The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND GOYOG 381

prevailing in north China at this time: Tax farmers placed high bids with the

court for the right to collect taxes, thus forcing the tax quotas ever upward.

The merchants, of course, collected as much as possible over the set quotas to

maximize their profits. Because few people could pay such elevated rates,

they were forced to turn to

ortogh

merchants (themselves tax farmers) for loans

on usurious terms. The capital of the latter, it should be remembered, was

provided by the Mongolian court or by imperial princes who had obtained it

in the first instance in the form of taxes from their hapless subjects!

Thus,

by the end of Ogodei's reign, Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's influence at court

had evaporated, and his program of reform was in shambles. He retained his

title oi

chung-shu

ling and continued on as royal astrologer, but he was no longer

consulted on affairs of

state.

The most revealing indication of

his

eclipse came

in 1241, when Ogbdei was finally moved to reverse his destructive financial

policies in north China. Conditions had so deteriorated that the khaghan

determined to remove Abd al-Rahman from office and reinstitute a more

regular system of tax collection. Having come to this conclusion, however, it is

significant that Ogodei turned not to Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai but to another Central

Asian Muslim, Mahmiid Yalavach (Ya-lao-wa-ch'ih), a Turkic-speaking

Khwarazmian, who until 1239 had been head of the Branch Secretariat of

Turkestan. Evidently, Ogodei felt that he could not, in the prevailing political

climate at court, return the administration of north China to Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai

or any other champion of Chinese interests.

It should not be assumed, however, that in bypassing the Khitan for

Yalavach the court had opted for a continuation of Abd al-Rahman's policies,

even in modified form. Mahmiid Yalavach, though he never stood high in the

valuation of his Chinese associates, was a reformer in his own right. He had

regularized the collection of taxes in Turkestan, opposed the extravagance of

Ogodei's court, and fought against the extension of the appanage system

within his former jurisdiction. Although it is true that he was unable to

curtail the rampant official corruption and ceaseless quarreling among the

appanage holders during his short tenure in office

—

late winter of 1241 to

spring of 1242 - his appointment nonetheless represented a change of impe-

rial policy in north China.

In sum, then, even though Yalavach's policies paralleled those of Yeh-lii

Ch'u-ts'ai in many respects, his assignment in place of Abd al-Rahman

clearly signaled the end of the Khitan's personal influence. Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai

died in 1243 in Khara Khorum during the regency of Toregene (1241-6),

honored but unheeded.

77 For a brief and generalized description of conditions in north China in this period, see Yao Sui, Mu an

chi

(SPTK ed.), 15, p. 4a.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

382 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

The death of

Ogodei

and the

regency

of Toregene

Following the completion of the Chin campaign, in which the khaghan had

actively participated, the imperial princes urged Ogodei to remain in Mongo-

lia, to live the good life, and to enjoy the vast bounty generated by the

Chinggisids' successful imperial venture. The khaghan, desiring to lead the

forthcoming campaign against the Russian principalities, at first rejected

their entreaties but was "persuaded" in the end to heed their advice.

From

the mid-i23os onward, Ogodei, bowing to the princely pressure as well as to

his personal inclinations, led a life of luxury and leisure, spending most of his

time hunting and drinking. The resulting political vacuum was eagerly filled

by the khaghan's second wife, Toregene, who soon consolidated her authority

at court and began issuing imperial edicts in the name of her rapidly failing

husband.

By the end of

his

reign Ogodei was drinking so heavily that a special court

functionary was named to count and thereby control the number of wine

goblets that he emptied daily. Such measures, however, were to no avail, and

on 11 December 1241, while on a hunting trip, Ogodei succumbed at age

fifty-six, following a lengthy drinking bout. The second khaghan of the

Mongolian empire was buried apparently in or near his personal appanage in

Jungaria, and not with his father at Burkhan Khaldun.

According to Mongolian social custom, when a male head of household

died, his widow was to administer his estate in trust and to assume his

authority until the eldest son came of age. The Mongolian ruling house

continued to respect this principle, long sanctioned by social convention,

utilizing it as a mechanism for the transference of political authority within

the early Mongolian empire. The empire

itself,

in other words, was looked

upon as the patrimony of the imperial family and treated accordingly. Thus,

when Ogodei died his widow, Toregene, already in firm control of the court,

also took up the administration of his estate, that is, acted as regent of the

empire until such time as a new male head of

the

imperial family, a khaghan,

could be confirmed in office by a khuriltai.

Once Toregene, known in the Chinese sources as Liu Huang-hou (Sixth

Empress Dowager),

assumed office, she endeavored to engineer the en-

78 Juvaynl/Qazvinl, vol. i,pp. 156-7; and Juvaynl/Boyle, vol. i,pp- 198—9.

79 See John

Boyle, "The burial place of the great khan Ogedei," Ada

Orimtalia,

32 (1970), pp. 45—50.

80 This principle was not applied following the death of Chinggis khan because his principal wife, Borte,

the mother of his potential successors, had predeceased him. Furthermore, Chinggis khan's final

illness was of brief duration, and none of his secondary wives had the opportunity to establish her

ascendancy at court.

81 In all likelihood, her actual title was not liu

buang hou

(sixth empress dowager) - she was in fact his

second empress

—

but ta huang

hou

(great empress dowager), which is a direct translation of her

Mongolian title,

yeke

khatun.

Apparently this confusion arose among Chinese writers of

the

thirteenth

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND

GOYOG

383

thronement of her son Giiyiig (r. 1246—8), in the face of considerable opposi-

tion. Those resisting his candidacy, led by Batu, Jochi's second son and khan

of the Golden Horde, were in the end unable to prevent Giiyiig's elevation,

but they did manage to delay a final decision on the matter for about four and

one-half years. And throughout this artificially prolonged interregnum, the

able and determined Toregene ruled over the affairs of the empire in her

deceased husband's name.

In the military sphere, however, Toregene's authority was somewhat cir-

cumscribed. Major military undertakings in progress at the time of Ogodei's

death, such as the invasion of central Europe, were automatically halted, as

the Mongolian princes and most high-ranking commanders had to return

home to confirm a successor. Some campaigning was resumed under

Toregene, but in all cases the objectives as well as the scale of the operations

were clearly limited. Baiju, for instance, was allowed to complete his destruc-

tion of the Seljuqs of Rum, and an operation of equally narrow scope was

mounted against Sung-held territories south of the Huai River, which culmi-

nated in the Mongol occupation of Shou-chou (modern Shou-ch'un in Anhui)

in 1245.

In administrative and fiscal matters, however, there are many indications

that the regent enjoyed wide powers and that she chose to exercise this power

to its fullest extent. In 1244, for example, Toregene authorized the issuance

of new coinage in the Transcausasian provinces in order to facilitate the

collection of the poll tax, an initiative that anticipated Mongke khaghan's (r.

1251—9) more systematic and extensive efforts to monetize imperial revenues

in the next decade.

' That the regent was no mere caretaker is evidenced

further by her personnel policies. She dismissed Chinkhai (Chen-hai) and

many other central government officials from office and made sweeping

changes, too, in the leadership of the Branch Secretariats: Korgiiz in Iran,

Masud Beg in Turkestan, and Mahmud Yalavach in China, all appointees of

Ogodei, were soon removed. Yalavach, much hated by Toregene, was forced

to flee for his life from her agents, finally finding sanctuary with Koten,

Ogodei's second son.

Toregene replaced the departed Khwarazmian with the previously dis-

missed Abd al-Rahman. China was once again delivered into the hands of the

rapacious tax farmer. Although little is known of the economic and social

policies pursued in north China during Toregene's regency, it is a reasonable

century, because the characters for six

(//'»)

and great (to) are graphically similar. See Igor de

Rachewiltz, "Some remarks on Toregene's edict of 1240," Papm

Far

Eastern

History, 23 (1981), pp.

42-3.

82 YS, 2, p. 38.

83 M. A. Seifeddini, "Monety s nadpis'iu 'uluq mangul ulus bek'," Numizmatika i Epigrafika, 9 (1971),

pp.

115-21.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

384 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

conjecture that they were similar in character to those of Abd al-Rahman's

first administration.

The

elevation

ofGilyiig and

dhsidence among

the imperial princes

Although her personnel changes, undercutting as they did the collegial

character of the Branch Secretariat, displeased some of the Mongolian

princes, none openly challenged Toregene on this issue. Her power, as her

opponents recognized, was transitory in nature, and her more unpalatable

policies could always be reversed at some future date. On the question of

succession, however, Toregene encountered strong resistance. Because the

Mongols' weakly developed system of determining succession, nomination

by the ruling khaghan, was easily circumvented in practice, any transference

of imperial power inevitably became the focal point of intense political

struggle and in the long run led to armed conflict among the princes, all of

whom, in principle at least, were eligible for the throne.

Therefore, because

the long-term interests of the entire imperial family, as well as the personal

ambitions of its individual members, were at stake, in order to obtain her

ends Toregene was forced to negotiate this critical issue with all the inter-

ested parties.

The major sources of opposition to Toregene's plan to place her eldest son,

Giiyiig, on the throne were two. First, because Ogodei had nominated his

grandson Shiremiin (who was the eldest son of Kochii, the deceased

khaghan's third son), there was discontent and resistance within the regent's

own family.

' This explains why Toregene'e enemies, such as Mahmud

Yalavach, were able to find safety with other Ogodeid princes and why she

felt compelled to remove her husband's ministers. Although Shiremiin's

candidacy was successfully derailed by Toregene, a second and more formida-

ble line of resistance immediately surfaced among collateral branches of the

royal house.

Giiyiig had made powerful enemies among his fellow princes, the most

important of whom was Batu, the khan of the Golden Horde and the ac-

knowledged leader of the Jochids. The two openly despised each other; the

cause of their deep-seated enmity went back to personal disagreements that

broke out during the campaign of

1236—41

in western Eurasia. At issue was

a question of seniority and precedence, which became so heated that Ogodei

was forced to intercede to settle the matter in Batu's favor.

This naturally

84 On the nature of succession struggles among steppe peoples, see Joseph Fletcher, "Turko-Mongolian

monarchic tradition in the Ottoman empire," Harvard Ukrainian

Studies,

3-4 (1979—80), pp. 236-51.

8; Rashld/Karimi, vol. 1, p. 443; and Rashid/Boyle, p. 19.

Secret

history, sees. 275—6 (pp. 215-17).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND GtJYtJG 385

further embittered the relationship between the two princes and between

Giiyiig and his father and may have been at the root of Ogodei's decision to

bypass his son in favor of his grandson Shiremiin.

When, in 1241, word reached the still-feuding Mongolian princes in the

west that Ogodei was dangerously ill, Giiyiig immediately left the campaign

and hastened to his father's side, presumably to patch up their differences and

thereby advance his own claims to the khaghanate. The emperor died before

his son could reach him, but Toregene had already taken positive action on

her son's

behalf.

With perhaps unseemly haste, given her husband's recent

demise, she hurriedly convoked a khuriltai in the fall of 1241 in the hope of

securing quuick approval of Giiyiig's succession.

Although he harbored no imperial ambitions of his own, Batu was deter-

mined to deny the throne to his hated adversary, Giiyg. He therefore declined

the invitation to join the khuriltai, claiming a severe attack of gout as an

excuse. By such tactics the Jochids managed to delay Giiyiig's enthronement

for several years.

? In the meantime, Toregene continued to press her case,

using her position and influence to acquire support for her son. After much

intrigue and political infighting, the regent secured the necessary consensus

within the imperial house, and in the suummer of 1246, a new khuriltai held

on the Keriilen duly elevated Giiyiig to the emperorship. Batu, bitterly

resentful, resisted to the end, refusing to appear at Giiyiig's enthronement,

again claiming illness, and sending in his stead his older brother, Orda, to

represent his family at the official ceremonies.

Open conflict between the antagonists had been avoided, but the Jochids'

acceptance of the new khaghan had been tendered grudgingly and reluc-

tantly. The extent of the opposition to Giiyiig's elevation is revealed in the

statement by the author of the Tartar

relation,

a contemporary of these events,

that the new emperor had been elected "by a majority of one."

This, of

course, was not literally true, but it did accurately mirror the growing

political tension among the Mongolian princes. Further evidence of the

division within the ruling house is the fact that another claimant for the

throne, Temiige Odchigin, the youngest brother of Chinggis khan, hoping

to profit from the widespread dissension, tried to seize the khaghanate for

himself without benefit of

properly constituted khuriltai. As the Franciscan

friar Carpini phrased it, because "he wanted to rule without an election," he

was put to death with the concurrence of the assembled princes.

For the

87 Rashld/Kariml, vol. i, pp. 523—4; and Rashid/Boyle, p. 120.

88 R. A. Skelton et al., The Vinland map andthe Tartar

relation

(New Haven, 1965), p. 84.

89 Christopher Dawson, ed., The Mongol mission: Narratives and letters of the

Franciscan missionaries

Mongolia and China in the

thirteenth

and

fourteenth centuries

(New York, 1955), p. 25 (hereafter cited as

Mongol

mission).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

386 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

first time a member of the royal clan had been killed as a consequence of

internal power struggles.

Giiyiig thus assumed office in a climate of hostility and suspicion. Subse-

quent succession crises would prove even more costly in human life and in the

end would undermine the unity and power of the empire of the Great

Mongols.

Giiyiig's

administration of the

realm

At the time of his enthronement, Giiyiig was forty years of

age.

Like most

Mongolian princes, his youth had been spent on military campaign; he had

fought against the Chin and participated in the conquest of the northern

Caucasus in 1239-40. As far as one can tell from the meager evidence, he

had had little or no civil administrative experience before his elevation.

Giiyiig commenced his reign by showering his supporters, from princes of

the blood to lowly scribes, with an array of costly gifts

—

jewels and

finery,

well as grants of money. In emphasizing his extraordinary generosity on the

occasion of his enthronement, the Persian sources leave the distinct impres-

sion that this was no mere show of imperial munificence but a political payoff

on a gigantic scale for debts incurred in acquiring the khaghanate.'

Indeed,

throughout his brief and generally ineffectual reign, Giiyiig continued the

practice of lavishing presents on members of the royal clan and the army,

much to the detriment of the imperial coffers.

As an additional gesture of goodwill, the new emperor restored to office

most of the administrative personnel dismissed during Toregene's regency.

Chinkhai was returned to his post as head of the Central Secretariat, together

with his former associates. The administration of Turkestan was once again

entrusted to Masud Beg, and his father, Mahmud Yalavach, was placed in

charge of the Branch secretariat for north China, with the title of great judge

(yeke

jarghuchi).'*

Abd al-Rahman, Toregene's agent in China, was stripped

of his responsibilities and subsequently put to death. Although the previous

regime had been reconstituted for the most part, Giiyiig was able to place a

few of his own men in positions of power, principally his

atabeg,

or tutor,

Khadakh, a Nestorian Christian of Naiman origin who, according to Carpini,

held the office of "procurator of the whole empire."

This restoration of the collegial principle in the governance of the empire,

most certainly a concession wrung from the Ogodeids by other princely lines

90 Juvaynl/Qazvinl, vol. I, p. 209; and Juvaynl/Boyle, vol. 1, pp. 254—5.

Ch'eng

Chii-fu,

Hsiieb-lou

chi

(Hu-pei hsien cheng

i shu ed.), 25, p. 17b.

Mongol

mission,

pp.

66—7.

For his

title,

atabeg,

see Juvaynl/Qazvinl,

vol. i,p.

2i3;andJuvaynI/Boyle,

vol.

1, p. 259.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND GOYtJG 387

as the price for their support of Giiyiig's candidacy, appears to have been

honored in both spirit and practice by the new khaghan. When, for instance,

irregularities were reported in the management of imperial land grants in Ta-

ming circuit (contemporary Hopei) during the first year of Giiyiig's reign,

the incident, a matter of some significance, was investigated jointly by the

Tangut Hsi-li Ch'ien-pu, a representative of

the

imperial court, and by Bujir

(Pu-chih-erh), a long-time servitor in the Toluid household. It is interesting

to note that the crucial documents in the case, the papers of the Ta-ming

censor, were placed in the custody of

the

Toluids' agent, not the khaghan's.

Giiyiig's princely partners took an active interest in the business of the

empire.

Unfortunately, further data on the administrative arrangements and mea-

sures in north China are extremely scarce for this period. Even the activities

of its chief judge, Mahmud Yalavach, are unknown. From the available

records, it appears that Giiyiig's major administrative undertaking was an

effort to compile fresh population figures for the empire. An order for a

census of the Chinese territories was issued late in 1247, and similar endeav-

ors,

though clearly limited in scope, are reported for Iran and the Russian

principalities at about the same time. The results and actual compass of the

enumeration in China are nowhere recorded, perhaps because they were never

completed, if indeed they were even begun.

In general, under Giiyiig's stewardship the imperial government lacked

vigor and exhibited a pronounced tendency toward decentralization, if not

fragmentation. Local officials, in consequence, enjoyed ample opportunity to

exploit the subject population, and this in turn led to outbreaks of "banditry"

and rebellion in the countryside and cities of north China.

' The erosion of

central authority was due in part to the Jochids' intransigence, but the

situation was aggravated by Giiyiig's own failings as a leader. His father's

son, he was a dedicated drinker from an early age; chronic illness also took its

toll, and by the time he ascended the throne he was in such a weakened

condition that he had neither the vitality nor the inclination to take an active

part in managing the empire's affairs. He developed no general plan of action

around which to mobilize the energies of his people, and his policy initia-

tives,

few in number, were never forcibly implemented. Initially, for in-

stance, he made a great show of calling in all unauthorized imperial decrees

(jarligh)

and badges of authority

{gerege)

issued under Ogodei and Toregene,

93 YS, 122, p. 3012; and Yao Sui, Muancbi, 19, pp. lob-na.

94 For details and documentation on this registration, see Thomas T. Allscn, "Mongol census taking in

Rus',

1245—1275," Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 5 (1981), pp. 36—38.

95 Hu Chih-yu, Tzu-shan ta

ch'iian

chi (SKCS ed.) 151, pp.

20b—

ia, describes several such outbreaks in

the period betwen 1247 and 1249.

388 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

but he himself soon became equally lax in this regard, and his successor,

Mongke, had to bring such abuses under control once again. What energies

Giiyiig did possess he seems to have expended in partying, hunting, and

keeping a wary eye on Batu.

To add to the woes of the empire, Giiyiig was profligate in the extreme.

His ceaseless bestowals of money and rarities on his backers assumed enor-

mous proportions and soon alarmed his more responsible ministers. Court

criticism on this score, however, carried little apparent weight with the

khaghan, for by his own declaration he desired above all to surpass the record

of munificence and openhandedness of his father.'

In this he certainly made

a most promising start: The Persian chronicles record that by the time of

his

death Giiyiig had written drafts against the imperial treasury totaling

500,000 silver ingots

(Jbdlish)

to pay for the luxury items that he distributed

to his supporters.

' These numbers may be exaggerated, but it is clear that

Giiyiig was heavily involved with and financially indebted to the

ortogh

merchants. The extensiveness of his dealing with the

ortoghs

and their conse-

quent influence at court suggest that the abusive practices of

these

merchants

so common during Ogodei's reign - tax farming, usury, peculation, and

extortion

—

were again the order of the day.

The death of Giiyiig and

the regency

of Oghul Khaimish

During Giiyiig's short reign, military operations were few and restricted in

scope. In 1246—7 there were limited attacks on Sung positions in Hupei and

Anhwei, and about the same time Eljigidei, the new commander in west

Asia, undertook some minor campaigning in Iran. The Mongols' uncharacter-

istic lack of aggressiveness in this period is obviously connected with the

continued tensions among the princes of the blood. Batu's grudging accep-

tance of Giiyiig's sovereignty was, of

course,

at the center of their divisions,

and because an open conflict between the two seemed imminent, the princes

were unwilling to commit large numbers of their troops to a new round of

external expansion. The empire, in

brief,

was edging toward civil war, and

the potential antagonists were husbanding their resources for the inevitable

clash of arms.

Though the sources are somewhat vague, the available evidence seems to

indicate that Giiyiig, with uncustomary decisiveness and resolve, made the

first move to force a showdown with Batu. In the fall of 1247 the khaghan

96 Rashld/Karlml, vol. i, p. 574; and RashTd/Boyle, p. 188.

97 Juvayni/Qazvinl, vol. 3, pp. 83-5; and Juvaynl/Boyle, vol. 2, pp. 603—4.

THE REIGNS OF OGODEI AND

GOYOG

389

left Mongolia for his appanage in the Hi River region, ostensibly on a tour of

inspection. In fact, as his subsequent actions demonstrate, the true purpose

of the "tour" was to position himself unobtrusively in Jungaria for a surprise

strike at his rival's territories, which lay farther to the west. What event, if

any, triggered his decision to move against

the

Jochids at this particular time

is unknown. In any case, once he reached Jungaria, Giiyiig immediately set

about reorganizing and expanding his force preparatory to the attack. By

imperial decree the khaghan ordered that "one man from every one hundred

Mongol households be enlisted as 'braves' "

(pa-tu-lu;

Mongolian:

badur).**

Because the latter were an important element in the imperial guard, function-

ing as the khaghan's advance guard and as elite shock troops," it is clear that

Giiyiig was contemplating offensive action in the near future.

His preparations completed, in the spring of 1248 the khaghan set out

from his base in Jungaria with a large army, heading in a westerly direction.

Batu was at this time camped at Ala Qamaq, a locale south of

Lake

Balkash,

and was therefore in the general line of march of Giiyiig's massed troops. At

this juncture, Tolui's widow, Sorghaghtani Beki, who was outwardly on good

terms with the Ogodeids, secretly dispatched a messenger to alert Batu to the

khaghan's movements and hostile intentions, an action obviously calculated

to win Jochid support for her carefully orchestrated campaign to place her son

Mongke on the imperial throne.

Batu received the timely warning and readied his forces for the expected

onslaught. The long-awaited confrontation was, however, averted when

Giiyiig's frail constitution finally gave way and he died at Khum Sengir

(Heng-hsiang-i-erh), a place one week's march from Besh Balikh, the Uighur

summer capital on the northern slopes of the

T'ien

Shan Mountains. With his

demise the campaign was called off. Giiyiig's body, on the orders of his

widow, Oghul Khaimish, was taken back to his appanage in Jungaria for

burial.

Despite his open hostility to the Ogodeids, Batu readily conceded Oghul

Khaimish's right to act as regent of the empire until a

khuriltai

confirmed a

successor. Her powers, however, were circumscribed, for Batu stipulated that

she had to retain the services of the deceased khaghan's ministers and officials

and that massive purges of administrative personnel, as had occurred under

Toregene, would not again be tolerated.

100

Unlike the opposition, which quickly rallied around Mongke, Tolui's el-

98 YS, 2, p. 39. Giiyiik's plans for an attack on Batu are also noted in Yuan Chiieh, Ctiingjungchiishih

chi (SPTK ed.), 34, pp. 240-253.

99 See Hsiao, The military

establishment

of the Yiian dynasty, p. 36, for details on the "braves."

100 Juvaynl/Qazvlnl, vol. 1, pp. 217—18; and Juvaynl/Boyle, vol. 1, p. 263.

39°

THE

RISE

OF THE

MONGOLIAN EMPIRE

dest son,

the

Ogodeids had difficulty settling

their own candidate

for the

vacant throne. Oghul Khaimish

was

forced

spend most

of her

time

con-

tending with

the

discord inside

her

own family

and

preventing the elevation

the

Toluid standard bearer. Under these circumstances, Juvaynl states,

very little governmental business

was

transacted during

the

interregnum

except "negotiation with merchants,

the

provisional allocation

sums

money

every land

and

country

and the

dispatch

relays

churlish

messengers

and tax

gatherers."

101

Specifics

are

lacking

on the