Telo M. European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era

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what J. Rosenau called ‘a bifurcation’:

on the one hand, a fragmented multilevel

soft governance and, on the other, a concentration of high-level political decision

that is, a practical shift towards a perpetual dependency on US-centred globalism,

both in economic and political terms. No doubt that new regionalism would fail

in that scenario, as a dynamic third way of multilateral and polycentric world

governance, between unipolar power politics and fragmentation.

4.2 The second scenario: a ‘Fortress Europe’ as part of a global new-

mercantilist competition?

In the uncertain framework of the post-Cold War and post 9/11 world, given the

increasing uncertainties of global multilateralism, Europe could strengthen current

tendencies to set inward-looking priorities, reducing dependency from partners and

allies, as a reaction to both external pressures and internal demands. Economic

failures and international threats could exacerbate this. The combination of hard

trade disputes and the social demands of economic security could force not only

single MS but also the EC/EU to set defensive economic and protectionist policies,

and, according to a part of the international literature,

also ease a spillover towards

enhanced political and military security. The politicization of domestic pressures

could be particularly evident in the case of growing instability in the eastern and/

or southern borders of the Union, the arch of crisis.

These two demands are not

necessarily linked, but the ﬁrst one creates a background that is favourable to the

second one and vice versa. Thirdly, the demands of internal security also play a role

in strengthening such a double trend. The perceptions of threats linked to migration

ﬂows, terrorism and criminality have already inspired defensive border-control

policies at national and European level (as shown by some of the Schengen Treaty

provisions regarding immigration and asylum policies).

A kind of institutional reform, fostered by new conﬂicts and threats in the

surrounding world or by a degradation of the multilateral economic and trade

system is not excluded, even if it would not occur in line with a federal pattern.

In front of the undesirable consequences of the federal and functional patterns,

a new confederate polity would be the more realistic institutional consequence of

that scenario.

The new polity would be based on the revival of the territorial

sovereign logic as a major institutional principle, ﬁrstly at national level.

Broadly diffused fears and a negative perception of external threats could act

in support of the old idea of puissance, the plea to revive the classical concept of

international power. Paradoxically, such an evolution happens to be more likely

in the case of the failure of the model of Europe as a civilian power that quietly

contributes to peaceful external relations and world governance, as a regional

stabilizer, and as a resource of economic dynamics for partners and neighbors.

Indeed, even if the starting point were economic demands, the trend would be

towards political and military power as the only one able to settle disputes and

conﬂicts when the economic, juridical, and ideological powers fail.

Against the

simple notion of inﬂuence, the myth of an European classical power, ‘telling other

parts of the world what political, economic and social institutions they should have’

would cover neo-colonial practices, inward looking protectionist statements and

re-nationalized policies.

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To what extent is that scenario realistic in the early 21st century? Firstly, several

socio-political streams in many Member States and interest networks openly

support the idea of Europe, or European States, as a classical economic, political

and military power. Relevant industrial and socio-economic sectors (interested

in arms cooperation etc) need protection, as well as agricultural interests. Most

importantly, the difﬁculties that emerged during the last decades for the EU in

coping both with the challenges of a globalized economy make such a scenario less

abstract than during the 1970s and the 1980s.

The latter challenge is on the very ﬁrst point of the agenda. EU countries are still

lagging behind Japan and the US in the areas of information and communication

technologies (ICT), employment and growth, and economic competitiveness in

strategic sectors. New demands for protecting the domestic market and subsidizing

exports (including NTBs) are about to surface because of urgent domestic and

sectorial problems. A vicious circle is possible since only a dynamic European

economy can ﬁnance the costs of social cohesion and of enlargement, the stability

plans in the Balkan subregion, the Mediterranean policies, and so on, and

compensate the problems created by liberalization in sensitive economic sectors

and local districts. Even if global economy provided in the last ﬁve years more

growth than ever since 1945, large part of European population feels poorer and

more marginal and demands for protectionist policies.

What would be the implications for new regionalism and world governance? A

shift to multiple conﬂicts among competing regional blocs (and nations) could result

out of the uncertainties of global multilateralism. As far as Europe is concerned,

much more than it already does, it could oppose US interests with a general counter

strategy of ‘Europe-centred’ inter-regional agreements and a myriad of ‘EC centred

preferential free trade areas’,

whatever biregional or bilateral, including Eastern

Asia, Russia, Africa and Latin America. The US is pushing in that direction by

setting bilateral PTAs with singles Asian and Latino-American countries. Most

Favored Nation clause could become a weapon in provoking trade wars. Setting

global multilateral agreements would be increasingly difﬁcult because of growing

tensions as far as the global commercial, ﬁnancial and monetary systems were

concerned.

Furthermore, the costs of more blocs competition might be sidelined

particularly in the developing countries and in the periphery, becoming the victim of

struggles between spheres of inﬂuence, obliged to opt for one or another contender

in the framework of inter-centres competition. The UN system could suffer because

of increasing transatlantic conﬂicts. In conclusion, the fundamental opposition

theory of regionalism versus globalism would be revived in a new form.

However, there are some important caveats about such an evolution towards

scenarios of a kind of new-mercantilist contested globalization:

It cannot but cause serious divisions among and within European States,

according to various interests in expanding the open economy, to variations in

the consequences of trade wars in defence of selected geo-economic interests

and, lastly, to the various historical pressures of liberalism and protectionism.

As for the political side of the demand for a harder European power politics,

there are huge discrepancies according to national traditions. These include

differences between the two nuclear powers themselves and the others,

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between the neutrals and the nuclear states, between the ﬁve countries with

greater experience of power politics (according to the consequence of WW2),

and between the staunch defenders of symbols of national sovereignty and

hard-line federalists. Lastly, an important cleavage is the people’s acceptance

of the cost of defence policy in terms of standard of living and of possible

input into the democratic scrutiny of European and national decision

making. The simultaneous explosion of some of these internal cleavages

could possibly disintegrate the EU.

However, imagine the scenario of several regional powers managing the internal

economic and political conﬂicts within their regions. What would be the international

implications for world governance? As previously mentioned, global economic and

trade organizations would be jeopardized. There would be no automatic spillover;

however, the strengthening of defensive regionalism or economic nationalism

elsewhere in America and Asia would support various demands for tighter economic

protectionism and military security. Most probably, the EU and many regional

organizations mentioned in this book would be profoundly transformed in the case

of increasing trade and political disputes between trade blocs: either they would

disintegrate or they would become hierarchical spheres of inﬂuence by a regionally

dominating State. Secondly, according to Hettne, Söderbaum and others, even if not

highly militarized, the EU would be a factor in the tendency towards a multipolar

world. Of course, theoretically, there are many possible forms of a multipolar

world. The military concept of multipolarism, replicating the negative experience

of the thirties, is no longer relevant. The transformation of multilateralism into

hard bargaining between trade blocs, or the emphasis on the classical dimension of

power politics in an ambiguous way (whatever the main actors would be – mega-

states or regional blocs), is not far from the vision of international relations recently

expressed by leaders both in Asia and Europe. It could provide the background

for a controlled nuclear proliferation. Traditional international theories consider

the balance between various spheres of inﬂuence as a realistic basis for a better

world government. However, is a step back to the international system of ‘balance

of power’ in the early 21st century conceivable? Such a vision of multipolarism

lacks realism, and not only because there is no evidence that the legacy of ﬁfty

years of world history could be easily deleted. Consider the primacy of US, the

role of international and multilateral organizations, the tremendous development

of transnational relations, the development of peaceful and cooperative new

regionalism. Certainly, given the uncertainties of the new global framework, the

shift from benevolent to malevolent behavior of regional entities should not be

excluded. However, even the tendencies towards a new multipolar balance of

power should cope with the historical transformations of the last decades at global,

regional, domestic and transnational levels.

4.3 The third scenario: new regionalism as a pillar of a new multilateral world

order

Research on new regionalist associations transforming into new kind of

international actors entails various approaches, both normative and analytical,

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idealistic and realistic. Contrary to idealized pictures of civilizing and normative

power, this volume brings some arguments in favour of a realistic understanding

of the evolving regional polities, able to adjust their socio-economic features in the

context of globalization, better able to cope with the evolving changing international

environment, but unable and/or unwilling to build classical powers.

The European workshop is the most advanced and several authors as Sbragia,

Higgott, Eliassen/Arnesen, Söderbaum do underline the differences between the

‘Brussels model’ and the other paths to regional cooperation. However, many

regional entities are already providing their contribution to global governance,

by their relationship both with neighbors and far abroad, with big powers and

international organizations as WTO, IMF and UN. Under this respect EU is not

entirely isolated as a regional entity transforming its internal context and external

environment by its very existence. It is relevant for comparative studies and as

proactive entity: many writers in this volume suggest new concepts for deﬁning

the European Union’s international identity beyond the two previously mentioned

scenarios. The contributions by Gamble and Padoan describe Europe as a ‘strategic’

economic actor. Hettne underlines its political relevance as the transatlantic rift and

the very different global presence of EU and US are concerned, while keeping

open the question of the nature of EU. Comparing with US and with the colonial

legacies of European states, Söderbaum, Vasconcelos, Joffé among others well

show how controversial is the balance between similarities on the one hand and

alternative geopolitical interest and original external relations on the other hand.

In our understanding ‘civilian power’ is matter both of external policies and of the

implications of what the EU internal governance already is. While Göran Therborn

elaborates the concept of ‘Europe as a Scandinavia of the World’ in his chapter,

emphasizing the socio-economic contents and the potential international inﬂuence

of Europe as such, R. Seidelmann includes the two distinctive notions of ‘political

responsibility’ and ‘historical learning’ in his concept of ‘soft power Europe’.

These visions are important pillars of a new research, combining the question of

civilian power Europe, with the evolving new regionalism facing the challenges of

global governance and world order.

By overcoming the idealistic understanding of civilian power we don’t come

back to classical realism. By contrary, to show to what extent, in several regions of

the world, past conﬂicts, shared interest and needs of common belonging bring states

to opt in favor of cooperation with neighbours and apply the value ‘responsibility’

to external relations is to emphasize the need of radical innovation of the realist

and neo-realist tradition. In some cases, calling for democracy, peaceful settlement

of conﬂict and accountability in foreign policies puts in question the ‘Chinese wall’

between domestic democratic politics and international power politics, a perennial

stake for democratic theory, since Rousseau, Kant, and Tocqueville. Furthermore,

to explain EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN internal foreign policy of reconciliation

through shared values goes even beyond F. Duchêne’s Euro-centric deﬁnition

quoted above. In the sole European case, however, ‘international responsibility’

means, the weight of domestic democratic public opinion, and particularly on

memory of the past tragedies: on the one hand, keeping alive the best legacy of

2,500 years of Greek polis, Roman right, Renaissance and Enlightenment culture,

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Christian inﬂuences and so on, and, on the other hand, emphasizing the democratic

learning process, making of past tragedies and aggressive policies (fascism,

colonialism, intolerance, infra-European civilian war, and so on) a resource for

people’s understanding and good governance. For example, it is useful to compare

the salient differences between the German/Italian/Portuguese/Spanish post-fascist

learning processes and the Japanese post-war experience and with the tensions

between Japan and its neighbours regarding memory of the past and its political

impact. That helps by explaining the deep ‘realistic’ roots of the variously spread

diffusion of the idea of peace in different regions of the world. Moreover, the

relatively stronger weight of norms in Europe, given the normative multilateral

internal network. Is Europe more globally responsible for the public good of world

governance than, for example, the US, Japan or China? Are European foreign

policies more consistent with the UN’s and cosmopolitan values, by defending

the common interests of humans (disarmament, peace, environment, economic

growth, social justice, the ﬁght against crime and drugs and so on)? This volume

fosters impact studies on oscillations and incoherence, which cannot be something

else than comparative studies.

We need to combine various disciplinary and theoretical approaches to

understand such an original combination of interests and ideas and the practical

inﬂuence of normative values within the European construction. Furthermore,

current constructivist approaches focus on the weight of historical learning and

memory, by building people’s consciousness and by inﬂuencing national and

supranational preferences in many policy ﬁelds particularly linked to international

identity and global role. That is matter of fact in many European countries, either as

a heritage of the post-fascist democratic reconstruction or as a traditional national

commitment to democratic values, republican aims, or neutral proactive traditions.

To what extent such an evolution is occurring also within MERCOSUR and other

regional entities? Cognitive regionalism is to some help under this respect.

The realistic background as far as interests and historical forces are concerned

has been strengthened after the end of the Cold War: diminishing the weight of

nuclear threats and hard security issues, enhanced role of ‘idealistic democracies’,

particularly Germany, Italy, Iberian countries, Benelux, Scandinavia within the

European construction. Is Europe a post-modern island? The conﬁdence building

measures and the regional cooperation between Brazil and Argentina is considered

the best success story of the declining Non Proliferation Treaty. The evolving

cooperation between previous enemies Vietnam and Thailand/Philippines within

ASEAN is proving the potential of peace setting through economic integration.

The incipient transformation of Europe and of several regional entities into new

civilian actors is raising several theoretical questions. To focus more on long-term

beneﬁts than on purely short-term utilitarian criteria, as far as foreign relations are

concerned, raises the question of the time frame of foreign policy. The theoretical

opposition between the ‘structural foreign policy’ and the ‘conjunctural’ foreign

policy of traditional powers needs to be theoretically deepened. The crucial question

is: in which meaning do political dwarfs conceive and implement a ‘structural’

foreign policy? For example, the Therborn socio-economic perspective provides

insights for a ﬁrst step regarding the present and future European regionalism. His

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concept of Europe as a ‘Scandinavia of the world’ means much more than a mere

economic entity and deepens explicitly an alternative to both the above-mentioned

scenarios. A ‘Scandinavian Europe’ is not essentially a prescriptive rather an

analytical concept, consistent with realized economic and social features and with

the awareness of the impossibility of simply importing the American model.

The question is twofold: Firstly, is the European socio-economic model

condemned to fail within the globalized economy or can it not only adjust and

survive , but further inﬂuence the global environment? Secondly, is it one of

several resilient regional socio-economic-institutional-values diversities (Europe,

East Asia, Latin America, Africa ) within the same global market as fundamental

features of the world of 21st century? To the second question, this books clearly

answers that, not only because of the fragile globalization, we will have more

regionalism in the current century than in the last one. And what about the ﬁrst

question? Europe has maintained its peculiarities so far in spite of domestic and

international troubles. The diffusion of social justice as a value inﬂuencing the

social actors and the various national party systems, and, the relatively well

developed welfare states demonstrate resilience and continue to shape the wider

EU in characteristic ways. Moreover, the European Union is a speciﬁc set of

intergovernmental and supranational institutions, a process of systemic integration,

a ‘social mega-network’, a normative area, and at least partly governed by European

law and common rules. It includes relatively binding human rights protection, and

inspiring concentric organizations like the EU, the Council of Europe and the

OSCE. A consistent set of common values regarding science and society (including

control of genetic manipulation, the defense of human beings against the death

sentence, and so on) is surviving globalization. Lastly, as a result of the acquis

communautaire and the dynamics of European integration the ‘EU is perceived

in the world as one bloc and attracting many neighbour countries to apply for

membership and to accept long and hard training to achieve it’.

Of course, such a socio-economic model is challenged: it is currently facing a

double erosion, both from inside (unemployment and huge demographic change) and

from outside (competitiveness, immigration ﬂows and so on). The future European

socio-economic diversity in the 21st century cannot be the same as in the second

half of the 20th century, when Western European states were able to adjust to a

less developed economic internationalization by high-performing national welfare

states, Keynesianism, ‘Rhenan capitalism’

and functional regional integration.

Even in defending the past achievements, Europe has to be more proactive within

the international arena. The huge pressure towards economic convergence and the

technological, ﬁnancial and trade trends are challenging European regionalism to

combine competitiveness, technological innovation, economic reforms and social

cohesion in new terms. By new terms, we mean more research, more investment

in human resources, growth policy, and also new methodologies of vertical and

horizontal coordination and coherence among member states, going beyond the

old federalism–confederalism debate. A concrete example of new regionalism with

a strategic vision and innovation policy, including concrete benchmarking and

monitoring, has been offered by the ‘Lisbon ten years program’ started in 2000.

The results are controversial, positive in northern Europe, limited in southern. Larger

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states resist to deeper regional coordination. However, awareness of lagging behind

in the area of international competitiveness might break up the institutional inertia

of Europe and of the member states pushing them to start a new era, with a new

strategic concept giving a soul to new European Regionalism. Every regional entity

is challenged by the building up of knowledge societies, while variously combined

with development programs. Europe already is providing references and inputs

to other regional paths by its experience and sophisticated modes of governance

of national diversities (for example the ‘open method of coordination’). Further

coordination and deeper integration does not mean building a European state, and

setting up a protectionist trade policy either. New forms of European governance

on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the process of soft institutionalization of

other regional entities is making two-ways communication easier than in the past.

Indeed, the troubles and tensions of global multilateral regulation show that

new regionalism, if conceived as a mere assertiveness of regional interests against

other regions and powers, would not be a responsible provider of the rare ‘public

good’ of world governance. By its very existence, the EU, up to now, moderates

both wild liberal and protectionist member state’s policies, but its ability to cope

with growing protectionist demands is an open question.

Mutatis mutandis, the

same uncertainty exists for MERCOSUR, ASEAN and other regional entities. Our

insight is that the future of ‘Europe as a Scandinavia of the World’, strictly depends

on the necessary pre-condition that EU and other regional entities could provide

the background for a new multilateralism at a global level.

To what extent do similarities between EU and other regional entities have to

do with the concept of power? According to Göran Therborn, it is more realistic

to talk about inﬂuence. Neither the marginalization of Europe nor the building

of a superpower Europe, are very realistic, while its inﬂuence as a policy model

is much more likely to be diffused inwards and outwards: ‘a model is taken as

inﬂuential only to the extent that other people choose to regard it as such’. Rather

than a civilian power, he speaks about a civilian ‘inﬂuence’, namely of a particular

interest in social experimentation and in universalistic social norms as Scandinavian

countries have already demonstrated through their past action in the framework

of the UN (‘Bruntland Commission’, ‘Palme Commission’, ‘Global Governance

Commission’).

Let us moderate our agreement with some step forwards. The inﬂuence of national

social and political cultures is an essential part of the European international socio-

economic identity, including shared values and varying practices. However, the

common institutions are more and more salient in reviving and spreading out such

a legacy than in the past. Without strengthening its decision-making process and

institutional capabilities and further developing towards a new path as a civilian

power, ‘Scandinavian Europe’ would risk falling into a Volterian ‘Candide’ Europe

scenario, a victim of hard economic competition and political threats. Even worse,

is the case of other regional entities who risk becoming marginal.

What do we mean by a more proactive and regulatory regionalism and, as a

vanguard, a new civilian power Europe? We have already stressed the importance

of the political global changes occurred in 1989 and 2001. They are challenging

regional entities, and namely the EU, to step forwards from external inﬂuence to

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international power, from mere regional governance to an active role in shaping

a rule-based multilateral world order. If regional actors, and namely Europe, as

international entity have not the means ﬁt to strengthen regional governance and

shape the surrounding economic and political environment, malevolent actors,

middle or great powers, will marginalize or even break up their values and

interests.

Reassessing the relationship to USA within a more balanced and multilevel,

multilateral framework is a crucial issue at stake, not only for Europe, but also for

every regional entity. Respectively Vasconcelos, Söderbaum, Hettne and Higgott

show how relevant the critical relationship to US in the three continents is for the

political future of regional cooperation. In Europe, at the end of the bipolar world

and particularly after 9/11 (informal terrorism) and the US New Security Strategy,

neither founding member states of the EC nor Scandinavian and neutral states,

can be satisﬁed living any longer (explicitly or not) in the shadow of the security

provision offered by the traditional transatlantic relationship within a NATO in

identity crisis. To become a classical political and military power with centralized

leadership is not an option for the EU, nor for regional groupings. However,

no doubts that (whatever the destiny of the Constitutional Treaty might be) the

European agenda already entails strengthening of common institutions, improving

the coherence of external relations, pushing peace-keeping and peace-enforcing

missions in the near abroad and beyond, preventing trade wars, settling North–

South relations, and defending common strategic interests. Pursuing such ambitious

objectives as an isolated regional entity without strategic allies and dynamic and

genuine interregional partnerships would be futile.

What concept can we use to describe such a new civilian, militarily limited,

soft, responsible, democratic, long-term oriented, economic and political power?

Both the member states and the EC/EU have already made some important steps

forwards with their foreign policies in terms of conceiving and implementing a

European international presence and role. It was the next best option, given the

impossibility of becoming a traditional actor of power politics. According to the

international scientiﬁc literature, the concept of ‘structural foreign policy’

is able

to describe such a strategic and practical evolution. A ‘structural foreign policy’

affects particularly the economic and social structures of partners (states, regions,

economic actors, international organizations, and so on) and it is implemented

through paciﬁc and original means (diplomatic relations, agreements, sanctions

and so on),

and its scope is not conjunctural, but rather, middle of the road and

long range. However, the concept of ‘structural foreign policy’ should be deepened

beyond its empirical side.

When speaking of structural power and structural policy within international

relations theory, the main references are of the ‘structural’ new realism developed

by Kenneth Waltz

and the concept developed within the international political

economy. Contrary to Marxist thought, according to Waltz the word structural is

not synonymous with economics opposed to the superstructural dimension, namely

politics and culture. By ‘structure’ he means the political perennial structure of the

international system. This structure is anarchical, centrifugal, and non-hierarchical.

The deﬁnition of structural foreign policy should focus on the ability of an

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international unit to support, even gradually and partially, the changes brought

about in such a structural feature of the international system through cooperation

among states. The very existence of the EU, making war between former enemies

impossible, is already the best example of ‘internal’ structural foreign policy. The

relationship between Brazil and Argentina, between South Africa and neighbouring

countries, and between Vietnam and some ASEAN member states, as well, are

salient in this respect. This is particularly noteworthy if compared with the India–

Pakistan conﬂict, which has put a stop to regionalism in Southern Asia because of

the resilience of great states and of nationalism elsewhere in Asia. We can propose

indeed the concept of ‘cooperative power’, able to prevent conﬂict and diminish

security dilemmas, beyond a competitive international game.

Our general forecast is that, in the 21st century, new regionalism will not only

remain a multidimensional feature of the fragile global system, but increase in

political relevance. Of course we don’t underestimate failures, as the chapter on

Mediterranean well shows. The comparative analysis of the regional variations

brings us to the conclusion that ‘a structural policy’ by the EU and by regional

entities cannot succeed if it only occurs top-down: it can be successful only when

and if deep domestic endogenous bottom-up trends exist within the region limiting

anarchy among states. Only when successful regional arrangements emerge

limiting the anarchical structure of the regional/global system can the interregional

relationship help to further reduce fragmentation and conﬂicts and strengthen

cooperation.

Our critical approach to Waltz new realism beneﬁts from an established

theoretical background. Regional cooperation studies beneﬁt from the

extraordinary development of the transnational complex interdependence theories

and new institutionalism for more than thirty years. The concepts of regional

institution and of civilian power would be inconceivable without the theoretical

background of the critical analysis of neo-realism developed within the American

and international political science ﬁeld in the 1970s and 1980s.

Secondly, as an

example of ‘international regimes’, regional arrangements establish various sets

of common rules and procedures, providing mutual information and expectations

among member states. This makes transnational interest coalitions easier, limiting

uncertainty and security dilemmas. Even candidates for membership are inﬂuenced

by the club’s internal rules as far as their preferences are concerned. Thirdly, the

growing network of multiple, informal and formalized, decentralized systems

of governance do correct substantially the neorealistic, state-centered vision of

a structural anarchy. Even the current deﬁcit of world government, typical of a

post-hegemonic era, does not necessarily revive the tendency towards anarchy,

fragmentation and mere power politics. Our conclusion is that both the multiple

functional networks and also the new regional territorial entities are providing a

third level of governance, between local and national fragmentation on the one

hand and, on the other, the global level, dominated by declining concentration of

political and economic authority by the US.

The key issue at stake is the bridge between regional and global governance.

Without being a ‘model’, the European experience appears to be relevant not

only as partial governance of globalization and regulation of national diversities,

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but also because of its impact on international rules, other regional cooperation

arrangements and global multilateralism. That can work only if Europe is not

perceived as a ‘post-national constellation’, a ‘post-Westphalian’ or ‘post-modern’

entity, an island of peace, democracy and prosperity opposed to the rest of the world.

Regional associations and regime, including the EU are nothing more than parts of a

gradual process of revision of the classical state-centered Westphalian system. Take

the example of the EU. Its main instrument is ‘structural foreign policy’ , which can

be, at least to a certain extent, interpreted as an export of the internal multilateral

experience, setting peaceful political relations through economic interdependence.

That is shown by means of external relations (economic agreements and sanctions,

partnership with developing countries, and so on) and particularly by the so-called

bilateral and interregional ‘pactomania’, spreading out cooperation agreements

over the world. Post-war reconstruction, and in general the so called ‘Petersberg

tasks’, are an essential element of this European international assertiveness.

This book takes into account critical views of European ‘conditional’ bilateral

relations, underlining their possible evolution towards a new hegemonic sphere

of inﬂuence opposed to others and reviving the theories of growing dependency

centre-periphery. Our comparative research on regional groupings in Africa, Asia

and America proves that external support to regional arrangements by the EU can

be successful only if domestic pressures, coming from economic and political

orientations within the partner member states, are autonomously pushing towards

regional cooperation. It fails because of asymmetrical balance between internal

and external factors.

In conclusion, structural foreign policies are efﬁcient only if

they interact with deep endogenous trends and set two-ways partnerships. Quoting

Machiavelli, ‘virtus’ is efﬁcient only if combined with ‘fortuna’: proactive policies

need a favourable objective context.

The international political economy provides a second concept of ‘structural

power’ opposed to the traditional realistic notion of ‘relational power’. According

to S. Strange, the structural powers are increasingly able to shape the hierarchies

of the globalized world. They are indirectly condition the actors’ way of acting,

by changing the conditions of their behaviour and without forcing them to do

something. With the end of the bipolar world, the security structural power is

declining while the economic, ﬁnancial and knowledge-based structural powers

are enhancing their role in changing the international economy and affecting world

politics.

If accepted, this international political economy approach recommends

paying much more attention to the decline of the EC/EU in terms of ICT and the

knowledge society than to its capacity gap in terms of military power. A regional

organization, leader of the international trade and no longer disadvantaged as far as

the technologies of knowledge are concerned, would maybe be able of balancing

its minor defence power. Our second conclusion is that, within the new framework

of evolving structural power, the realistic argument (mentioned among others by H.

Bull in the 1980s), opposing the ‘contradictory in terms’ concept of civilian power

to a European classical kind of military power is no longer as conclusive as during

the Cold War. However, Bull is perfectly right in emphasizing Europe’s need to

develop an international actorhood ‘compatible with the dignity of nations with the

wealth, skills and historical position of those of Western Europe’. However, the huge