Schmitt C.B. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
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Astrology
and
magic
297
pneumatic (spiritual) theory of
matter
expressed in the context of a 'semi-
Paracelsian' cosmology.
63
Despite his
belief
in the astrological and magical
efficacy
of
spiritus
and
imagination, Bacon concluded
that
ceremonies invoking these
natural
powers are unlawful because they enable man to achieve his material ends
without labour. Bacon's strongest objections to magic were ethical; in this
respect, they reflected his
views
on the failings of philosophy, which in the
past had seduced man from truly useful learning. Plato had tempted
philosophy to its original sin of abstract, sterile contemplation, and
then
he
compounded the
error
by confusing philosophy with religion. Aristotle,
whose faults were fewer,
turned
philosophy toward verbalism, dogmatism
and sophistry. 'Plato made over the world to thoughts', wrote Bacon, 'and
Aristotle made over thoughts to words.' As mere speculation detracts from
the crucial work of observation, so magic aims 'by a few easy and slothful
observances' to pluck the fruit
that
God commanded man to seek in the
sweat of his brow. Bacon preferred the mechanical
arts
to the magical
because they were
collective,
collaborative and institutional, whereas magic
isolated the individual in selfish quests
that
'aim
rather
at admiration . . .
than
at utility'.
64
Joined to this moral indictment were certain physical and
metaphysical departures from the post-Ficinian theory of magic, derived
for
the most
part
from Paracelsus, Telesio and the other
nature
philos-
ophers. Most important was Bacon's rejection of metaphysical hyle-
morphism and his reformulation on physical grounds
of
a magical theory of
forms and occult qualities.
Bacon
conceived of magical phenomena as those 'wherein the . . . cause
is
. . . small as compared with the . . . effect'. From this disproportion of
cause and
effect
follow
amazement and difficulty of explanation.
Those
arts
. . .
that
take
more
from
fancy
and
faith
than
from
reason
and
demonstrations
are
three
in
particular:
astrology,
natural
magic
and
alchemy,
whose
ends,
however,
are not
ignoble
. . .
Magic
proposes
to
recall
natural
philosophy
from
a
miscellany
of
speculations
to a
magnitude
of
works.
. . But the
methods thought
to
lead
to
these
ends
are
full
of
errors
and
nonsense,
both
in
theory
.
. . and in
practice.
63. F.
Bacon
1857-74,11, pp.
656-7,
660; iv, pp.
347-54,
400-1 (for
Latin
text,
seei,
pp.
553-9,
608-9);
P.Rossi
1974,pp.
18-20,25;
Walker
1958,pp.
199-200;
1985,§x,pp.
122,
i27-8;Rees
1975,pp.
81,
85-6; 1977, pp. 110-13; 1980, pp.
552-3.
64. F.
Bacon
1857-74,n,
p. 86; iv, pp.
84,401
(for
Latin
text,
seei,
pp.
192-3,
609); P.
Rossi
1974, pp. 14-
15,
34, 40-1, 48, 52-3,
92-100;
Walker
1958, pp.
201-2;
1985, § x, p. 127;
Anderson
1948, pp. 107,
207.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
298
Natural
philosophy
Because
the utilitarian promise of the magical
arts
could rescue philosophy
from its moral doldrums, Bacon said he 'would
rather
have [them] . . .
purified
than
altogether rejected', and he suggested programmes for the
reform of natural magic and astrology. Even 'superstitious narratives of
sorceries,
witchcrafts [and] charms' became legitimate objects of enquiry.
Bacon
urged
that
the word 'magic', 'which has long been used in a bad
sense, be again restored to its ancient and honorable meaning . . . I . . .
understand it as the science which applies the knowledge of hidden forms
(Jormae
abditae)
to the production of wonderful operations; and by uniting
.
. . actives with passives, displays the wonderful works of nature.' In the
absence
of
this reform, a 'popular and degenerate natural magic . . . lays the
understanding asleep by singing of specific properties and hidden virtues,
sent as from heaven and . . . learned from the whispers of tradition'. This is
the otiose magic
that
'makes man no longer alive and awake for the pursuit
and enquiry of real causes'.
65
The
new magic
that
Bacon advocated was the operative manifestation of
his metaphysics, as mechanics was the practical expression of his physics.
Metaphysics
for Bacon was 'the investigation of forms', but the forms he
had in mind were not the 'toys
of
logic'
that
he and the
nature
philosophers
scorned in Aristotle.
'Of
a given
nature
to discover the form or
true
specific
difference
or nature-engendering
nature
or source of emanation', Bacon
explained,
is the
work
and aim of
human
knowledge
... In
nature
nothing
really
exists
beyond
individual bodies
performing
pure
individual
acts
according
to a
fixed
law
.
. . And it is
this
law . . .
that
I
mean
when
I
speak
of
forms
. . . The
form
of a
nature
is
such
that
given
the
form
the
nature
infallibly
follows.
. .
[Form]
deduces
the
given
nature
from
some
source
of
being
which
is
inherent
in
more
natures.
. .
He who
knows
the
forms
of
yellow,
weight,
ductility,
fixity,
fluidity
. . . and so on
and the
methods
for
superinducing
them
... in
some
body
. . . [may
achieve]
the
transformation
of
that
body
into
gold.
Obviously,
the Baconian form is not the Peripatetic abstraction, but its
exact
contours are obscure - a generative force, a defining essence, a
taxonomic distinction, a natural law, a material quality, an alchemical
65. F.
Bacon
1857-74,1, pp.
456-7:
'Artesipsae,
quae
plus
habent
ex
phantasia
et
fidequam
exrationeet
demonstrationibus,
sunt
praecipue
tres;
Astrologia, Naturalis Magia, et Alchymia;
quarum
tamen
fines
non
sunt
ignobiles.
. . Magia
sibi
proponit
naturalem
philosophiam
a
varietate
speculationum
ad
magnitudinem
operum
revocare
. . . Sed
viae
atque
rationes
quae
ducere
putantur
ad hos
fines,
tarn
in
theoria
illarum
artium
quam
in
praxi,
erroris
et
nugarum
plenae sunt';
iv, pp. 245, 296, 349,
355,
366-7,425
(for
Latin
text,
seei,
pp.
362-3,
498, 554, 559,
573~4);
Occult and Scientific Mentalities
1984, p. 355 (Clark); Capp 1979, PP-
180-90;
K.
Thomas
1971, pp.
350-2,
661-3.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Astrology and magic
299
additive, any of these
will
answer to Bacon's description which, however,
seems most akin to the
fixed
and distinguishing material properties of an
object.
66
This becomes clearer as one leafs through Bacon's illustration of
his method for the investigation of forms, a long list of 'instances'
that
gradually isolate the
nature
of heat, the particular material quality
that
Bacon
chose as the first exemplary object of his technique. To organise his
inductive method, Bacon outlined twenty-seven categories of'prerogative
instances', the last of which are 'instances of magic' marked by
that
imbalance of cause and
effect
that
makes them 'seem like miracles'.
67
Bacon
regarded this feeling of mystery as an obstacle to learning. He
condemned 'the easy passing over of the causes of things by ascribing them
to secret and hidden virtues and properties (for this
hath
arrested . . .
inquiry)'. He did not deny the existence of occult virtues and sympathies,
but he traced them to imperceptible physical structures in bodies called
'latent configurations'
(latentes
schematismi).
What are called occult and specific properties or sympathies and antipathies are in
great
part
corruptions of philosophy . . .
Inner
consents and aversions (consensus et
fugae) or friendships and enmities (for I am . . . weary of the words sympathy and
antipathy . . . [because of the] superstitions and vanities associated with them) are
either falsely ascribed or mixed with fables or from want
of
observation very rarely
met with . . . [Genuine] consents. . . are found in greatest abundance ... in certain
medicines, which by their occult . . . and specific properties have relation ... to
limbs or humours or diseases.
Having
thus
confirmed a tradition of pharmaceutical magic reaching back
two
millennia and more, Bacon explained
that
the genuine but occult
phenomenon of consent 'is nothing else
than
the adaptation of forms and
configurations
(symmetria
formarum
et
schematismorum)
to each other'. In
adopting the term
schematisms,
Bacon may not have known the kindred
language in Plotinus, and in listing a series of consents in 'sulphur, oil . . .
greasy exhalation, flame, and perhaps the body of a
star'
he may not have
had in mind the
rants'
of
Proclus
that
it resembles.
68
He had, however, read
Ficino's
De
vita
m, the Renaissance treatise on magic
that
first
fully
exploited
the philosophies of Proclus and Plotinus, and in any event, whatever the
manner of their mediation, the resemblance of Bacon's magical ideas to
66. F.
Bacon
1857-74,
iv, pp.
119-22,126,
146,
366-7,
398 (for
Latin
text,
seei,
pp.
227-31,
234,
257-8,
573-4,
606);
Anderson
1948, pp.
154-62,
207.
67. F.
Bacon
1857-74,
iv, pp.
127-55,
245 (for
Latin
text,
see 1, pp.
236-68,
362-3);
Anderson
1948,
pp. 207, 219.
68. F.
Bacon
1857-74,11, pp.
671-2;
iv, pp.
124-5,233,242-4,
366-7
(for
Latin
text,
seei,
233-4,
349~50,
359-61,
573-4);
Rees
1975, pp. 91, 97-8; see nn. 28, 35
above.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
300
Natural philosophy
their Neoplatonic ancestors is apparent
—
as are the differences. In the case of
occult
phenomena, Bacon's investigation
of
forms ended in the discovery of
forms, configurations and symmetries more physical
than
their Greek
analogues but still more magical
than
the quantitative conceptions of force
and
structure
that
were to emerge in the new science and philosophy of
which
Bacon is considered a prophet.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
VII
MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
II
THE
TRIPARTITE
DIVISION
OF
MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
In the Renaissance moral philosophy was divided into three parts: ethics,
oeconomics
and politics. This division corresponded to Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics and Politics and the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics, the
basic texts used in university teaching of moral philosophy. Aristotle
referred in passing to this type of tripartite division,
1
which was later
codified
and adopted by his Greek commentators as the standard Peripatetic
classification
of practical philosophy.
2
This tradition, transmitted to
medieval
Latin philosophy by Boethius and Cassiodorus, is reflected in the
classification
of
sciences
presented by Hugh of St Victor and other twelfth-
century authors, even though they lacked the Aristotelian texts on which it
was
based.
3
Dominicus Gundissalinus, for example, in his De divisione
philosophiae,
written around 1150 and based on both Arabic and Latin
sources,
divides practical philosophy into the science of governing a state,
ruling one's own family and controlling oneself.
4
With the rise of the
universities in the thirteenth century and the availability in Latin of the
Aristotelian
Ethics, Oeconomics and Politics, the triad of ethics, oeconomics
and politics became the normal structure for the moral philosophy
curriculum.
5
Renaissance authors continued to
follow
the tripartite division which
they inherited from their medieval predecessors. The traditional scholastic
organisation
of
moral philosophy was used by humanists and philosophers,
Aristotelians
and Platonists alike.
6
It continued to be a standard feature of
1.
Eudemian Ethics 1.8
(i2i8
b
i3-i4).
2. See, e.g.,
Simplicius
1907, p.
4.26-8.
3. See
Weisheipl
1965.
4.
Dominicus
Gundissalinus
1903, pp.
134-40
identifies
the
three
parts
of
practical
philosophy
as
scientia gubernandi civitatem, scientia regendi
familiam
propriam and gubernacio sui ipsius.
5. For the
University
of
Leipzig
see
Ehrle
1925, p. 206 n. 6; for
Oxford
see
Statuta
Antiqua 1931, p. 23 5
and
Weisheipl
1964, p. 175; for the
University
of
Greifswald
see Cambridge History 1982, p. 19
(Kenny
and
Pinborg);
see
also
Overfield
1984, p. 41.
6.
Bruni
1506, f.
I26
v
;
Reden und Briefe 1970, p. 12
(Argyropulos);
Landino
1974,1, p. 10;
Acciaiuoli
1535» sig- *
iv
r-v
;
Zini
1547, f n
r
;
Lambin
1565, sig. А
З
г
;
Vieri
1577, p. 9.
Some
Renaissance
authors
noted
that
the
tripartite
division
derived from
Simplicius:
see R.
Maffei
1506, f.
496
е
;
Beraud
1515, sig. a
iii
v
.
303
MORAL
PHILOSOPHY
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
304
Moral philosophy
moral philosophy treatises
and
textbooks
in the
sixteenth
and
well
into
the
seventeenth century.
7
In
his
commentary
on
book
I of the
Nicomachean Ethics,
the
Byzantine
philosopher
and
theologian Eustratius
of
Nicaea
(c. 1050-c. 1120) explained
the
tripartite
division
in
terms
of
subject-matter:
the
individual
man
was
the
subject
of
ethics;
the
home
and its
inhabitants were
the
subject
of
oeconomics;
and the
state was
the
subject
of
politics.
8
Eustratius' work
was
part
of
a corpus
of
Greek
commentaries translated into Latin along with
the
Nicomachean Ethics
by
Robert Grosseteste
in the
1240s.
9
Albertus Magnus,
who
used this corpus
a few
years later
in the
lectures which
he
gave
on the
Ethics,
explained
that
according
to the
'Commentator Graecus' each
of
the
three
disciplines
of
moral philosophy dealt with man's behaviour. They
differed,
however, because
man
could
be
considered
in
relation
to
himself
or
to
others;
and the
others could
be
further divided into
two
categories:
his
family
and his
fellow-citizens.
10
Albertus' student, Thomas Aquinas,
developed
this argument along similar lines
in his
commentary
on the
Nicomachean Ethics. Since
man was by
nature
a
social animal,
he was
dependent
on
others, who could
be
divided into
two
groups:
one
domestic,
the other
civil.
It was on
this basis
that
moral philosophy
was
divided into
three
parts: monastica, which concerned
the
actions
of the
individual;
oeconomica,
the
actions
of
the domestic unit;
and
politica,
the
actions
of
civil
society.
11
Although
some Renaissance philosophers drew directly
on
Eustratius
for
their explanations
of the
tripartite
division
of
moral philosophy, most
adopted
his
scheme
as
expounded
and
elaborated
by
Thomas Aquinas.
12
Thomas himself was only rarely cited,
but his
arguments
and
terminology
frequently appear
in
Renaissance discussions
of the
subject.
13
Each author
7.
R. Maffei 1506 (lib. 26); Javelli 1651; Nores 1578; Brisanius 1588; Golius 1606, 1622 and 1634;
Keckermann
1607a, 1607b and 1607c; Timpler 1612; Burgersdijk 1629 and 1644.
8. Eustratius, Michael of Ephesus and Anonymous 1892, pp. 1-2.
9. Eustratius, Michael of Ephesus and Anonymous
1973—,
Ь PP- 38*—45*; see also
McEvoy
1982, pp.
471-7.
10.
Albertus Magnus
1951-,
xiv, 1, p. 3: 'homo dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum se vel in
comparatione ad alterum, et in comparatione ad alterum dupliciter: vel ad domesticos coniunctos
vel
ad omnes communiter qui sunt sub eadem civitate'.
11.
Thomas Aquinas 1934, p. 4: 'moralis philosophia in très partes dividitur. Quarum prima considérât
operationes unius hominis ordinatas ad finem, quae vocatur monastica. Secunda autem con-
sidérât operationes multitudinis domesticae, quae vocatur oeconomica. Tertia autem considérât
operationes multitudinis civilis, quae vocatur politica.'
12.
Figliucci
1551,
p. i cites Eustratius; F. Piccolomini 1594b, p. 7 refers to Thomas, whose exposition
'Latinorum
multi sequuntur.'
13.
Javelli 1651, p. 5: 'advene quod homo . . . dupliciter considerari potest: primo secundum se . . .;
secundo, ut est pars multitudinis . . . Multitudo autem cuius homo est pars, duplex est, scilicet
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
305
tended
to
adapt
and
embellish
the
basic formula,
but
most accepted
the
principle
that
ethics dealt with
the
individual, oeconomics with
the
family
and politics with
the
state.
14
As a
variation
on
this theme, some suggested
that
ethics trained
the
good
man,
oeconomics
the
good head
of
household
and politics
the
good citizen
and
magistrate.
15
In
the
sixteenth
and
early seventeenth centuries another explanation
of
the difference between
the three parts
of
moral philosophy gained currency.
According
to
this
view,
ethics
was
concerned with general principles,
whereas oeconomics
and
politics dealt with
the
specific application
of
these
principles
to the
home
and
state.
16
On
these grounds, some authors argued
that
moral philosophy should
be
divided into
two
parts:
one
theoretical
and
general, consisting
of
ethics;
the
other practical
and
specific, consisting
of
oeconomics
and
politics.
17
There
was no
consensus about
the
relative importance
of the three
disciplines.
Some authors maintained
that
politics
was far
superior
to
ethics
and oeconomics because
it
concerned
the
good
of the
state, which
was a
higher
and
more perfect good
than that of the
individual
or the
family.
18
Others gave pride
of
place
to
ethics
as the
most fundamental
and
comprehensive
of the
disciplines.
19
There
was,
however, general agree-
ment
that the
study
of
moral philosophy should begin with ethics, proceed
to oeconomics
and
conclude with politics.
20
The
term 'ethics' derives from
the
Greek word rjdos, meaning disposition
familia sive domus, et civitas'; see
also
Vermigli 1582, p. 3; GifFen 1608, p. 2;
Collegium
Conimbricense
1612, sig. aaa 2
r
. Thomas' term
monástica
was
sometimes
adopted as a synonym for
ethics; see Fox-Morcillo 1566, p. 121, and Valerius 1566, p. 5.
14.
Landino
1974,1,
p. 10: 'In eo . . . quod tibi ipsi moderaris, ethica, in eo quod familiam privatamque
domum administras, oeconomica, in eo denique quod rem publicam geris et cum civibus versaris,
politica traduntur'; see
also
La Torre 1855, p. 383; Nifo 1645, pp.
17-18;
R. Maffei 1542, f. 2
r
;
Toletus 1600, f. 2
r
.
15.
Golius 1634, p. 1: 'Philosophia practica in tres partes distribuitur. Quarum una . . .
r¡0iKrj
appellatur, qua ostenditur, quodnam sit officium viri boni. Altera vocatur oUovojXLKr), qua
ostenditur, quod sit officium boni patrisfamilias. Tertia nominatur
TTOXITLKT),
qua traditur officium
boni civiset boni magistratus'; Florimonte 1554, p. 18: 'Filosofía morale. . . insegna a far l'huomo
buono, et mostra
a i principi o a i maestrati come
possono
fare il regno o la cittá loro felice; et al
padre di famiglia come habbia a governare casa sua'; see
also
Heiland 1581, pp. 1-2; Magirus 1601,
P-
7-
16.
Burgersdijk 1629, p. 9: 'Ethica . . . tradit generalia principia, ex quibus vitae practicae mores
formandi sunt. . . turn in familia, quod fit in Oeconomica; turn in civitate, quod fit in Politica'; see
also
Zwinger 1586, vi, p. 1558; Donaldson 1620, p. 3.
17.
F. Piccolomini 1594b, pp. 7-10; Waele 1620, pp. 7-8; Burgersdijk 1629, p. 9.
18.
Clichtove justifies this position on the basis of
Politics
1.1
(i252
a
i-6)
in Lefevre d'Étaples 1972, p.
367. See
also
Lambin's preface to his edition of Nepos 1569, sig. aaa i
v
.
19.
Fox-Morcillo 1566, p. 221; Camerarius in his edition of Aristotle and Xenophon 1564, p. 44.
20. Acciaiuoli 1535, sig. * V
r
; A. Piccolomini 1542, f. $2
X
; Figliucci 1551, p. 1; Vermigli 1582, pp. 4-6;
see, however, Piccart 1605, pp. 120-4,
wno
argues that politics should precede oeconomics.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Moral philosophy
or character. Ethics concerned
the
formation
of
man's moral character
or, in
the Latin terminology, his mores.
21
But
before philosophers could even begin
considering
how to
train
man's character, they first
had to
understand
his
nature.
RENAISSANCE
CONCEPTS
OF MAN
There was nothing particularly
new or
original about Renaissance
views
of
man.
The
various themes
and
motifs which were used
to
deplore
the
misery
of
the human condition
or to
exalt
the
dignity
of
man were
for the
most
part
borrowed from classical, biblical, patristic
and
medieval sources.
22
The
Renaissance
was,
however, characterised
by an
increased
and
intensified
interest
in the
exploration
of
man's nature.
23
In
the De
remediis utriusque fortunae Petrarch claimed (without justifica-
tion)
that he
was
the
first
to
write about
the
dignity
of
man. Others,
he
said,
had attempted
to
discuss
the
topic,
but had
given
up
because
it
was easier
to
write about human misery.
24
Petrarch probably
had
Pope Innocent
III in
mind,
for in the
prologue
to his De
miseria humane conditionis,
he had
announced his intention
to
write about
the
dignity
of
human
nature as
well,
but
had
failed
to do
so.
25
In
fact, Petrarch
was
specifically asked
by the
Grand Prior
of the
Carthusians
to
fulfil
Innocent's promise
by
writing
a
treatise
on the
dignity
of
man.
26
The
fifteenth-century humanist
Bartolomeo
Facio,
in
his
De
excellentia acpraestantia hominis, also took
up the
challenge
to
complete
the
task which Innocent, preoccupied with pressing
papal business,
had
left unfinished.
27
Spurred
on by
Facio's treatise,
Giannozzo
Manetti wrote
his De
dignitate
et
excellentia hominis,
in
which
he
intended
not so
much
to
complete Innocent's work
by
presenting
the
other
21.
Heiland 1581, p. 2:
'Circa
quid versatur haec scientia?
Circa
mores hominum, unde et nomen
habet:
-r)6os enim, ingenium hominis, indolem et mores significat'; R. Maffei 1542, f. 3
r
: 'Ethica:
tfdos
est animi seu habitus seu compositio seu conformatio, unde mores nascuntur.'
22.
Gentile 1925, pp. 35-96; Garin 1938; Trinkaus 1940, pp. 64-^79, 1970 and 1983, pp. 343-63; Baker
1947;
Kristeller 1956a, pp. 279-86; Buck
i960;
Rice 1969, pp.
176-7;
Sozzi 1982; Melammed 1982;
Giustiniani
1985, p. 187.
23.
For Renaissance concepts of women see Maclean 1980.
24. Petrarch 1577, p. 732
(11.93):
'Et si de hoc nemo hactenus,
nisi
fallor, scripserit, aggressique aliqui
destiterint, quod . . . humana miseria nimis multa prorsus evidenter emineat, foelicitas parva et
latens stilo altius fodienda sit'; see also Raimondi 1947.
25.
Innocent III 1955, p. 3: 'dignitatem humane nature Christo favente describam'.
26. Petrarch 1581, pp. 961-3
(Epistolae seniles
xvi.9); see also Trinkaus 1970, 1, pp. 179-99.
27.
Facio 1611, p. 149: 'De hominis excellentia scribere nuper aggressus sum . . . de qua quidem re
acceperam Innocentium . . . in eo libro, in quo humanas miserias complexus est, pollicitum
esse
sese
scripturum, sed . . . pontificatus negotiis impeditum, quod promiserat, non praestitisse.'
Facio's treatise (1448) was a reworking of De
dignitate hominis
et
excellentia
humane
vite
by the
Olivetan
monk Antonio da Barga; see Trinkaus 1970, 1, p. 209 and 1983, p. 356.
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