Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Moral philosophy
317
attempted
to
reconcile
the
views
of the
major philosophical schools
by
arguing
that
their disagreements over man's supreme good were merely
verbal
and
that
in
reality their positions were quite similar.
92
But
most
Renaissance authors recognised
that
there
was a
bewildering diversity
of
conflicting
and
contradictory opinions about
the
source
of
man's happi-
ness.
93
Some, wrote Montaigne, placed
it in
virtue, others
in
pleasure; still
others thought
it lay in
following
nature,
or in
knowledge,
or in
having
no
pain,
or in not
being deceived
by
appearances.
94
While
pagan philosophers disagreed about
the summum
bonum, Christians
were
in
fundamental agreement
that
God
was
the
source
of
man's ultimate
happiness. This
belief
was held
by
Renaissance philosophers
no
less
than
their medieval predecessors.
95
They universally accepted
the
fundamental
Christian doctrine
that
man
would only attain
his
supreme good after
death, when
his
immortal soul would enjoy
the
perpetual vision,
contemplation
and
fruition
of
God.
96
The
meagre
and
ephemeral
felicity
available
to man on
earth hardly deserved
the
name
of
happiness, according
to Hieronymus Wolf,
and
could more aptly
be
termed
a
diminution
of
misery.
97
In the
opinion
of
Facio,
man
could never find happiness
on
earth
because
he was by
nature
dissatisfied with whatever
he had and
always
desired more. This Faustian discontent would
not be
allayed until
he
attained perfect
and
eternal beatitude
in
heaven.
98
Alfonso
de La
Torre
claimed
that
the
prophets
had
experienced
a
complete vision
of
God
in
their
92. Bruni 1928, p. 27
(Isagogicon):
'etsi verbis pugnent, re tamen et effectu proximae sunt'.
93. Beroaldo 1513, f. ii2
r
(Oratio
de
foelicitaté):
'de hac foelicitate . . dissentiunt; nec vulgus
sapientesque concordant; immo nec ipsi philosophi inter se conveniunt'; Carbone de Costacciaro
1585,
f. 201
r
: 'Maxima semper inter eos, qui de moribus. scripserunt, de humana felicitate extitit
concertatio';
Collegium Conimbricense
1612, col. 15: 'De nulla ... re apud philosophos tanta
dogmatum
varietas . . . fuit, ut de hominis felicitate.'
94. Montaigne 1965, p. 578
(11.12):
'Les uns disent nostre bien estre loger en la vertu, d'autres en la
volupté,
d'autres au consentir à nature; qui, en la science; qui, à n'avoir point de douleur; qui, à ne se
laisser emporter aux apparences.'
95.
Reisch 1504, sig. qq iii
v
:
'[Deus]
est finis ultimus et beatitudo seu foelicitas perfecta ad quam homo
creatus est'; F. Zabarella 1655, p. 101: 'tribus his, Deo intelligendo, tenendo, fruendo, beatorum
constat vera, certa consummataque félicitas'; Filelfo 1552, p. 19: 'si totius . . . hominis bonum,
felicitatem
esse
volumus, hanc vero aliud nihil
esse
quam Deum'; Landino 1980, p. 76:
'Christianorum
. . . una sententia est . . . ultimum atque extremum omnium bonorum deum
esse.'
96. Bosso 1493, sig. b vii
v
: 'Pulcherrimo ... et gloriosissimo illo fruemur divinitatis spectaculo, in quo
et tota et consummata beatitudo consistit'; Fox-Morcillo 1566, p. 134: 'Summum . . . hominis
bonum ... est perpétua quaedam et constans cernendi Dei fruendique voluptas'; Du
Vair
1945, p.
57:
'cette dernière et plus parfaite félicité consiste au regard de la face du Père des lumières'.
97.
See Wolf's commentary in Cicero 1569, col. 6: 'Quae profecto non tarn félicitas est, quam
diminutio quaedam miseriarum'.
98. Facio
1611,
pp. 108-9: 'Guarinus: . . .
sentio
neminem in hac vita beatum
esse
posse
... Est enim
insitus natura mortalibus inexplebilis quidam appetitus, ut quo maiora quis adeptus sit, eo plura
desideret.'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
318
Moral philosophy
own
lifetime
and that
wise
men
through their intellect
and
erudition were
able
to
understand something
of the
divine essence.
But the
majority
of
men, who were neither wise
nor
prophetic,
had to
wait until
the
next
life
to
be united with
God and
thus
attain
the
supreme good."
Scholastic
philosophers
had
worked
out a
compromise solution
to the
conflict
between
the
Christian
and
Aristotelian
views
of
happiness. They
argued
that
although perfect
and
complete happiness was only attainable
in
heaven,
there
was
nonetheless
an
imperfect
and
inferior happiness which
was
available
to man
while
on
earth.
100
This formula continued
to be
widely
used
in the
Renaissance. Johannes Versor,
for
instance, explained
that
in the
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle was
not
discussing perfect happiness,
which
could only
be
attained
in the
afterlife,
but
rather
human
and
mortal
happiness, which could
be
experienced
in
this
life.
101
Another late
scholastic philosopher, Petrus Tartaretus, defined
God as
man's ultimate
good
in an
absolute sense
and
Aristotelian happiness
as the
best
of
merely
human goods.
102
The
humanist Agostino Dati also asserted
that
happiness
was
two-fold:
the true
happiness
to be
enjoyed
in
heaven, which was never
mentioned
by
Aristotle;
and the
incomplete, flawed happiness
man
achieves
by
his own
powers, which Aristotle discussed thoroughly.
103
In his
commentary
on
Boethius'
De
consolatione philosophiae,
the
Flemish theo-
logian
Dionysius Carthusianus claimed
that the
terrestrial happiness
described
by
Aristotle was relative,
not
absolute.
In the
present
life,
since
we
can only
see God
through
a
glass darkly,
we are
unable
to
experience true,
divine happiness.
But we can
achieve
a
limited felicity,
the
first stage
of
that
perfect beatitude which
will
be our
reward
in the
future
life.
104
For the
Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez,
the
natural happiness
of
this
life,
although
not perfect
and
real
in
comparison with
the
supernatural happiness
of the
99. La Torre 1855, pp. 400-1; see also Delfino 1556, pp. 254-62, a plagiarised Italian version of La
Torre's
work. 100.
Cambridge History
1982, pp. 657-72 (Wieland).
101.
Versor 1491, f. n8
v
: 'in hac vita [Philosophus] non ponit perfectam felicitatem, sed talem qualis
potest competere humane et mortali vite. . . perfecta et vera felicitas non potest haberi in hac vita'.
102.
Tartaretus 1514, f.
3
v
: 'ipsa [felicitas] est ultimus finis; quod non est intelligendum simpliciter, quia
deus est ultimus finis, sed debet intelligi inter bona humana'.
103.
Dati 1503, f. i64
r
(Epistolae 11):
'Duplex . . . ilia [felicitas] a doctis viris traditur. Una, quae vera
beatitudo est . . ., qua in codesti patria fruendum sit, quam nunquam Philosophus disserit . . .
Altera,
quae ex
solis
naturalibus parari consuevit, nequaquam perfecta, sed manca quaedam atque
inchoata . . . Hanc vero . . . copiose et graviter Aristoteles disserit.'
104.
Dionysius Carthusianus 1532-40, xm, f. io
r
: 'Est . . . duplex beatitudo. Una viae, alia patriae.
Beatitudo
viae est. . . inchoatio quaedam felicitatis futurae, quae est praemium beatitudinis viae
.
. . [Philosophus] asserit hominem hie
posse
esse
felicem, secundum quid, non simpliciter ... in
vita
praesenti non cognoscimus deum
nisi
per speculum in aenigmate [I Cor.
13:12].'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
319
next,
was
nonetheless
the
highest
and
ultimate good attainable within
the
limited framework
of the
human condition here
on
earth.
105
CLASSICAL
ETHICS
AND
CHRISTIANITY
Not
all religions
are
bound
up
with
a
system
of
ethics. Worship
of
the Greek
gods,
for
instance,
by no
means entailed imitation
of
their behaviour, which
could
hardly
be
described
as
morally instructive.
But
Christ's actions,
as
reported
in the
gospels, have always been regarded
by his
followers
as an
ideal
and
model.
The
moral values preached
in the
Sermon
on the
Mount
were very different from those declaimed
in the
Agora
and
Forum.
Nonetheless, Christianity never entirely rejected
the
ethical philosophy
of
pagan antiquity. Instead
it
attempted
to
appropriate
the
useful aspects
of
classical
ethics, while abandoning
or
avoiding
any
doctrines which overtly
contradicted Christian dogma. Opinions varied among Church Fathers
as
to
the
relative proportion
of
wheat
to
chaff
in
classical ethics;
and
some
philosophical schools, such
as
Platonism
and
Stoicism, fared
better
in
patristic
literature
than
others, such
as
Aristotelianism
and
Epicureanism.
Attitudes toward pagan ethics were continually revised
and
challenged,
especially
in the
thirteenth
and
fourteenth centuries, when scholastic
philosophers,
following
the
lead
of
Thomas Aquinas, devised elaborate
strategies
to
make Peripatetic ethical doctrines compatible with Christian
dogma.
The
increased interest
in
classical philosophy which arose during
the Renaissance
did not
bring with
it any
diminution
in the
tension between
Christian
and
pagan ethics. Renaissance
authors
drew heavily
on
ancient
philosophical sources
in
their effort
to
establish
a
system
of
ethics which
was
appropriate
for
laymen
living
in the
secular world
of the
present
life.
But
they never forgot
that
these laymen were Christians, whose immortal souls
were destined
for a far
higher goal
in the
next
life.
One solution
to
this perennial problem
was the
eclectic approach
recommended
by St
Basil.
He
suggested
that
Christians reading
the
works
of
pagan
authors
should imitate bees,
who
select only certain flowers
and
take only what
is
useful from them, leaving
the
rest behind.
106
Citing
Basil
as
his
authority, Bartolomeo Scala claimed
that the
ethical doctrines
of
105.
Suarez 1856-78, iv, p. 45 (Dejwe fcommisiv.3):'necesse est. . . ut pro tempore huius vitae aliquid sit
optimum , . . illud ergo habebit rationem beatitudinis huius vitae, quae licet comparata ad illam,
quam speramus, sit imperfecta et revera non sit beatitudo'.
106.
St Basil, De
utilitate
studii
in
librosgentilium,
cap. 4. This work was translated into Latin by Bruni and
enjoyed considerable popularity in the fifteenth century; for his preface, see Bruni 1928, pp. 99-
100; see
also
Schucan 1973.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
320
Moral philosophy
ancient philosophers were
not to be
entirely neglected,
but
rather
followed
selectively
and
cautiously,
so
that
one
took
in
what
was
profitable while
avoiding
what
was
erroneous.
107
Theodor Zwinger wanted Christians
to
reap
the
harvest ploughed
by
Plato
and
sown
by
Aristotle,
but
with
a
pious
and judicious selectivity, assenting
to
whatever agreed with faith,
but
rejecting
anything which disagreed.
108
Erasmus also subscribed
to
this
view.
Although
he
warned against adopting
the
moral habits
of
the pagans
when
studying their literature,
he
nevertheless admitted
that
their works
contained much
that
was
conducive
to
upright
living.
And
good advice,
even
if it
came from
a
pagan,
was not to be
spurned.
109
Indeed, pagan authors like
Cicero
had
often presented such good advice
that
Erasmus felt they
put
Christians
to
shame. Although Christians claimed
to
follow
the
divinely inspired morality
of the
gospels,
for the
most part
they
did not
even
live
up to the
moral standards
set by
mere pagans relying
solely
on
natural reason.
110
In a
similar vein,
Vives
complained
that
the
pagan Seneca taught Christians what
he by
right should have learnt from
them.
111
Philippe Le Plessis thought his slothful
and
morally lax contempo-
raries could learn
a
good deal from
the
pagan Aristotle,
who
spoke with
such divine inspiration about virtue, despite
the
fact
that
in
place
of
Christ's
preaching
he had
heard only Plato's.
112
According
to
Francisco Thamara,
in
the
preface
to his
Spanish translation
of
Xenophon's Oeconomicus,
God
had permitted
the
works
of
many ancient authors
to
survive precisely
in
order
that
they might serve
as a
reproach
to
Christians,
who
despite their
illumination
by the
light
of
true
faith were more blind
and
obtuse than these
virtuous pagans.
113
107.
Scala,
Epistola
de
nobilioribusphilosophorum sectis,
published in Stein 1888, p. 551: 'Neque... is sum
qui antiquiorum scripta philosophorum negligenda putem. Sed imitandae mihi videntur apes, ut
ait Basilius, quae in adeundis floribus ... ex singulis id assumunt quod melli faciundo aptum
vident.'
108. Zwinger 1566, p. 16: 'Plato arat; Aristoteles serit; nos cum iudicio et pietate fruges demetamus. . .
ut in quibus cum sacrosancta fide nostra consentiunt, iis assentiamur; in quibus ab eadem
discrepant, antiquior apud nos sit dominae scripturae quam pedissequae philosophiae auctoritas.'
109.
Erasmus 1703-6, v, col. 7
(Enchiridion militis Christiani):
'nolim te cum Gentilium litteris, Gentilium
et mores haurire. Alioqui permulta reperies et illic ad recte vivendum conducibilia; neque
adspernandum, quod etiam Ethnicus auctor bene monet.'
no. Erasmus 1906-58, iv, p. 67 (preface to his
15
20 edition of
Cicero's
De
officiis):
'quamturpesitnonid
perspicere pectus Evangelica luce illustratum, quod perspectum est iis quibus sola nature scintilla
praelucebat'.
111.
Vives 1973, p. 27:
'Audi
Senecam, hominem gentilem, Christianos edocentem quae ilium
conveniebat potius a Christianis discere.'
112.
See his preface to Aristotle
1553b,
sig. aa iii
r
:
'Cest
Ethnique, qui . . .
n'ouist
iamais pour
Christ
preschant que Platon, parle si divinement de la vertu.'
113.
Xenophon 1546, p. 205: 'permitio Dios que [las escripturas] permanesciessen por tantos tiempos
.
. . para castigo y reprehension de nosotros los Cristianos, que siendo alumbrados por aquella luz
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
The
basic premise underlying
all
these
views
was that
classical morality,
although vastly inferior
to
Christian, was
not in
fundamental conflict with
it. Ancient ethics
had
thus
mapped
out a
path
which
led in the
direction
of
the
true
Christian homeland,
but
which stopped short
at the
boundaries
of
the temporal world. Although, according
to
Petrarch, virtue was
not
man's
final
goal,
as
pagan philosophers
had
thought, nonetheless
the
right road
to
that
goal (which
was, of
course,
God)
passed through
the
virtues.
114
A
similar
view
was
expressed
by
Poggio
Bracciolini,
who
claimed
that the
ancients
had
taught essentially
the
same moral precepts
as
Christians.
But
while
pagan philosophers
had
regarded these doctrines solely
in the
context
of
this
life,
Christians
saw
them
as a
preparation
for the
next.
115
Andrea
Camuzio,
challenging those philosophers
and
professors
of
Scripture
who
claimed
that the
study
of
philosophy, especially Aristotelian,
was at
variance with Christianity, maintained
that so far
from conflicting with
the
dogmas
of
sacred theology,
the
doctrines
of
Aristotle
and
Plato were
in
complete agreement with them.
116
For
Crisostomojavelli Christian moral
philosophy transcended
that
of
Plato
and
Aristotle
as
much
as the
unfailing
brilliance
of the sun
outshone
the
lustre
of the
stars
and
moon.
117
Nevertheless,
Javelli
did not
deny
the
validity
or
utility
of
Peripatetic
and
Platonic ethical doctrines, which
he in
fact discussed
in
great detail.
He
merely pointed
out
their limitations
in
comparison with
the
infallibility
and
perfection
of
Christian dogma.
There was,
of
course, considerable sensitivity
to the
differences between
classical
and
Christian concepts
of
morality. Salutati,
for
example, stressed
the fact
that
while pagan philosophers
had
dealt primarily with external
actions as judged
by
others, Christians were
far
more concerned with
the
internal quality
of
their behaviour as evaluated
by
their own consciences.
118
verdadera
de nuestra fe . . . estamos porventura mas ciegos y torpes y mas descuyadeos que
estos
varones excelentes'.
114.
Petrarch 1955, p. 746 (De sui
ipsius
et multorum
ignorantia):
'Etsi. . . non sit in virtute finis noster, ubi
eum philosophi posuere, est tamen per virtutes iter rectum eo ubi finis est noster'; see also Foster
1984,
p. 168.
115.
Poggio Bracciolini 1984-,
11,
p. 40: 'quod gentilium habet philosophantium doctrina, id totum fere
respicit presentem vitam; quod vero nostri tradunt, id ita presentis vite rationem haberi concedit,
ut
sit tanquam viaticum future'.
116.
Camuzio 1541, p. 18: 'ego sum huius sententiae, ut existimem sacrosanctae theologiae praecepta
Aristotelis atque Platonis placitis nulla ex parte reluctari, quinetiam conspirare in omnibus'; see also
Schmitt
1982.
117.
Javelli 1651, p. 378: '[Christianae moralis philosophiae] dignitas et celsitudo supra Peripateticam et
Academicam
tanta utique erit, quanta est Solaris claritas indeficiens supra astrorum lunarisque globi
refulgentiam eclipsabilem.'
118.
Salutati
1891-1911,11,
p. 184: 'virtutes . . . non ex operibus acquiruntur, sicut philosophi tradunt,
sed sunt bona mentis qualitas . . . quam
solus
Deus in nobis operator'; 1947, p. 334: 'Timeamus . . .
conscientie nostre secretum et illam quasi testem cunctis que facimus adhibeamus'; see also Garin
1943-6;
Witt 1983, pp. 416-29.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
322
Moral philosophy
Clichtove,
in his
commentary
on
Aristotle's Magna moralia, described
the
virtues produced
by
reason
and
recommended
by
philosophers
as
mere
shadows
of
those inspired
by
Christ.
For
while
in
human virtues
it
was
man
who
acted,
in
divine ones
it was the
Holy Spirit which acted through
man,
using
him as an
instrument.
119
Yet
despite their awareness
of
such
important
distinctions between classical
and
Christian morals, most
Renaissance philosophers regarded
the two
ethical systems
as
basically
compatible.
Most,
but not
all.
The
Florentine canon Matteo
Bosso,
whose eloquent
erudition was admired
by
Angelo
Poliziano
and
Giovanni
Pico,
rejected
the
notion
that
philosophers could make
any
contribution
to
man's happiness.
For lacking
the
spiritual light
of
true
wisdom which only Christ could
fully
and perfectly provide, they wandered
in the
dark
and
committed childish
errors.
120
Such opinions were
by no
means limited
to the
priestly caste.
In
his
De
transitu
Hellenismi
ad
Christianismum
(1535),
the
humanist Guillaume
Bude
wrote:
'The
happy
life
should
not be
discussed
in the
Stoa,
or in the
Academy,
or in the
clever debates
of
the Peripatetics,
but
rather
we
should
philosophise
in the
school
of the
gospel,
the
Olympus
of
theory,
the
paradise,
so to
speak,
of
theosophical contemplation.'
121
In
the mid
fifteenth century Lorenzo
Valla
mounted
a
thoroughgoing
attack
on
those
who
attempted
to
assimilate classical ethics
to
Christian
doctrine,
for he
believed
that
ancient morality
had
been totally superseded
by
the
teachings
of
faith.
122
Vives,
who
shared this point
of
view,
complained
that his
contemporaries neglected
the
infallible guidance
provided
by
sacred doctrine, preferring
to put
their faith
in
dim-sighted
and
half-blind
philosophers.
Why, he
asked,
do we
base
our
doctrines about
virtues
and
vices
on the
dreams
of
pagans instead
of
the divine philosophy
of
Christianity which
God has
provided
for
us?
123
119.
Clichtove 1537, f. 3
r
: 'virtutes quas parit ratio, quasque praedicant philosophi, umbrae earum sunt
quas spiritus
CHRISTI
in membris suo insertis corpori operatur ... In
illis
agit homo; in his agitur
potius, ac organum est.'
120.
Bosso 1495, sig. D v
v
: '[Vera sapientia] lux animi est,
sine
qua tamquam caligine offusa omnis est
vita.
Et . . . hanc perfectam et plenam intulit Christus. Unde philosophi, quibus Christiana non
illuxit foelicitas, sunt vagati per tenebras erroresque pueriliter'; for Poliziano and Pico, see Bosso
1492,
sig. a ii
r_v
; see also Soranzo 1965.
121.
Bude
1557,1,
p. 227
(111):
'Non in Porticu, non in Academia, non in ambulatione arguta, de vita
beata
disputandum est; sed in schola Evangelii, in Olympo theoriae, et velut in qua paradiso
theosophicae contemplationis philosophandum'; see also Penham 1954; De la Garanderie 1976, pp.
209-60.
122.
L. Valla 1970a, p. 2: 'ego . . . planum faciam . . . nihil cum virtute gentilitatem, nihil recte fecisse';
see also
Gray
1965, p. 46.
123.
Vives 1782-90, vi, p. 210 (De
causis
corruptarum
artium vi.i): 'nos
illis
[philosophis] credimus
lusciosis
et lippis, doctrinam aperte coelestem negligimus . . . Quod si, ut par est, pluris facimus
divinam
nostram philosophiam, quam
esse
a Deo nobis collatam pro certo habemus, quorsum
attinet de virtutibus et vitiis ex illorum hallucinationibus statuere?'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
323
The
validity
of
classical
ethics was also challenged
by
Protestants, such
as
Lambert Daneau.
As a
rigorous Calvinist, Daneau
saw the
fall
as the key
factor
in
understanding human behaviour. Since ancient philosophers
had
not taken original
sin
into account, none
of
their moral precepts
was in his
view
of
any
use to
post-lapsarian man.
124
Moreover, their opinions were
vain
and
invalid because they were based solely
on
corrupt human reason.
On
these grounds, Daneau rejected
the
whole tradition
of
classical moral
philosophy
and
presented instead
a
complete ethical system based
on the
law
and
word
of
God
as
revealed
to
Moses
in the Ten
Commandments.
125
For Philipp Melanchthon,
the
fall
was
also
the
central issue
in
ethics.
He
believed,
however,
that
although man's spiritual understanding
of
God's
law
was totally vitiated
by
original sin,
his
rational knowledge
of
the law
of
nature,
which was
part
of
divine law, remained intact.
So man
was still able
to judge whether external actions were right
or
wrong.
126
Moral
philosophy, according
to
Melanchthon,
was the
explication
of the law of
nature
by the use of
reason
for the
purpose
of
establishing rules
to
govern
behaviour.
127
It
was perfectly acceptable, indeed desirable,
for
Christians
to
use classical philosophy
in the
exegesis
of
the
law
of
God
as
found
in
nature,
provided they kept
it
strictly separate from
the
law
of
God
as
revealed
in the
gospels.
For
ethics
had
nothing
to do
with
the
will
of
God
or the
remission
of
sins;
it was
exclusively
concerned with rules governing external action
and
civil
society. Conversely, theology
had
nothing
to do
with these ethical
rules:
'For
Christ
did not
come
to
earth
in
order
to
teach moral precepts
which
were already known
by
reason,
but
rather
to
remit
our
sins
and
deliver
the
Holy Spirit
to
those
who
believed
in
him.'
128
By
delineating these
two
different spheres
of
influence,
Melanchthon was
in
effect
applying Luther's doctrine
of the two
kingdoms
to
ethics.
In his
treatise
Von
weltlicher Obrigkeit
(1523),
Luther distinguished between
the
sacred kingdom,
in
which
true
Christians
are
ruled
by
Christ through
the
Holy
Spirit,
and the
secular kingdom,
in
which non-Christians
are
ruled
by
124.
Daneau 1588, f. no
v
: 'quum philosophi ipsam naturae nostrae vitiositatem minime agnoscant
(quae est omnium in nobis peccatorum fons), ii quoque vitio et fonti non medentur'.
125.
Daneau 1577 (lib. 11); see
also
Fatio 1976.
126.
Melanchthon 1834-60, xvi, col. 23
(Philosophiae moralis epitome):
'manet iudicium de
honestis
actionibus exterioribus, . . . quod ipsum tamen est lex naturae et pars legis divinae'.
127. Ibid.,
col. 167
(Ethicae doctrinae elementa):
'[Philosophia moralis] est explicatio legis naturae,
demonstrationes ordine in artibus usitato colligens, quantum ratio iudicare potest, quarum
conclusiones sunt. . . praecepta de regenda disciplina in omnibus hominibus'; see
also
Hartfelder
1889, pp. 231-8.
128. Ibid.,
col. 281
(Enarrationes aliquot
librorum
Ethicorum Aristotelis):
'Non enim venit Christus in
mundum,
ut praecepta de moribus doceret, quae iam ante norat ratio, sed ut remitteret peccata, ut
credentibus in ipsum donaret Spiritum sanctum.'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
324
Moral philosophy
political
authorities through laws
and
coercion. Since
the
secular kingdom
is
also established
by God and is
necessary
in
order
to
preserve society,
Christians must obey
its
authority, provided
it
does
not
impinge
on
their
higher loyalty
to God by
interfering
in
matters
of
faith.
129
For
Melanch-
thon
the
ethical precepts established
by
ancient philosophers performed
the
same function
as the
laws
of
the state: they governed
the
external actions
of
those
who had not yet
been enlightened
by the
Holy Spirit
and
helped
to
preserve
the
peace
and
order
of
civil
society.
Just as it was
right
for
Christians
to
obey
the
laws
of
the state,
so it
was also incumbent
on
them
to
follow
the
precepts
of
moral philosophy.
130
Indeed,
the
innate
knowledge
of
right
and
wrong,
on
which these precepts were based,
was one
of
God's
greatest gifts
to man and
should
by no
means
be
ignored.
By
strictly
separating ethics
and
theology, Melanchthon
was
able
to
delimit
an
area,
governed
by
natural
law
and
coterminous with
civil
society,
in
which
it
was
legitimate
and
beneficial
for
Christians
to use
pagan moral doctrines.
131
Among
Protestants, Melanchthon's arguments were extremely influen-
tial,
for
they made possible
a
strong defence
of
classical
ethics against those
who
wanted
to
restrict Christian moral education
to the
Bible.
Joachim
Camerarius
justified
his
commentary
on
Aristotle's Ethics,
and
Hieronymus
Wolf
his edition
of
Epictetus' Enchiridion,
on the
grounds
that
the
study
of
moral philosophy was
not to be
rejected
but
rather
embraced
by
Christians,
as
part
of
God's bounty
to
man.
132
Bartholomaeus Keckermann declared
that
although ethics differed from theology,
it by no
means conflicted with
it.
For if it did, it
would mean
that
good morals were contrary
to
piety,
while
barbarous
and
scandalous behaviour, which disrupted society,
was
conducive
to
it.
133
According
to
Keckermann, pagan ethical doctrines
129.
Luther 1883-, xi, pp. 267: 'Lieber herr, ich bynn euch schuldig zu gehorchen mit leyb unnd gütt,
gepietet myr nach ewr gewalt mass auff erden, so will ich folgen. Heysst yhr aber mich glewben
...
so will ich nicht gehorchen'; see
also
Reich Gottes
1969.
130.
Melanchthon 1834-60, xvi, col. 281
(Enarrationes):
'ut legibus publicis obtemperare rectum est, ita
rectum est et philosophicis praeceptis parere'.
131.
Ibid.,
col. 23
(Epitome):
'Nec habet humana natura ullam dotem praestantiorem hac notitia, hoc est,
discrimine honestorum et turpium'; col. 168
(Elementa):
'Philosophia moralis nequaquam est
Evangelii
promissio, sed pars est legis, sicut lex naturae, quae de disciplina concionatur . . .: ita
veram
philosophiam amplecti et probare et ea uti recte potest [Christianus].'
132.
Camerarius 1578, p. 15:
'[non]
Studium sapientiae et prudentiae abiiciendum aut negligendum est;
sed potius hoc tanquam maximum bonum a Deo collatum hominibus et gratissimo animo
amplecti et accurate custodire debemus'; Epictetus 1561, p. 13: 'Non . . . reliquiae divinae lucis in
natura
humana contemnendae sunt, sed magnificendae et
studiose
excolendae.'
133.
Keckermann 1607a, p. 5: 'qui opinantur ethicam repugnare sfacrae] theologiae, quid aliud aiunt,
quam
bonos mores
esse
adversos pietati? Quod si boni mores repugnent pietati,
necesse
est . . .
barbariem,
imo omne genus flagitiorum, quo turbatur haec humana societas, amicum
esse
pietati';
see
also
Muller 1984.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
325
were not to be damned, as some critics had claimed, but
rather
carefully
separated from theology and restricted to
civil
morality.
134
The
attempt to establish the proper relation between Christian and
classical
moral doctrines and the effort to determine the supreme good of
man were two of the most important issues in Renaissance ethics. The
analysis and resolution of these problems varied considerably, however,
depending on which
of
the ancient philosophical sects was being discussed.
Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic and Epicurean ethics each gave different
answers to the question
of
the
sutnmum
bonum, and each had different areas of
conflict
and agreement with Christianity.
ARISTOTELIAN
ETHICS
Throughout the Renaissance, ethics as a professional and university
discipline was Aristotelian. The evidence of statutes and inaugural lectures
proves
that
in all major European universities, whether ethics was taught by
scholastic philosophers or humanists, in the Protestant stronghold of the
University
of
Wittenberg or the Jesuit
Collegio
Romano, Peripatetic texts
and doctrines formed the basis of instruction.
135
The
Leiden theologian Antonius de Waele noted
that
although some
thought Plato's ethics surpassed Aristotle's as much as Aristotle's physics
surpassed Plato's, Aristotelian
rather
than
Platonic writings had nonetheless
been used over the past several centuries for the teaching
of
ethics.
136
One of
the main reasons for Aristotle's continuing predominance was
that
his
well-
organised and methodical treatises were far more useful from the teaching
point
of
view
than
Plato's highly rhetorical and unsystematic dialogues.
137
Melanchthon chose Peripatetic
rather
than
Platonic ethics as the foundation
134. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
135. For
Florence,
see Reden und Briefe 1970, pp. 3-30
(Argyropulos)
and pp.
158-60
(Filelfo);
for
Pisa,
see
Kristeller
1956a,
p. 298; for
Padua,
see Platon etAristote 1976, pp.
105-46
(Poppi);
for
Rome,
see
Muret
1789,1, pp.
59-75;
for
Spanish
universities,
see
Robles
1979, pp.
45-69;
for
Salamanca,
see
Pagden
1975, pp.
308-11;
for
Coimbra,
see Estatutos 1963, pp. 317 and 329; for
Paris,
see
Grabmann
1926-56,
in, pp.
128-41,
University Records 1944, p. 247 and
Lambin
1565; for
Leiden,
see
Dibon
1954-,
1, pp.
59-61;
for
Cambridge,
see
Hackett
1970, pp. 277 and 299; for
Oxford,
see
Statuta
Antiqua 1931, p. 235 and
Weisheipl
1964, p. 175; for
Freiburg
im
Breisgau,
see Ott and
Fletcher
1964, p. 117; for
Greifswald,
see Cambridge History 1982, p. 19
(Kenny
and
Pinborg);
for
Wittenberg,
see
Petersen
1921, p. 170; for the
Jesuits,
see Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Iesu
1965-,
11, p. 180 and the 1599 Ratio
studiorum
in
Farrell
1970, p. 45.
136.
Waele
1620, sig. f 3
r
~
v
:
'licet
sint,
qui
existiment
Platonem
in
doctrina
morum
tanto
esse
superiorem
Aristotele,
quantum
in
rebus
physicis
Aristoteles
Platonem
antecellit,
obtinuit
tamen
iam
aliquot
seculis
inter
Christianos,
ut
Aristotelica
scripta
in
scholis
atque
academiis
. . .
Platonis
commentationibus
praeferrentur';
on
Waele
see
Lohr
1982, p. 228.
137.
Kristeller
1956a,
p. 288; Platon et Aristote 1976, p. 136
(Poppi).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
326 Moral philosophy
of
Protestant education partly because Plato's doctrines, although often
full
of
wisdom,
were ambiguously expressed
and
frequently couched
in
irony,
thus making them less suitable than Aristotle's treatises
for
pedagogic
purposes.
138
Zwinger,
who had a
Ramist obsession with method,
appreciated Aristotle's systematic treatment
of
ethical doctrines.
He
declared
that
although Aristotle might
not be
equal
to his
teacher Plato
in
devising
arguments,
he was not far
inferior, while
in
method
he was
superior.
139
Jason
de
Nores,
a
Cypriot noble who taught moral philosophy
at
the
University
of
Padua
in the
late sixteenth century, found Aristotle's
Ethics
well
ordered
and
organised,
but
lacking
in the
stirring rhetoric
and
inspiring examples necessary
to
arouse virtuous behaviour. Plato,
on the
other hand,
was
eloquent
and
stimulating
but
deficient
in
organisation
and
order.
In the
opinion
of
Nores,
it was
only
Cicero
who
managed
to
combine rhetorical elegance with methodical treatment, thus producing
the most
effective
ethical treatises.
140
Yet Aristotle
so
dominated
the
field
that
Nores felt obliged
to
defend Cicero's moral works
by
demonstrating
that
they covered
the
same territory
as the
Nicomachean Ethics.
He
therefore
argued
that
Definibus corresponded
to
book I,
De
officiis
to
books n—vi,
the
Tusculan Disputations
to
book
vn, and De
amicitia
to
books
vm and ix. For
book
x,
however,
he
offered
no
Ciceronian equivalent.
141
Although
the
Magna moralia
and De
virtutibus
et
vitiis, which were both
thought
to be
genuine Aristotelian works, received some attention during
the Renaissance,
the
Nicomachean Ethics remained
the
most important text
for
the
study
of
Aristotelian
ethical doctrine,
and the
commentary remained
the predominant method
of
exegesis.
142
Moreover, commentaries written
in
the
thirteenth
and
fourteenth centuries continued
to be
influential,
as can
be seen
by the
number
of
printed editions
of
these works, especially
in the
period
up to
about
1520.
143
The
medieval commentator
who
exerted
the
138.
Melanchthon 1834-60, xi, col. 348 (De
Aristotele
<I537>): 'male intellectae Platonis ironiae,
ineptum hominem prorsus infatuarunt. Aristoteles contra discentium utilitati consulere, et scholas
iuvare
voluit'; col. 655 (De
Aristotele
< 1547>): 'Nec ego nego plurima apud Platonem Ethica
reperiri sapientissime cogitata. Sed sermones sunt ambigui multi diversis locis sparsi'; xvi, col. 280
(Enarrationes):
'Aristoteles, cum sit amans methodi, pleraque rectius dicit quam caeteri philosophi'.
139.
Zwinger 1586, vi, p. 1558: 'Aristoteles inventione praeceptori suo Platoni si non par, non multo
tamen inferior, methodo etiam superior.'
140.
Nores 1597, p. 157: 'In M. Tullio nec ordo, nec methodus, nec perspicuitas, nec exempla, nec
eloquentiae vis, nec concitatio animorum ad honestas actiones desideratur'; on Nores see Lohr
1979,
PP-
541-2.
141.
Ibid.,
p. 51:
'Libri
De finibus respondent primo Ethicorum.
Libri
OrTiciorum respondent secundo,
tertio, quarto, quinto, sexto Ethicorum.
Libri
Tusculanarum respondet septimo Ethicorum . . .
Dialogus de amicitia respondet octavo et nono Ethicorum.'
142.
Aristotle
1970,1,
1, pp. 91-240. For commentaries on the
Magna moralia,
see Clichtove 1537 and
Case
1596b. On the De
virtutibus, seeEthik
im
Humanismus
1979, pp.
87-112
(Schmitt);
Kraye
1981.
143.
Printed editions of medieval commentaries are listed by Lohr 1967 to 1974a; see also
Cranz
and
Schmitt
1984.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008