The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
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THE REIGN OF MONGKE 4OI
Mobilization
In order to secure the resources needed for further campaigns of conquest,
Mongke called for a new and definitive census of the entire realm. Designed
to identify and mobilize the empire's wealth and talent for war, this census
tabulated animals, orchards, and sources of raw material (e.g., iron and salt
deposits), as well as people. In both extent and thoroughness, Mongke's
inventory far surpassed the earlier efforts of Ogodei and Giiyiig.
11
'
The enumeration commenced in China in 1252 under the general direc-
tion of Bujir, Mongke's agent on Mahmud Yalavach's
staff.
Supplemental
censuses were taken in 1255, 1257, and 1258 to uncover the displaced
population and to register the inhabitants of newly surrendered areas. In west
Asia the census was conducted by Arghun Akha. In close association with the
khaghan's personal representatives, he surveyed Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and
the Transcaucasus between 1253 and 1258. The registration in the Golden
Horde was first ordered in 1254. Actual counting began in the north
Caucasus in 1254 and culminated in Novgorod, the northernmost of the
Russian principalities, in 1259.
In the latter case, as in all others, the census teams were composed of
representatives of the khaghan, the regional khan, and other interested mem-
bers of the imperial family. The data accumulated were entered into registers
that, when completed, were sent directly to Mongke. With up-to-date cen-
sus figures at their disposal, the Central Secretariat could make a reasonably
accurate estimate of the quantities of taxes and numbers of military recruits
that they could expect from a given province or dependent state, thus mak-
ing it difficult for local authorities to withhold resources from the center.
The tax obligations of the populace were individually fixed at the time of
the registration according to a system pioneered by Mahmud Yalavach in
Turkestan during the 1230s. Under his scheme there were three basic catego-
ries of taxes: a head tax (khubchir) in coin imposed on all adult males, an
agricultural tax (khalan) paid in kind by the rural population, and a commer-
cial tax {tamgha) on all business transactions collected in cash in urban
markets and at numerous customs stations."
6
The khubchir, as formulated by Muslim chroniclers of the period, was
assessed everywhere in the empire in accordance with an individual's ability
to pay, the original rate per annum varying between one dinar for the poor to
eleven dinars for the wealthy. In practice, this formula was applied only in the
115 See Allsen, "Mongol census taking in Rus'," pp. 38-52.
116 On the evolution of the categories of taxation, see John M. Smith, "Mongol and nomadic taxation,"
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studio, 30(1970), pp. 46-86.
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402 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
Islamic portions of the empire, where the system had originally been devised
and tested. In China the principle of graduated taxes was retained, but the
khubchir
(Chinese: k'o-ch'ai or
ch'ai-fa)
was modified in several important
respects to conform to Chinese customs. It was collected there on the basis of
households, not individuals, and payment was accepted in precious goods,
especially silk floss, as well as in silver. Further, the original maximum rate
of six
Hang
of silver and one-half
chin
of silk
floss
per year per household was
soon reduced. Thus, with the exception of the increased importance of the
silver component, the
k'o-ch'ai
under Mongke was much the same as it had
been following Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai's revenue reforms of 1236.
To facilitate the collection of this tax, Mongke made a concerted effort to
place more currency into circulation throughout the empire, at least in those
areas that had prior experience with a monetary economy."
7
In China a
Superintendency of Paper Money (Chiao-ch'ao t'i chii-ssu) was established by
imperial order in 1253. There is no doubt that the superintendency actually
issued bills, for Rubruck examined specimens in Khara Khorum in 1254,
but the extent to which this currency circulated and its role in the payment of
k'o-ch'ai
are not indicated in the Chinese sources. However, as Rubruck
expressly states elsewhere in his work that the Chinese daily paid their
Mongolian overlords fifteen hundred
iascot
(Turkic,
yastuq,
"pillow" or ingot)
of silver in addition to an unspecified amount of silk,"
8
it seems permissible
to infer that paper money was not widely used for tax purposes, at least in the
early years of Mongke's reign.
In Turkestan, Iran, and the Transcaucasus there is sure evidence that by the
mid-12 50s local mints were producing large quantities of
dinars
and that the
khubchir
was in fact collected in this coin. Within the confines of the Golden
Horde, only the Volga Bulgars paid tribute in coin; in the Russian principali-
ties,
which had no tradition of minting coin, the Mongols were content to
collect the
khubchir
(dan'
in Russian) in furs or other high-value commodities.
Among the nomadic population, the
khubchir
was still calculated accord-
ing to the size of
herds.
Under Mongke, the excessive one-in-ten rate inaugu-
rated by Oghul Khaimish was quickly abrogated, and the former rate of one
per hundred head was restored.
As for agricultural taxes, the Mongols for the most part followed local
usage. In China they retained the system elaborated by Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai, in
which the tax was assessed on the basis of the quantity and quality of land.
And in west Asia the customary Islamic tithe prevailed.
In summary, then, Mongke established three categories of taxes to be
117 Bart hold, Istoriia Turkatana, p. 149, was the first to point out Mongke's efforts to monetize the
taxes.
118 Mongol
mission,
pp. 144, 169—70.
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THE REIGN OF MONGKE 403
applied in all the sedentary regions of the empire. The basis of assessment
and rates were clearly stated for each category, and in the case of the tribute
and agricultural levies it was stipulated that they were to be collected only
once a year. Although inequities continued and extraordinary levies were
never completely eliminated, a sustained effort was made to adjust the tax
schedules to local traditions and economic realities. But even allowing for
such accommodations, which were normally introduced at the regional level,
a fairly uniform and regular system was imposed on the empire's extremely
heterogeneous population.
The recruitment of manpower for the Mongols' war effort also was inti-
mately tied to the census. Following the registration, the population of north
China was divided into three basic categories: military households, civilian
households, and appanage households. Those in the military category were
organized into tiimen (Chinese: wan-hu, literally "ten thousand families"),
groups that in theory could field ten thousand infantry to fight as auxiliaries
alongside Mongolian regulars. Although the total number of new troops
mobilized during Mongke's reign is unknown, it must have been consider-
able,
judging from the figures reported for various localities: Twenty thou-
sand troops were raised in Shantung in 1255, and Georgia yielded ten
tiimens
by 1257. The Mongols' field armies at this time were thus both large and
international in character. The armies that invaded the Sung between 1253
and 1259 contained, besides Mongolian and Turkic contingents, Chinese,
Tanguts, Koreans, Uighurs, and Alans, the last a north Caucasian people
impressed into service following the census of 1254.
In addition to regular military recruitment, the census was used to identify
skilled craftsmen, who were then put to work in imperial arsenals, mines, and
the like or employed as specialist troops in the army. Some idea of the effective-
ness and flexibility of the Mongols' manpower mobilization system can be
gleaned from the fact that a unit consisting of one thousand "crews" of Chinese
artillerymen accompanied Hiilegii to the west and helped breach the walls of
Baghdad in
12
5 8. Mongke was able to supply his brother with these troops be-
cause all the metal workers, carpenters, and gunpowder makers in north China
had been registered as catapult operators
(p'ao-shou)
during the census of 1252
and placed on separate rolls. When it was subsequently determined that such
specialists would be needed in west Asia, Mongke and his advisers had only to
consult the proper rolls to find the desired number of qualified personnel.
New conquests
At the khuriltai of
12
51,
agreement had been reached and planning begun for
a series of campaigns in west Asia, Korea, and southwest China. Determined
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404 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
to fulfill Chinggis khan's mandate and confident that
his
mobilization mea-
sures would produce
the
necessary troops
and
materiel, Mongke moved
swiftly
to
implement
the
new program
of
conquest.
By the
following year,
preparations were well enough advanced
to
start
all
three operations
at
once.
Contingents assigned
to
the west Asian campaign were assembled
in
west-
ern Mongolia.
In
the summer
of
1252 the advance guard departed, and
in
the
following year,
the
main force. Though nominally under
the
control
of
the
emperor's brother Hulegii,
the
conduct
of
field operations once
the
armies
reached their destination had been entrusted
to
Ked Bukha, the commander
of the vanguard and
a
steward
in
Mongke's household.
11
'
Because
of
the great distances involved
and the
large quantities
of
men,
animals,
and
siege equipment
in his
train,
the
logistical problems were
immense,
and
Hiilegii's progress
to the
west was necessarily measured.
The
bulk
of
his forces reached Khurasan
in
1256, where they were reinforced
by
contingents from
the
Golden Horde
and the
Chaghadai khanate
and by
numerous local auxiliaries
-
Persians, Armenians, and so on
—
mobilized
on
the basis
of the
recent census.
The
formidable weight
of
these combined
forces fell first
on the
Ismailis (known
to
the Europeans as
the
Assassins),
an
Islamic religious order famed
and
feared
for
their
use of
assassination
as a
political weapon. Ensconced
in a
network
of
castles
in the
mountains
of
northwestern Iran,
the
Assassins initially offered fierce resistance,
but
after
months
of
continuous battering they began
to
give way; by early 1257 most
of their strongholds had capitulated and their leader
was
in Mongolian hands.
Mongke, cognizant
of
their special skills
and
wary
of
attempts
on his
life,
ordered
all
surviving Ismailis, starting with the grand master of
the
order,
to
be
put to the
sword.
Hiilegii next moved
his
massed armies toward Baghdad,
the
seat
of the
'Abbasid Caliphate. Mustasim, the caliph, refused Hiilegu's order of submis-
sion
and
thereby condemned
to
death himself and most
of the
citizens
of
Baghdad.
The
Mongolian columns converged
on the
city
in
late 1257
and
established
a
close siege. Baghdad fell
to Ked
Bukha's assault forces
in
February
1258 and was
then given over
to
pillage
and
massacre
for
seven
blood-filled days.
In the meantime, several subsidiary campaigns were under
way:
The secon-
dary cities of Iraq and western Iran were under attack, and sizable expeditions
had been sent into Kashmir and Slstan. With the completion of these opera-
tions
in 1259,
Hiilegii
had
fulfilled Mongke's commission
to
secure
a
firm
Mongolian
(and
Toluid) hold
on
west Asia. Hiilegii's efforts
to
extend
his
119 This campaign
is
treated
in
detail
by
John
A.
Boyle
in
"Dynastic
and
political history
of
the
II-
khans,"
in The
Saljuq
and
Mongol
periods,
vol. 5 o{ Tht
Cambridge history
of
Iran,
ed.
John
A.
Boyle
(Cambridge, 1968),
pp.
340-52.
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THE REIGN OF MONGKE 405
newly created realm still farther in the direction of Syria resulted, however,
in a major disaster when in September of the following year, the Egyptian
Mamluks crushed the invading armies at 'Ain Jalut and made the Mongolian
commander, Ked Bukha, their prisoner.
I2
°
At the other end of Asia, the campaign against the Koreans commenced in
late 1252 under the direction of Prince Yekii (Yeh-ku), the eldest son of Jochi
Khasar, Chinggis khan's brother. Mongke's choice of commanders in this
instance was a poor one: Unreliable and insubordinate, the prince badly
mismanaged matters and so in 1253, on the khaghan's orders, was replaced
by Jalayir (Cha-la-i-erh), an officer in the imperial guard. The latter made
some progress in the next five years but was unable to overcome the Koreans'
spirited resistance, forcing Mongke to send large reinforcements to the penin-
sula in 1258. Even with fresh units in the field, it took another year of
strenuous campaigning before the Koreans reluctantly acknowledged Mongo-
lian overlordship.
On the southern Chinese front, large Mongolian forces were also in mo-
tion. In order to avoid a costly frontal assault on the Sung, which would have
required a risky forced crossing of the lower Yangtze, Mongke decided to
establish a base of operations in southwestern China, from which a flank
attack could be staged. To this end, in the late summer of 1252 he ordered
his brother Khubilai to invade and occupy the Nan-chao, or more properly
the Ta-li, kingdom ruled by the Tuan family in Yunnan, which adjoined the
Sung's more weakly defended western and southwestern frontiers.
121
Starting
from Shensi, the Mongolian armies reached the T'ao River, an affluent of the
upper Yellow River, in the fall. The advance force under the Chinese general
Wang Te-ch'en then penetrated the Szechwan basin, defeated the local Sung
garrisons, and established a major Mongolian base in the city of Li-chou
(later called Pao-ning). The path to the south now cleared and his lines of
communication secure, Khubilai, with the main force, advanced on the Ta-li
kingdom. In the fall of 1253, after traversing wild and mountainous terrain,
Khubilai set up headquarters on the Chin-sha River in western Yunnan.
Here he divided his troops into three columns and marched on Ta-li, the
capital of the kingdom (see Map 29).
Between December 1253 and January 1254 the kingdom was subdued,
and even though its ruler had rejected Khubilai's submission order, the
capital and its inhabitants were spared. As they had done on many other
120 John M. Smith, " 'Ain Jalut: MamlGk success or Mongol failure?" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,
44 (1984), pp. 3°7-45-
121 The fullest account of this campaign in the Chinese sources is found in the biography of
Uriyangkhadai, the field commander in charge of the opeation. See YS, 121, pp. 2979-81. See also
Otto Franke, Gtschichtt
dcs
chinaischtn Riichts (Berlin, 1948), vol. 4, pp. 316—19.
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406
THE RISE
OF THE
MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
Eastern Army Wang te-ch'en
Central Army Khubilai
Western Army Uriyangkhadai
Uriyangkhadais
subjugation
of Ta-li
Boundaries of
Ta-li kingdom
follow
Tan Ch'i-hsiang Chung-kuq li-shih
li-fuchi Vol6.p,75-6, Both the
western
and
southern boundaries
are probably far beyond
the
area
actually controlled by
Ta-li.
Boundaries of Fu and Chun
in
Ta-li
MAP
29. The conquest of Ta-li
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THE REIGN OF MONGKE 407
occasions, the Mongols left the native dynasty in place under the supervision
of Mongolian officials. The king, Tuan Hsing-chih, was later sent to Mongke
and invested with the title of Mo-ho-lo-ts'o, or Maharajah (literally, "great
king").
At the end of 1254 Khubilai returned to Mongolia to consult with his
brother the khaghan. Siibetei's son Uriyangkhadai, whom Mongke had as-
signed to Khubilai as expedition commander, remained in the southwest
conducting campaigns against the local Man and Lolo tribes. His efforts at
pacification proved successful, and following a clash with Sung troops he
returned north to Kansu in early 1257. From here he sent emissaries to
Mongke's court informing his sovereign that Yunnan was now firmly under
Mongolian control. Pleased, the emperor honored and generously rewarded
Uriyangkhadai for his fine achievement.
Uriyangkhadai subsequently returned to Yunnan and began preparing for
the first Mongolian incursions into Southeast Asia. In late 1257 he entered
Annam, forcing the ruling Tran dynasty to seek safety on an offshore island.
In the spring of the next year the Annamese king, recognizing the futility of
further resistance, recognized Mongolian suzerainty by sending his son as a
hostage to the imperial court.
The stage was now set for Mongke's own appearance on the scene and the
commencement of the long-planned conquest of the Southern Sung.
Khubilai and
north
China
The administration of north China during Mongke's reign was conditioned
to a considerable extent by his relationship with his younger brother
Khubilai, the basic characteristics of which are best revealed by comparing
the latter's position in China with Hiilegii's somewhat analogous status in
west Asia.
The similarity of their situations came about through the conscious design
of the emperor: Khubilai and Hiilegii were granted their princely jurisdic-
tions at the same time, in the fall of 1251, and as Rashid al-DIn notes, the
khaghan specifically and pointedly paired together the two princes on this
occasion as his right and left wings.
122
Their commissions, too, were identi-
cal.
Hiilegii was to extend and consolidate Mongolian-Toluid power in west
Asia, and Khubilai was to do the same in east Asia. To carry out their tasks,
both were given Mongolian field armies commanded by officers, Ked Bukha
and Uriyangkhadai, whom Mongke had selected from his personal guard. For
administrative purposes, each prince was allowed to build up a cadre of local
122 Rashld/Kariml, vol. 2, p. 685.
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408 THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
specialists, mainly Central Asian Muslims
in
Hiilegii's case and Chinese
in
Khubilai's,
to
help them rule their domains.
In
both instances, however,
Mongke reserved the right to appoint and discharge key officials within his
brothers' jurisdictions. Both,
in
other words, were il-khans, subordinate
khans,
whose rights
to
their territories were entirely contingent
on the
emperor's will. And neither, because their lands had been granted to them by
their elder brother
in a
secondary dispensation, had the stature of the other
regional khans, such as the Jochids and Chaghadaids, whose lands and titles
had been allotted to them in Chinggis khan's original dispensation.
Although their status
was
essentially the same and their functions likewise
identical, the two brothers' personal relationships with Mongke nonetheless
differed in several important respects. Hiilegii, for his part, was content with
his station.
He
advertised
his
subordination
to the
emperor
by
formally
adopting
the
title tl-khan and,
as far as the
records show,
had no
serious
disagreements with Mongke.
Khubilai,
on
the other hand, was much more restive and willing
to
test
the khaghan's authority. Harboring ambitions of his own and closer
to the
seat
of
imperial power, and therefore
to
the scrutiny
of
the central govern-
ment, Khubilai frequently clashed with
the
khaghan
and his
agents.
In
1252,
for example, he had a dispute with Bujir, whom he found too willing
to impose
the
death penalty
on
Chinese subjects
for
minor breaches
of
the
law. And prompted, no doubt, by his Confucian advisers, who were trying to
prevent the introduction of Muslim financial practices into their homeland,
Khubilai
in the
same year expressed
to the
throne his displeasure over
the
reappointment of the Khwarazmian Mahmud Yalavach as head of the Branch
Secretariat
of
north China. Subsequent conflict over administrative proce-
dures between Mahmud and Chao Pi, Khubilai's representative on his
staff,
merely reflected the ongoing tension between the khaghan and his younger
brother.
Their most serious confrontation, however, erupted
in
1257 over Khubi-
lai's administration of north China. Beginning
in
1251, the year he obtained
princely jurisdiction over the region, Khubilai launched a series of reforms in
Honan, Ching-chao (in Shensi), and Hsing-chou (in modern Hopei) designed
to reinstitute Chinese-style government
in
these areas and
to
restore their
economies.
In
1252, when Mongke announced his decision to distribute new
appanages
to
the imperial family, Khubilai,
at
the urging of
one
of
his
most
trusted Confucian counselors, Yao Shu, requested and received the strategic
and fertile Wei River valley
as his
personal share
(kbubi).
Two years later,
following
the
Yunnan campaign
and his
meeting with
the
khaghan,
Khubilai went
to
his appanage and, with the aid of his advisers, continued
his efforts
at
administrative reform and economic revitalization. His work in
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THE REIGN OF MONGKE 409
Ching-chao, as well as in Honan and Hsing-chou, met with considerable
success and progressed undisturbed until 1257. In this year
a
major investiga-
tion of Khubilai's activities was suddenly and unexpectedly launched by
Mongke, who correctly suspected that his brother was endeavoring to build
up in Ching-chao and Honan an independent power base from which he
might eventually challenge the throne.
The inquiry, initiated ostensibly by complaints of corruption in Shensi,
was headed by 'Alamdar (A-lan-ta-erh), the assistant garrison commander of
Khara Khorum. His investigating team, moving swiftly through the prov-
inces of Honan and Shensi, seized a multitude of administrative records and
subjected local officials to harsh interrogation. On the basis of their findings
and with, of course, the knowledge and approval of
the
emperor, the board of
inquiry dismissed Khubilai's chief pacification officer
(hsuan-fu shih)
in Shensi
and summarily executed some of his underlings. As a further display of his
imperial power, Mongke ordered the imposition of extraordinary levies on
the province, which, after some minor adjustments in the methods of pay-
ment and delivery, were exacted in full.
Although outraged by this turn of
events,
Khubilai was in no position to
defy the emperor at this time. On the advice of Yao Shu he exercised his only
viable option and traveled to Mongolia in early 1258 to reaffirm his loyalty
and beg his older brother's indulgence. The latter, placated by this show of
submissiveness, drastically curtailed Khubilai's administrative authority in
north China but took no further punitive action against him.
His preemptive purge a complete success, Mongke now considered the
matter closed, and as an indication that his trust in Khubilai had been
restored, the emperor invited his contrite brother to help plan and execute
the second phase of his assault on the Sung.
12
*
The assault on the Sung and
the
death of Mongke
Once the success of Uriyangkhadai's campaign in Yunnan seemed assured,
Mongke had begun to give serious consideration to a large-scale and direct
attack on the Southern Sung. Starting in 1254, Mongolian raids and recon-
naissances along the Sung's northern borders were stepped up, and a program
of political warfare was initiated, designed to induce Sung frontier officials to
defect. In the summer of 1256, citing as his casus belli the imprisonment of
Mongolian envoys by the Sung, the khaghan formally announced his inten-
tion of attacking the Sung and held preliminary discussions on a plan of
123 On Khubilai's reforms and his subsequent confrontation with the emperor, see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing,
Yiian tai shih hsin fan (Taipei, 1983), pp. 285-94; and Hok-lam Chan, "Yao Shu (1201-1278),"
Papers on
Far
Eastern
History, 22 (1980), pp. 25—8.
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4IO THE RISE OF THE MONGOLIAN EMPIRE
military action. In early 1257 assault troops were deployed to the south, and
Mongke made known his resolve to lead in person one of the three invasion
armies committed to the campaign. A year later the emperor moved south
through the Gobi, where he met with Khubilai and other princes to go over
the details of the forthcoming operation. By the spring of 1258 Mongke and
his force reached the Liu-p'an Mountains of Kansu and established a tempo-
rary camp. Here he stayed throughout the month of May, making final
preparations for his drive into Szechwan.
Although it had been partially occupied by the Mongols at the time of
Khubilai's attack on Ta-li, Szechwan still contained a formidable Sung pres-
ence.
The Sung commanders committed their available forces to defend a
number of fortified cities scattered throughout the province. Mongke there-
fore divided his troops into three separate columns and began the task of
reducing these garrisons one by one. At the head of one column, the emperor
penetrated northern Szechwan in the fall of 1258, taking several cities by
storm, and then proceeded to Li-chou, which had been under Mongolian
control since 1253. After inspecting its defenses he moved his army into the
heart of the Szechwan basin, where he spent the rest of 1258 besieging
various cities and accepting the surrender of numerous Sung officials. In early
1259 he moved to western Szechwan to attack Ya-chou (now Ya-an), which
he took in January.
Mongke then turned back east and advanced on Ho-chou, a major garrison
city on the Chia-ling River, around which he concentrated a considerable
part of
his
forces. Assaults on the city began in February and were intensified
throughout the spring and summer. Ho-chou, however, put up a stout
defense, successfully repelling all the Mongolian assaults, and
in
July,
unable
to take the city, Mongke ordered the siege lifted. Leaving behind three
thousand men to blockade Ho-chou, the emperor sent the bulk of
his
troops
against Ch'ung-ch'ing in the south of
Szechwan.
In the meantime two addi-
tional Mongolian armies had entered the conflict, invading Sung territory
from different directions. Khubilai, commanding the central army, opened
up a new front in Hupeh in August 1259, moving against the Sung city of
O-chou on the middle Yangtze, while the eastern wing, commanded by the
Mongolian prince Taghachar, made for northern Huai-nan (modern Anhwei
Province). In conjunction with these operations, Uriyangkhadai struck north-
east into Sung territory from southern Yunnan, with the objective of joining
Khubilai's forces on the Yangtze.
Now simultaneously assailed from the north, west, and south by Mongo-
lian field armies, the Sung defenses were gravely threatened, and the very
survival of their dynasty was in serious jeopardy. The dire situation in which
they found themselves was, however, shortly alleviated. On 12 August 1259,
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