Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Fate,
fortune, providence and
human
freedom
6S7
Ethics.
43
Pomponazzi notes how strange it is
that
no theologian had yet
noticed these contradictions in Aristotle's thought. The debate between the
opinio Christiana
and the Stoic
view
is therefore still open.
Christians declare
that
providence embraces everything which exists,
including individuals, and infallibly knows the future decisions of the
human
will,
which nevertheless retains its own freedom to make
unpredetermined choices. So, Pomponazzi continues, we must choose one
of
two propositions: if, on the one hand, God knows our future decisions,
we
are no longer able to do otherwise; on the other hand, if we claim to
make our own choices, then they do not
fall
within divine causality.
Consequently, God would not infallibly know all reality because in the case
of
human choices he 'moveretur a rebus',
that
is, his knowledge would be
determined by things. In other words, to assign the initiative to human
will
is
to deny God's omniscience and causality in the universe.
In this dilemma Pomponazzi would prefer, he
says,
to be a slave of fate
rather
than
a servile denier of divine providence: 'malo enim esse servus
quam sacrilegus'
(11.3.19).
So he opts for the Stoic
belief
which denies
human freedom in order to affirm divine providence: 'they preferred to be
servants and followers
than
to be impious and blasphemous'. Since God
operates from necessity, they concluded
logically
that
everything must
happen with ineluctable necessity, even in human affairs: 'they believed
that
everything was fated and arranged according to providence and
that
there
is
nothing in us which is not done by providence'
(11.1.77).
Thus human
will
depends on God as a saw depends on the hand of a
carpenter. We as individuals do not play the role of an active principle but
merely
that
of a subject in which the
will
resides and which it uses to carry
out the dispositions of the unique, universal and divine efficient cause
expressed in natural and cosmic
laws.
In this way we can explain how
astrology can predict the destinies of individuals and of entire civilisations.
Equally,
we may say
that
all good and
evil
in the world come from
providence, which has arranged things so as best to display the virtuous and
to enrich
nature
with variety.
Just
as we are not surprised when
wolves
devour sheep, so we should not be astonished when the wealthy and the
powerful
exploit the poor. 'It is necessary
that
there
should be sin;
43. Ibid., pp. 182-3
(n-5-59):
'Mihi
autem
videtur
quod
Aristoteles
sibi
contradixit
et
quod
apertenegat
fatum,
ut
manifestum
est in
fine
i
libri
De interpretatione 6, et ix Metaphysicae, et per
omnes
Libros
morales; ex
suis
tamen
principiis
videtur
sequi
quod
omnia
fato
proveniant, veluti
deductum
est.
Quare
sibi
ipsi
contrarius
videtur.'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
658 Problems
of
knowledge
and
action
providence intends
there
to be
sins
and is
itself author
of
sins'
(11.7.1.34).
44
Pomponazzi concludes
that
this Stoic
view,
while contrary
to
Christian
faith,
is the
best answer
to the
arguments
of
those
who
deny free
will.
Furthermore,
it
conforms entirely
to
Aristotle's principles
for the
natural
laws
of
motion, even
if
Aristotle
himself
had
to
repudiate those principles
in
order
to
salvage human freedom.
In
the
third
book Pomponazzi goes deeper into
the
nature
of
the
will
and
its relationship with
the
intellect.
He
begins
by
restating
the
incompatibility
of
the Christian theory
of
free
will
with Aristotle's position. Aristotle asserts
that
God operates
in the
world necessarily
and
states
that,
other things being
equal, opposed
or
merely differing effects could
no
more proceed from
the
same cause
than
a
will
could freely choose
two
contrary options. Since
reason
is
incapable
of
certitude,
it is
better
to
rely
on
God's wisdom.
Anticipating
a
doctrine
that
was to be
demonstrated
by
Spinoza
and
adopted
by
transcendental idealism, Pomponazzi declares
that
the
will
is
the
same
as the
intellective faculty
or, if we
prefer
to
speak
in
terms
of two
separate powers,
the
freely willed
act is the
proper
and
efficient mode
of
the
intellect, granted
that
the
will
complies passively with
the
free act.
To
avoid
certain scholastic errors which Pomponazzi
had
already refuted,
we
should
choose
one of two
cases:
Either
the
intellect
and the
will
are one and the
same power
or,
if
they
are
different,
the intellect
is the
power wherein
the act of
free
will
is
properly found since
it is
there
constitutively, whereas
it is in the
will
improperly
and in a
secondary
way
since
it
merely concurs passively
in
these acts. Freedom, however, consists more
in
activity
than
in
passivity.
(111.4.1)
Therefore,
the
active cause
of
the
act
which
is
willed
or not
willed resides
in
the
intellect.
The
will
passively accommodates
in
itself
the
image
of the
object
and the
suggested intellective thought. Immediately after, however,
when
it
concerns
the
executive
or
elective power
of
one
of
the alternatives,
the
will
reassumes
its
pre-eminence
in
relation
to
both object
and
intellect:
'In this choice,
the
will
is the
prime mover' (in.6.8).
45
44.
Ibid.,
p. 204
(11.7.1.39):
'Neque ex hoc quod pauperes conculcentur a divitibus arguit defectum vel
crudelitatem in Deo, sicuti quod ovis devoretur a lupo, et lupus lanietur a canibus, et canes a
leonibus. Nam licet considerando in particulari hoc videatur iniustum et impium, in ordine tamen
ad
universum non videtur tale . . . neque mundus
esset
perfectus
nisi
talia in ipso reperirentur.'
Bearing
in mind that the Stoics also held the human soul to be mortal, man's condition is compared
with that of cattle and chickens,
ibid.,
p. 205: 'Nam ita erit de hominibus respectu deorum quale est
de nostris bobus et nostris gallinis, in quibus nulla videtur
esse
crudelitas vel iniustitia.' His comments
on Aristotle in his lectures reveal an identical position:
GraifF
1976, pp. 340-1.
45.
It is worth looking at Pomponazzi's own account of the various phases into which the act of choice
falls,
ibid.,
p. 252
(111.6.8):
'Erit
igitur
iste
ordo in electione actus voluntatis: Nam primo intellectus
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Fate,
fortune, providence
and
human
freedom
659
This
is a
crucial statement.
It
allows
the
will
to
become
the
principle
of
independent initiative. Indeed,
as a
result
of the
genuine identification
of
the
two
faculties,
the
will
must necessarily
follow
the
intellect's moral
judgement about
an
object. Pomponazzi goes
on to
recognise
that
the
will
possesses
an
ultimate refuge
in
which
to
exercise
its
freedom. This refuge
consists
of a
suspension
of the act of
volition
or
choice
in the
face
of
intellective
deliberation, even when
the
individual's greatest good
and
happiness
are at
stake. This
is not,
however,
a
positive
act of
commission,
but
a
purely privative
act of
omission:
'It is
nevertheless
in the
power
of
the
will
to
will
and to
suspend
an act -
thus
freedom
is
preserved'
(111.8.10).
By
permitting
the
suspension
of
the
will,
the act
of
withdrawal from
the
universal necessity
of
reality
as
presented
to the
intellect, Pomponazzi
contradicts what
he had
repeatedly stated
in
his first two books about man's
complete dependence
on the
order
of
being.
This contradiction reveals
the
pull
of a
more orthodox Christian
view
of
liberty.
It
hints
perhaps
at an
unresolved interior struggle between Pomponazzi's naturalistic Stoic vision
and
a
sincere yearning
for a
greater human dignity, where man's virtue
is
the fruit
of
his freely willed choice
for the
good.
46
A
probable explanation
is
that
Pomponazzi
did not
concede
a
negative initiative
to the
will
out of
philosophical conviction
'by
extending
the
notion
of
choice
to
include
suspension
of the act'
(111.10.16),
but
rather
that
he
suggests
it as a
possible
line
of
defence
for the
opinio
Christiana,
taking
as a
spring-board
the
veracity
of
faith instead
of
mere
natural
reason.
It is
therefore purely
a
dialectical
exercise,
in
keeping with
his
assertion
of the
primacy
of
faith
and his
repeated wish
to
cling
to it,
even
at the
cost
of
sacrificing
the
intellect.
This
interpretation
is
confirmed
by
Pomponazzi's conclusion. Concern-
ing
the
Stoic
view
he is
emphatic
that
'while staying purely
in the
natural
realm
—
in
so
far
as
it is
accessible
to
human reason
—
none
of
these opinions
is
less
likely
to be
contradicted'. Having summarised
the
counter-arguments
and their responses,
he
concludes:
'I do not see any
natural
reason which
contradicts this
view'
(epilogus sive peroratio,
7).
In
the
fourth book
he
considers
the
coexistence
of
human freedom,
which
is
essentially variable
and
indeterminate, with divine providence,
practicus consultât de agendo et demonstrat voluntati quid sit agendum; et secundum hoc intellectus
concurrit active, et voluntas passive non quidem quoniam tunc velit, sed intelligendo quid sit
agendum
et consilium recipiendo. Deinde hoc habito, voluntas habet potestatem exequendi et non
exequendi quod sibi consultum fuerit, et ex sui potestate, exempli gratia, eligit partem affirmativam
contradictionis. In hac
electione
voluntas est primum movens, obiectum est secundum movens
motum a voluntate et per se specificans actum; consilium autem et obiectum sumptum in ratione
praesentantis concurrunt
ad istam electionem non primo et per se, sed in ratione adiuvantis et causae
sine
qua non.' 46. Pine 1973.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
66o
Problems of knowledge and action
which
is immutable and eternal. He takes issue with Boethius and Thomas
Aquinas
and proposes a solution to the problem posed by the assertion
that
acts are determined in knowledge because they are determined in being.
Consequently, while future acts are still contingent and have the possibility
of
occurring or not, divine knowledge is also indeterminate. In other words,
God
would only know
that
a particular individual might, or might not, sin
at some future date. If, on the other
hand,
he sees our acts as already
produced by the
will
and activated in time,
then
his knowledge is utterly
certain and determined because all reality is present to his intellect for all
eternity. And knowledge, as Aristotle said, is always knowledge of
something which is (iv.2—3).
47
In the fifth book Pomponazzi denounces the Thomist account of
predestination and discloses his own preference for
that
of the
Stoics.
Though
fully
aware
that
this is an entirely theological thesis, Pomponazzi
subjects everything to the
pure
elective
will
of God which has established a
degree
of
order between the
parts
of
the whole independently
of
any human
achievements. Pomponazzi
thus
falls back on a solution analogous to
that
of
Thomas Aquinas
(v.7).
48
Pomponazzi's subjection of human freedom to
natural
and astral laws
drops a curtain on the rhetorical and lyrical humanist celebration of man's
exaltation above the material universe by virtue of his divinely endowed
free spirit. Machiavelli too, in the famous chapter 25 of II principe
(1513),
after dispassionately surveying the cruelty
of
politicians and
of
politics
in his
day, set pessimistic limits to human initiative by assigning half of what
happens to the hostile domain
of
fortuna.
Opponents and proponents
of
freedom were soon divided along the lines
drawn by Pico and Pomponazzi. There was little noteworthy elaboration
of
these positions, though Simone Porzio did develop the naturalistic
background of Pomponazzi's De
fato
by suggesting a more precise and
materialist conceptualisation of God as the prime mover of the universe.
The
disenchantment of the world seemed complete. Concepts like
freedom, fortune, fate and providence were entirely explained away as the
expression and activity
of
natural
laws.
Already in the sixteenth century the
Copernican revolution was beginning to elbow man aside from the centre
of
the stage of
nature
and history. The situation clearly prefigures the
modern materialistic-mechanistic conception of reality where man's place
is
peripheral.
49
47. Philosophy and
Humanism
1976, pp.
100—15
(Pine).
48. Di
Napoli
1970,
especially
p. 200
(also
in 1973, pp.
85-159).
49. The
sixteenth
century's
attention
to the
notion
of
fortune
was
encouraged
by
(often
dramatic)
military
a»d
political
events,
as
narrated
in
Machiavelli's
II principe, as
well
as by the
sudden
reversals
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Fate,
fortune, providence
and human
freedom
THE
THEOLOGICAL
CONTROVERSY
After
1520
the
controversy about freedom became markedly theological,
and
the
motives which fuelled
it
were by
no
means
exclusively
philosophical.
Protestant theology proposed variations
of
a 'theological fatalism*
—
that is,
the total dependence
of
human freedom
on the
efficacy
of
grace.
The
Catholics
defended
a
degree
of
human initiative
and
interaction with
the
necessary divine motion. Precisely
how
man's
will
and
divine grace
cooperate
was
debated
but not
entirely resolved
by the
various currents
of
post-Tridentine theology. Here
we can
only survey
the
main points made
by
the
most important contributors
to the
debate, beginning with Erasmus
and
his De
libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio
(1524).
The
theological context
in which this work
was
composed means
that it
cannot
be
regarded
as a
product
of the
previous homocentric phase
of the
debate, which
was now
superseded.
Despite urgent imperial
and
papal pressure
that he
commit himself
against Luther, Erasmus hesitated.
A
humanist
of
vast classical learning,
his
ideas about
the
moral
and
theological reform
of the
church favoured
concord between
the
factions,
and
involved
the
cultural
and
philological
re-
education
of
courtiers
and
churchmen. Erasmus
was
temperamentally
averse
to
hand-to-hand combat;
his
inclination
was
away from fanaticism
and towards
a
noncommittal
attitude
wherever
it was not
expressly
forbidden
by
faith. Unlike
so
many scholastics
and
humanists,
he was not
concerned with
the nature and
existence
of
freedom,
but
instead with
the
possibility
of
cooperation between human
will
and
supernatural salvation.
In other words,
is man
merely passive,
as
Luther,
following
Wyclif,
asserted,
or can he,
under
the
influence
of
grace,
actively
do
good
and
evil?
After
defining
the
kernel
of the
Protestant position according
to the
radical formulation
of
Luther's Assertio
omnium
articulorum
per
Bullam
and
successes
experienced by the great mercantile dynasties which ruled much of
Italy.
See Procacci
1951,
who considers a number of late fifteenth-century and early sixteenth-century European
writers,
including Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Doren 1922—3 is useful for the new literary and
figurative
approaches to fortune. F. Piccolomini 1583 devotes useful chapters to fate, providence,
astronomy and fortune; he moves from an analysis of the various obstacles to human freedom to a
serenely rational interpretation of natural causality, disagreeing with the
doctissimus Pomponatius,
who 'rationem
satis
levem insolubilem censuit' about the question of fate (p. 128). For a preliminary
analysis of Porzio 1551a and 1553, see Saitta 1961, 11, pp.
367-80.
Regarding his unpublished
writings,
see Garin
1966,11,
pp. 541, 576. In the bibliography at p. 569 Garin
also
lists
the unpublished
Questiones
de
casu
[or
defato?]fortuna
et
casu
by Antonio Fracanziano; see
also
Sireni 1563, 1580. The
disconcerting works of Girolamo Cardano would
need
a separate discussion. Though on the
threshold of a mathematical approach to science his ideas were still heavily involved with magical-
astrological
notions
of a Neoplatonic provenance: see Corsano
1961b.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
662
Problems
of
knowledge
and
action
Leonis
X
novissimam
damnatorum
(1520)
50
,
Erasmus tried
to
diminish
the
exaggerated
importance
of the
controversy
by
setting
it in the
broader
context
of the
salvation which Christian revelation promises.
He
stressed
the inappropriateness
of
debating moral issues before
the
great mass
of
believers
who are
unqualified
to
evaluate
the
arguments.
He
proposed
to
disregard
the
immense
legacy
-
bequeathed
by the
Fathers, martyrs, saints,
theologians,
councils
and so on - of
statements favouring
the
belief
that
man's freedom
can
contribute
to his
salvation. Instead
he
considered only
what
the
Bible
had to say on the
subject, because
he
knew
that
Luther
admitted
no
other authority than
the
Bible
as
interpreted
by
himself.
51
Accordingly,
Erasmus defined freedom
as 'a
power
of
the human
will,
by
virtue
of
which
man can
devote himself
to
everything which leads
him
towards
or
away from salvation'.
52
Then
he
notes
that
even after
the
fall,
human intelligence
and
will,
though wounded, nevertheless retained some
residue
of
their previous ability
to
discern
the truth and
strive after
the
good
—
otherwise
no sin
could
be
imputed
to man.
Thus,
the
Scriptures, which
continually appeal
to
man's
will
to
cooperate with God,
are
contradicted
by
both Pelagius
and
Luther.
The
first attributes
too
much
to
human
will,
and
the second, regarding
man as
totally corrupt, demands
a
wholesale
cleansing
of man by
grace
that
acts through
us on our
entirely passive
will.
Undoubtedly
the
divine initiative
in the
process
of
salvation must have
priority because
the
first impulse
and the
continued support
for the
sinner
to
return
to God
comes from
his
mercifulness. Temperately,
but
very
em-
phatically,
Erasmus stressed
that
there must
be
some minimum
of
cooperation
and
personal responsibility
in
man's answer
to
God, otherwise
there would
be no
sense
in
salvation
and
damnation
and in the
praise
and
blame which
the
Bible
directs
at man.
Indeed, there would
be no way of
comprehending God's motives
for
rewarding some people
and
punishing
others
if
both
had
lived
their
lives
out of
pure necessity, dragged along
willy-nilly
by
some heavenly force.
50. Erasmus 1703-6, ix, cols.
1215-48.
At col. 1229, there is a quotation from Luther's
Assertio:
'Unde,
inquit, et hunc articulum
necesse
est revocare. Male enim dixi, quod liberum arbitrium ante gratiam
sit res de
solo
titulo, sed simpliciter debui dicere, liberum arbitrium est figmentum in rebus, seu
titulus
sine
re, quia nulli est in manu quippiam cogitare mali aut boni, sed omnia, ut Wyclevi
articulus Constantiae condemnatus recte docet, de necessitate absolute eveniunt.'
51.
Ibid.,
cols.
1215-20.
Juan Gines de Sepulveda is incorrect, therefore, when he accuses Erasmus of
having underrated the weight of nature and the demonstrative force of human reason, and of
having allowed himself to be drawn on to his adversary's
chosen
ground, namely the Bible; see
Gines de Sepulveda 1526.
52.
Erasmus 1703-6, ix, cols. 1220-1: 'Porro liberum arbitrium hoc loco sentimus vim humanae
voluntatis, qua se
possit
homo applicare ad ea quae perducunt ad aeternam salutem, aut ab iisdem
avertere.'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Fate,
fortune, providence
and
human
freedom
663
Against
both positions Erasmus stresses
that
even
the
Bible
must
be
understood with moderation. Luther's obsessive exaltation
of
God's
works
and his reduction
of
man
to a
mere instrument
of
grace,
capable
of
no action
except
faith, lead ultimately
to the
idea
that
God's discrimination between
the saved
and the
damned
is
incomprehensible: 'While
we are
fully
occupied
singing
the
praises
of
faith,
we
must
be
careful
not to
destroy
freedom,
because
if
we
do, I
cannot
see how we
could resolve
the
problems
of
justice
and
divine mercy.'
53
The
biblical passages which sanction
—
or
proscribe
—
man's voluntary
collaboration with God
can
easily
be
reconciled.
We
must acknowledge
the
primacy
of
grace, though with
the
proviso
that
it has to be
willingly
accepted
and not
merely imposed
on its
recipients. Against
the
aggressive
dogmatism
of
the factions which were lacerating
the
social fabric, Erasmus
concluded,
in the
best humanist tradition,
by
adopting
the
middle
way:
'Some
good, however imperfect, might come from this moderation;
but
man
will
not be
able
to
claim
any
credit
for
it.'
54
In
the
Loci communes
rerum
theologicarum
of
1521,
the
first compendium
of
Lutheran theology, Melanchthon
had
stated
that
'nulla
est
voluntatis
nostrae libertas'.
But the
modesty
and
courtesy
of
Erasmus' Diatribe
won
him over,
and he
moved towards
the
position, balanced like
that
of
Erasmus
between
grace
and
freedom, which
he was to
expound
in
subsequent
editions
of the
Loci communes. Melanchthon certainly could
not
endorse
Luther's fulminating riposte,
the De
servo arbitrio
(1525).
This work, always
one
of
Luther's favourites,
was
widely read,
and it has
been described
as
'undeniably
one of the
most important books
of the
century'.
55
In it
Luther's
new
theology
and his
philosophical
view
of man
reach their
mature phase.
The
inscrutable majesty
of God is
supremely exalted,
and
man
in his
vanity
and
self-importance
is
consigned
to the
nethermost
depths. Luther grants human
will
and
reason
no
credit
at all in
distinguish-
ing
good from
evil
on the
way
to
salvation. As Pierre Mesnard
has
correctly
53. Ibid.,
col. 1243: 'Caeterum hie cavendum crat, ne dum toti sumus in amplificandis fidei laudibus,
subvertamus libertatem arbitrii, qua sublata, non video quo pacto possit explicari quaestio de
iustitia, deque misericordia Dei.'
54. Ibid.,
col. 1247. The term
moderatio
frequently recurs in the defence against Luther.
Hyperaspistes
diatribae aduersus
servum
arbitrium
Martini Lutheri: ibid.,
x, cols. 1249-1536, followed by
Adversus
calumniosissimam epistolam Martini Lutheri,
cols.
1537-58.
See the posthumous collection of essays in
Cantimori
1975, especially pp.
40-59,
60-87,
142-57;
and see the introduction by Mesnard to De
libero
arbitrio
in Erasmus 1970, pp.
177-201.
A useful background to the cultural, political and
ecclesiastical events in Europe of the time may be found in
Storia della Chiesa
1975, especially pp.
172-84
(the bibliography concerning the Luther-Erasmus polemic is updated from the original
edition published in
1967).
55- See Boisset 1962, p. 28.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
664
Problems
of
knowledge
and
action
pointed
out, De
servo arbitrio marks Luther's final break with
the
Christian
focus
on man and the
evangelical liberalism
of the
Renaissance.
56
At
the end of the
book Luther does admit
that
Erasmus alone
had
managed
to
identify
and
analyse
the
crux
of
the problem.
But
this does
not
prevent Luther from launching
a
vicious personal attack
on
him. What
can
a
man
like Erasmus,
he
wonders, possibly achieve
in
theology
and
scriptural
exegesis?
He is a
sceptic,
a
pettifogging quibbler
in the
worst traditions
of
medieval
scholasticism.
He
prizes peace
and
quiet even above
truth
and the
commands
of
Christ,
whom
he
hardly mentions
in
his writings.
He
is pliant
and evasive.
He
will
do
anything
to
avoid
a
confrontation.
In
short,
he has
too much human wisdom
and no
evangelical understanding
at all. His
treatise is dreary
and
ineffectual,
and,
adds Luther,
'I
have never seen
a
book
on free
will
that
was so
feeble
-
except
in its
stylistic elegance.'
57
It
is not
true
that
the
Bible
is
obscure, Luther continues,
and it is
quite
wrong
to
suppose, as Erasmus does,
that
where
the
authentic Christian
life
is
concerned,
it is not
important
to
sort
out the
problem
of
free
will.
Erasmus
begins
by
saying
that
we can do
nothing without grace,
but he
goes
on to
endow
the
human
will
with enough power
to
fulfil
its
own commands
and
even
to
earn eternal
life.
These contradictions necessarily arise when
we
claim
to use our
reason
to
investigate
the
enigma
of
God's
will
and to
criticise
God
himself
for not
acting
as we
think
he
should:
'The
flesh does
not think God worthy
to be
called good and just,
if
he says
or
does anything
which
goes beyond
the
legal definitions
in the
Codexfustinianus
and
book
v
of
Aristotle!s
Ethics.'
59,
Instead
of
criticising
God's words through syllogism
and grammar
in
order
to
make room
for our
own struggle
for
goodness,
we
should humbly understand
that
biblical imperatives
are not
evidence
of
human moral potential
but
rather
reveal
our
impotence
and our
depen-
dence
on
God's
will
and
actions
if
we
are to
attain salvation. Freedom
can
achieve
nothing where goodness
and
eternal
life
are
concerned. This is clear
from
the
Scriptures,
and it is
useless, indeed dishonest,
to
slide into
metaphorical
or
figurative interpretations which, following certain
of the
worst
ancient commentators, lead
the
believer towards heresy. Erasmus
recognised
in
certain pagans morally exemplary actions which
are
outside
the sphere
of
grace. Instead
of
demonstrating
the
natural benevolence
of
56. See Mesnard in Erasmus 1970, p. 200.
57.
Luther 1883-,
XVIII,
p. 615 (De
servo
arbitrio):
'ut ineptiorem librum de libero arbitrio non viderim,
excepta
orationis
elegantia'.
58.
Ibid.,
p. 729: 'non dignatur Deum caro gloria tanta, ut credat iustum
esse
et bonum, dum supra et
ultra dicit et facit, quam definivit Codex Iustiniani, vel quintus liber Ethicorum Aristotelis.'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Fate,
fortune, providence
and
human
freedom
freedom, these actions constitute
a
theft
of
divine glory because such people
acted
as
they
did out of
self-interest
and
vanity.
59
The
Christian must
understand
that
he is not
guided
by his own
good
will,
but
exclusively
by the
Spirit
of
God. Whatever
he
does,
he
does
necessarily:
he may do
good
if
God
permits
him to be
dominated
by
faith,
or
do
evil
if
God lets
him
fall
under
the
sway
of
Satan. Man's coming into
being
and the
maintenance
of his
existence
owe
everything
to God
—
likewise,
everything pertaining
to
salvation proceeds from divine
providence.
60
As
Paul never tired
of
saying
in his
Epistle
to the
Romans,
our
justice
is
not
a
function
of
works
in
accord with
the
law
but is due
entirely
to the
free
gift
of
grace.
Man's task
is not to
understand
rationally
but
simply
to
adore
the supreme mystery
of
salvation which God performs regardless
of
human
merits. Erasmus' openly Pelagian
attempt
to
reserve
a
corner
for
free
will
in
this
exclusively
divine action
had
already been radically refuted
by St
Paul;
he condemned
the
self-justificatory efforts
of
pagans
and
believers alike
when
he
attacked 'both
the
Pelagians with their notion
of
total merit
and the
sophists with their notion
of
man's minuscule merit'.
61
Luther concluded
that
freedom
is a
prerogative
of
God alone because
he is an
absolute
and
utterly perfect being.
The
entire
contingent universe
is
subject
to his
eternal
consciousness
and
control,
and
therefore
we
must admit
—
and
this
is
also
a
rational conclusion
—
that
'there
can
be no
free
will
in
man,
in the
angels
or in
any other creature'.
62
As
has
already been mentioned, Melanchthon initially
followed
Luther
on
the
question
of
freedom,
but
after reflecting
on the
theological
and
legal
consequences
of a
doctrine which blamed
God for our
sins, gradually
modified
his
position.
In the
1548 edition
of
the Loci communes, free
will
is 'a
faculty
for
devoting
the
self
to
grace'.
In his
Initia doctrinae physicae
(1549)
and Ethicae doctrinae elementa
(1550),
he
reviews
the
Aristotelian
and
medieval
idea
of
freedom
of
choice
and
argues
in its
favour against Stoic
determinism, which confuses
the
laws
of
nature
with
the
operations
of the
human
will.
Fausto
Sozzini
reacted
in a
similar way against
the
dark fatalism
59. Ibid.,
pp. 742-3. 60.
Ibid.,
p. 754.
61. Ibid.,
p. 771: 'conteritque [Paulus] uno fulminis huius ictu tam Pelagianos cum suo toto merito,
quam
sophistas cum suo pusillo merito'.
62.
Ibid.,
p. 786: 'nullum potest
esse
liberum arbitrium in homine vel angelo aut ulla creatura'.
Regarding
the new anthropology demanded by Luther's revolutionary theology, see Gherardini
1982,
especially pp.
48-82,
which has an extensive bibliography; see also Cantimori 1975, pp.
88-111.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
666
Problems
of
knowledge
and
action
of
Calvin
in his
Praelectiones theologicae
and
especially
in the
letter
Ad
philosophum
B.
63
Indeed,
in his
desire
to
defend human freedom
he
goes
so
far
as to
question God's foreknowledge
and
predestination.
By
contrast,
the
Lutheran denial
of
freedom was taken even further
by
Zwingli
and
Calvin.
In his
De
vera etfalsa religione
commentarius
(1525)
and
his more philosophical
Deprovidentia
Dei
sermo (1530),
Zwingli
maintained
that
God was the
sole
cause
of
the universal activity
of
beings,
which were merely
the
instruments
of
his
will.
In the
absence
of
secondary causes,
it
must
be
admitted
that
evil
was
also
to be
ascribed
to
providence,
but
with tenuous logic
he
tried
to
exonerate
God
from human sinfulness
on the
basis
of his
holiness
and
sublime goodness.
Calvin's
Institutiones Christianae religionis (1536)
and De
servitute
et
liberatione
humani
arbitrii (1543) similarly regarded
man as
nothing more
than
the
instrument
of
a divine sovereignty which despotically imposes
its
eternal decrees even
to the
extent
of
willing
human sinfulness.
Calvin
was
vigilantly
intolerant
of any
independent initiative
by man
where
God is
concerned. Thus,
he
asserted
that
man's
will
is
compelled
by a
necessity
which
urges
it to
evil,
even when
it
goes against
his
better
judgement
and
against reason itself. Even when
man is a
victim
of
these irresistible
and
irrational forces,
he
is still responsible
for
his sins.
Calvin
gloried
in the
direct
and inscrutable intervention
of
providence
in the
physical
and
human
sphere
and
deplored
the
revival
of
Stoic
and
Epicurean theories about God's
absence from
his
creation
—
an
absence
too
often filled with pagan beliefs
about fate
and
fortune.
In
the
Reformation debate, therefore, Pomponazzi's philosophical
fatalism
was infiltrated
by a
fideistic fatalism
of
the opposite kind. The
latter
is
equally destructive
of
man's reality;
in the
first case because
he
is
the
victim
of
material cosmic forces,
and in the
second because
he is the
victim
of a
predestined
will.
Man's highest faculties
are
systematically demoted
and
denied;
his
works
are
entirely disregarded,
and his
moral commitments
discarded
as
illusory. Whether
by
fate
or
predestination,
man is a
slave
without
the
dignity
of
choosing
his own
destiny.
The
reaction
to
this
prostration
of
the human soul before
an
inscrutable God
-
according
to the
celebrated thesis
of
Max
Weber's
Die
protestantische Ethik
und
der 'Geist'
des
Kapitalismus (1904-5)
- was an
explosion
of
secular commerce leading
to
the early forms
of
capitalism.
63.
See
Bibliothecafratrum polonorum 1656,1,
pp.
368ff.,
542flf.
(The addressee of the anonymous letter
may
be the philosopher Nicolas Bernaud.) With reference to discussions about freedom and the
determinism of grace, see Zambruno 1983, especially pp. 55-64.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008