Scott W. See. The History of Canada. Second Edition

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In this respect Canada is behind twentieth-century democracy

elsewhere.

Ethnic and religious affiliation in Canadian society have always had

an effect on the life chances of the individual. If not its one distinctive

value, that of the mosaic is Canada’s most cherished. Legitimization

for the mosaic is sought in the notion of collective or group rights

which becomes confused with the legal foundation of individual

rights. It seems inescapable that the strong emphasis on ethnic

differentiation can result only in those continuing dual loyalties

which prevent the emergence of any clear Canadian identity. From

the point of view of our study of social class and power, it is likely

that the historical patterns of class and ethnicity will be perpetuated

as long as ethnic differentiation is so highly valued. Canada will

always appear as an adaptation of its British and French charter

groups, rather than as one of a new breed in a new nation. . . .

Canada is a new society, and should have had great opportunities

for institutional innovation, but so far it has been incapable of taking

a lead in the changes and experimentation necessary for more

democratic industrial societies. A fragmented political structure, a

lack of upward mobility into its elite and higher occupational levels,

and the absence of a clearly articulated system of values, stemming

from a charter myth or based in an indigenous ideology, are some of

the reasons for this retardation.

The Underside of Canadian Society 367

Keenleyside’s Letter

As the Cold War deepened, a growing number of Canadians began to

question the country’s relationship with its superpower neighbor. In

the late 1960s and early 1970s an impressive number of works were

published by academics, policymakers, and journalists that had at

their core a decidedly anti-American tone. The expansion of

American military might, the most alarming example of which was

the wrenching and protracted war in Vietnam, served as a key

element for this growing skepticism of the historic relationship

between Canada and the United States. Hugh Keenleyside, an

experienced diplomat with a resume that included working with the

United Nations, contributed the following piece to one of the most

widely read collections of critical essays. Addressed to “Sam”—an

obvious literary reference to the fictitious Uncle Sam—the letter

explores some of the prevailing Canadian opinions of American

political and cultural dominance in the Cold War era.

Dear Sam:

We have often talked about the attitude of Canadians towards the

United States and, in particular, why it is so often, as you believe,

unfairly critical. . . .

Let me say first, that the fact that you and so many other Americans

are interested and even concerned about how you and your country

appear to people from other lands illustrates one of the most

attractive of your national characteristics —your willingness to invite

frank and critical comment on your domestic and foreign policies and

John H. Redekop, ed., The Star-Spangled Beaver (Toronto: Paul Martin

Associates, 1971), 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23.

Keenleyside’s Letter 369

behaviour. In this you are almost unique, especially among the so-

called developed countries. We in Canada, for example, while

indulging in almost perpetual self-criticism, are notoriously sensitive

to criticism from others. . . .

As is the case with others, self-defence is the first preoccupation of

the American Government. . . .In addition to developing a military

power that has no close rival the United States has evolved a policy

which, in spite of occasional variations and modifications, has had a

certain coherence and consistence. It has used its economic power to

organize and assist various programmes designed to promote

economic and social progress in the under-developed countries and

regions. . . .

The first thing to say about the Canadian reaction is that we realize

that both our security and our economic welfare have been

strengthened by the “good neighbour” policy that existed towards

Canada long before President Roosevelt enunciated it in relation to

Latin America. . . .This does not mean, however, that we are so

comfortable in this warm relationship that we are satisfied or tempted

to relax and enjoy the sunshine of your smile. American businessmen

are just as sharp and aggressive in their dealings with Canada as they

are elsewhere abroad, or, indeed, at home. Many of them don’t

hesitate to lie . . .or, when they can, to use the big stick of government

intervention. . . .

We are concerned when we find that a large part of our industrial

machine is owned or controlled by Americans and we object very

strongly when we learn that parent companies in the United States

have prohibited their Canadian subsidiaries from filling orders from

countries, like China or Cuba, of whose governments the American

State Department currently disapproves. We may or may not

disapprove too, but we feel that Canadian companies and Canadian

citizens, even if the companies are owned in the United States, should

conform to Canadian not to United States rules. And we don’t like to

have Canadian citizens told that if they even visit such countries their

associates in the United States will be greatly upset. . . .

It is when we come to problems of defence, of war and peace, of

disarmament and proliferation of arms, of cold war debates and hot

war threats and practices, that many foreign observers feel and

express the most serious reservations about the leadership of the

United States. . . .

370 Keenleyside’s Letter

You are, of course, aware that informed opinion throughout the

world is generally critical of what they consider to be Washington’s

obsession with communism. The official American conviction that

there exists a world-wide, monolithic, malevolent communist

conspiracy guided from a single centre, employing unlimited funds,

marked by diabolical cleverness, and using methods that are as

unique as they are unscrupulous, is not generally accepted in other

countries, including Canada. . . .

What worried Canadians and, I believe, many others as well, is not

doubt of American power, but doubt of American wisdom. Above all

we are frightened by the Pentagon’ s obvious preference for action

rather than thought, and by the possibility that a weak or stupid

President may at some crisis act on the advice of his Chiefs of Staff. . . .

There is, I believe, some significance in the fact that almost all

Canadians think that the American people are better than their

governments. . . .[I]n spite of doubts and even fears of some American

policies, and in spite of our strong distrust of some American leaders,

particularly in the Pentagon, we Canadians, who should know you

better than anyone else in the world, would be the last people to ask

for another neighbour. . . .

Sincerely,

Hugh Keenleyside

Keenleyside’s Letter 371

Perspectives of History and

the Sovereignty-Association

Question

The arguments in support of sovereignty-association and in opposi-

tion to the idea were important for setting the stage for the

referendum of 1980. They were also instructive because the

oppositional groups mustered their evidence in a fashion that was

heavily colored by their respective views of history. The following

excerpts come from the “New Deal” and “New Federalism”

platforms that were designed to convince Quebec voters to support

a direction for the province to take in reshaping its relationship with

Canada. In these selections one can detect the pessimistic tones of the

“New Deal” arguments for setting Quebec on a track towards

sovereignty, as well as the more positive assessment of the historic

relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada in the “New

Federalism” approach.

“Québec-Canada: A New Deal”

A study of our past will show that the path taken by Quebecers, no

matter how original it is, follows the same laws that have prevailed

through the ages as various peoples have assumed national

sovereignty.

Québec-Canada: A New Deal (Quebec: Éditeur official, 1979), 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12.

Perspectives of History and the Sovereignty-Association Question 373

Our ancestors put down their roots in American soil at the

beginning of the 17th century, at the time the first British settlers were

landing on the east coast of what would become the United

States. . . .By 1760, our community was already an established society

along the shores of the St. Lawrence. North American by geography,

French by culture, language and politics, this society had a soul, a

lifestyle, a way of behaving, traditions, institutions that were its very

own. Its struggles, its successes and the ordeals it endured had made it

aware of its common destiny, and it was already impatient under the

colonial ties.

Sooner or later, that society would have rid itself of the colonial

yoke and acquired its independence, as was the case in 1776 for the

United States of America. But in 1763 the hazards of war placed it

under British control. . . .

[In Confederation] Quebecers did gain responsible and autono-

mous government, but with its autonomy limited to jurisdictions

seen then as being primarily of local interest. . . .It is obvious that

this new regime was a Confederation in name only. . . .Under the

terms of the British North America Act, Québec is not the

homeland of a nation, but merely a province among others, first

four, then five, then ten; a province like the others, with no more

rights or powers than the smallest of them. Nowhere in the British

North America Act is there talk of an alliance between two

founding peoples, or of a pact between two nations; on the

contrary, there is talk of political and territorial unity, and of a

national government which essentially dictates the direction the

regional governments are to take. . . .

The federal regime thus sanctioned, and favoured as well, the

supremacy of English Canada. It was natural that in such a regime the

interests and aspirations of Quebecers and Francophones in other

provinces should take second place. . . .

Though some federal laws belatedly attempted to encourage

bilingualism in central institutions . . .Francophones were never

regarded in Canada as a society with a history, a culture and

aspirations of its own. They were seen at best as an important

linguistic minority with no collective rights or particular powers, one

374 Perspectives of History and the Sovereignty-Association Question

that must sooner or later melt into the Canadian whole, as English

Canada long believed. . . .

“A New Canadian Federalism”

At the moment when Quebecers are preparing to make an historic

decision on their collective future, they have every right to ask that the

major options competing for their loyalty be presented to them

honestly and clearly.

The government of Quebec, led by the Parti Québécois, has already

made public the broad outline of its option, sovereignty-association,

in the white paper entitled “Quebec-Canada: A New Deal.”

One objective emerges clearly from the white paper. The Parti

Québécois and the present government, propose to make Quebec a

fully sovereign country. . . .

The Péquiste [supporters of the Parti Québécois] view of our

collective future is new in terms of the radical solution it proposes.

However, their resolutely pessimistic view of our past history and our

present situation is all too familiar.

In this frame of mind, they perpetuate an attitude which was held by

the opponents of Confederation in the last century.

During the years which preceded the proclamation of the BNA Act,

the enemies of this new constitution pronounced it to be a suicidal

adventure for the people of Quebec. They predicted freely that

Quebec and its traditions would be devoured by the Canadian

federation, that it would mark the end of our culture and our own

institutions.

It is this same theme, with a few variations, which forms the basis of

the Péquiste refrain.

But alongside this negative attitude, there has always existed in

Quebec another viewpoint, resolutely open to a more optimistic

perspective of confidence and co-operation.

R. Douglas Francis and Donald B. Smith, eds., Readings in Canadian History:

Post-Confederation (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1982),

606, 607.

Perspectives of History and the Sovereignty-Association Question 375

Those who hold this vision have always defended the existence in

Quebec of a distinct and unique society, with all the attributes of a

national community. Far from denigrating the Quebec government’s

key role in the development of this community, they are its very

architects, the ones who have built and strengthened it. . . .

The Quebec Fathers of Confederation did not fear the assimilation

of Quebec in 1867. They believed that the federal challenge presented

a unique occasion for the disparate colonies of that day to form a

great country, one in which Quebec would be called upon to play a

major role.

Those who defend the federal tie today are the true inheritors of that

vision.

It is certainly necessary to review in depth the constitutional

arrangements bequeathed to us in 1867. The venture has become

urgent in the light of current tensions which have been generated not

only in Quebec but elsewhere, and particularly in Western Canada.

But a realistic and honest evaluation of the Canadian federation can

lead to only one conclusion—the assets far outweigh the liabilities.

376 Perspectives of History and the Sovereignty-Association Question