Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Moral philosophy
307
side
of
the story
as to
challenge
it by
refuting
the
view
that
man's condition
was
one of
unrelieved misery.
28
Yet
there
were also those
who
agreed with
the
pessimistic assessment
of
man presented
in the
long tradition
of
Christian contemptus
mundi
literature.
29
Poggio Bracciolini's
De
miseria humanae conditionis, written
in
1455,
not
only borrowed Innocent's title
but
also elaborated many
of the
themes
he had
discussed.
For
example, Innocent
had
outlined
the
miseries
peculiar
to
each
of the
ages
of
man. Poggio took
up
this motif, using
his
rhetorical skills
to
paint
an
even more depressing picture
of
man's progress
from
the
depravity
of
infancy
to the
decrepitude
of
old age.
30
An
equally
bleak
view
of the
ages
of man was
presented about fifteen years later
by
Giovanni
Garzoni
in his De
miseria humana.
As a
doctor,
he
was inclined
to
dwell
on the
physical aspects
of
human suffering, which
he
described
in
gruesome detail: 'Some people's eyes grow weak; others have their noses
amputated; some
are
tortured
by
toothache; others have their tongues
cut
out.'
31
The
same topos was used
by
Erasmus
in his
Moriae encomium',
but he
gave
it an
ironic twist
by
attributing
the
lament
to
Folly.
32
Some
discussions
of man
were
set out as
dialogues,
in
which
the
first
interlocutor catalogues
the
afflictions which make
life
wretched.
His
arguments
are
then refuted
by the
second interlocutor,
who
describes
the
happiness
of
man's existence.
For
example, Aurelio Brandolini's
De
humanae vitae conditione begins with
King
Matthias Corvinus
of
Hungary
deploring man's physical suffering
and
spiritual anxiety. However, Petrus
Lucerinus,
Bishop
of
Novara, proves
to him
that
life
on
earth must
be
pleasant
and
agreeable since
no one
willingly departs from
it.
Moreover,
man's terrestrial happiness
is
increased
by
anticipation
of the
future
beatitude which
his
soul
will
enjoy eternally
in
heaven.
33
A
similar debate
28. Manetti 1975, p. 2 refers to Facio's 'opusculum quoddam precipuum et egregium'; on p. 100 (lib.
iv),
he argues against
those
who have written 'vel de laudatione et bono mortis, vel de miseria
humane vite', such as Innocent III (p. 111).
29. Bultot 1963-4.
30. Innocent III
1955»
PP.
12-16;
Poggio Bracciolini 1964-9, 1, p. 104: 'Infantia, pueritia, pubertas,
adolescentia,
nonne
cum stulticia, lascivia, impudentia, incontinentia redundent, sunt miseria
plenae?
Quid
harum aetatum vita differt a beluis? . . . vita [decrepitorum] . . . infinitis pene
confecta molestiis, . . . ut solum doloris et laboris particeps
esse
videatur.'
31.
Garzoni 1505, sig. A vii
v
: 'Quidam oculis debiles fiunt; quibusdam nares abscinduntur; quidam
dolore dentium torquentur; quibusdam lingua exciditur.'
32. Erasmus 1969-, iv,3, p. 108: 'quot calamitatibus hominum vita sit obnoxia, quam misera, quam
sordida nativitas, quam laboriosa educatio, quot iniuriis exposita pueritia, quot sudoribus adacta
iuventus, quam gravis senectus'.
33.
Brandolini 1543, p. 80: 'Potest haec misera aut molesta vita appellari, in qua tantae opes, tarn
multae voluptates ac suavitates sint, ut. . . nemo . . . ab ea
nisi
invitus discedat?'; p. 105: 'animus
.
. . perfruitur . . . spe atque expectatione futurae
illius
beatitudinis'.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
308
Moral philosophy
occurs
in
Fernán Pérez
de
Oliva's Dialogo
de la
dignidad
del
hombre.
The
opening speaker, Aurelio, attempts
to
prove
that man is a
worthless
and
miserable creature.
His
arguments
are
then systematically rebutted
by
Antonio,
who
defends
the
dignity both
of
man's soul
and his
body.
34
One
of the
ways
in
which
man was
defined
was in
relation
to the
lower
animals. Drawing
on
Pliny
the
Elder
and
Lactantius, some Renaissance
authors described
man as a
stepchild
of
nature,
for he
alone among animals
comes
into
the
world naked
and
defenceless.
Man
lacks
the fur,
feathers,
scales,
shells, spines
and
horns which protect other animals;
he is
less strong
than
the
bull, less swift
than
the
tiger
and
less cunning
than
the
lion;
he can
neither fight
effectively
nor
flee quickly.
35
But man
receives
one
gift
which
compensates
for all his
natural disadvantages: reason. Indeed,
man is
born
naked
and
defenceless precisely because
he can use his
intellect
to
clothe
and
arm himself.
36
According
to
Marsilio Ficino, man's reason gave
him
godlike
powers.
For
while animals were dependent
on the
particular bodily
gifts
provided
by
nature, man's intellect gave
him an
unlimited capacity
to
provide
for
himself.
37
It was
also argued
that
man's reason allowed
him to
dominate animals
who
were physically superior
to him. He
might lack
the
ox's
strength,
but the ox
ploughed
the
field
for
him.
Man,
moreover, made
his clothing from
the
skins
of
animals
and
dined
on
their flesh.
38
Those
who
complain
about
our
weakness
in
comparison
to
animals should seriously
consider, suggested Benedetto Varchi, whether they would prefer
to
swim
like
a
fish
or run
like
a
deer
rather
than
to
walk
and
talk like
a
man.
39
Anselm
Turmeda's Disputa
de
Vase consists
of a
debate between
the
author
and an ass
about whether
men or
animals were more noble.
Turmeda,
a
Franciscan friar from Majorca
who
converted
to
Islam, adapted
the work from
one of the
Epistles
of
the Brethren
of
Purity,
a
tenth-century
Arabic
encyclopaedia.
40
Anselm argues
that men are
superior
to
animals
because they build houses, towers
and
palaces.
The
ass, however, points
to
the intricate edifices made
by
bees, spiders
and
birds. Anselm then argues
34. Pérez de
Oliva
1982, p. 78: '(Antonio) Sobre el hombre es nuestra contienda: que Aurelio dize ser
cosa vana y miserable; y yo soy venido a defenderlo'; see
also
Solana 1941, 11, pp. 46-61.
3 5. Pliny,
Naturalis Historia
vii. 1-5
;
Lactantius, De
opificio
Dei, capp. 2-3
;
Pérez de
Oliva
1982, pp. 81—
2; Boaistuau 1982, pp. 77-8; Campanella 1620, p. 150 (n.25).
36. A character in the dialogue
Della condizione
de
l'uomo
(Brucioli 1982, p. 19) claims that man was
born 'ignudo e inerme perché d'ingegno si poteva armare e vestire di ragione'; Boaistuau 1982, p.
79:
'il est pour son grand profit et advantage armé d'entendement, et vestu de raison'; see
also
Magirus
1603, p. 3. 37. Ficino 1964-70, 11, p. 224 (xni.3).
38. Petrarch 1577, P- 739
(
n
-93)-'
'Non est tibi bovis robur, at tibi bos arat'; Campanella 1620, p. 150
(11.25):
'homo superat ammalia, vestitur ipsorum pellibus, carnibus vescitur ipsorum'.
39. Varchi 1858-9, 11, p. 612
(Sopra
la
pittura
e
scultura):
'Eleggeremo più volentieri il nuotare che
l'andare? ... ci piacerà più il correre, che il discorrere?'.
40. La
disputa
de los
animales
1984; see
also
Rico 1970, pp. 90-6.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
309
that
men eat the
flesh
of
animals.
But the ass
replies
that
worms
eat
men's
flesh, as
do
lions
and
vultures. None
of the
traditional arguments which
Anselm
puts forward
for
man's superiority
are
accepted
by the
ass, until
he
produces
his
final proof: God incarnated
himself
as
a
man. With this deus
ex
machina, Anselm wins
the
debate:
the
animals concede
that man is
more
noble
and
humbly agree
to
serve him.
41
Turmeda's Disputa was unquestionably
an
eccentric work,
but his use of
the Incarnation
as the
central argument
for the
dignity
of man was not
unusual.
The
fact
that God
chose
to
become
a man
rather
than
an
angel
or
any other animal
had
always been used
by
Christian philosophers
as an
important proof
of
human excellence. This argument lost none
of its
potency
in the
Renaissance.
42
Indeed, Manetti went
so far as to
claim
that
even
if
the
fall
had not
occurred, Christ would still have descended
to
earth
in order
to
glorify
man by
taking
on
human flesh.
43
God
had not
only become
man, he had
also made
man
Godlike:
'Let us
make
man in our
image, after
our
likeness' (Genesis 1:26). This biblical text
was
a
popular topic
for
patristic exegesis
and
was widely influential among
medieval
Christian authors.
44
It
continued
to be
cited
or
alluded
to in the
Renaissance
as a
powerful argument
in
defence
of
man's dignity.
45
Most
authors believed
that it was
man's immortal soul
and his
intellect which
resembled God.
46
Many also repeated
the
scholastic argument
that the
soul
conformed
to the
image
of the
trinity,
for
according
to
Augustine,
it was
divided
into
three
parts: memory, intellect
and
will.
47
Pushing
the
resemblance between
God and man
even further, Nicholas
of
Cusa,
in his
41.
Turmeda 1984, pp.
80—2;
p. 139: 'je vous accorde que les filz d'Adam sont de plus grand noblesse et
dignité que nous aultres animaulx, et que Dieu tout puissant nous a créez pour vostre service'. The
Disputa
was written in Catalan in
1417-18,
but only the 1544 French translation survives.
42. Nemesius of Emesa, De natura
hominis,
cap. 1; Honorius of Autun,
Liber
XII
quaestionum,
cap. 7;
Boaistuau 1982, p. 43: 'Mais quel tesmoignage de la dignité de l'homme! lequel son créateur a tant
prisé que de son éternité est devallé et descendu au monde, et a prins le vestement de la chair, et
s'est
faict
homme.' See also Petrarch 1577, p. 734 (ii-93); Facio 1611, p. 158; G. Pico 1942, p. 266
(Heptaplus);
Pérez de
Oliva
1982, p. 96.
43. Manetti 1975, p. 98: 'si primi nostri parentes nequaquam peccassent, Christusnihilominus e
celis
in
terras descendisset... ut hominem per hanc humilem humane carnis susceptionem mirabiliter et
incredibiliter honoraret glorificaretque'.
44. Garin 1938; on Gregory of Nyssa, see Muckle 1945; on Lactantius, see Perrin 1981, pp. 419-29; on
S.
Pier Damiani, see Bultot 1973; see also Eustratius, Michael of Ephesus and Anonymous 1892, p.
6; Hermes Trismegistus, Pseudo- 1945-54, 1, p. 10
(1.12).
45.
Petrarch 1577, pp. 732-3 (n-93); Bosso 1493, sig. a v
r
; Zwingli 1905-83, vi, 3, pp.
116-17 {Sermonis
de providentia
dei
anamnema);
Carbone de Costacciaro 1585, ff. I7
v
-i9
r
; see also Trinkaus 1970.
46. Nanni Mirabelli 1503, f. 150
r
: 'Anima facta est
similis
deo, quia immortalem et indissolubilem fecit
earn deus'; Fox-Morcillo 1566, p. 133: 'in homine animus praestantissima est pars, eaque Dei
similitudinem habet'; see also Brandolini 1543, p. 56; Sensi 1577, f.
H2
R
;
Camerarius 1578, p. 14;
Daneau 1588, f. 36".
47.
Augustine, De
trinitate
x.u; Pérez de
Oliva
1982, pp. 94-5; Benivieni 1984, pp.
175-6;
see also
Trinkaus
1970.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
De
coniecturis, likened
the
human mind's creation
of its own
mental
or
conjectural world
to the
divine mind's creation
of
the real world.
It was as
the creator
and
ruler
of
his own mental universe
that man
resembled God.
48
Man
was not
merely
the
image
of
God
but was
himself a second
god, a
terrestrial
and
mortal divinity, ruler
of the
earth
and
king
of all
God's
creations.
49
Although this anthropocentric
view
is
found
in
classical
philosophy, especially
in
Stoicism,
the
most influential source
for
patristic,
medieval
and
Renaissance authors
was
Genesis 1:26-8,
in
which
God
gives
man dominion over
the
earth
and
everything
that
moves upon it.
50
Renaissance
man
lived
in a
world which
had
been specially built
for him and
over
which
he was
lord
and
master. Fields
and
mountains, animals
and
plants, even metals
and
stones were
put on
earth solely
for his
convenience
and use.
51
Another
of
God's gifts
to man was a
body which surpassed
all
other
created beings
in
beauty
and
symmetry because
it
reflected
the
divine image
on which
it was
modelled.
52
According
to
Henricus Cornelius Agrippa,
man's body
was so
perfectly designed
that he was in the
literal sense
the
measure
of
all
things: temples, houses, theatres, ships, even Noah's
ark, had
all
been designed according
to the
proportions
of
the human body.
53
Using
Cicero
and
Lactantius
as
their models, many Renaissance authors wrote
elaborate catalogues
of the
parts
of the
human body, describing
the
particular beauty
and
utility
of
each limb
and
organ, from head
to toe and
from brain
to
intestines.
54
Of all
man's bodily attributes,
the one
which
48. Nicholas of
Cusa
1932-,
111;
see also Watts 1982, pp. 27-8 and no.
49. Bruni 1741, 11, p. 138: 'Homo ... est quasi mortalis quidam Deus'; Giorgi 1525, sig. Q iii
r
:
'audendum est dicere hominem quidem terrenum Deum
esse
mortalem'; Bovelles 1982, p. 148
(cap.
19): 'Sapiens est. . . terrenus quidam mortalisque Deus'; Du Bartas 193 5-40,11, pp.
393-4
(La
Premiere Sepmaine):
'un second Dieu . . . chef de l'univers. . . roy desanimaux'; Boaistuau 1982, p.
38: 'Roy et Empereur de tout ce qui estoit contenu en cest univers'.
50. On the Stoics, see Pohlenz
1970,1,
pp. 99-101; on the Church Fathers, see Spanneut 1969, pp. 380-
4; see also Cicero, De natura
deorum
11.62—3;
Philoponus, De
opificio niundi
v.i.
51.
Manetti 1975, pp. 80—1: 'Nostre sunt terre, nostri agri, nostri campi, nostri montes . . . nostri
boves,
nostri tauri, nostri cameli. . . nostra maria, nostri omnes pisces . . .'; Buonamici 1591, p.
1001:
'Homini elementa serviunt . . . multis etiam plantis lapidibusque atque metallis medicae
vires datae sunt ad unam
eius
salutem'; see also M. Fox 1983, for the use of this theme by the
sixteenth-century Jewish philosopher
MaHaRaL.
52.
See Giorgi 1525, sig. Q iiii
r
. Manetti 1975, p. 30
notes
that in some churches God is painted 'instar
hominis'. The ass in Turmeda 1984, pp. 88-91 counters this type of
argument
by pointing out that
men use a lamb to depict Christ and a cow, eagle and lion to depict three of the Evangelists;
Matthew,
who is usually depicted as a man, is conveniently omitted by the ass.
53.
Agrippa 1533, p. 160; see also Magirus 1603, p. 3. On the human proportions of Noah's ark, see
Ambrose,
De Noe, cap. 7, and Augustine, De
civitate
Dei xv.26.
54.
Cicero, De natura
deorum
11.54-9;
Lactantius, De
opificio
Dei, capp. 7-15; Manetti 1975, pp. 5if.;
Brandolini
1543, pp.
49ff.;
Perez de
Oliva
1982, pp.
98rf.;
Boaistuau 1982, pp. 49fF.; Du Bartas
i935
-
40,
n, PP-
394ff-
(La
Premiere Sepmaine).
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
3ii
most distinguished him from other animals was his upright posture. For
while
all other animals were face down with their gaze
fixed
on the earth,
man alone stood erect with his face and eyes turned towards the heavens.
This
immensely popular topos, found in classical, patristic and medieval
sources,
55
was used by Renaissance philosophers, humanists, theologians
and poets as proof
that
man was destined to contemplate the spiritual and
heavenly
realm, which was his
true
home.
56
Man's body, however perfectly formed, still connected him to the
temporal and mortal world
of
animals. His soul, however, united him with
the eternity and immortality of God. It was thus man's most noble
possession and his greatest source of dignity.
57
His
true
distinction,
moreover, resided in the highest part of his soul, the rational faculty, since
according
to the generally accepted Aristotelian psychology the vegetative
and sensitive souls were shared by plants and animals, but the rational soul
was
peculiar to man. So while the highest faculty in animals was sense-
perception, in man it was cognition.
58
Renaissance authors took great
delight
in praising man's intellect and in cataloguing the marvels it had
accomplished,
among which they listed the construction of Brunelleschi's
cupola
for the Florentine cathedral and the invention of printing.
59
Because
man consisted not only
of
an immortal soul but also
of
a mortal
body,
he united within
himself
the temporal and the eternal, the earthly and
the divine. The ancient Neoplatonists therefore described man as the
ontological
link between the material and intelligible worlds. This notion
of
man as the vinculum
mundi
who ties together the universe influenced a
number
of
Church
Fathers and medieval authors.
60
It is found in the works
55.
Plato,
Cratylus
399c;
Aristotle,
De partibus
animalium
iv.io
(686
a
27-8);
Cicero,
De
natura
deorum
11.56;
Ovid, Metamorphoses
1.84—6;
Silius
Italicus,
Punka
xv.84-7;
Manilius,
Astronomica
iv.905-8;
Lactantius,
Divinae Institutiones 11.1;
Gregory
of
Nyssa,
De hominis opificio cap. 8;
Boethius,
De
consolatione philosophiae
v.m.5;
Peter
Lombard,
Sententiae
11.16.
56.
Petrarch
1577, p. 734 (11.93);
Facio
1611, p. 156;
Manetti
1975, p.
5;Brandolini
1543, pp. 53-4; Mair
1530, f
i64
v
;Ricchieri
1542, p. 84(111.11);
Perez
deOliva
1982, p.
98;Zwingli
1905-83,
vi, 3,p. 120
(Sermonis de providentia dei anamnema); Du
Bellay
1966, p. 121 (Les Regrets 53); see
also
Patrides
1982;
Sozzi
1982, pp.
12-20.
57.
Erasmus
1969-,
v, 1, p. 74 (De contemptu mundi):
'Corpore
quidem,
excepta
figura,
nihil
a
brutis
absumus,
anima
vero
non
parum
ad
divinam
illam
atque
aeternam
naturam
accedimus';
Ricchieri
1542, p. 59 (11.22):
'Omnis
nostra
dignitas
ab
anima
est,
quae
vehiculum
est ad
deum
. . .'; see
also
Paleario
1696, p. 168 (De felicitate);
Florimonte
1554, p. 14;
Fox-Morcillo
1566, p. 133.
58.
Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics 1.7;
Bruni
1741,11,
pp.
138-9;
Florimonte
1554, pp.
34~5;Nores
1578,
f. 5
V
;
Heiland
1581, p. 183;
Piccart
1605, p. 4.
59. For
Brunelleschi,
see
Manetti
1975, p. 59; for
printing,
see
Boaistuau
1982, p. 61.
60.
Nemesius
of
Emesa,
De
natura
hominis, cap. 1;
Gregory
of
Nyssa,
De hominis opificio, cap. 2;
Augustine,
De civitate Dei ix.13; Asclepius, cap.
6;John
Scotus
Eriugena,
De divisione naturae
iv.io;
Hugh
of St
Victor,
De sacramentis 11.1.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
312
Moral philosophy
of
a variety
of
Renaissance authors,
61
but it
played
a
particularly
important
role
in the
philosophical system
of
Ficino.
Soul,
the
category
to
which
man
belonged,
was
according
to him the
lowest being
in the
intellectual world
and
the
highest
in the
corporeal world.
62
It,
therefore, held
the
central place
in
the
scheme
of
five
ontological hypostases adapted
by
Ficino from
the
Enneads
of
Plotinus
and
also from Proclus' commentary
on the
Parmenides:
God,
Angel,
Soul,
Quality
and
Body.
63
Ficino's disciple Francesco
da
Diacceto
described
how
soul united
the
intelligible
and
corporeal realms
in
such
a way
that
it
neither lost
its
connection with
the
divine
nor
became
corrupted
by
matter,
so
that
it was
'truly
the
bond
and
knot
of the
universe'.
64
Man's soul
not
only tied together
the
categories
of
being,
it
also
in
some
sense contained them
all
within itself. This
was the
reason, according
to
Ficino,
why
God
had
incarnated
himself
as
a man. By
uniting
himself
with
human
nature,
he
was united with
all
creation.
65
The
theory
that
man was
composed
of all
the
elements
in the
universe
and
was therefore
a
small world
or microcosm
was
essentially
a
Platonic doctrine, found above
all in the
Timaeus.
But
from antiquity onwards
it had
influenced thinkers
of all
philosophical persuasions.
66
It
was used extensively
by
philosophers with
a
Platonic bent
of
mind, such
as
Nicholas
of
Cusa, Marsilio Ficino
and
Francesco
Giorgi,
but
also appealed
to a
wide range
of
writers.
67
It was
61.
Acciaiuoli 1535, f I95
v
: 'homo autem videtur
esse
medium inter alia animalia et
essentias
separatas'; Pomponazzi 1954, p. 38: 'bene enuntiaverunt antiqui cum ipsum [sc.
hominem]
inter
aeterna et temporalia statuerunt, ob earn causam, quod neque pure aeternus neque pure temporalis
sit, cum de utraque natura participet'; Zwinger 1566, p. 6: 'Homo . . . mundi vinculum';
Rhenanus 1969, p. 43 describes man as 'utriusque mundi copula'.
62. Ficino 1964-70, in, p. 113 (xvi.i): 'in eo gradu locata est hominis anima, ut sicut succedit proxime
mentibus, ita proxime terrena praecedat corpora'; see
also
G. Pico 1942, p. 266
(Heptaplus).
63. Ficino 1964-70,1, p. 137 (in.2): 'inquinque gradus. . . omnia colligamus, Deumetangelum in arce
naturae ponentes, corpus et qualitatem in infimo; animam vero inter ilia summa et haec infima
mediam'; see
also
Kristeller 1953a, pp. 435-7; M.J. B. Allen 1982, who points out that Ficino
used
tetradic and hexadic, as well as pentadic, schemes.
64. Diacceto 1563, p. 109 (De
amore
libri
tres
11.2):
'nec adeo degenerat a mundo intelligibili, ut divinae
conditionis expers sit; nec adeo vergit in corpus, ut materiae sordibus participet... Ex quo universi
nodus ac vinculum iure dicta est'.
65. Ficino
1576,1,
p. 21 (De
Christiana religione):
'naturae . . . humanae Deus uniatur oportet, in qua
sunt omnia'.
66. Conger 1922; Allers 1944; Olerud
1951;
Festugiere 1944-54,1, pp. 92-4; Spanneut 1969; Rico 1970;
D'Alverny
1976; Bertola 1984. The expression
fiLKpos
Koofxos
was coined by Aristotle in
Physics
VIII.2
(252
b
26).
67. Nicholas of
Cusa
1932—, 1, pp. 126—7 (De
docta
ignorantia
111.3):
'Humana vero natura . . .
intellectualem et
sensibilem
naturam complicans ac universa intra se constringens, ut microcosmos
aut parvus mundus a veteribus rationabiliter vocitetur'; see
also
in, p. 143 (De
coniecturis 11.14);
Vives
1782-90, in, pp. 334-5 (De
anima
et
vita):
'Nec immerito illud fere placuit, hominem parvum
quendam mundum appellari, quod vim naturamque rerum omnium sit complexus';
Agrippa
1533,
p. 160; Ficino 1981, pp.
121-2;
Giorgi
1525, sig. Q ii
v
; Castiglione 1947, pp.
482-3;
Ricchieri
1542,
p. 56
(11.18);
Varchi
1858-9, 11, p. 625; Sensi 1577, f 3
r
; Magirus 1603, PP- 1-2.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
313
often
stated
that
man was a
microcosm because
he was
composed
of the
same four elements
as the
cosmos: fire,
air,
water
and
earth.
68
For
Paracelsus
the four elements were combined
in man
into
a
fifth essence
or
quintessence,
in which
the
celestial
and
elemental worlds were united.
69
In
the
view
of
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
man was a
microcosm
in
which
all
forms
of
life
were contained.
Men
therefore
had the
potential
to
become
whatever type
of
being they chose. Although
there
were many
discussions
of
man's protean
nature
in
patristic
and
medieval literature, Pico
gave
this traditional idea
a
striking
new
formulation.
70
In his
famous i486
Oratio,
God tells Adam
that
he has
been given
no
fixed place
in the
universe.
He
is
therefore free
to
fashion
himself
into whatever form
of
life
he
selects:
he
can
sink
to the
level
of an
animal
or
rise
to the
heights
of a
god.
71
Pico
thus
removed
man
from
the
centre
of the
Neoplatonic hierarchy
of
being
and allotted
him
instead
an
indeterminate ontological status.
Pico's
Oratio became
a
popular
and
influential work, often quoted
and
imitated.
72
More importantly, many
of
his ideas filtered into
the
thought
of
sixteenth-century thinkers,
who
developed
and
adapted them according
to
their
own
perspectives. Filippo Beroaldo
in his
commentary
on
Apuleius'
Golden
Ass
elaborated Pico's notion
of
man's metamorphic capacity.
73
And
Francesco
Piccolomini's account
of
man
as the
creator
of
his
own
perfection
clearly
drew
on
Pico's assertion
of
man's freedom
to
fashion himself.
74
Juan
Luis
Vives
used
the
Oratio
as the
basis
for his
Fabula
de
homine
(1518),
in
which
man is
allegorised
as an
actor
who
plays every role
in the
universe
from
the
lowliest plant
to the
highest divinity.
75
The notion
that
man
has
no
fixed
place
in the
universal hierarchy was developed
by
Charles
de
Bovelles
68. Du Bartas 1935-40, 11, p. 391 (La
Premiere Sepmaine):
'En nous se void le feu, l'air, et la terre,
l'onde|Et brief, l'homme
n'est
rien qu'un abregé du monde'; see also Vives 1782—90, v, p. 156
(Vigilia
in
Somnium
Scipionis).
69. Paracelsus 1922-33, Abt. 1, xii, pp. 36-9
(Astronomia
magna):
'[Got] hat ausgezogen das wesen von
den vier dementen zusamen in ein stück . . . Also ist der mensch die kleine weit, das ist, alle
eigenschaft der weit hat der mensch in ime . . . Also ist der mensch das fünfte wesen und ist
microcosmus'; Abt.
1, ix, p. 220
(Opus Paramirum):
'nichts ist im himel noch
auf
erden das nicht sei
im menschen'.
70.
Lubac
1974, pp. 184-204.
71.
G. Pico 1942, pp. 104-6
(Oratio);
see also p. 192
(Heptaplus):
'Tritum in scholis verbum est,
esse
hominem minorem mundum, in quo mixtum ex elementis corpus et caelestis spiritus et plantarum
anima vegetalis et brutorum
sensus
et ratio et angelica mens et Dei similitudo conspicitur.'
72.
Perez de
Oliva
1982, pp. 93, 96; see also the writings of Hieronymus Pico published in Schmitt
1984,
§ v, pp. 70-3.
73.
Beroaldo 1500, f. 266
r
: 'Sic homines transfigurantur in lupos fiuntque versipelles, quando induunt
lupinam voracitatem; sic mox ex lupis in pristinam faciem revertuntur pristinamque vestem
resumunt, quando exutis improbis moribus et lupina deposita natura ad humanos mores et
humanam rationem
. . . regrediuntur'; see also Krautter 1971, pp.
65-71.
74.
F. Piccolomini 1594b, p. 2: 'summopere gloriari vales, si tuo labore, studio, cura et diligentia
perficeris . . . cum sis tuae integritatis, tuaeque perfectionis faber'.
75.
Vives 1782-90, iv, pp. 3-8; see also Colish 1962; Rico 1970, pp.
117-28.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
314
Moral
philosophy
in
his
Liber
de
sapiente (1509).
Man,
according
to
Bovelles,
is a
mirror
who
stands outside
and
opposite
the
rest
of
creation
in
order
to
observe
and
reflect
the
world.
He is
thus
the
focal
point
of the
universe
in
which
all
degrees
of
reality converge.
76
Luther's concept
of man was in
sharp contrast
to
this exalted picture
of
human potentiality,
for he
centred
his
view
on the
fall.
Christians
who
lamented man's misery
had
always pointed
to the
evil
consequences
of the
fall;
and
even those
who
praised
his
dignity
did not
entirely ignore it.
77
But
Luther,
in
order
to
stress man's total dependence
on
redemption through
Christ,
insisted that human nature
was
wholly
corrupted
by
original sin.
78
Man
was
therefore unable
to
make
any
contribution
to his own
salvation.
Instead
of
the autonomous self-creator described
by
Pico,
Luther saw fallen
man merely
as raw
material which received
its
ultimate form from God.
79
Erasmus rejected this
view
of man as a
lump
of
clay
which
God
moulded
like
a
potter.
80
In
Protestant thought, however,
the
spiritual impotence
and
depravity
of
post-lapsarian
man
became
a
central doctrine. Man's high
opinion
of
himself, according
to
Calvin,
had to be
deflated,
and he had to be
convinced
of
his
own
corruption
and
debility.
For
only then would
man
realise
that
he was
lost
and
hopeless without divine grace.
81
Like
the
Reformers,
the
Catholic sceptic Michel
de
Montaigne
was
concerned
to
destroy man's presumption
and
lower his
excessive
estimate
of
his
own
worth. Unlike them, however,
he did not
focus
his
attention
on
man's salvation. Instead
he
turned
his
critical gaze
on
many
of
the standard
Renaissance
views
of man and
gradually undermined
the
foundations
on
which
they stood.
He
questioned,
for
instance,
the
belief
that
men
were
76.
Bovelles 1982, p. 176 (cap. 26): 'Homo nichil est omnium et a Natura extra omnia factus et creatus
est: ut multividus fiat sitque omnium expressio et naturale speculum, abiunctum et separatum ab
universorum ordine, eminus et e regione omnium collocatum, ut omnium centrum'; see also
Charles
de
Bovelles
1982, pp. 101-8 (Magnard).
77.
Salutati 1957, p. 77 (cap. 33): 'Pone tibi ante oculos, miser homo, statum tue miserabilis voluntatis
.
. . Transgressione quidem primorum parentum hac pena tenetur cuncta posteritas, ut. . . nunc
non peccare penitus nequeamus'; Petrarch 1577, p. 733
(11.93):
'Nisi . . . peccati iugum sponte
subiissetis, omnium quae sub coelo sunt dominium haberetis.'
78.
Luther 1883-, xvm, p. 786 (De
servo arbitrio):
'Si credimus Christum redemisse homines per
sanguinem suum, totum hominem fateri cogimur
fuisse
perditum.'
79. Ibid.,
xxxix, 1, p. 177 (De
homine):
'tota creatura, nunc subiecta vanitati, materia Deo est ad
gloriosam futuram suam formam'; see also Mostert 1983.
80. Erasmus 1703-6, ix, col. 1248 (De
libero arbitrio diatribe):
'ad quid valet totus homo, si sic in illo agit
Deus,
quemadmodum figulus agit in luto?'; cf. Rom. 9:21.
81. Calvin
1863-1900,11, cols.
209-24
(Institutio religionis Christianae
11.3:
'Ex corrupta hominis natura
nihil
nisi
damnabile prodire'); see also Battenhouse 1949; Trinkaus 1983, pp.
317-39;
F. Wilson
1751,
p. 265: 'quocunque te vertas, intelligis te nihil
esse,
nisi
sordes, vitium, infirmitatem, scelus,
adeoque omni odio dignum; omne auxilium, omnem salutem atque dignitatem a Deo
exspectandam'; see also Baker-Smith 1984.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
315
superior
to
animals. Man's upright posture, which supposedly distinguished
him from
the
animals, was
in
fact surpassed
by
camels
and
ostriches, whose
necks
were
set
even higher
and
more erect than man's.
82
Nor was
Montaigne sympathetic
to the
complaint
that
nature
had
treated animals
better than
man by
giving
them more adequate covering. Man's skin
was
just
as
protective
as
that
of
animals,
as
could
be
seen from
the
example
of
the
ancient Gauls
and the
Irish
who
managed without wearing
any
clothes
at
all.
83
Indeed,
man was let
down
not by
nature
but by his own
reason,
of
which
he
was
so
inordinately proud.
It
was pure presumption
on
man's part
which
led him to
rate
the
uncertain knowledge
he
acquired through reason
more highly than
the
infallible dictates
of
nature. Man's knowledge
did
little
or
nothing
to
improve
the
quality
of
his
life,
whereas natural instinct,
which
guided animals, provided them with peace, tranquillity, security,
innocence
and
health.
84
Pierre Charron,
who
developed many
of
Montaigne's ideas
in his De
la sagesse
(1601),
concluded
that
man's superior
intellect
cost
him
more than
it was
worth.
For it was the
source
of his
greatest
woes:
vice,
passion, irresolution, despair.
By
contrast, animals,
who
simply
lived
according
to
nature, were more secure, happy
and
content
than men.
85
Man's
belief
in the
anthropocentric teleology
of
creation
was, for
Montaigne,
another
proof
of
human vanity
and
self-aggrandisement:
4
Who
persuaded
him
that
this wonderful motion
of the
vault
of
heaven,
the
eternal light
of
these torches
that
roll
so
proudly above
his
head,
the
terrifying
movements
of
this infinite
sea,
have been established
and
have
lasted
so
many centuries
for his
convenience
and
use?'
86
But
perhaps
the
most revolutionary aspect
of his
concept
of man was
Montaigne's
conviction
that
he
could learn about human
nature
by
studying
one
individual
man:
himself. Since
the
time
of
Petrarch, there
had
been
a
personal
and
subjective quality
in
some Renaissance ethical thought.
But
82. Montaigne 1965, p. 484
(11.12):
Tancoleure des chameaux et des
austruches,
je
la trouve encore plus
relevée et que droite la nostre'; see also Tahureau 1981, p. 164, who points out the dangers of man's
erect posture. 83.
Ibid.,
pp. 456-7
(11.12).
84.
Ibid.,
p. 460
(11.12):
'La vanité de nostre présomption faict que nous aymons mieux devoir à nos
forces qu'à sa [i.e. la nature] libéralité nostre suffisance'; p. 487: 'De quel fruit pouvons nous estimer
avoir
esté
à
Varro
et Aristote cette intelligence de tant de choses? Les a
elle
exemptez des
incommoditez humaines?'; p. 485: 'à eux [i.e. les animaux] nous
laissons
... la paix, le repos, la
sécurité, l'innocence et la santé'; see also A. C. Keller 1957;
Montaigne
1982, pp. 77-100
(McFarlane);
on Montaigne's scepticism, see Popkin in this volume, pp.
682-4
below.
85. Charron 1824, i, pp. 203-23.
86. Montaigne 1965, p. 450
(11.12):
'Qui luy a persuadé que ce branle admirable de la voute celeste, la
lumière éternelle de ces flambeaux roulans si fièrement sur sa teste, les mouvemens espouvantables
de cette mer infinie, soyent establis et se continuent tant de
siècles
pour sa commodité et pour son
service?'
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
3i6
Moral philosophy
Montaigne
was the
first
to
assert
that
each
man
bore
the
entire form
of the
human condition
and
therefore
to see
himself in
all his
individuality
as the
central subject
of
moral philosophy.
87
THE
SUPREME
GOOD
In Nicomachean Ethics
1.2
(1094*18-26), Aristotle described
the
final goal
of
mans's
life
as the
attainment
of the
supreme good
(TO
apiorov). This
he
defined
as
that
end
which
is
desired only
for
its
own
sake, while other things
are desired
for the
sake
of
it. From antiquity
to the
Renaissance,
the
enquiry
into man's supreme good
or summum
bonum,
that
is, the
attempt
to
determine
the
ultimate purpose
for
which
he was
born,
was
generally
accepted
as the
defining characteristic
of
ethics.
88
The
supreme good, according
to
Aristotle,
was
happiness (evSaifiovia),
since other things, such
as
wealth, honour
and
pleasure, were sought
in
order
to
achieve happiness,
but it was
desired solely
for its own
sake.
89
His
view
was so
thoroughly adopted
by
scholastic philosophers
that
the
term
happiness {félicitas
or
beatitudo) became synonymous with
the summum
bonum.
90
As
to
what constituted this happiness
or
supreme good,
there
had
always
been considerable disagreement among philosophers. Renaissance
discussions
of
the subject often began
by
referring
to the
fact
that,
according
to Augustine, Varro
had
postulated
the
existence
of
288 possible philosophi-
cal
sects, each with
a
different position
on the summum
bonum.
91
Bruni
87.
Ibid.,
p. 805 (in.2): 'On attache aussi bien toute la philosophie morale à une vie populaire et privée
que à une vie de plus riche estoffe: chaque homme porte la forme entière de l'humaine condition';
p.
622
(11.16):
'Puis que la philosophie n'a sçeu trouver aucune voye pour la tranquillité, qui fust
bonne en commun, que chacun la cherche en son particulier!'; see also Kristeller 1965a, pp. 66—7;
Screech 1983, p. 6.
88. Augustine, De
civitate
Dei vin.8: 'moralis . . . [est pars philosophiae] ubi quaeritur de summo
bono'; Landino 1980, p. 119: 'In ea [parte philosophiae, quam
Graeci
ethicen, nos de vita et de
moribus nominamus] . . . nos nihil aliud quaerimus
nisi
primum bonorum malorumque fines';
Javelli
1651, p. 633: 'Omnes qui de moralibus scripserunt, et antiqui philosophi et sacri theologi,
intentionem suam compleverunt in investigatione summi boni et ultimi finis ad quem natus est
homo'; Lambin 1565, sig. A 3
r_v
: 'Inexquirendo. . . summohominisbono philosophiam moralem
esse
occupatam . . . perspicuum est'; F. Piccolomini 1594b, p. 9: 'in libris de moribus . . .
praesertim consideratur summum bonum'.
89. Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics
1.7
(i097
a
34-i097
b
6).
90.
Cambridge History
1982, pp. 673-86 (Wieland).
91.
Augustine, De
civitate
Dei
XIX.I;
Fox-Morcillo 1566, p. 124: 'Siquidem in extremi boni adeptione
sitam
esse
foelicitatem, nemo est philosophorum omnium qui ignoret; sed quid sit illud ultimum
bonum,
minime adhuc inter
ipsos
constat, planeque omnes hac in re dissentiunt usque adeo, ut
ducentas et eo amplius philosophorum sententias de summo bono a Varrone commemoratas,
divus Augustinus affirmet';
see also Petrarch 1958, p. 91;
Giorgi
1525, sig. D v
r
; Zwinger 1586, vi, p.
1561;
Talon 1583, p. 1020; Keckermann 1607a, p. 9. Cf. the remarks of Scala discussed by Grafton
in this volume, pp. 772—3 below.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008