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Euros in 2006) and share of global trade (about 20 per cent). To what extent does a

regional kind of power entail several distinctive features as far as both the internal

governance and the contribution to external governance are concerned? To what

extent are its cooperative nature, support of regionalism elsewhere and setting of

inter-regional regimes, able to change the surrounding and global system, beyond

the anarchy, unipolarism and classical sphere of inﬂuence Realpolitik?

2 EU as an international actor in the making?

The self-consciousness of the EC/EU as a proactive region of the world and its

inter-regional cooperation are essential elements in understanding it as a new

international actor. To deepen the theoretical implications of this crucial topic, we

ﬁrstly need to focus on the empirical side of the evolving interaction between the

economic and political dimensions of EC/EU external relations.

2.1 The EC/EU as a global economic actor

Even in the difﬁcult times of the bipolar world, the European Community was

considered as a highly signiﬁcant example of the inadequacy of a state-centric

paradigm, the declining role of force and the growing importance of transnational

interdependence.

The famous K.Deutsch deﬁnition of an ‘amalgamated security

community’

or area of peace, is a concrete consequence of intense regional

integration at economic and social levels according to the J. Monnet model, or of a

successful ‘internal foreign policy’, in Habermas’ words. The very ﬁrst deﬁnition

of Europe as a ‘civilian power’ has such a theoretical background. Tocqueville

already categorized trade policy as foreign policy. The Common Trade Policy is the

core of external economic relations.

In a few decades, the European Community

became an economic and trade power with growing inﬂuence. It was the ﬁrst trade

power since 1996, a net exporter of products to the so-called emerging economies

and was the ﬁrst foreign investor and aid provider. European states are no longer the

predominant economic powers they used to be pre-Second World War, however,

four members of the G8 are European and, similar to the US, European Union

constitutes one-ﬁfth of the world’s economy.

It would be wrong to speak of the strength of individual Western European

countries: such an enhanced global economic weight is largely the consequence of

a successful regional integration process. Since the Single European Act and the

Maastricht Treaty, the EC/EU is becoming even more proactive as a multilateral

international entity. In ﬁfteen years, the Community and Union have created both

on bilateral and increasingly on region-to-region bases, an important network of

institutionalized international agreements. Europe acts either as a supranational unit

(as it does within the WTO and international and interregional trade arrangements)

or by cooperation and coordination among member states.

Summing up, whatever our critical evaluation of their differentiated impact

might be, several crucial ‘post-Westphalian’ tendencies have to be stressed as far as

the external relations of EC/EU are concerned: the successful enlargement process

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and the association pacts and bi-regional agreements often explicitly supporting

regional cooperation among partners. For example, the ACP Convention and the

regional arrangements in Africa, the bi-regional agreements with MERCOSUR and

other Latin American groupings, the ASEM process, the association agreements

with Eastern European countries and the Mediterranean process, illustrate (with

various degrees of success) an EC/EU strategic preference for region-to-region

cooperation, even if often mixed to bilateral conditionality. Secondly, many

international and domestic factors result in the border between economic and

political dimensions of regional cooperation, no longer constituting a ‘Chinese

wall’. For example, the external representation and implications of the single

currency are highly sensitive political issues, despite depending on the ﬁrst pillar.

The political impact of trade disputes and negotiations, particularly, the various

difﬁcult challenges related to the Uruguay Round, the Millennium Round, the

Doha Round of the WTO were also a feature of this ‘politization’ of civilian issues.

The political dimension of economic and trade external relations are becoming

clear, and the realistic classic criticism of the European economic and trade power,

as a mere part of the bipolar balance of power, was eventually questioned after the

Cold War. To what extent is the scepticism expressed, by R. Gilpin among others,

regarding, on the one hand, the huge dependency of EC regional integration on the

‘pax Americana’ (that is, on US hegemony), and on the other hand, the primacy of

states, still a satisfying explanation?

2.2 The Common Foreign and Security Policy

We are witnessing a spectacular evolution, spanning from the low proﬁle of the very

ﬁrst decades after the Second World War, to the years after the end of the bipolar

world. The growing expectations by third parties and the very ambitious self-

deﬁning aspirations asserted by the Treaty of European Union (TEU, Maastricht,

1992) are particularly signiﬁcant in the next evolution. Recalling brieﬂy the history

of political cooperation may be helpful in better understanding its signiﬁcance and

limits.

After the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954, and the rejection

of the 1961 ‘Fouchet Plans’, the political dimension became a taboo. A step in a

new direction was the Summit of The Hague in 1969, the ﬁrst summit of the ‘post

de Gaulle era’ and of the new ‘Brandt era’. The six Heads of State and government

called at that time for ‘a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in

the world of tomorrow’. The ﬁrst declaration for political cooperation came in the

next Luxembourg Summit and, already by 1973; the Nine established the EPC

(European Political Cooperation) and a principle of consultation among member

states before taking political foreign policy decisions. Even if ineffective, the 1978

‘Venice Declaration’ on the Israeli–Arab conﬂict was the most famous example of

this new activism and of the emergence of a partial disengagement from the previous

identiﬁcation to the American policy.

The 1981 ‘London Report’, which associated

the European Commission with the EPC process, replacing cooperation with joint

action as an EPC main goal, and also the Single European Act of 1986, which

institutionalized the ECP in the framework of the Treaty and partially associated

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300

the European Parliament to the process, were the next signiﬁcant steps taken by the

EPC. The EC identiﬁed nine areas in which European political cooperation could

be developed: CSCE, Council of Europe, East–West, Cyprus, Middle East, Africa

(South Africa and the Great Lakes), Latin America and the USA.

In the new international context, characterized by the declining power of Russia

and by the increase in the weight of the uniﬁed Germany, the 1989 Franco-German

initiative was historically important, even if not as yet sufﬁcient to achieve a

political union in Europe. The preference by new Germany for deepening European

cooperation, instead of asserting its new national identity, has been the crucial

background for any further development and, in general, the tendencies towards a

‘renationalization of foreign policy’ have been contained.

However, Maastricht’s

dual decision to create a monetary and political union (including a common security

policy) was unable to correct the internal asymmetry of the integration process,

namely the gap between the huge international weight of the EC, as an economic

and commercial world player, and its political role.

Indeed the objectives set by the Treaty of Maastricht, establishing the so-

called ‘second pillar’ (Common Foreign and Security Policy), independent from

the European Community procedures but belonging to the same house,

the new

European Union, emerged difﬁcult to implement. The Lisbon European Council

(1992) was a move in the evolution towards a settlement of concrete common

priorities.

The European Councils of Essen (1994), and particularly after the Saint

Malo meeting (Chirac-Blair) the ones in Cologne and Helsinki (1999) inﬂuenced

the development of the so called European common defence policy. However,

the balance of the achievements of the ﬁrst years of CFSP and ECDP is widely

considered modest by international literature. The pan-European and enlargement

policies are more successful, as far as the pre-membership association agreements

are concerned, than regarding partnership with neighbouring countries so far.

By contrast, the Mediterranean dialogue is very problematic. European policies

during the 1990s regarding civilian wars and tragedies in the former Yugoslavia are

considered a ‘Debutante Performance’.

As regards the global action, the ASEM process stated in 1996, the framework

cooperation agreement with MERCOSUR, the bi-regional process started in 1999

in Rio and the new ACP Conventions have a double meaning. They give an initial

answer to external expectations for an expanding and global role for the EU and

they push the EU beyond the traditional trade dimension or cooperation policy.

Political dialogue with the near abroad, and with Asia, Latin America and Africa

increase European responsibilities in stabilizing world politics after the end of the

Cold War. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the previous large gap between

stated aims and economic power on the one hand and, on the other, political actions,

operational abilities and diplomatic representation has truly been overcome.

far as common foreign and security policy is concerned, even if the Amsterdam

Treaty increased visibility and allowed a more ﬂexible decision-making process,

the procedure still included, even in the Nice treaty, a veto right.

As a consequence,

very contradictory facts characterize the beginning of the new century. On one

side there exists the conﬁrmed political and technological dependency of Europe

on American leadership regarding the revival of ‘power politics’ (Kosovo war,

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301

Iraqi war) and the reluctance of European states and peoples to provide for their

military security. On the other side, the practice of collaboration, the institutional

spillover and the willingness of several member states and of EU institutions to

react collectively to external challenges, is making both external expectations and

the European international role, stronger then ever before, even in the controversial

and dangerous context following 2001( informal international terrorism and New

US Security Strategy, 2002).

When analyzing the described mix of discontinuity and continuity in a global

assessment of the EU external relations and actions, one should mention two

main points. The ﬁrst is the increasingly extended multidimensional presence of

both the Union and member states worldwide after the end of the Cold War,

and secondly, the more ‘active identity’ of the EU.

The EU is the second global

player and is considered thus by third parties. No doubt that since the end of the

Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, European regional association is less

dependent than previously on American security strategy and threat perceptions.

Most of the chapters printed here underline such a discontinuity and, in particular,

the importance of the inter-regional dialogue in the new institutional framework

and international environment. Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, the EC was an

economic entity with initial political impact, playing a minor international role.

The European states were under the umbrella of American multilateral hegemony.

In the new international environment, however, the will of member states to cope

more efﬁciently with external opportunities and responsibilities and also with the

internal spillovers of the EC/EU process allow one to speak of a new European

regionalism. That does not only refer to deepening integration policies but also to

giving an active contribution – as a single entity and not only as a sum of member

states – to ﬁltering and shaping international economic and political relations.

3 Beyond the idealist concept of ‘civilian power Europe’

The concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ is reoccurring, though with multiple

meanings. One is a euphemism, a synonym of semi-sovereign power. Indeed, every

observer notices that, if confronted with a revival of power politics (for example,

the. Kosovo and Iraqi war), the EU remains under the American shadow or shows

internal rifts. Despite the end of the Cold War and the EC/EU success story (Single

Market and Monetary Union), the so-called ‘French way’ to international power

prescribed by H. Bull in the early 1980s, still seems beyond European capabilities.

Bull described it as a notion of European political power ‘comparable with the

dignity of nations with the wealth, skills and historical position of those of Western

Europe’. What is behind the reluctance of many European states and citizens to

devote a part of their wealth in order to provide for their security? Firstly, different

national visions, as far as the future of Europe in the world and as far as the

relationships with the US are concerned,

play a role. Secondly, controversies

surrounding the institutional form of Europe as a political power can also explain

this reluctance: for many, enhanced supranational unity would be a weakness and

not a strength in defence policy. Moreover, the current system of a rotating Council

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Presidency is structurally weak because it is temporary, part-time, and is not as

yet based on any diplomatic apparatus. Finally, as far as the internal feedback is

concerned, the further external relations are extended, the more it is causing a huge

coordination difﬁculty among the various dimensions of external relations (trade,

cooperation policy, foreign policy, external implications of internal security, and so

on) due to the pillar structure and the lacking coherence.

However, the concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ is richer in nuances than the

narrow notion of semi-sovereign power. There are two good reasons for dwelling

on the analysis provided by F. Duchêne and R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye during

the Cold War. The European Community had already been deﬁned as more than a

mere economic power but not as ‘a superpower in the making’, by J. Galtung, in

1973. François Duchêne focused his pioneering notion of ‘civilian power Europe’

both on its internal and external roles of civilizing and domesticating relations

between member states and also on spreading civilian and democratic standards. He

wrote, ‘this means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common

responsibility and structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past

associated exclusively with ‘home’ and not foreign, that is alien, affairs’.

In spite of

the limits set by the bipolar world, the EC started to become an international entity,

without any military dimension by focusing on norm setting. However, it was also

able to exercise its inﬂuence on states, international and regional organizations,

multinational corporations and other transnational bodies through a wide variety

of diplomatic, economic and legal instruments. Furthermore, the aforementioned

international relations scholars have studied the EC, emphasizing the external

implications of its internal successful integration process. It has particularly been

stressed that the concepts of power and of foreign policy are no longer as clearly

deﬁned as in the past and also that the traditional distinction between political

and economic dimensions and between high and low politics are becoming quite

obsolete, even within international relations theories.

The famous 1989 letter by Kohl and Mitterrand proposing to the twelve to

strengthen the European political dimension, in order to be able to cope with the new

post-Cold War challenges and the Maastricht decision to create both a Monetary

and Political Union, are symbolic of the EC/EU opportunity to tremendously

increase its presence and to strengthen its international identity.

The external

acknowledgements and expectations are helpful in so far as the EU institutions

are seeking international and inter-regional agreements, with the aim of enhancing

both the EU’s visibility and internal legitimacy.

What about the terminus ad quem of such an evolution? According to a large

part of the literature, the EU is becoming a global actor.

‘Actorhood’ raises the

question of the criteria of the actor’s capability, in comparison with the model of

the nation state and, more particularly, with the US: a community of interests, a

decision-making system, an independent system for crisis management, a system

of policy implementation, external communication channels and representation,

an appropriated amount of common resources. To what extent has the EC/EU

achieved a satisfactory degree of actorhood in the main areas of external relations?

The previous type of semi-sovereign civilian power was able to cope as a second

range power with the bipolar world, however there is no evidence that an enlarged

EU, can, cope with the globalized and uncertain world of the twenty-ﬁrst century.

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Thirdly, there is a crucial theoretical problem: how and to what extent can a

regional ‘civilian power’ evolve towards a more open political dimension without

following the classical French pattern of ‘Europe puissance’, which was over-

illustrated by H. Bull? It is not sufﬁciently clear what a non-state-like political

Union can be, in terms of power deﬁnition. What kind of political and military

capacity is necessary to overcome the current, already mentioned, picture of a

‘Candide’ Europe and to act effectively as a more independent actor facing the new

global and regional threats?

This volume focuses on the institutional variables: namely the evolving revision

of the Treaties. The delicate topic of security policy, the ‘Petersberg tasks’, included

within the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the programme to build a military capacity

approved in 1999 and the provisions for an ‘enhanced cooperation’ in the treaty

of Nice (2000) represent modest but concrete innovations. This applies even if

their implementation in the case of regional crises is far from evident and even if,

ultimately, such an evolving European international identity is not as yet at the level

of a fully achieved, coherent, reliable, credible international political power.

The institutional dimension of external relations deserves an increasing place

within international scientiﬁc literature. The EU’s legal status is still unclear

because the member states have not yet provided the status of an independent

subject of international law, while in contrast the legal status granted to the EC and

the Constitutional Treaty is not yet ratiﬁed.

But the most important point is that

the decision-making process and implementation of foreign policy and external

relations are particularly affected by the lack of centralization, which causes

incoherence and inconsistency among the three pillars of the existing Treaty. There

are actually three external relations systems: the EC, highly centralized (trade

policy) the second and third intergovernmental pillars and ﬁnally the member

states foreign policies, where decentralization makes the decision making a two

level game (national and supranational). Notwithstanding the wishes of the article

3, two centres of decisions ( Council and Commission) are diminishing the EU/

EC external efﬁciency. Europe lacks hierarchical, centripetal, legitimized decision

making, including – even if of course unlike the so-called ‘Imperial Presidency’ of

the USA – a stable, full-time, legitimized central Council and European Council

presidency.

This would constitute a realistic centralization in difﬁcult political

matters, balancing the internal polyarchy and the fragmentation of multilevel

actors taking part in the decision and implementation processes. As T. J. Lowy

pointed out, in the USA crucial foreign political issues, fragmented governance and

polyarchy are centralized, better and clearly substituted by decisions of the uniﬁed

élites

while, on minor issues, decisions and implementation are taken according

to the fragmented or polyarchic pattern. What about the EU way?

The Constitutional treaty (2004) provides original solutions combining

decentralized European multilevel governance with centripetal tendencies. The

reformed European institutions, particularly the new Foreign Minister supervising

both the European Commission and the European Council external competences,

would support coordinated decisions and actions. This reform will be on the next

agenda, whatever the destiny of the Constitutional treaty will be. Furthermore,

the national Ministries’ so-called Europeanization process, namely the routine of

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304

working jointly with fourteen partners and of regularly taking their points of view

and interests into account when formulating national preferences, substantially

changed thousands of high-ranking civil servants’ vision and practice, especially

those who attended the various specialized Councils of Ministers. It is provoking

to a certain extent a dynamics of institutionalization of the Brussels regimes, a

feeling of common identity, of shared values and aims.

Beside any teleological

illusion, how to explain almost sixty years of progress, high citizen expectation and

also some very ambitious statements and some steps accomplished even by Euro-

sceptic member states?

However, the growing international role of the EU and its

relations with other regions of the world is not only explained through the positive

sum play within the Council but also by the converging dynamics of interests,

values and institutions.

The current institutional evolution needs to be correctly interpreted. On the

one hand, the European Union is not a state in the making. The causes of the still

highly decentralized polity are of structural nature. Firstly, they are to be found in

the heterogeneous national interests and different visions of the Union’s future,

as shown by the routinized bargaining between the supporters of an increased

internal consistency and the defenders of the symbols and practices of national

sovereignties.

Secondly, they are to be found in the overlapping and conﬂicting

competencies, the internal pluralism and lobbying, the lack of hierarchies, the

continuous negotiation among different levels and various bodies, the two poles of

external relations (Council and Commission) and the multidimensional structure

as far as European Commission external relations are concerned (divided among

many DGs), which inevitably hinder the EU’s ability to decide and to act as a

state.

On the other hand, inter-governmentalist approaches underestimate the

centripetal spillover provoked by converging interests and common policies, as

far as the ﬁrst pillar and EMU are concerned. They also underestimate the impact

of institutions on state’s behaviour: the simple fact that thousands of national civil

servants and representatives of ministries have been accustomed, through routine

cooperation of many decades, to paying fundamental and continuous attention to the

EU-partners by stating positions and agendas has changed their national preferences.

However, contrary to the federalist hopes, the second global player is not a state,

neither is it a republic of republics, nor a unique and coherent political actor. It is

instead a regional polity, an original institutional construction. The Constitutional

Treaty would not fundamentally change this feature: it would, however, put an

end to the most evident deﬁcits in terms of external consistency and coherence:

that the EU has no E. Council President, no single and hierarchical diplomatic

body and no single Minister of Foreign Affairs; ﬁnally it would change the current

lack of loyalty among states and between them and the EU: despite the fact that

participating in the European common policy strengthens the international weight

of the member states, the simple coordination of national foreign policies within

international organizations as the UN and conferences sometimes happens.

Our theoretical conclusion is that institutions fundamentally matter when

dealing with regional civilian powers. Changes in rules and legal settlements might

induce changes in the policies and behaviour of member states. They also largely

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305

explain, the strength and the weakness of ﬁfty years’ achievements, the sui generis

nature of the EU, as a special kind of international actor, a ‘strange power’. All

in all, the EU contrasts with a classical state and particularly with a superpower,

which gathers both soft inﬂuence and hard power, namely the means to implement

its aims in different ﬁelds: ideology, politics, economics, ﬁnance, military ﬁeld,

nuclear technology. But regional integration is already so deeply advanced that

the rescued European nation state does not have very much in common with the

sovereign state of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century and very little option than

underpinning the established regional polity.

4 New regionalism and multilateralism: three scenarios

The following three scenarios are based on different interconnections between

EU, new regionalism and globalization. To conclude the present introduction by

drawing scenarios seems to be a realistic way of expressing the uncertainty of the

current developments both of the European Union and of the international system.

This avoids ‘would be thinking’, that is challenging in a trivial way Europe as it

is, as opposed to Europe as it should be, or presenting black/white pictures of the

present debate between alternative options. The evolving international role and

identity of the EC/EU are not analysed as the world’s centre, but as a still salient

aspect of evolving global trends.

4.1 Back from political regionalism to regionalization within a globalized

economy?

This book does not trust that the over-simpliﬁed image (paradoxically proposed

both by ‘apocalyptic’ and ‘integrated’ visions) of Europe as ‘a mere free trade area’

is a realistic option. The ﬁrst scenario rather shows an apparent continuity with

the existing low proﬁle ‘civilian power’, however, under the condition of a stop in

the deepening process of regional integration. In parallel, the already-decided or

planned Eastern and Mediterranean enlargements of the EC/EU are creating a new

geopolitical reality. There are two versions of this scenario. In the most optimistic

hypothesis, the EU is conceived as diffusing the historical beneﬁts of the European

construction (peace, stability, democracy and prosperity) on a continental scale

and in the near abroad. In the worst hypothesis, this ‘Candide Europe scenario’

would be ﬁrstly shacked by the international security troubles. Secondly, given

the widened economic gap between the many parts of Europe, the huge ﬁnancial,

social, political and cultural challenge linked to enlargement and the uncertainties

regarding the Eastern border, the traditional positive trade-off between widening

and deepening of the EC/EU would be interrupted. In case of further institutional

inertia a major economic and political decline of political actorness and an

increasingly overlapping and fragmented European polity.

Let’s examine this scenario in more detail, regarding the other features of

the EC/EU and their external role: EMU could either fail because of a lack of

political authority, or it could survive. However, it would be very doubtful that the

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Economic Monetary Union would do more than stabilize the economies of member

states and prevent internal disintegration. The Single European Market would be

largely diluted as a part of a continental and Mediterranean free trade area and

within worldwide liberalization. The acquis communautaire would not disappear

but would certainly be faced with gradual erosion. The ‘Brussels model’ of deep

regionalism would be downgraded, by withdrawing to a special kind of regional

grouping within American economic and political globalism.

What do we mean by a new, overlapping and fragmented European polity?

According to the ‘new-Medievalist’ school of thought the European Union would

only become a diplomatic coordination of apparently ‘sovereign’ nation states,

occupying territorial spaces but no longer controlling what goes on in those

spaces.

The political authority lost by nation states would not be centralized at

supranational level but would mainly shift elsewhere, towards public and private

bodies. Within European Studies, an important school of thought emerges, analyzing

the consequences of the possible blockade of the dynamics of political integration.

For an European polity, as a non-hierarchical, centrifugal, variegating, overlapping

set of policies, including increasing problems of democratic legitimacy, the concept

of ‘condominio’ – a complex mix of functional and territorial constituencies and

forms of governance remains relevant.

According to other observers a maintained

intergovernmental cooperation including common rules and procedures, mutual

expectations among partners could continue with a two-level game.

While the

national level would rather be a voluntarist framework than a shell, really protecting

what happens inside, the intergovernmental cooperation would be more like a mere

set of international regimes, than a political community.

Regarding the socio-economic contents of such a weak European polity, two

versions have been outlined. For this European-rich corner of the world, the present

book offers on the one hand, a relatively optimistic view: should a certain degree

of territorial stabilization of such a new multilevel polity be possible, it would

partly be comparable with the semi-sovereign Bonn Federal Germany of 1949–90.

Europe could keep its international image of being a relatively ecologically and

socially conscious continent, but politically divided and militarily weak. Such a

heavyweight entity within the international economy, rich in speciﬁcity, would be

challenged because of international competitiveness and of demographic changes

(immigration ﬂows and free movement of people, not only as a consequence of

eastern enlargement). However, it is true that these latter threats are frequently

overestimated by protectionists. According to several longue durée observers,

for instance, Göran Therborn, ‘there is no evidence of European marginalization

either pending or current’, in spite of the broadly diffused visions of an ‘inexorable

struggle’ for world competitiveness and market. Under this condition, in spite of

eastern and southern enlargement and globalization, Europe will continue to play

an inﬂuence-role in the world.

On the other hand, less optimistic comments emphasize that the ‘Bonn-GFR

type’ Europe, in order to maintain social integration and a prosperous economy,

would require a sharp competitive edge to survive within the global economy. Most

observers agree that this scenario would necessarily diminish, on a global level,

the proﬁle of the EC/EU as an economic and trade giant and its ambitions not only

European Union, Regionalism, New Multilateralism: Three Scenarios

307

as a European power but also as a European inﬂuence is concerned. Somehow

such a timid Europe would go back to the kind of regionalism, typical of the ﬁrst

decades of European integration. To mention the Federal Republic of Germany,

which existed in the decades before German unity, reminds one of the famous

picture of an economic giant and half-sovereign political dwarf. According to R.N.

Rosencrance, the ‘trading state’ is a political system where economic growth has

no relevant implications, as far as political power is concerned, because the latter

remains ﬁrmly monopolized in the hands of the leading power of the alliance.

All in all, the weight of US and emerging powers could make of Europe the victim

of globalization.

The current main supporters of this evolution are economic networks,

transnational coalitions of social interests, not only in the US, but in many European

countries, and more precisely in the United Kingdom and in the new member states.

A way towards this scenario could also be a hierarchical version of a strengthened

transatlantic inter-regional entity, including the EC/EU and the sole remaining

superpower. Of course, the trade disputes, political obstacles, the failure of the

American transatlantic project for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998)

and the troubles of similar most recent initiatives, show the huge problems existing

between and within European states on this asymmetrical perspective, particularly

after the troubles of the Doha Round.

What about its implication for new regionalism worldwide? At the end of the

twentieth century, a ‘European continental trading state’ looked to be a potential

part of a general trend: within the globalist strategy of ‘emerging markets’, creating

free trade mega-arrangements between US and Latin America, FTAA; between

US and Asia-Paciﬁc, APEC with EU, a stronger NTA. Such an evolution of the

EC/EU would probably have important implications for other regions of the world,

putting a stop to European support of the developments for deeper regionalism in

Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to Vasconcelos: ‘If Europe were only a

trading region, then MERCOSUR would be reduced to a “backyard” of the United

States’. Would it be the same for every regional association? Hettne’s chapter

provides relevant inputs on that issue. Every country and region would only have

the choice between adjustment of national economies to the imperatives of global

markets and catastrophic isolation. Nationalistic or fundamentalist movements,

as a reaction to globalization imperatives, are likely to arise somewhere in the

world, since these movements would no longer have a regional alternative, as a

framework for setting a more gradual and compromising cooperative process. Less

would be done against the current marginalization of the poorest countries, which

would lose bargaining edges, allied within international organizations. In 2006, the

limits of US power and trade strategy both at global and inter-regional levels and

the declining interest of US in global governance are clearer and this scenario looks

more controversial.

In conclusion, this scenario is relevant as far as economic and political research is

concerned. However, something would be amiss, if we go on by variously combining

‘New Medievalist’ theories with US-imperialist theories, in spite of changes and

failures. The twenty-ﬁrst century starts by showing how controversial is the idea

that the globalized international system would be increasingly characterized by

Telo M. European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era

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