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Metaphysics
627
Wittenberg professor Daniel Cramer
95
in 1594, two years before Taurellus'
Synopsis. Cramer's Isagoge in Metaphysicam is a very modest
attempt
to
present the contents of Aristotle's Metaphysics, but the work is
important
because its basic
structure
was retained in other early German textbooks.
After
a preface on the subject-matter of metaphysics, he reversed the order
of
the two central sections of Aristotle's work, dealing in his book 1 with
the properties of being (act and potency, ens per se and ens per accidens, the
transcendentals), in his book
11
with its principles (the categories and the
principles of
natural
substance) and finally in his book m with its species
(the intelligences). Cramer's work was not strictly a commentary on the
Metaphysics, but
rather
a textbook written in the form of questions and
answers on points of metaphysical doctrine. The treatises of his successors
were also independent of Aristotle's text and sought to apply and develop
his thought. In so doing, the German school-metaphysicians were
willing
to draw on Catholic scholastics and Italian
naturalists
for their material, as it
fitted their purposes. In 1596 the questions of
Johannes
Versor on the
Metaphysics were published at Wittenberg with a preface emphasising the
importance of metaphysical terminology for theological controversy with
the Calvinists. Cramer, like Versor, regarded the doctrine of God and the
intelligences not as a particular science, but as an integral
part
of
metaphysics. The influence
of
Duns Scotus' approach to Aristotle's science
of
being may be observed in the introduction
of
disjunctive transcendentals
among the properties of being in two of the most
important
treatises on
metaphysics composed in Germany in the seventeenth century, the
Exercitationes metaphysicae (1603—4) of the Wittenberg professor Jakob
Martini
96
and Metaphysica commentatio (1605) of Cornelius Martini of
Helmstedt.
97
Scotus, it
will
be recalled, denied the possibility of a
natural
knowledge
of God, but added disjunctive properties like act and potency,
necessity and contingency, infinity and finitude to the simple transcen-
dentals of the earlier scholastics in order to make possible assertions about
immaterial reality.
Decisive
for the development of German metaphysics as the science of
being was the publication of Suarez' Disputationes metaphysicae at Mainz in
1605,
eight years after its first publication at Salamanca. Suarez' work was
well
suited to the purposes of the Lutheran thinkers. He understood
metaphysics as a general science of being and rejected the idea of an
independent
natural
theology. He provided the philosophical basis for the
95.
Concerning
Cramer
see
Lohr
1975, p. 726.
96.
Concerning
Jakob
Martini
see
Lohr
1978, pp.
568-9.
97.
Concerning
Cornelius
Martini
see
Lohr
1978, pp.
567-8.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Table
2. Organisation of metaphysics in German textbooks
ARISTOTLE
CRAMER
(1594) J-
MARTINI
(1603-4) C.
MARTINI
(1605)
SCHEIBLER
(1618)
i-vi
Introductory
ix-x
Properties of
substance: act and
potency,
unum,
verum
Philosophiae
partes
De
subiecto
metaphysicae
LI
De
natura
et divisione
philosophiae
1.2 Definitio metaphysicae
1.3 De
ente
Subiectum
Argumenta librorum
Explicatio
transcendentis
primi entis
1.
De affectionibus
entis; De divisione
entis in
ens per se et
ens per accidens; actus
et potentia; verum,
bonum, unum
1.4 De causis et causatis; 5 De De potentia et actu; De causis;
necessario et contingenti; 6-10 De necessitate et contingentia;
De
uno; 11 De finito et
infinito; 12 De perfecto et
imperfecto; 13 De priori et
posteriori; 14 De eodem et
diverso;
15 De aequali et
simili;
16 De veritate
De
finito et infinito; De
imperfectione et perfectione;
De
priori et posteriori;
De
vero; De bono; Res;
Aliquid
vu-vin
Principles of il. De summis entibus n.i De divisione entis
substance: substance
and accident;
material substance
XII
Types of
substance
et praedicamentis; De
principiis substantiae
naturalis
ni. De intelligentiis et
substantiis divinis
11.2—6
De substantia corporea;
De
intelligentiis; De Deo; De
creatione et conservatione; De
cultu divino
11.7-11
De accidente
De
substantia
De
intelligentiis
De
primo
ente
De
philosophia
1.1
De
natura
metaphysicae
1.2 Pars Generalis
De
subiecto
metaphysicae; De
ente
et essentia
1.3 De aνfectionibus
entis in genere
1.4—10
De uno, vero,
bono
1.11-23
De
ente
perfecto; De completo
et incompleto; De
infinito et finito; De
actu et potentia; De
necessitate et
contingentia; De
permanente
et
successivo;
De
absoluto et respectivo
1.24 De
ente
rationis
Pars Specialis
11.1
De substantia in
genere
11.2-4
De Deo; De
angelis;
De anima
separata
11.5-10
De accidente
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Metaphysics
629
treatment of the Incarnation. Most importantly, he provided a foundation
for
a refutation of the theory of double
truth
proposed by some extremist
theologians. Suarez' Disputationes describe a confessionally neutral, possible
world
to which all those who accepted the doctrine of creation could
subscribe. In an effort to avoid the errors which led to conclusions at
variance with Christian doctrine, Suarez offered a reinterpretation of
Aristotle's
doctrine in accordance with its most fundamental axiom, the
principle of non-contradiction. Armed with the concept of being which
Suarez
propounded on the basis
of
this principle, Lutheran theologians were
able to respond to the
threat
to orthodoxy which came from the extremists.
Distinguishing clearly between
that
which belongs to reason and
that
which
belongs to revelation, they maintained
that
reason in its own sphere cannot
contradict revelation. But the philosophical idea of God which man is able
to attain is not such
that
we can say
that
it conflicts with the revealed idea.
The
influence
of
Suarez'
approach may be observed as early as the works of
Cornelius and Jakob Martini and most clearly in the Opus
metaphysicum
(1617)
and Epitome metaphysica
(1618)
of Christoph Scheibler, professor of
logic
and metaphysics at Giessen
98
(see table 2).
In spite
of
such efforts to maintain the integral character of metaphysics,
Lutheran writers came increasingly to regard an independent natural
theology
as a necessity. They distinguished between traditional metaphys-
ics,
as a discipline which had the task of explaining certain generally valid
terms and principles, and a discipline which was often called pneumatologia
because it dealt with the nature, properties and activities of spiritual being.
Although
this development took place in the period after the Thirty
Years
War, its roots may be found in the period under consideration in this
volume.
Scheibler
himself
contributed to the distinction
of
the two subjects
by
publishing a separate textbook on Theologia naturalis
(1621).
In the
preface to this work he gave a practical reason for treating the subject
separately
—
to limit the extent
of
his general treatment
of
metaphysics
—
but
the division was in fact a natural consequence of his own distinction
between a metaphysicageneralis and a metaphysica specialis.
Also
contributory
to the separation
of
the two sciences was the publication at Cologne in 1595
of
the De communibus
omnium
rerum
naturalium
principiis
of
the Jesuit Benito
Pereira. The Wittenberg professor Johannes Scharf
99
referred in the preface
to his Pneumatica (1629) to Pereira's distinction between first philosophy as
98.
Concerning
Scheibler
see Allgemeine Deutsche Biographic 1875-1912, xxx, pp.
700-2;
Petersen
1921, pp.
306-8
and passim;
Wundt
1939, pp.
119-23
and passim.
99.
Concerning
Scharf
see
Lohr
1980, pp. 717—18.
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Metaphysics
the science
of
being
and metaphysics as the science
of
God,
and maintained
that
it was
well
founded.
The
distinction between the science of being and
natural
theology was
also
occasioned by a new understanding in Lutheran orthodoxy of the
nature
and method of revealed theology. On the one
hand,
a Protestant
apologetics
appeared about the beginning
of
the seventeenth century, called
forth by the necessity of defending not only the use of philosophy in
theology
against the agnosticism
of
the followers
of
Fausto
Sozzini,
but also
the biblical doctrine
of
creation against the increasing influence of Stoicism
and Epicureanism and the fundamental significance of the faith against a
growing
spirit of indifference in religious matters. On the other
hand,
the
need was increasingly felt to make the presentation of revealed theology
more scientific. Lutheran orthodoxy was opposed to the private
interpret-
ation
of
Scripture and put forward a new understanding
of
the analogiafidei
according
to which individual biblical texts should be
interpreted
within
the system of the articles of faith. Melanchthon's topical method was
therefore succeeded by efforts to present an
VTTOTVTTOJOLS of Christian
doctrine, such as Paul
himself
had provided in Romans, or a corpus doctrinae
integrum,
showing the
logical
interconnections between individual
teachings.
A similar evolution had taken place in early scholasticism, but
whereas thirteenth-century writers generally understood revealed the-
ology
as a theoretical science in Aristotle's sense, Lutheran
authors
of
the late
sixteenth century tended to regard it as a practical one.
The
publication at Basle in 1594 ofjacopo Zabarella's Opera logica played
an
important
role in this development. Whereas the theoretical sciences
employ
a synthetic method in the presentation of doctrine, drawing
conclusions
from first principles, the practical sciences make use of an
analytic method
—
described by Zabarella
—
which takes as its point of
departure
the end or purpose of an action and seeks to discover the means
and principles by which this end might be attained. Applied to theology,
this method would present eternal beatitude, for example, as the end to be
achieved,
soteriology as the means to the end, Christology as its principle
and the doctrine
of
man and creation as concerning the subject by whom the
end is to be attained. The analytic method became the
standard
approach in
Lutheran dogmatics with the publication in
1619
of
Georg
Calixt's Epitome
theologiae.
Calixt
was a pupil of Cornelius Martini and professor of
theology
at Helmstedt, but the method was adopted at
Jena
and Wittenberg
as
well.
At the same time,
Calixt
regarded philosophy as the condition for
the scientific development of revealed theology. In accordance with the
apologetic
tendency which had appeared in seventeenth-century Luther-
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Metaphysics
631
anism, he sought to develop rational proofs for the
truth
of the Christian
religion,
assigning to philosophy the task
of
proving not only the existence
and
attributes
of
God
and the immortality
of
the soul, but also the necessity
of
revelation on the basis of God's providential care for men. This
understanding
of
the relationship between philosophy and theology opened
the way for the free development in Lutheranism of
natural
theology as a
theoretical science, distinct from the practical science
of
revealed theology.
The
analytic method had little success in those German territories
—
like
the Palatinate, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel and several smaller principalities
bordering on the Netherlands — which leaned towards Calvinism and
rejected the Formula concordiae. In accordance with the architectonic spirit of
Calvinist
scholasticism, Reformed theologians at the universities of
Heidelberg and Marburg and later at Herborn and Burgsteinfurt regarded
their science as essentially speculative and
followed
the synthetic method in
the presentation of doctrine. Rejecting the Lutheran transposition of the
tracts
on salvation and soteriology in systematic works on theology, they
took the glory of God and predestination as their point of
departure.
Reformed dogmatics began with God as the first cause and final goal of all
things, and
treated
his eternal decrees of providence and predestination
before taking up his government of the world in time. In this conception
natural
theology formed an integral
part
of
the cognitio Dei perfecta at which
theology
aimed. Consequently, whereas Lutheran writers on metaphysics
sought to maintain the unity of Aristotle's science and only reluctantly
admitted the necessity of an independent
natural
theology, Calvinist
authors
tended to distinguish clearly between two sciences, a science
of
God
to the extent
that
he is accessible to human reason and a science of being
understood as a universal science which supplies the principles for all the
particular sciences.
For the formulation of the distinction they
turned
to the
Jesuit
Benito
Pereira. In the preface to his Isagoge in
primam
philosophiam (1598) the
Marburg professor Rudolphus Goclenius spoke of two separate sciences, a
universal science called 'first philosophy' and a particular science called
'metaphysics'. First philosophy deals with being, its properties and its
principles; metaphysics studies the various types
of
immaterial being: God,
the intelligences and the human soul. Goclenius composed no treatise on
metaphysics as the science of God, but his Isagoge is an introduction to first
philosophy as the science of being. The work has two parts, the second of
which
deals with individual questions in the form
of
disputations. The first
part,
entitled Praecepta metaphysica, contains his complete
treatment
of the
science.
The first chapter deals with the definition of first philosophy and
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632
Metaphysics
the notion of being, chapters 2-15 take up the simple and conjunct
properties
of
being and the last
three
chapters
treat
substance and accident as
its principles. Goclenius seems to have been aware of the difficulties
involved
in restricting the term 'metaphysics' to the science of God while
speaking of the science of being as 'first philosophy'. In his Lexicon
philosophicum
(1613)
he made a new and important addition to philosophi-
cal
terminology. In the article on abstraction he divided the speculative
sciences
according to the types of abstraction from matter
that
characterise
them;
that
employed in physics he described as 'physical',
that
made use of
in the science of God and the intelligences as
'transnatural'
and
that
used in
the science of being and the transcendentals as 'ontological'.
100
The term
occurs here in its adjectival form, but it soon appeared as a noun. The
term 'ontology' made it possible to recognise the claim of the science of
being to be metaphysics just as much as the science
of
God.
It was in this way
that
the term 'metaphysics' came to designate both the universal science of
'first philosophy' or 'ontology' and the particular or special science of
'natural theology'.
The
significance of the Calvinist approach to metaphysics was not
limited, however, to terminological innovation. In the works of authors
like
Clemens Timpler of Heidelberg and Steinfurt, Bartholomaeus
Keckermann of Heidelberg and Danzig and
Johann
Heinrich Alsted of
Herborn
there
appeared a new, unified vision of the encyclopaedia of the
scientific
disciplines in which ontology had the role of assigning to each of
the particular sciences its proper domain. This new vision was grounded in a
conception of the scientific enterprise which was specifically a product of
the Renaissance, a conception which set it
apart
from the Aristotelianism of
both Catholic scholasticism and Lutheran orthodoxy. According to the
traditional Aristotelian understanding, scientific knowledge was made up
of
conclusions which are not only
true
but also certain, because they are the
result
of
a demonstration based on an evident principle or cause. Science was
the habit or faculty by which the mind is disposed to assent to such
conclusions.
The habit
of
science
was thought
of
as being acquired by an act
of
demonstration and increasing as more and more conclusions were drawn
from principles. Writers of the Reformed Confession broke with this
conception. In their approach science was understood not as a habit but as a
body of knowledge, systematically ordered so as to make it possible for a
learned man to impart the habit
of
scientific
knowledge to others by correct
100.
Goclenius
1613, pp. 13—19.
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Metaphysics
633
explanation. Their notion of a corpus doctrinae differed from the Lutheran
idea in a way which betrayed the influence of humanism. Whereas
Lutheran writers concerned themselves
exclusively
with theological
doctrines and sought simply to show the
logical
connections between
individual theological teachings, the Calvinists saw theological doctrine as
part
of
the sum total
of
the knowledge which has been gained by man in the
course
of
history and
transmitted
to the present generation by written and
oral tradition. The task of the scientist was to systematise the teachings of
each of the disciplines
—
including theology
—
and to relate them to one
another
in a new encyclopaedia of knowledge.
At
the same time, men like Keckermann departed in
another
way from
the traditional definition of scientific knowledge. According to Aristotle,
only
necessary, universal statements can be scientific;
there
can be no
demonstration of contingent, singular facts and no science of changeable
things as such. But because Reformed theologians wanted to assure the
scientific
character of theological conclusions, they extended the range of
scientific
validity beyond the universal conclusions which
natural
theology
can derive from the properties of things to the singular, historical facts,
dependent on God's providential care, which revealed theology holds, on
the testimony
of
Scripture, to be principles
of
knowledge.
In his Praecognita
philosophical
1
Keckermann presented a general theory
of
science
in which
he appealed to the norms of certitude which had, as we have seen, been
proposed by Melanchthon: revelation, the universal sense experience of
men, common
innate
notions and the orderly presentation of syllogistic
conclusions.
Keckermann went beyond Melanchthon, however, by
defining the intellectus ordinis in syllogismo as a facultas artificialis acquisita per
certam
disciplinam. By 'faculty' he meant an internal source of certitude
which
is a habit or disposition — in accordance with the Aristotelian
conception. By the 'discipline' through which the habit is acquired he
meant the external body of doctrine which the learned man must master.
The
most significant word in Keckermann's definition is the word
'artificial'.
He described the habit acquired by the learned man not as
'scientific'
but as 'artificial', because it concerns conclusions which belong to
all
the liberal
arts
and includes both universal conclusions drawn from the
nature
of things and singular, contingent conclusions based on testimony,
for
the reason
that
knowledge
of
both types
of
conclusion can be gained by
the systematic application of methodical principles.
102
101.
Keckermann
1607c!,
1, pp.
118-24.
102. See
Ritschl
1906.
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634
Metaphysics
The
emphasis in this new theory
of
science
was
thus
placed, above all, on
the orderly, systematic presentation of doctrine. A discipline in the liberal
arts
is a system
of
precepts and rules, methodically ordered, through which
one can
—
with the requisite natural ability and corresponding practice
—
gain
the habit
of
knowledge
in the liberal arts. Around the beginning
of
the
last quarter of the sixteenth century the term 'system' began to be used by
Reformed theologians for ordered compilations
of
Christian teachings. The
term acquired its technical sense
of
a body
of
knowledge
unified by a single
idea or principle in writers like Keckermann. These thinkers understood
each
of
the liberal
arts
as a system
of
precepts and rules according to which a
given
subject-matter is arranged for correct explanation. The precepts
(praecepta) are made up of definitions and distributions. The rules (regulae)
are made up of conclusions; they are called 'theorems' in the speculative
disciplines and 'canons' in the practical ones. The principle or idea
according to which the precepts and rules are ordered is not merely an
external principle, so
that
the elements are simply
parts
of
a whole, but one
which
grounds the knowledge of the elements and coordinates their real
functions. Theological rules are derived, by the analytical method, from
revelation; philosophical rules, by the synthetic method, from ipsa
rerum
naturalium
natura
or notitiae nobiscum natae. Revealed theology is a discipline
consisting of rules (loci communes), disposed systematically for the under-
standing of the book of Scripture. Natural theology is
that
part
of the
discipline
of
pneumatics which consists
of
rules concerning God's existence,
essence, eternal decrees and temporal government of the created world, as
they can be read in the book of nature. The other two
parts
of pneumatics
are angelography and psychology.
The
idea
of
each
of
the liberal
arts
as a system found its
logical
counterpart
in the idea
of
the encyclopaedia of the arts. It was at this point
that
the new
conception
of
scientific
knowledge espoused by Reformed thinkers affected
the traditional role
of
metaphysics as the queen
of
the sciences. Keckermann
and Timpler composed systems of
logic,
rhetoric, physics, mathematics,
optics,
astronomy, geography and the various
parts
of
practical philosophy.
Keckermann and Alsted also drew up systems of theology. All of these
systems taken together were regarded as forming a unified whole. Alsted
103
published a complete edition
of
Keckermann's works in 1613 under the title
Systema
systematum.
His own Cursus philosophici encyclopaedia appeared in
103.
Concerning
Alsted
see Dictionnaire d'histoire et géographie ecclésiastiques 1912-, 11,
cols.
773-5;
Petersen
1921, p. 311;
Wundt
1939, pp. 80-3,
236-9
and passim; Lexikonfiir Théologie 1957-67,1,
col. 368.
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Metaphysics
635
1620
and ten years later his complete Encyclopaedia for all four university
faculties.
For each of these
authors
the system of metaphysics (see table 3)
had the task of assigning to each of the disciplines its proper domain and
place in the encyclopaedia
of
the arts. Pneumatics was to deal with spiritual
reality, physics with corporeal reality as corporeal, mathematics with
quantity, practical philosophy with human actions as moral, law with
human actions as political, medicine with the human body as to be cured.
Accordingly,
the metaphysics which
—
as first philosophy
—
formed the
foundation of this encyclopaedia was no longer understood as a science in
the Aristotelian sense, but
rather
as one of the liberal arts. Metaphysics
thus
became
closely
connected with the theory of the arts, which these authors,
employing
the Greek word, entitled 'technologia'. Timpler
104
prefaced the
second edition of his Metaphysicae
systerna
methodicum of 1606 with a
Technologia sen
tractatus
generalis de
natura
et differentiis
artium
liberalium.
Alsted
opened his Encyclopaedia with a general account
of
the new theory of
scientific
knowledge. Under the title Praecognita philosophica, he
treated
the
theory
of
the principles
of
knowledge,
the theory
of
the habit
of
knowledge,
the theory
of
the
arts
and didactics. For the
third
section
of
this introduction
he also used the neologism 'technologia'.
Clemens
Timpler was the thinker who
followed
out most consistently
the consequences of the understanding of metaphysics as one of the liberal
arts. Because the individual systems which make up the encyclopaedia of
the liberal
arts
are bodies
of
doctrine, the discipline which coordinates them
must
itself
be less a theory
of
being
than
a theory
of
knowledge.
Although,
ordine inventionis, this discipline
follows
the other disciplines, it must, ordine
doctrinae, precede all of them. Consequently, Timpler proposed
that
the
subject-matter of metaphysics is not being, but
rather
the intelligible,
irav
vorjr6v. Metaphysics is distinct from
logic
which also deals with the same
subject because it is a speculative discipline, whereas
logic
is a practical one.
In a definition which is only comprehensible against the background
of
the
Reformed theory of knowledge, Timpler defined metaphysics as the 'ars
contemplativa quae
tractat
de omni intelligibili quatenus ab homine
naturali
rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile'.
105
The
designation res applies to everything concerning which it is possible to form
an intelligible proposition. It includes, therefore, not only being, but also
privations
of
being and not-being itself. Not-being must be considered by
metaphysics because it is intelligible, at least per accidens; without the notion
of
not-being it would be impossible to defend the rule
of
non-contradiction
104.
Concerning
Timpler
see
Lohr
1982, pp.
194-6.
105.
Timpler
1606, p. 1 (1.1).
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Table
3. The systems of metaphysics
GOCLENIUS
(1598)
TIMPLER
(1606)
KECKERMANN
(1609-13)
ALSTED (1611)
1.1
De definitione primae
philosophiae
De
subiecto
1.2 De
entis
affectionibus
3 De uno et multis; 4 De eodem
et diverso; 5 De vero et
falso;
6 De bono et malo
LI
De
natura
metaphysicae
2
De nihilo et essentiae
3 De ente et eius
distributionibus
1 De
attributis simplicibus
entium
4 De existentia; 5 De duratione
11
De
attributis coniunctis
et
absolutis
1 De perfectione et
imperfectione; 2 De simplicitate
et compositione; 3 De
unitate
et
multiplicitate; 4 De infinitate et
finitate; 5 De illocalitate et
localitate;
6 De necessitate et
contingentia; 7 De possibilitate
et impossibilitate; 8 De ventate
et falsitate; 9 De bonitate et
malitia
1 De
ente primario
sive
de
sub
stantia
I
De metaphysica; 2 De ente
improprie dicto; 3 De imagine
entis; 4 De opposito entis seu
de negatione et non-ente; 5 De
ente proprie dicto; 6 De
substantia
7
De
principiis
substantiae: De
dependentia a Deo; 8 De
compositione seu concretione; 9
De
principiis internisi De
essentia substantiae; 10 De
existentia substantiae
II
Modi entis
in genere
12 Modi instar qualitatum primi;
13
Unitas; 14 Veritas; 15
Bonitas;
16 Perfectio et
plenitudo; 17 Pulchritudo; 18
Finitudo seu determinatio
essentiae et existentiae
De
natura
metaphysicae
1 De
transcendentibus
1 De ente; 2
Aliquid
et Res
[Principia:]
3 De essentia; 4 De
existentia; 5 De duratione
[Modus
primus:]
6 De unitate; 7
De
veritate; 8 De bonitate;
[Modus
ortus unitus:]
9 De
ordine; 10 De numero; 11 De
perfectione; 12 De
pulchritudine
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