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Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs 305

inter-connectedness of members probably aﬀects the rate of rehabilita-

tion,” and notes that JI remained cohesive even after the loss of their

leaders and the restructuring of the organization following a series of

widespread arrests.

Galanter’s (1989) study of both voluntary and involuntary defec-

tions from the Uniﬁcation Church is also revealing. He observed, as

did both Garﬁnkel and Bjorgo, that those who left the sect voluntarily

usually moved toward this end over a long period of time and after

disillusionment with the internal management of the organization or

a loss of commitment to the organization’s values—because of a per-

ceived failure of those values and beliefs. Forced departure was often

initiated by families, with the help of deprogrammers or organizations

representing the deprogrammers. Deprogramming “refers to the use of

physical restraint by a family or its representatives in an attempt to dis-

lodge a member” from a cult or sect (p. 166). Deprogramming always

involves a counterideological component, a reeducation component,

and usually a period of isolation not only from the sect but also from

family and friends. In a study of 66 former Uniﬁcation Church mem-

bers, those who were forcibly removed from the church had more nega-

tive views on the church in later years and “showed a greater alienation

from the church, scoring lower on loyalty toward the members they

knew best and on their relative acceptance of the church creed” (p.

175). In this case, disengagement was more closely linked to deradical-

ization when members were forcibly removed from the church rather

than when they left of their own accord. When members left of their

own accord, they indicated positive feelings toward existing members

of the church and even continued to accept some speciﬁc church tenets.

However, at least half of the former members surveyed felt that “cur-

rent members should leave the Uniﬁcation Church” (p. 174).

In each of these cases, departure from the group was made more

diﬃcult by the fact that membership in the radical group entailed sub-

stantial isolation from other social networks and from potentially coun-

tervailing inﬂuences. In contrast to the experience of joining the group,

with all of the concomitant beneﬁts of fraternity, acceptance, purpose,

identity, and even status, individuals who try to leave the group are

faced with the prospect of trying to repair the mended relationships

306 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

they left behind in addition to trying to ﬁgure out who they are and

what they believe, once they take the step of rejecting their adopted

identity. Because of this dynamic, individuals who may question their

allegiance to the group are often faced with twice as many reasons to

stay as to leave. Leaving brings condemnation from the group but also

fails to provide a context in which approbation for the decision to leave

is provided on the other end.

Nor can we aﬀord to forget that leaving an ideologically based ter-

rorist group may not be the same as leaving a nonideologically driven

group such as a gang. Mark Juergensmeyer’s (2001) study of terrorism in

ﬁve religious traditions concluded that although religion—by itself—

did not generally lead to violence, religion did in many cases provide

the ideological foundation, motivation, and organizational structure of

the terrorist group as well as fostering group cohesion. Leaving a radi-

cal Islamist group implies a rejection of the radical ideology espoused

by the group. Hence, even if a militant experiences both push and pull

factors that lead him to consider leaving the group, the articulation—

by credible religious authorities—of “theologically grounded impera-

tives for renouncing violence could be an important factor in catalyz-

ing the decision to leave the radical group.”

Garﬁnkel and, to a lesser

extent, Galanter emphasize the importance of countering the radical

ideology, but neither provide lessons about how best to do so. Coun-

terideological education is the foundation of most of the existing state-

run deradicalization programs, discussed in the next section.

Programs

Structured, state-sponsored deradicalization programs have been

attempted in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Tajikistan,

Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom in recent

years. We currently know the most about programs in Indonesia, Saudi

Arabia, and Egypt. Most reeducation and rehabilitation programs have

an ideological foundation—reinterpretation of theological arguments

to “de-legitimize the use of violence against the state, the society and

the ‘other’” (Ashour, 2008a, p. 11). ese programs typically include

Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs 307

other social-service and individual counseling components as well,

making it diﬃcult to determine which aspects of the program are more

or less eﬀective in achieving deradicalization. What follows draws most

heavily on the Saudi experience as currently reported.

e case for the reinterpretation of theological arguments in favor

of jihad is often made in small group settings that bring together reli-

gious authorities and radicalized individuals. Recent counterideologi-

cal eﬀorts in Salaﬁsm have been assisted by the publishing of Sayyid

Imam al-Sharif’s Document for Guiding Jihad in Egypt and in the World.

Al-Sharif, also known as Abd al-Qadir Ibn Abd al-Aziz, was a former

al-Qaeda ideologue and the Emir of al-Jihad in Egypt from 1987 to

1993. He was replaced in 1993 by Ayman al-Zawahiri, now considered

Osama bin Laden’s right-hand man.

In addition to the ideological component, there is often a counsel-

ing or psychological component, as well as a social services component

targeting both the family of the detained as well as the detainee, after

his release. e Saudi government’s program, begun in 2004, is based

around a counseling program that includes detainee participation in

religious debates, as well as participation in psychological counseling.

e goal of the program is for individuals to “repent and abandon ter-

rorist ideologies” (Boucek, 2007a). Six week courses include sessions on

loyalty, allegiance, terrorism and even self-esteem. Religious dialogue

focuses on the idea that prisoners were tricked into believing a false

interpretation of Islam; the correct interpretation is then provided.

is process is facilitated both by the participation of former militants

in the Advisory Committee, and by the religious authority of the Saudi

state (Boucek, 2007a).

In addition to religious dialogue, the Psychological and Social

Subcommittee of the Saudi program evaluates each prisoner’s social

status, psychological problems, and types of social assistance the pris-

oner and his family will need during the detention period. Families are

provided with schooling, health care, and ﬁnancial assistance to oﬀset

the loss of income during incarceration. On release, job assistance pro-

grams and government stipends for cars and apartments are provided

to those who successfully complete the program and “repent.” Single

men are encouraged to marry and have children. Finally, the Saudi

308 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

program makes it clear to the prisoner’s wider familial network that

they will be held partly responsible for his behavior after his release

(Boucek, 2007a).

Participants in the Saudi program are limited to those arrested

for minor infractions or for sympathy with radical ideologies or groups

(for example, individuals may have been caught with jihadi literature).

ose who have committed more serious acts of terrorism are not part

of the group targeted for deradicalization. In some ways, then, this is

preemptive deradicalization.

Although every country with a deradicalization program reports

success, there are limited data available to conﬁrm either the degree of

success or the reasons for it (that is, how important is the counterideo-

logical component compared with the ﬁnancial incentives). Moreover,

any accurate measure of recidivism relies on tracking and reporting

rearrests. Ashour (2008a, p. 11) claims that the successful 1997 eﬀort

to deradicalize the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG) “removed more than

15,000 IG militants from the Salaﬁ-Jihadi camp led currently by al-

Qaeda.” Moreover, he notes that deradicalization may have a “domino

eﬀect” when one group inﬂuences another—as was the case with the

small, violent Takﬁri and Salaﬁ-jihadi groups that joined al-Jihad’s re-

education eﬀorts in 2007 (Ashour, 2007, pp. 596–597). ese numbers

seem severely inﬂated when compared with the number of individu-

als interviewed by Horgan for his forthcoming book, Walking Away

from Terrorism. Horgan says, “In the sample of individuals I inter-

viewed from 2006–2008, while almost all of the interviewees could

be described as disengaged, not a single one of them could be said to

be ‘de-radicalized’” (Horgan, 2008, p. 6). e Saudi eﬀort has report-

edly resulted in the release of 700 of the 2,000 prisoners who par-

ticipated in the deradicalization program. Saudi authorities claim that

only nine individuals have been rearrested, a 1–2 percent recidivism

rate (Boucek, 2007a).

A closer look at the Yemeni deradicalization program revealed

that a number of the program’s supposed graduates were ﬁghting in

Iraq. e BBC interviewed a graduate of the program in 2005, who

said, “We understood what the judge wanted and he understood what

we wanted from him. e Yemeni Mujahideen in prison know Hitar

Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs 309

(head of the Religious Dialogue Council) is the way for them to get

released, so they ingratiate themselves with him. ere was no long

or complex dialogue” (Whewell, 2005). is is anecdotal evidence, of

course, but it is an important caution nonetheless in a new research

area for which little reliable information exists.

In Singapore, the discovery of a Jemaah Islamiyyah cell in 2003

led to the establishment of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG)

initially focused on individuals detained for terrorism oﬀenses. e

RRG later expanded its focus to include detainee family members on

a voluntary basis and then education of the broader Muslim public.

Local Muslim scholars help the RRG to address JI’s misinterpreta-

tion of Islam, publish and distribute moderate Islamic tracts (such as

Unlicensed to Kill: Countering Imam Samudra’s Justiﬁcation for the Bali

Bombing [Hassan, 2006]),

and provide education on moderate Islam to

both the detainees and the broader community. In addition, a number

of loosely aﬃliated local Muslim groups provide ﬁnancial and psycho-

logical support to the families of the detained. As with the programs

mentioned above, few data are available about the eﬃcacy of ideologi-

cal intervention on deradicalization. However, 19 out of 51 detainees

were released after an average of three years detention between 2001

and the end of 2007 (Hassan, 2007, p. 8).

e International Crisis Group (2007) recently warned that the

issue of deradicalization in Indonesia is inextricably linked to the issue

of prison reform. is is not only because corruption in the prison

system reinforces the idea of the government as un-Islamic, but also

because jihadi solidarity is reinforced by the need to band together

for protection against dangerous prison gangs (p. 5). Existing deradi-

calization programs are similar to those in Saudi Arabia and Singa-

pore, emphasizing the involvement of former JI militants who have

renounced their actions—albeit not always their ideology. In addition

to the ideological component, the Indonesian programs also emphasize

the need to meet the economic needs of imprisoned radicals’ families.

About two dozen former JI members and several members of other

jihadi organizations have agreed to cooperate with Indonesian police

(p. i).

310 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

A contrast between notable JI ﬁgures participating in the pro-

gram is striking. Nasir Abas, a former JI leader who split from the

group early on over disagreements about the use of violence, takes a

traditional counterideological perspective when working with prisoners

or speaking in public—emphasizing “right” and “wrong” interpreta-

tions of Islam. Ali Imron takes a very diﬀerent tack. Imron was one of

the key JI members involved in the 2002 Bali bombings. He apolo-

gized for his role in the bombings during his trial and is now work-

ing with police on deradicalization. Rather than emphasizing a wrong-

headed interpretation of Islam, Imron says that JI’s understanding of

jihad was correct and that attacks on the Indonesian state were justiﬁed

at a time when Muslims were being killed in regional conﬂicts and

the government’s failure to fully implement sharia had allowed “devi-

ant teachings, secularism and idolatry to ﬂourish, immorality to rise,

splits among Muslims to surface and the gap between rich and poor

to widen” (p. 12). Where JI went wrong, according to Imron, was in

acting without the support of the Muslim community, in failing to

attempt to persuade by other (nonviolent) means those they targeted,

and by acting precipitously, before the group had the strength to fulﬁll

their lofty goals (p. 13). is is precisely the problem with conceptual-

izing deradicalization as equivalent to disengagement. Horgan (2008,

p. 5) notes “Often there can be physical disengagement from terrorist

activity, but no concomitant change or reduction in ideological sup-

port, or indeed, the social and psychological control that the particular

ideology exerts on the individual.”

Conclusions

If we think about radicalization as a staircase (Moghaddam, 2005),

with each step up constituting deeper commitment to the group, then

deradicalization would likely begin at the point when the investment

of time and resources begins to outweigh the material, psychological,

and communal beneﬁts of belonging to the group. Abandonment of

the group is most likely if the individual believes that increased com-

mitment will fail to produce a more desirable outcome in the future.

Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs 311

e time at which this decision point occurs will diﬀer in accordance

with each individual’s calculation of his own investment and rewards.

is calculation is also likely to diﬀer in accordance with the roles and

responsibilities of the individual within the group. Jeﬀ Victoroﬀ (2005,

p. 33) has observed that leaders are psychologically distinct from fol-

lowers. is may be reﬂected in the fact that group leadership is gener-

ally more stable than group membership. Other scholars have observed

that leaders and followers have diﬀerent levels of commitment, diﬀer-

ent interests, and even diﬀerent goals (Crenshaw, 1981; Chai, 1993). In

addition, terrorism is a group phenomenon and an attempt to under-

stand the process of deradicalization from only the individual perspec-

tive is one-sided. Further, just as the individual’s decisions are nested in

a group context, the radical group is nested within a speciﬁc political,

economic, and cultural context. Hence, just as radicalization pathways

are somewhat context-speciﬁc, so too are deradicalization pathways

likely to be aﬀected by the political-economic and sociocultural con-

text in which the individual and group are nested.

Despite the myriad possibilities for variation, several common

themes with potential implications for counterterrorism stand out in

the existing literature. Given the cited importance of relationships with

role models in the decision to reject violence, Garﬁnkel’s (2007) obser-

vation that the decision to deradicalize was often an individual one is

more likely attributed to necessity than to choice. e “reeducation”

eﬀorts of state deradicalization programs as well as their focus on the

detainees’ families seem more in line with our understanding of the

important role that social and familial ties have on identity, values,

and beliefs, as well as on an individual’s extracurricular activities. If

any area of terrorism studies can be said to have reached a level of con-

sensus, it is the role of social networks in contributing to both recruit-

ment and radicalization (Sageman, 2004, 2008; Bakker, 2006; Heg-

ghammer, 2006a, 2006b; and Cragin, Chalk, Grant, Helmus, Temple

and Wheeler, 2006). It is therefore extremely likely that this particu-

lar factor will also play a key role in deradicalization. Bjorgo (2006)

emphasizes the double-bind of having to leave one’s new social group

behind while having no new social ties to sustain the decision to dis-

engage at the other end. Decker and Van Winkle (1996) underscored

312 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

that the lack of a “receiving group” was an important hurdle not only

for reasons of identity and belonging but also for protection from both

random and reprisal-related violence.

ese ﬁndings suggest that the existence of alternative social net-

works could be a critical pull factor that is currently missing in discus-

sions of deradicalization from terrorist groups. Bjorgo (2006) reports

that parental network groups in Norway successfully intervened to

help youth disengage from neo-Nazi and other racist groups. Between

1995 and mid-2000, some 130 parents representing 100 youths par-

ticipated in parental network groups targeting disengagement. By the

end of that period, 90 percent of the youths were no longer involved in

a right-wing group. Bjorgo reports that “parental involvement played

a decisive role in many cases,” although numerous other factors were

also important in the decision to leave the group (p. 27).

Also of note,

post-release detainees from the Saudi program usually continue to meet

regularly with the same religious study group and imam to whom they

were assigned while in the detention facility. If the Saudis’ reported

recidivism rates are even partially correct, this factor might account for

some of their success.

A study of Germany’s deradicalization programs for right-wing

radicals found that the majority of those who became involved with

the programs voluntarily contacted a deradicalization organization

looking for help (Grunenberg and van Donselaar, 2006). is is also

a common experience for those working to rehabilitate former gang

members, which suggests the need to establish and publicize the avail-

ability of deradicalization assistance and resources.

e authors writing about deradicalization also cited the impor-

tance of a traumatic or precipitating event that immediately preceded

the decision to reject violence or the beginning of the process of disen-

gagement. Remarkably, the majority of those interviewed—from reli-

gious groups, gangs, and right-wing groups alike—cited an experience

of violence or trauma or an event that forced them to question their

existing values and beliefs and led them to consider disengagement

or deradicalization. Decker and Van Winkle noted the criticality of

timing; inducements to leave the group grew weaker as time passed

following the incident’s occurrence. Just as radicalization is a long evo-

Disengagement and Deradicalization: Processes and Programs 313

lutionary process for some and a rapid “snap” for others, so, too, is the

process of deradicalization. However, the similarity of the experiences

cited above, across all diﬀerent types of extreme groups, suggests impli-

cations for the timing of deradicalization initiatives.

Positive incentives are reportedly more durable than negative

incentives in the larger picture. Negative sanctions were just as likely to

increase group solidarity as to lead members to leave the group. Posi-

tive incentives included new employment or educational prospects as

well as the possibility of taking on parental and spousal responsibili-

ties. ese incentives were relevant speciﬁcally when ties to the violent

organization would inhibit access to these opportunities. Boucek told a

reporter from the Boston Globe that the Saudi government even found

wives for released detainees in a few cases, hoping to “insulate them

from the predominantly male world of aspiring jihadis.”

e role of positive incentives is complex. As mentioned in other

papers, economists have found no correlation between income or gross

domestic product and participation in terrorist activities. However, a

2003 RAND project that compared social and economic programs

in three countries targeted at reducing terrorism found that social and

economic development policies did weaken local support for terrorist

activities. is was true, for example, in cases where social and eco-

nomic development policies led to the expansion of a new middle class

in communities that traditionally supported terrorist groups (Cragin

and Chalk, 2003, p. x).

Recent RAND research focusing on the detainee population

in Iraq found that large numbers of those involved in preparing and

placing improvised explosive devices were not ideologically motivated.

Instead, they had been recruited by local insurgents and lured by the

promise of ﬁnancial compensation (O’Connell and Benard, 2006). One

U.S. postdetention program took this factor into account when design-

ing a six-month followup program for released detainees. Detainees

check in with the command each month for six months following their

release and are paid a small fee for their continued cooperation and for

remaining disengaged from the insurgency (Bowman, 2008).

e few scholars commenting on deradicalization programs are

uniformly skeptical about the eﬀectiveness of deradicalization from an

314 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

ideological perspective (Bennett, 2008). But this skepticism reinforces

Horgan’s point about the need to distinguish between deradicalization

and disengagement. If we assume that groups of individuals in essen-

tially every country hold ideas that are contrary, or even abhorrent,

to those held by the majority (for example, the Ku Klux Klan in con-

temporary America), one possible course of action is to target not the

ideological orientation of radicalized individuals but their action orien-

tation. In this case, the goal is not to change an individual’s worldview

but to get him to stop engaging in terrorism.

In addition to gaining a better understanding of the potentially

divergent deradicalization pathways of terrorist group leaders and ter-

rorist group followers, of how members of diﬀerent types of radical

groups (for example, nationalist, religious, or single-issue) might expe-

rience deradicalization incentives diﬀerently, and of how the diﬀerent

social, economic, and political conditions of the state aﬀect the like-

lihood of deradicalization, a future deradicalization research agenda

should

examine the eﬀect of temporary cease-ﬁres or other cessations 1.

of terrorist activity on group members and any steps taken to

maintain group cohesion

examine the extent to which former militants express remorse 2.

and the ways they make amends or take action to alleviate the

associated psychological stress

follow up on Gallanter’s ﬁndings with respect to the diﬀerence 3.

between voluntary and forced disengagement and compare the

experiences of imprisoned terrorists with those of voluntarily

disengaged former radicals

expand the comparison of deradicalization experiences across 4.

diﬀerent roles and functions within terrorist organizations

(for example, do fundraisers have diﬀerent attrition rates from

gunmen?) (Horgan, 2007b, p. 124)

obtain a better understanding of what produces dissension and 5.

internal fragmentation of groups and what factors reduce popu-

lar support for extremist groups (Horgan, 2007b, p. 120)