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Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups 255
66
Remaining underground or clandestine can negatively affect factors shaping
group decisions, such as the availability of information or resources, even though
operational security is helped.
67
See, for example, the discussion in Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007), which indi-
cates that Palestinian groups are willing to travel farther (taking greater risk of
apprehension) for higher-value terrorist attacks.
68
See, for example, the rationale for relocation to Afghanistan by Ayman al-Zawahiri
described in Gerges (2005).
69
Extracted discussions of strategic intelligence from jihadi documents (quoted and
described in Stout et al. (2008, pp. 74–79) are instructive in this area.
70
ese activities can be broadly captured as the groups’ ability to learn new infor-
mation over time. e author and RAND colleagues have reviewed these processes
and the factors that shape groups’ ability to carry them out in Jackson (2005) and
Jackson, Baker, Cragin, Parachini, Trujillo, and Chalk (2005).
71
See, for example, the discussion of al-Qaeda in Combating Terrorism Center
(2006); this has been observed in a variety of other terrorist groups as well (for
example, a similar description in a 1980s case study of the Shining Path is available
in McCormick, 1988).
72
For a review of deterrence issues and terrorism, see Carter (2001); Casebeer and
omas (2002); Davis and Jenkins (2002); Melese and Angelis (2004); and National
Research Council (2002).
73
Discussed in McCormick (2003, p. 482).
74
See, for example, Gerges’s discussion of internal rivalries and factions within al-
Qaeda that hurt the functioning of the organization (2005, pp. 104–105).
75
See, for example, the discussion in Strinkowski (1985) of the sources of authority
of group leadership that provide the ability to influence others’ behavior. Shapiro
(2005b, 2007) discusses the principal-agent issues in terrorist organizations that
make it difficult for even leaders with authority to control the behavior of supposed
subordinates. Al-Qaeda has had such problems when the actions of its affiliates
have produced negative responses in public opinion. See also Combating Terrorism
Center (2006). Stout et al. discuss views of al-Qaeda strategists of the problem of
“uncoordinated and ill-considered action [by independent actors in the movement
that] are at best unhelpful and at worst counterproductive” (2008, p. 118).
257
CHAPTER SEVEN
How Does Terrorism End?
Gaga Gvineria
Introduction
One of the most important terrorism-related questions for the world
today is how terrorism ends, or at least diminishes. For those seeking
to counter terrorism, the question is perhaps more salient than ques-
tions about causes. e answer to how terrorism ends is also interesting
because the mechanisms of decline do not simply mirror the mecha-
nisms of how terrorism arises. Recognizing this causes us to think dif-
ferently about the factors and processes with which counterterrorism
must be concerned.
How terrorism ends has been discussed in only a relatively small
portion of the social-science literature on terrorism. Some articles
approach the issue empirically (Alterman, 1999, p. 16; Crenshaw,
1987, 1991; Cronin, 2006; Gurr, 1990; Ross, 1995; Ross and Gurr,
1989; Jones and Libicki, 2008), but most articles subsume the end-of-
terrorism issue under five broad investigative topics: (1) origins, root
causes, and motivations of terrorism; (2) histories of individual terror-
ist groups; (3) effectiveness of counterterrorist policies; (4) evolution of
terrorist groups as part of wider social movements; and (5) organiza-
tions’ structure, needs and internal dynamics.
is paper mainly relies on the literature of the first type (origins,
root causes, and motivations) but draws selectively from the vast gen-
eral literature on terrorism and from the literatures on counterterrorism
and the end of civil wars. e discussion in this paper is organized as
follows. e next section presents a framework showing eight modes of
terrorism decline, that is, eight major classes of cases. e next section
258 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
describes processes, developments, and factors that seem to contrib-
ute to each mode of decline. e following section inverts the discus-
sion: It draws on the preceding sections to summarize potential factors
that help sustain terrorism (the undercutting of which factors, arguably,
leads to decline) and indicates plausible relationships among them. A
final section then summarizes government policies that work to under-
mine terrorism, relating them to the critical factors discussed earlier.
An appendix critiques the state of the literature on the end of terrorism
and suggests some directions for future work.
Modes of Decline
e literature on the end of terrorism suggests a number of ways terror-
ism has ended, characterizing them by what appeared to the authors to
have been the dominant reasons in historical cases. e various papers
do not typically relate well to each other and no integrated discus-
sion seems to exist, so an organizing structure was constructed for this
review. It drew heavily on suggestions by Crenshaw (1995), a review
that covered Crenshaw’s work (Alterman, 1999), and the insightful
work of several other authors (Cronin, 2006; Ross and Gurr, 1989;
Weinberg, 1991). e result was a set of eight modes of decline (that
is, classes of cases), named by what was identified as the key element of
the decline.
1
Some explanation of terminology is important here. We refer to
“elements” rather than using such words as “factor” because the mono-
graph of which this paper is part uses “factor” in the context of causal
models, where a factor is an independent variable. In contrast, the “ele-
ments” used to name the modes of decline are really labels for attri-
butes of outcome or intermediate outcomes. Although they could be
regarded as “causes” of the subsequent end of terrorism, they are not
the independent variables of policy but rather intermediate outcomes
to be sought.
e modes are not mutually exclusive in that in a given case of the
end of terrorism, several of the elements may exist and it may even be
unclear as to which, if any, is dominant.
How Does Terrorism End? 259
e eight modes are itemized below and in Table 7.1, which also
gives historical examples.
Substantial Success.1. Terrorist tactics succeeded in at least help-
ing to achieve the terrorists’ main goals, usually in conjunction
with less-violent political actions.
Partial Success.2. Terrorists achieved public recognition for its
organization and its causes and chose to abandon terrorism to
avoid the costs of continuing violence and thereby alienating
supporters, sponsors, and key third-party actors.
Direct State Action, Including Repression.3. e state’s direct
measures (including repression) succeeded in undermining the
terrorists’ coercive capabilities.
Disintegration rough Burnout. 4. e terrorist organization
disintegrated as members lost commitment to the organization
and its mission because of, for example, collective perceptions of
failure, physical exhaustion, availability of attractive paths out
of violence, general disillusionment with violence, and growing
disagreements with ideology and strategy.
Loss of Terrorist Leaders.5. Death or imprisonment of influen-
tial leaders occurred and the rest of the organization was un-
willing or unable to continue functioning as a terrorist organiza-
tion.
unsuccessful Generational Transition.6. Terrorists were unable
to pass their cause to the next generation when the first genera-
tion of leaders departed or were eliminated.
Loss of Popular Support. 7. Terrorists lost support of their
constituencies: populations, governments, and other organi-
zations.
Emergence of New Alternatives. 8. Better options for political
change or organizational survival and enhancement emerged,
including more traditional forms of warfare and revolution,
mass-based protest movement, opportunities for legal political
action, and organized criminal activity.
260 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
Table 7.1
Classes of Cases and Historical Examples
Mode of Terrorism Decline Notable Historical Examples
Substantial success (primary
objectives met, by whatever
means)
Original Irish Republican Army (IRA) (circa 1921)
EOKA (Cyprus)
Croatian Ustasha
African National Congress (ANC)
Nepalese Maoists
Irgun/Stern Gang (Israel)
Partial success Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
Direct state action
(sometimes repression)
Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF)
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)
George Jackson Brigade
Narodnaya Volya
Uruguayan Tuparamos
Muslim Brotherhood
Disintegration through
burnout
Weather Underground
Front de libération du Québec (FLQ)
Red Brigades
Loss of leaders Shining Path
Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA)
Aum Shinrikyo
Unsuccessful generational
transition
Red Brigades
The Second June Movement
The Japanese Red Army
Weather Underground
Symbionese Liberation Army
Baader-Meinhof group (Red Army Faction)
Loss of popular or external
support
Weather Underground
Front de libération du Québec
Real IRA
Red Brigades
Shining Path
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA)
Emerence of new
alternatives to terrorism
Front de libération du Québec
Provisional IRA
Palestinian Liberation Organization
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Khmer Rouge
Armed Islamic Group
Nepalese Maoists
Guatemalan Labor Party/Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unit
NOTES: The cases are not mutually exclusive, as several dominant factors may exist.
The historical examples are illustrative, not a comprehensive list. The Nepalese
Maoists are formally the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)).
How Does Terrorism End? 261
e assessments in Table 7.1 (most of them from Cronin, 2006)
are all controversial because of subtleties in definition and interpreta-
tion, the on-again off-again nature of some conflicts, and uncertainties
as to how influential the violent activities were on results. For example,
the original IRA, which fought for Irish independence in 1919–1921,
did not defeat the British Army but had made governance difficult
without military force, thereby pressuring the British (Laqueur, 1976;
Hopkinson, 2004). A splinter group (also called the IRA) continued
the battle after the 1921 Anglo-Irish treaty but lost that war two years
later. Versions of the IRA have continued to exist and, as discussed
recently by Alonso (2004), the 1998 Good Friday Agreement between
British and Irish governments fails to qualify as a success of the then-
current version of the IRA in achieving its main objective—a unified
Ireland.
Despite these caveats, the next section discusses the modes
separately.
Processes, Developments, and Factors Contributing to the
End of Terrorism
is section discusses each of the modes of terrorism decline separately,
identifying related processes, developments, and factors. Each subsec-
tion also includes some discussion of when the headlined element has
not correlated (or need not correlate) with the end of terrorism.
Substantial Success
If success is defined as the achievement of the terrorists’ original objec-
tives, then available historical evidence suggests three factors that have
been critical to such success (separately or together) in the past:
1. e terrorist organization has narrow, clearly defined, and
attainable goals.
2. Powerful outside powers assist the terrorist organization.
262 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
3. e organization is waging an anticolonial campaign for
independence against a power unwilling to bear the costs of
continued struggle (state survival is not at stake and where
continued struggle would imperil other state objectives).
Achieving success has often required more than just terrorism, for
example, activities such as less violent political action or more tradi-
tional warfare tactics (Cronin, 2006; Laqueur, 1977).
Cautions. e success of a terrorist organization need not logically
bring an end to terrorism, although the literature is quiet on this matter.
A sufficient condition seems logically to be that the terrorist group and
its members have both a limited and fixed rationale for using terror-
ism—a rationale that no longer exists after success is achieved. e vic-
torious group may still choose to preserve its identity and continue to
exist in a different capacity, including as a political force. e examples
of successful groups include the original IRA after World War I, Croa-
tian Ustasha during World War II, the ANC in South Africa, Irgun in
Israel, EOKA in Cyprus, and the Nepalese Maoists.
Partial Success
A terrorist organization often abandons terrorism after achieving public
recognition for its organization and its causes, realizing that further
violence may alienate supporters, sponsors, and key third-party actors.
2
e result is a transition to a legitimate political process. e PLO and
PIRA are two examples of groups that have made this transition.
Some authors have suggested preconditions for a lasting successful
outcome (Alonso, 2004; Cronin, 2006; Sederberg, 1990). According to
their suggestions, the government must be ready to provide pathways
out of violence by offering amnesty and accepting the organization as a
legitimate negotiating partner, and the terrorists must agree to compro-
mise on their goals on issues critical to the government—for example,
they must abandon aims for the destruction of the state or the regime,
or renounce full independence, in exchange for autonomy. In addition,
the terrorist organization must possess a strong command and control
structure so that a decision to desist from terrorism will be honored,
How Does Terrorism End? 263
which is more likely when the group’s governance is hierarchical and it
has a strong leader.
Cautions. Although the “preconditions” mentioned may some-
times be necessary, they are not logically required. For example, a state
might cease the activities that caused political turmoil and might even
change policies and make de facto concessions without ever negotiat-
ing with the terrorist organization. Also, political negotiations with
terrorist groups do not necessarily bring an end to terrorism over the
long term. is is often the case if the group is a part of a wider resis-
tance movement with a popular cause and strong support base. e
violence often escalates in the short term as the rival groups step up
attacks in an attempt to derail the peace process and enhance their own
profile relative to that of competitors (Bloom, 2004; Kydd and Walter,
2002, 2006, pp. 72–78). Likewise, internal divisions within the gov-
ernment, and hostility from the government’s own support base toward
the government’s peace initiatives, may also undermine the peace pro-
cess (Alterman, 1999; Cronin, 2006).
e evidence seems to indicate that partial success leads to the end
of terrorism when it combines with other processes discussed below.
us, partial success appears to be contributory but is not necessarily
sufficient.
Direct State Action (Including Repression)
e government’s direct measures against the terrorist group, when
they succeed in significantly undermining terrorists’ coercive capabili-
ties, can be a major contributor to the end of terrorism. Such mea-
sures are targeted against the terrorist organization itself, its people,
its resources, and its motivations.
3
A recent RAND study (Jones and
Libicki, 2008) concludes that the more important measures tend to be
associated with law enforcement and intelligence, often clandestine,
rather than traditional military operations.
In some instances, it at first appears that direct state action was
successful by itself. Such cases include the success of counterterrorism
strategy against the American RATF, SLA, the George Jackson Brigade,
Narodnaya Volya, and various anarchist groups in Russia. All involved
264 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
punitive actions and sometimes preemption against a very small fringe
group (usually fewer than 50 members) with little external support.
Another example was Egypt’s crackdown against the Muslim Brother-
hood in the early 1980s. Of course, that was a large-scale effort.
Even in these cases, there were a number of contributing factors,
such as the terrorists’ failure to sustain popular support (Ross and Gurr,
1989) and strategic miscalculations. In most of the cases mentioned
above, the tactic of terrorism was used specifically to provoke govern-
ment repression that would incite the masses against the government
and lead to radical transformation of the existing political and social
order. When this tactic failed, the particular terrorists escalated their
destructiveness, which in turn alienated the sympathizers, outraged
the public, and made it easier for government to destroy the group.
4
More generally, it is evident that other factors must contribute.
Crenshaw (1987) has specified three classes of contributing factors that
enhance the effectiveness of direct government actions: (1) the presence
of internal disunity within the terrorist organization, (2) strategic mis-
calculations by the terrorists, and (3) strategic reversals (such as with-
drawal of state support, loss of sanctuaries, more attractive alternatives,
and collective perception of failures). Again, these factors are not inde-
pendent variables for the policymaker but rather developments that
occurred and that might be intermediate objectives of policy actions.
All of the other elements described in the other subsections of this
section have been identified by various authors as contributors in cases
characterized by direct state action. Indeed, it is not a matter of there
being other contributors. ey are often necessary.
In particular, repressive measures are often insufficient when a
large population supports the terrorists’ cause (Alterman, 1999). Puni-
tive actions can certainly erode support in some respects but cannot
fully do so in the absence of policies aimed at addressing popular griev-
ances and splitting off pragmatists from radical rejectionists (for exam-
ple, through accommodation, cooptation, and amnesty or repentance
legislation). Such policies tend to isolate the terrorists and diminish
public support for their organization, denying them a strong base from
which they operate (Alterman, 1999; Crenshaw, 1991; Gurr, 1990; Sed-
erberg, 1990). As one would expect, the size and the nature of public