Rawls J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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grown up under them, have for accepting them. Could society advance

otherwise?

It is clear from the way Rousseau introduces the law-giver that he never

supposes that people’s entering into an agreement of any kind could be the

transition from a pre-political stage to a society whose basic institutions

conformed to the requisite terms of the social compact. It could not be in

that way that a people of the early stage of history of the Second Discourse,

the free, equal, and just society of the state of nature, could be transformed

into citizens with a general will. The institutions that fashion a general will

are designed by the law-giver who persuades the people that his authority is

of a higher order and so they accept the laws he proposes. In due course

later generations come to have and to perpetuate a general will. Once soci-

ety is set up and running, it is in stable equilibrium: its institutions generate

in those who live under them the general will needed to maintain it in sub-

sequent generations as they come on the stage. Rousseau’s reference to

Montesquieu (quoted above) states this point perfectly.

Rousseau’s legislator/law-giver should be seen, then, as in effect a

ﬁctional ﬁgure—a deus ex machina—introduced to take up the second pair

of questions: that of moral learning and stability, and the other of historical

origins. This device causes no problems for the unity and coherence of

Rousseau’s view, as is sometimes alleged. We see this once we distinguish

the four questions and recognize that there are different ways in which the

society of the social compact might come about.

§5. Freedom and the Social Compact

1. We have still to discuss the second part of the problem of the social

compact. Recall Rousseau’s statement of that problem as ﬁnding a form of

association such that while uniting ourselves with others, we obey only

ourselves and remain as free as before (SC, 1:6.4). How it is possible to re-

main as free as before seems highly puzzling when Rousseau emphasizes

that we give ourselves with all our powers to the community, under the su-

preme direction of the general will, and we claim no rights in reserve

against it. Some have found an implicit totalitarianism in his doctrine and

have found particularly ominous his remark about our being forced to be

free.

Let’s consider this remark and see if there is a way to read it consistent

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with our obeying only ourselves and with our now being as free as before

the social compact. The relevant passage is: “...inorderforthesocial com-

pact not to be an ineffectual formula, it tacitly includes the following en-

gagement, which alone can give force to the others [the other commit-

ments]: that whosoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained

to do so by the entire body; which means only that he shall be forced to be

free” (SC, 1:7.8).

We get a start on Rousseau’s meaning here by looking at the next chap-

ter on civil society. This chapter illustrates his change of view and mood

from the Second Discourse. Here the transition from the state of nature is fa-

vorably described, although with an important proviso regarding our not

suffering too greatly from the abuse of political authority. He says: “This

passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a remarkable

change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his behavior and giving

his actions the morality they previously lacked....Although in this state he

deprives himself of several advantages given him by nature, he gains such

great ones, his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas broadened,

his feelings ennobled, and his whole soul elevated to such a point that if the

abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him beneath the condi-

tion he left, he ought ceaselessly to bless the happy moment that tore him

away from it forever, and that changed him from a stupid, limited animal

into an intelligent being and a man” (SC, 1:8.1).

From this it is clear that our human nature, with our fundamental inter-

est in developing and exercising our two potentialities under conditions of

personal independence, is only realized in political society, or rather, only in

the political society of the social compact. In the next paragraph Rousseau

distinguishes the natural liberty, which we lose on joining civil society, from

the civil liberty and the legal right of property, which we gain. He goes on

to say that man also acquires with civil society: “moral freedom, which

alone makes man truly the master of himself. For the impulse of appetite

alone is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is

freedom” (SC, 1:8.3).

Now Rousseau’s thought here is surely not that obedience to just any

law we might prescribe to ourselves is freedom: in a ﬁt of absent-minded-

ness I might prescribe to myself some crazy law! No. He clearly has in

mind the laws we prescribe to ourselves as subjects when we vote on funda-

mental laws as citizens, from the point of view of our general will, and give

our opinion, which we think all citizens could endorse (given our beliefs

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and information), on the question of which laws are best framed to ad-

vance the common good.

But as we have seen, when we do this we are moved by our fundamen-

tal interests in our freedom and in maintaining our personal independence,

and so on. These fundamental interests have priority over our other inter-

ests: as fundamental, they aim at the essential conditions of our freedom

and equality, which realize the conditions of our capacity for free will and

for our perfectibility without personal dependence. In obeying fundamental

laws properly enacted in accordance with the general will—a form of delib-

erative reason—we realize our moral freedom. With this capacity of reason

fully developed, we have free will: we are in a position to understand and to

be guided by the most appropriate reasons.

2. After this background, let’s return to the remark about being forced

to be free. The language is provocative, granted; but we look for the

thought behind it. In the immediately preceding paragraph (SC, 1:7.7) he

contrasts the private will we have as a separate individual (our “naturally in-

dependent existence”) with the general will we have as a citizen. He says:

“His [the citizen’s] private interest can speak to him quite differently from

the common interest. His absolute and naturally independent existence can

bring him to view what he owes the common cause as a free contribution,

the loss of which will harm others less than its payment burdens him ...he

might wish to enjoy the rights of the citizen without wanting to fulﬁll the

duties of a subject” (SC, 1:7.7).

It is clear that Rousseau has in mind a case of what today we call free-

riding on collectively advantageous schemes of cooperation. (Rousseau

speaks to this problem in SC, 2:6.2, where he says that “there must be con-

ventions and laws to combine rights with duties.”)

As a familiar kind of example, consider the installation of pollution-

control devices on cars. Suppose that from each device, everyone gains $7

worth of beneﬁt from clean air ($7 of beneﬁt to each citizen), yet a device

costs each person $10. In a society of 1,000 citizens, each device contributes

$7,000 worth of beneﬁt; if all install the device, each citizen’s net gain is

$7n−10 (n = number of citizens); this is large for n > 1. Nevertheless, each

citizen taking the actions of the others as given, can gain by defecting.

Rousseau assumes, I think, that the individual in question voted in the

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5. Example from Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 201f.

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assembly to require the devices and to ensure their installation by inspec-

tion (defraying the cost of inspection from taxes or fees). In being forced by

ﬁnes to comply with the law we gave ourselves, and voted for with the best

of reasons, we are subjected to rules we ourselves endorse from the point

of view of our general will. Now, that point of view is that of our moral

freedom, and being able to act from laws so enacted raises us from the level

of instinct and makes us truly a master of ourselves. Moreover, no one sup-

poses that in being required to pay the ﬁne we could still reasonably com-

plain. On Rousseau’s view, our fundamental interests are our regulative in-

terests; in the social compact we agree to advance our private interests

within the bounds of fundamental political laws endorsed by the general

will, a will guided by the fundamental interests we share with others.

But of course Rousseau misspeaks in saying we remain as free as be-

fore. Actually, we are no longer naturally free at all. We are morally free,

but not as free as before. We are free in a better and far different way.

§6. Rousseau’s Ideas on Equality: In What Way Distinctive?

1. In §2.3 of this lecture, we saw that Rousseau said that freedom and

equality are the “greatest good of all, which ought to be the end of every

system of legislation,” and that freedom cannot last without equality. In the

ﬁrst Rousseau lecture we discussed what he had to say about the types and

sources of inequality, and about its destructive consequences. We should

now consider what is distinctive about Rousseau’s ideas on equality. Let’s

review several of the reasons we might have for wanting to regulate in-

equalities so as to keep them from getting out of line.

(a) One reason is the alleviation of suffering. In the absence of special

circumstances, it is wrong that some, or much of society, should be amply

provided for, while a few, or even many, are deprived and suffer hardships,

not to mention treatable illnesses and starvation. More generally, one can

view such situations as cases of misallocation of resources. For example,

from a utilitarian standpoint (as stated by Pigou in his Economics of Welfare),

when the distribution of income is unequal, the social product is being used

inefﬁciently. That is, more urgent needs and wants go unfulﬁlled, while the

less urgent ones of the wealthy, and even their idle pleasures and whims,

are indulged. On this view, leaving aside effects on future production, in-

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come should be distributed so that the most urgent wants and needs that

go unfulﬁlled are equally urgent among all persons. (This assumes people

have similar utility functions as well as some way of making interpersonal

comparisons.)

Note that in this case it is not inequality that bothers us. Nor are we

even troubled by the effects of inequality, except insofar as these effects

cause suffering, or deprivation, or else involve what we view as inefﬁcient

and wasteful allocation of goods.

(b) A second reason for controlling political and economic inequalities

is to prevent a part of society from dominating the rest. When those two

kinds of inequalities are large, they tend to go hand in hand. As Mill said,

the bases of political power are (educated) intelligence, property, and the

power of combination, by which he meant the ability to cooperate in pur-

suing one’s political interests. This power allows the few, in virtue of their

control over the political process, to enact a system of law and property en-

suring their dominant position, not only in politics, but throughout the

economy. This enables them to decide what gets produced, to control

working conditions and the terms of employment offered, as well as to

shape both the direction and volume of real saving (investment) and the

pace of innovation, all of which in good part determines what society be-

comes over time.

If we view being dominated by others as a bad thing, and as making

our life not as good, or as happy, as it might be, we must be concerned with

the effects of political and economic inequality. Our employment opportu-

nities are less good; we would prefer more control over the workplace and

the general direction of the economy. So far, though, it’s not clear that in-

equality in itself is either unjust or bad.

with inequality in itself. I refer to the fact that signiﬁcant political and eco-

nomic inequalities are often associated with inequalities of social status that

may lead those of lower status to being viewed, by themselves and by oth-

ers, as inferior. This may foster widespread attitudes of deference and ser-

vility on one side and arrogance and contempt on the other. For how peo-

ple view themselves depends on how they are viewed by others—their

sense of self-respect, their self-esteem, their conﬁdence in themselves rests

on other people’s judgments and assessments.

With these effects of political and economic inequalities, and with the

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possible evils of status, we are much closer to Rousseau’s concerns. Cer-

tainly these evils are serious, and the attitudes status rankings may generate

can be great vices. But have we arrived yet at the conclusion that inequality

is wrong or unjust in itself, rather than its having wrong or unjust effects on

those who suffer from it?

It is closer to being wrong or unjust in itself in this sense: in a system of

statuses not everyone can have the highest status. It is a positional good, as

sometimes said, as high status depends on there being other positions be-

neath it; so if we value high status as such, we are also valuing something

that necessarily involves others having lesser status. This may be wrong

or unjust when the status positions are of great social importance, and

certainly when status is attributed to us by birth, or by natural features of

gender or race, and is not in an appropriate way earned or achieved. So a

system of statuses is unjust when its ranks are endowed with more impor-

tance than their social role in service of the general good can justify.

(d) This suggests Rousseau’s solution: namely that in political society

everyone should be an equal citizen. But before elaborating this, I mention

brieﬂy that inequality can be wrong or unjust in itself whenever the basic

structure of society makes important use of fair procedures.

Two examples of fair procedures are: fair, that is, open and workably

competitive markets in the economy; and fair political elections. In these

cases a certain equality, or a well-moderated inequality, is an essential condi-

tion of political justice. Here monopoly and its kindred are to be avoided,

not simply for their bad effects, among them inefﬁciency, but also because

without a special justiﬁcation, they lead to markets that are unfair. The

same kind of observation holds for unfair elections resulting from the dom-

inance of a wealthy few in politics.

2. For Rousseau the idea of equality is most signiﬁcant at the highest

level: that is, at the level of how political society itself is to be understood.

And the social compact, its terms and conditions, tells us about this. From it

we know that everyone is to have the same basic status of an equal citizen;

that the general will is to will the common good (as the conditions which

secure that each can advance their fundamental interests when personally

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6. In the preceding paragraphs (a)–(d) I’ve drawn in part on “Notes on Equality” by

T. M. Scanlon, dated November 1988. [See also T. M. Scanlon, “The Diversity of Objec-

tions to Inequality,” in Scanlon, The Difﬁculty of Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 2003). —Ed.]

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independent of others, and within the limits of civil freedom). Moreover,

economic and social inequalities are to be moderated so that the conditions

of this independence are assured. In a note to SC, 2:11.1, Rousseau says,

“Do you then want to give stability to the State? Bring the extremes as close

together as possible: tolerate neither opulent people nor beggars.” And as

we observed earlier, in SC, 2:11.2, he goes on to say, “Equality...mustnot

be understood to mean that degrees of power and wealth should be exactly

the same, but rather that with regard to power, it should be incapable of all

violence and never exerted except by virtue of status and the laws; and with

regard to wealth, no citizen should be so opulent that he can buy another,

and none so poor that he is constrained to sell himself.”

All this enables us to say that in the society of the social compact, citi-

zens—as persons—are equal at the highest level and in the most fundamen-

tal respects. Thus they all have the same fundamental interests in their free-

dom and in pursuing their ends within the limits of civil freedom. They all

have a similar capacity for moral freedom—that is, the capacity to act in ac-

cordance with general laws they give to themselves as well as others for the

sake of the common good. These laws each sees as founded on the appro-

priate form of deliberative reason for political society, this reason being the

general will each citizen has as a member of that society.

But how, more exactly, is equality itself present at the highest level?

Perhaps in this way: the social compact articulates, and when realized,

achieves, a political relation between citizens as equals. They have capacities

and interests that make them equal members in all fundamental matters.

They recognize and view one another as being related as equal citizens; and

their being what they are—citizens—includes their being related as equals.

So being related as equals is part of what they are, of what they are recog-

nized to be by others, and there is a public political commitment to pre-

serve the conditions this equal relation between persons requires.

Now as we know from the Second Discourse, Rousseau is keenly aware

of the signiﬁcance of feelings of self-respect and self-worth, and the vices

and miseries of self-love are aroused by political and economic inequalities

that exceed the limits required for personal independence. Rousseau be-

lieves, I think, that all of us must, for our happiness, respect ourselves and

maintain a lively sense of our self-worth. So for our feelings to be compati-

ble with others’ feelings we must respect ourselves and others as equals,

and at the highest level; and this includes the level of how society is con-

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ceived and the level at which fundamental political laws are enacted. Thus,

as equal citizens we can all, by way of the respect of others, bring into har-

mony our need for self-respect. Given our needs as persons and our natural

indignation at being subject to the arbitrary power of others (a power that

makes us do what they want, and not what we both can will as equals) the

clear answer to the problem of inequality is equality at the highest level, as

formulated in the social compact.

From the point of view of this equality, citizens can moderate lower-

level inequalities by general laws in order to preserve conditions of personal

independence so that no one is subject to arbitrary power, and no one expe-

riences the wounds and indignities that arouse self-love.

3. Is this view of equality distinctive of Rousseau? Was he the ﬁrst to

see it? I am not sure of the answer to this question. Ideas of equality have

been around from the beginning of political philosophy. But I suspect that

the family of ideas that combine to give his idea of equality—the idea of

equality at the highest level in how society is conceived, of citizens as

equals at this highest level in virtue of their fundamental interests and their

capacities for both moral and civil freedom, of self-love and its connection

with the inequalities connected with arbitrary power—are, as a family, dis-

tinctive. That is, it is in combining this family of ideas in this particular and

powerful way that the originality of Rousseau’s idea of equality may lie.

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mill

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