7
PowerAce is the name of their agent-based simulation model.
Two reasons can be advanced to explain the discrepancy: first
the authors averaged sets of 50 simulations, which effectively
smoothe out any peaks and troughs. More importantly, as
Sensfuss et al. [15] noted, most electricity is traded via
bilateral contracts (i.e., OTC) rather than through organized
markets. For example, in France about 10% of the power
consumed is traded via the day-ahead market. In fact,
producers and major consumers do not wait until the day
before delivery to start the process of buying and selling
electricity. They spread their transactions over time by using
futures markets and financial derivatives. For example,
buyers often purchase part of their requirements months
ahead of time through the futures and forward markets, and
then as the delivery date approaches, they make adjustments
by purchasing more or selling off unwanted power through
the day-ahead market. Last-minute adjustments are made
through the intra-day market. So the key question is whether
or not the aggregate offers to sell power on the day-ahead
market are a scaled-down version of the full merit order.
There are two ways of tackling this question: one is by
computing the merit order and comparing it to the aggregate
offers. This requires a detailed knowledge of the costs of all
the generators and being able to evaluate the opportunity
costs for hydropower stations and the nuclear plants,
8
which
is difficult to do. An alternative way of testing this hypothesis
is by studying the evolution of the aggregate curves over short
periods (e.g., a few consecutive days) when the same power
plants should be operational and hence when the merit order
should be constant. If the offers reflect the full merit order,
then they would remain stable over these periods [20].
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