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Endnotes
1
See also Guptka (2008). Guptka’s Chapter Eight reviews the demise of terror and
highlights three class of outcome: a degree of political success, defeat by the state, or
loss of ideological orientation and movement into criminality.
2
is process is facilitated by the tendency of terrorist organizations to engender
strong group dependency that results over time in organization imperatives—for
example, survival and viability—replacing political purpose as the dominant incen-
tive for the members (see Crenshaw, 1985, 2001).
3
ey include killing and imprisoning the terrorists, using force to gain intel-
ligence about attacks and organization, destroying and confiscating weapons and
materials, denying the terrorists’ contact with the sources of aid, disrupting their
coordination and communication, isolating them from their audiences, harassing
supporters, retaliating in kind, and so on. e instruments include more vigor-
ous law enforcement and criminal prosecution; military strikes involving conven-
tional actions, covert operations, and mirror response; legislative changes resulting
in longer prison terms; expanded definition of the culpability for terrorism; a more-
restrictive detention and confinement regime; reduced protections against search
and arrests; more-invasive search, surveillance and interrogation procedures; relaxed
standards of acceptable evidence; special courts and jurisdictions; restrictions on
free movement and speech; and other curtailments of civil liberties. Repressive mea-
sures undermine terrorists’ capabilities by disrupting operations, degrading organi-
zation, causing large-scale attrition, denying resources such as weapons and materi-
als, recruitment, funding, and safe havens; and deterring attacks and undermining
the terrorists’ will to fight.
4
e anarchist groups were especially vulnerable to repression, as their ideology
turned out to be a liability for building a strong, tight-knit organization (see McCor-
mick, 2003). In contrast, similar small radical left-wing groups in Europe enjoyed
a measurable and more-enduring, support, albeit limited. As a result, governments
found that some conciliatory measures were indispensable.
292 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
5
For example, group organization often depends on the availability of support
base: Groups lacking a social base appear to have a simpler structure (see Crenshaw,
1985). It may also depend on the ideological goals of the organization (see McCor-
mick, 2003, pp. 478–480).
6
For instance, the success of direct actions requires, among other things, that the
state have the ability to access the territory from which the organization operates, or
to effectively seal off the territory where potential targets are located from terrorists’
home base. (is is particularly true in the case of transnational terrorism.)
7
Strong authoritarian states—which include absolutist or totalitarian states
(Schmid, 1992, p. 16)—have better intelligence and access to the group. ey also
have a near-complete physical control over the population and monopoly over the
flow of information. us, they face few constraints on their behavior and frequently
engage in repressive terror (Wilkinson, 1973). Total government control explains in
large measure why little sustained terrorist campaigns are known to have occurred
in such totalitarian states as the Soviet Union and China (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 283).
Without freedom of information, there is little strategic incentive to engage in ter-
rorism against an overwhelming state power and the groups that do try their luck
can be easily suppressed by the government’s repressive apparatus.
8
e histories of the Uruguayan Tuparamos and Chechen groups in Russia sug-
gest that, in weak democracies, the public backlash caused by the destructiveness
of terrorists may empower the government or a part of the ruling elite enough to
enable it to crack down on democratic institutions and engage in outright repression
of the terrorists’ support base, resulting in internal splits among terrorists, collapse
of public support, and an ultimate defeat of the terrorist movement.
9
is statement closely parallels the argument found in the literature on root
causes of terrorism that points to nonmonotonic relationship between democ-
racy and political freedoms, on the one hand, and terrorism (Abedie, 2004; Eyer-
man, 1998; Iqbal and Zorn, 2003; Piazza, 2007). e general argument is that the
states with intermediate levels of freedoms—new or weak democracies and weakly
authoritarian states—are more vulnerable to terrorism than either established
democracies or highly authoritarian states: Unlike highly authoritarian states, they
have political constraints on their freedom of action in countering the terrorist
threat; at the same time, unlike established democracies, they lack strong and dura-
ble political institutions to provide terrorists and their supporters with alternatives
means to achieve their goals. On the mixed relationship between democracy and
terrorism see also Li (2005) and Wade and Reiter (2007).
At
the same time, Sederberg (1995, p. 310) suggests that the key variable might
involve “less the form of the regime than the essential strength of its political foun-
dations,” where “weak states, whether formally democratic or authoritarian, will
be both more vulnerable to terrorism and vacillating in their responses.” Supple-
mentary insights come from the research on the relationship between terrorism
and failed states. e literature maintains that the lack of legitimacy and ability to
How Does Terrorism End? 293
project power internally make failed states especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks
(see Kahler, 2002; Piazza, 2007; Rotberg, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Takeyh and Gvosdev,
2002).
10
Significant theoretical and empirical support for this argument comes from the
literature on strategic interaction between a terrorist group and a government. is
literature suggests that terrorist groups act strategically when using terrorist tactics
and examines the implications of the terrorists’ strategic interaction with the gov-
ernment (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Lake,
2003). e strategic logic behind terrorist actions is based on the calculation that
provocation increases the likelihood of repression and repression in turn increases
support for the extremists. ere is strong empirical evidence justifying this ratio-
nalist logic. Using data on the variation of attacks and electoral outcomes across
time and space in Israel, Berrebi and Klor (2006, 2008) investigated the interaction
between attacks, on the one hand, and electoral preferences and outcomes, on the
other, and found that terrorist attacks increase support for the right-wing politi-
cians to the extent that they are sufficient to determine the electoral outcomes. is
shift in electoral preferences in turn increases the likelihood of strong government
countermeasures (Kydd and Walter, 2006, p. 71). Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson
(2007) rely on a game-theoretic model to demonstrate that repression can, under
certain circumstances, radicalize the population and increase support for extrem-
ists through either economic damage or by revealing information about the gov-
ernment’s motivation. Jaeger and Paserman (2005), studying the Israeli experience,
found empirical support for the link between repression and radicalization.
11
Even though its number of members plummeted after the capture of its leader
Guzman, Shining Path continued to carry out terrorist activities, albeit at a much
reduced level. PKK did shift toward political activities after the capture of Ocalan,
declaring a “cease-fire,” but has maintained its armed wing and recently resumed
attacks against Turkish interests. Aum was, arguably, more a cult practicing terror-
ism than a political organization.
12
Israeli experience provides some evidence in favor of this claim. David (2002)
argues that targeted assassinations have all but destroyed or substantially reduced
the effectiveness of terrorist organizations in cases where leadership, planning,
and tactical skills were scarce and limited to a few individuals in the organization
(Black September, Islamic Jihad, senior Egyptian intelligence officers organizing
terrorist infiltration from Egypt, German scientist developing long-range missiles in
Egypt).
13
Freeman and McCormick also argue that “sustained” decapitation—one prac-
ticed repeatedly—may be effective against the organizations with centralized but
scarce leadership (see Freeman and McCormick, 2007).
14
Israel—the country that has practiced the policy of targeted killings for many
years—is a case in point. e policy has in the past produced worldwide condemna-
tion (including from such quarters as the United Nations, the European Union, and
294 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
even Israel’s main ally—the United States) and is thought to have contributed to
Israel’s international isolation. Becoming a victim of Israeli targeted killing became
a badge of honor among Palestinians and unwittingly enhanced the popularity of
the organization to which the victim belonged, as evidenced by public opinion polls.
e targeted killing of the Hamas bombmaker Yehiya Ayash and the leader of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Mustafa Zibri is claimed to
have undermined temporary cease-fire negotiations and resulted in greater terror-
ist action. Assassination in January 2002 of Tanzim leader Raed al-Karmi ended
a cease-fire declared by Yasir Arafat and caused the relatively moderate Al-Aqsa
Brigades affiliated with Fatah to engage in suicide bombings for the first time; it is
also suggested to have led to the appearance of women suicide bombers and unprec-
edented casualties among Israelis. e July 2002 killing of Hamas leader Sheikh
Salah Shehada that claimed the lives of 14 innocent bystanders derailed what many
believed to be promising negotiations. at year also saw a significant increase in
the number of suicide bombers. Some argued that Israeli actions to assassinate Pal-
estinian terrorists who were thought to be pragmatists and might have proven to be
useful political negotiators (such as PLO second-in-command Abu-Jihad) reduced
the chances for reaching agreement with the Palestinians. e Israeli policy of tar-
geted assassination might as well have led to enhanced cooperation between Islamic
Jihad, Hamas, and Palestinian Authority. Finally, when the Israelis assassinated the
PFLP’s theater director, Mohammad Boudia, he was replaced by an even more noto-
rious terrorist—Carlos “the Jackal.” (See Byman, 2006; David, 2002; Ganor, 2005;
Jenkins, 1987; Luft, 2003.)
15
e evolution of right-wing groups does not conform to the pattern identified
here despite some similarities. Even though many right-wing groups appeared to
have a difficulty persisting over generations, this is likely to reflect the challenges of
tracking them over time (see Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2006).
16
Several authors use the organizational dynamics perspective to reflect on the
causes and outcomes of less-than-perfect decisionmaking in terrorist organizations.
Gordon McCormick discusses the following features of imperfect decisionmaking
driven by organizational/group dynamic factors: isolation and loss of a sense of real-
ity, bias toward action, use of preexisting “scripts,” interorganizational competition,
“group-think” and excessive risk-taking as a result of “self-censorship,” consensus-
building, suppression of dissent, and strong group dependency. Crenshaw instead
focuses on the organizational needs and effects on decisionmaking of terrorist orga-
nizations. She points out that strong interest in group preservation over time can
supplant the ends as survival of the group becomes the end in itself; terrorist behav-
ior becomes self-sustaining over time regardless of changing conditions and political
results (see Crenshaw, 1985, 2001; McCormick, 2003).
17
Berman (2003) argues that, in cases where social services are inadequate, the
terrorists can seize the opportunity to win over supporters and that voluntary reli-
gious groups have a distinct advantage. His rational-choice model demonstrates
that, in places where the government is a poor provider of local public goods, such