his immediate household.
The duties of the chief judge were manifold. By Chinggis khan's express
order, he was to divide and apportion subject people, that is, decide how they
were to be distributed among military units and the khan's family. As his
title suggests, Shigi Khutukhu was the highest legal authority in the empire;
in cooperation with select members of the
kesig
he was to try all evildoers and
was granted the power of
life
and death over the guilty. Of
equal
moment, he
was instructed to institute and maintain a "Blue Register" (Koko Debter) in
which all judicial decisions, including Chinggis khan's own legal pronounce-
ments
(jasagh),
were to be preserved in order to establish precedents for
future legal decisions. All matters relating to the apportionment of peoples
were recorded in it as well. The Koko Debter was therefore a combination of
law code and population
register.
3°
29 Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, The military
establishment
of the Yuan dynasty (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 34-8.
30 Pavel Poucha, "Uber den Inhale und die Rekonstruktion des ersten mongolischen Gesetzbuches," in
Mongolian studies, ed. Louis Ligeti (Amsterdam, 1970), pp. 377—415; and Liu Ming-shu, "Yuan tai
chih hu k'ou ch'ing ts'e,"
Chung-kuo
wen
hua
yen chiu hui k'an, 7 (1947), pp. 101—6.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 345
The introduction of regular record-keeping procedures in 1206 was ren-
dered possible by Chinggis khan's farsighted decision, made several years
earlier, to transcribe his native tongue into a written form. In 1204, when
the Naiman were defeated, an Uighur official, T'a-t'a T'ung-a (Tatar
Tonga?), who served at their court, fell into Mongolian hands. After an
extended interview with the educated prisoner, Chinggis khan ordered him
to adapt the Uighur script to Mongolian and then teach the new alphabet to
his sons. Shigi Khutukhu, Chinggis khan's "fifth son" by adoption, must
have been among the first to master the alphabet and to write in his native
language. T'a-t'a T'ung-a also gave instructions concerning the use of
seals
in
the conduct of official business, which the Mongols quickly adopted.'
1
The military
establishment
The decimal system that Chinggis khan introduced into the Mongolian
armies in 1204 followed well-established steppe traditions. The scale on
which it came to be applied was, however, unprecedented. No figures are
available on the number of units formed in 1204, but there is a complete
order of battle of the Mongolian army as of 1206 preserved in the
Secret history
and a similar list for 1227 contained in Rashid al-Din's "Collected chroni-
cles."'
2
According to the former source Chinggis khan created ninety-five
units of a thousand
(.mingghan)
from the greatly enlarged manpower pool
available to him following the defeat of the Naiman and the consequent
surrender of sundry other tribes in 1205—6. To this figure must also be added
the 10 mingghan that formed his personal bodyguard. The figures for 1227,
the time of Chinggis khan's death, indicate that the number of mingghan
mobilized from the tribes of Mongolia had grown to a total of 129. It is
highly unlikely that these units maintained for long their paper strength, but
in theory at least, the strength of the purely Mongolian component of
Chinggis khan's army ranged between 105,000 and 129,000. As the Mon-
gols expanded territorially, the same system was imposed on subject
peoples
—
both nomadic and sedentary
—
so that by the mid-thirteenth cen-
tury the size of the Mongolian army, though unrecorded anywhere, was
certainly many times the 1206 or the 1227 figure.
The mingghan, not the more famous
tiimen
(unit of ten thousand), was the
basic structural element of the army in Chinggis khan's day. When the need
arose, ten mingghan were grouped together to form a temporary tiimen. A
commander of one of the subordinated mingghan was entrusted with the
31 Sung Lien et al., eds., Yiiansbih (Peking, 1976), 124, p. 3048 (hereafter cited as YS).
32 Sant
history,
sec. 202 (pp. 141-2); and Rashld/Karimi, vol. 1, pp. 399-413.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
346 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
command of the larger formation, while, however, continuing to lead his
own unit of one thousand. All of Chinggis khan's generals, it appears, held
permanent commissions as commanders
{noyan;
plural,
noyad)
of one thou-
sand and continued to function as such, even when placed in charge of large
field armies. Most of the commanders were companions of the Mongolian
chieftain and members of
his
household. For this reason many of the highest-
ranking officers in the army bore such seemingly insignificant titles as shep-
herd
(khonichi),
steward, and quiver bearer.
As a fighting force, the success of the Mongolian army rested on its
mobility, discipline, and maneuverability. They enjoyed no technological
superiority over their enemies; they possessed no secret weapon. By nature,
all nomadic armies are mobile, but none was as disciplined as the forces of
Chinggis khan. The legal pronouncements
(jasagh)
of Chinggis khan, as far
as they have come down to us, seem mainly concerned with military disci-
pline. The extant fragments indicate that the punishments for disobedience
were severe and that military units were held collectively responsible for the
behavior of individual members.
The ability of commanders to coordinate effectively the movement of
major formations on the battlefield was another hallmark of the Mongolian
military machine. This maneuverability was achieved by frequent peacetime
exercises, usually in the form of vast hunting expeditions in which the army
participated as units. It was also a matter of discipline. Mongolian field
commanders were expected to adhere strictly to prearranged operational
plans.
If a unit failed to appear at the proper place at the specified time, its
commanding officer was promptly punished, no matter what the excuse
offered.
33
The Mongolian army, in addition to its primary task, had important
administrative functions. The membership of the
mingghan
created in 1204
and 1206 included soldiers on active service together with their families
and dependents. Each
mingghan
was then a military formation and an organ
of local government under the control of the same official, the
noyan.
The
imposition of the decimal system afforded Chinggis khan an opportunity to
undermine tribal authority and loyalty and to replace it, to some extent,
with military discipline and solidarity. Old enemies such as the Tatars,
Kereyid, or Naiman were systematically broken up as tribal groups and
assigned piecemeal to composite units of one thousand or distributed as
dependents
(bo'of)
of
mingghan
made up of other peoples. Only old tribal
33 On the weaponry, training, and discipline of the Mongolian army, see Denis Sinor, "The Inner Asian
warrior," Journal of the American Oriental
Society,
101 (1981), pp. 133—44;
an
^ Denis Sinor, "On
Mongol strategy," in
Proceedings
of the fourth East Asian Atlantic
conference,
ed. Ch'en Chieh-hsien
(Tainan, 1975), pp. 238-49.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 347
allies of demonstrated loyalty were allowed to form their own ethnically
homogenous
mingghan.
The Onggirad, for instance, were allowed to form
into
mingghan
as a tribe with their own chief as commander. But even in
such cases, the tribe, whatever its record of fidelity, was nonetheless encased
within a new institutional framework and subject to rigid military disci-
pline. The
mingghan
was as much an instrument of social control as it was
of military mobilization.
The Mongols' ideology
During the early thirteenth century the Mongols elaborated an ideological
system that, to their own satisfaction in any event, legitimized the sover-
eignty of the Chinggisid line and justified their expansionist policies. The
system was certainly in place by the 1240s, but the precise time at which
these doctrines were first articulated and propagated remains unclear. It
seems reasonable to assume, however, that Chinggis khan and his advisers
devoted some attention to the matter of legitimation at his enthronement in
1206.
Although other components of Mongolian ideology may have been
added later, it is convenient to summarize the entire system at this juncture.
The Mongolian conception of sovereignty, like that of many other Eur-
asian peoples, was rooted in the notion of sacral kingship. In the Mongols'
own formulation, sovereign power was conferred on an earthly ruler by
Eternal Heaven (Mongke Tenggeri), the sky god and chief deity of the
steppe nomads. As Heaven's chosen instrument, Chinggis khan enjoyed the
protection and assistance of Mongke Tenggeri, which guaranteed the long-
term success of his military and political ventures. The special good fortune
that accompanied his rise to power was thus a manifestation of heaven's
favor. The narrow escapes, the timely warnings of danger, and the unex-
pected victories on the field of battle all served to identify Chinggis khan as
the earth's sole legitimate sovereign. His white battle standard with nine
tails,
as noted earlier, symbolized and affirmed his good fortune and hence
his sovereign rights.
Chinggis khan's pretensions were further buttressed by his control of the
Orkhon River valley and its surrounding mountains, the Otiiken-yish of the
Turkic inscriptions, the core territory of
all
previous nomadic polities of the
eastern steppe. According to pre-Mongolian Turkic traditions, good fortune
(qut) and imperial power were strongly associated with possession of these
holy mountains. The Mongols, it is true, had their own holy mountain,
Burkhan Khaldun, where their khans had to be invested, but it is significant
that when Chinggis khan chose a site for the imperial capital he selected
Khara Khorum, located in the heart of the Otiiken-yish, a decision designed
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
348 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
presumably to harness the good fortune that inhered in the region and to
sway opinion in the nomadic world at large.'
4
The sovereignty bestowed on Chinggis khan and subsequently bequeathed
to his successors
was
universal in character. In the orders of submission custom-
arily sent to neighboring states before initiating hostilities, the Mongols
claimed the right, if not the duty, to bring all the world under their dominion.
All nations outside their frontiers were considered members of the Mongolian
empire-in-the-making, and all were required to accept Mongolian suzerainty
without question or hesitation. Because in Mongolian
eyes
their expansion was
divinely sanctioned, anyone refusing to submit was thereby thwarting the will
of Heaven and deserving of the harshest punishment.
35
The claim of a Mandate of Heaven and universal sovereignty echo well-
known Chinese political doctrines, but exact Turkic parallels can also be
found for all elements of Mongolian ideology. Although direct Chinese influ-
ence cannot be ruled out, it seems more probable that the Mongols were
introduced to these ideas, whatever their original provenance, through the
mediation of the Turks, especially the Uighurs, whose influence on the
Mongolian state in its formative years was extensive.
36
Early conquests
Besides serving to confirm and consolidate Chinggis khan's hold on the
eastern steppe, the
khuriltai
of 1206 laid plans for various new military and
diplomatic initiatives.
Soon
after its deliberations concluded,
a
mop-up opera-
tion was mounted against Buyirugh khan and his followers, which resulted
in the Naiman's death.
In the following year, 1207, Chinggis khan dispatched emissaries to the
forest tribes of southern Siberia. His orders of submission had the desired
effect: The Kirgiz of Upper Yenesei, the Oyirad, and other forest peoples of
the Baikal region peaceably capitulated, presenting tribute of furs, falcons,
and geldings to their new sovereign. With their northern border secure and
fresh conscripts in the offing, the Mongols could now direct their attention
toward their neighbors in the south.
By 1207 there were unmistakable signs that the Chin frontier defense
34
Chinggis khan designated Khara Khorum
as his
capital
in 1220, but
construction
did not
begin until
1235
during
the
reign
of Ogodei. See YS, 58, p. 1328.
3;
The
pioneering work
on
Mongolian ideology
is
Eric Voegelin's
"The
Mongol orders
of
submission
to
the
European
powers, 1245—1255," Byzantion, 15 (1940—1), pp. 378—413. See
also
the
important
article
by
Igor
de Rachewiltz,
"Some remarks
on the
ideological foundations
of
Chinggis khan's
empire,"
Papers
on Far
Eastern
History,
7 (1973), pp. 21-36.
36 For the
Turkic
parallels, see
Peter
B. Golden,
"Imperial ideology
and the
sources
of
political unity
amongst
the
pre-cinggisid nomads
of
western
Eurasia,"
Anhivum Eurasiae Medii
Aevi,
2 (1981), pp.
37-76.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CHINGGIS KHAN AND THE EARLY MONGOLIAN STATE 349
system was beginning
to
erode.
The
Jurchens had been unable to prevent
the
unification
of
the steppe peoples under Mongolian auspices,
and
their chief
march warden
in
the Gobi, the Onggiid Ala Khush Digid Khuri, was openly
treating with Chinggis khan. Their problems were further exacerbated when
the Jiiyins (Ch: Chiu),
an
ethnically mixed people inhabiting
the
sensitive
Chin—Tangut—Onggiid border regions, who frequently served
the
Chin
as
military auxiliaries, revolted against their overlords, complaining of inequita-
ble treatment. Believing that
the
Onggiid prince
was at the
center
of the
turmoil, the Jurchens had Ala Khush Digid Khuri assassinated,
in the
hope
that
he
would
be
replaced
by a
member
of
the Onggiid princely house loyal
to the Chin court. Their plans, however, misfired. The successor,
a
nephew
of the murdered prince, immediately broke with the Jurchens
and
formally
acknowledged Mongolian
suzerainty.
'
7
With
the
strategic Onggiid territories under
his
control, Chinggis khan
was now
in
a position
to
strike a major blow at either the Chin dynasty
or
the
Tangut kingdom
of
Hsi Hsia.
He
decided
to
settle first with
the
Hsi-Hsia,
whose territories he had previously reconnoitered
in
1205
and
1207. A large
army was assembled and marched south, entering Tangut territory
in
the late
spring
of
1209. The Mongolian forces, under Chinggis khan's personal com-
mand, defeated the Tanguts' frontier garrisons and pushed on to the Hsi Hsia
capital, Chung-hsing (present-day Yin-ch'uan, Ning-hsia)
on the
Yellow
River, which they placed under siege
in
October. When direct assaults
proved unavailing, the Mongols endeavored to divert the waters of the Yellow
River
in
order
to
inundate
the
besieged city. Their plan, however, miscar-
ried.
The
irrigation canals
of the
Yellow River plain burst their dikes,
flooding the Mongolian positions as well as the Tangut capital.
In
the face of
this unexpected turn
of
events,
both sides decided
to
seek
an
end
to
hostili-
ties.
The
negotiations, which commenced
in
January
1210,
produced
an
acceptable compromise: The Tangut ruler acknowledged his subordination
to
the Mongols
and
pledged
to
support their future military operations with
troops.
In
return Chinggis khan lifted
the
siege
and
withdrew
his
armies
from
Hsi
Hsia territory.
The
Mongolian khan then returned
to the
steppe
with a new wife, a Tangut princess, and enhanced prestige;
for
the first time,
his armies had bested
the
forces of
a
major sedentary power.
Shortly after arriving home Chinggis khan accepted the submission of two
other sedentary peoples,
the
Uighurs
and
Qarluqs.
In
this case, however,
their submission was voluntary,
not
compelled.
The
Uighurs, long depen-
dents
of
the Khara-Khitai kingdom (centered
in
Jungaria
and
Semirechie)
37 Paul D. Buell, "The role of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone
in
the rise of Chinggis qan," in
Studies on
Mongolia:
Proceedings
of
the first North American
conference
on Mongolian studies,
ed.
Henry
G.
Schwartz
(Bellingham, 1978), pp.
63—8.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
35O THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
had for some years grown increasingly restive under the oppressive rule of
their overlords. In 1209 the Uighurs, provoked beyond endurance, rose in
rebellion and killed the much-hated and tyrannical Khara-Khitan political
resident in their capital. Seeking Mongolian protection, Barchuq Art Tegin,
the Uighur ruler, hastened to communicate a pledge of loyalty and service to
Chinggis khan. The latter
was
delighted and commanded Barchuq to present
himself to the Mongolian court with appropriate tribute. After some delay,
occasioned by Chinggis khan's operations against the Tanguts, the Uighur
ruler finally had his audience in the spring of 1211 beside the Keriilen River.
As the ruler of the first sedentary state to join the empire voluntarily,
Barchuq was made Chinggis khan's honorary "fifth son" and was ranked first
among the princes
(wang)
of dependent states.*
8
Second in rank was the
Qarluq Turk Arslan khan, the ruler of
Qayaliq,
a city in the Hi valley, whose
audience followed Barchuq's. Like his Uighur counterpart, Arslan khan had
become disenchanted with Khara-Khitan overlordship and willingly changed
masters when the opportunity presented
itself.
Both contributed auxiliaries to the Mongolian army, but most impor-
tantly, the Uighurs, a numerous and culturally sophisticated people, pro-
vided their new masters with a reservoir of experienced administrative and
clerical personnel on which Chinggis khan and his successors drew exten-
sively. Their heavy dependence on the Uighurs for services of this nature
accounts for the substantial Turkic influence on Mongolian chancellery prac-
tices,
financial institutions, and political doctrine.
Initial attacks on the Chin
The Chin dynasty, the Mongols' next opponent, possessed a large and effec-
tive army, but the demands placed on it were extensive. In the west they were
engaged in a border war with the Tanguts, and in the south they confronted
the Sung dynasty, which had never relinquished its hopes of recapturing the
north. As recently as 1206-8 the two powers had clashed, and though the
Chin had emerged victorious, the security of its southern frontier was a
continuing source of concern.
Chinggis khan, fully informed of Chin troop dispositions, took the first
step toward hostilities in 1210 when he broke off tributary relations (begun
around 1195) with the Chin court. He delayed the actual test of arms,
however, until the following year, by which time he had subdued the
Tanguts. Having no other immediate enemies, Chinggis khan could now
38 On this episode, see Thomas T. Allsen, "The Yuan dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th
century," in Chine among equals: The Middle Kingdom and its
neighbors,
10th—14th
centuries,
ed. Morris
Rossabi (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 246—8.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008