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Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups 235
of greatest importance. e choices of groups with complex internal
dynamics or competing internal factions may be dominated by how
they will “play” for internal constituencies. Some groups will be opti-
mizers, seeking to make the best choices possible given their circum-
stances; others will satisfice, seeking what is “good enough” rather than
optimal. Groups will also have different preferences and tolerances for
such factors as operational risk or incomplete information. Although a
given level of information or risk may reach an acceptable threshold for
one organization and it will decide to act, another organization might
instead decide to gather more intelligence or defer a decision until the
risks of acting can be reduced.
Implications for Strategy and Policy
In considering strategies for counterterrorism aimed at the organiza-
tional level, the decisionmaking processes of terrorist groups are one
potential target for action. In general, if options are unavailable to take
on terrorist groups directly, action to complicate or shape their deci-
sionmaking in ways that make it more difficult for them to plan and
stage violent actions can be an alternative. To the extent that the factors
shaping a particular group’s decision processes can be identified and
understood, defensive measures can also be better crafted to frustrate
their operations or guide group choices in ways that are favorable for
defense and security organizations. Clear models, based on available
social-science understandings of terrorist organizational behaviors, can
help to guide such policy design.
In considering terrorist group decisionmaking, and opportuni-
ties for counterterrorism action, there is an existing basis for think-
ing: Efforts at deterrence and influence are, at their most basic,
efforts to shape the choices that groups make about the things they
do and the ways they attempt to do them. From this perspective,
security measures seek to shape group risk tolerance, as do “clas-
sic” attempts at deterrence through threats of punishment or retali-
ation for specific acts; information operations telegraphing how use
of unconventional weapons would be viewed negatively in a group’s
236 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
Figure 6.1
Factors Shaping Terrorist Group Decisionmaking
RAND MG849-6.1
Likelihood of
decision to act
Scope of positive reaction
action will produce in
relevant population
Legitimacy and
acceptability of
target, means,
action, etc.
Consistency
with group
ideology
Level of
pressure to act
imposed by
competing
groups
Level of
pressure to act
imposed by
external events
or demands
Consistency with
group goals/
interests
Consistency
with
preferences of
state sponsors
Level of
alignment of
action with
any external
influences
Consistency with
preferences of strategic
or operational
influences in networks
or movements
Consistency
with
preferences of
cooperating
groups
Permissiveness
of group
success criteria
Defenses at
desired
targets
Group OPSEC
effectiveness
Scope of group
dynamics that
skew preferences
(e.g., groupthink)
Effect of past
behavior bias on
future preferences
Effects of
clandestinity on
group activities
Effectiveness
of state CT
activities
Group
capability
level
Level of
member risk
tolerance
Biasing effect
of recent
experience
(positive and
negative)
Group risk
tolerance
Group effects
on risk
decisions
Availability
of resources
from others
Amount of time
for planning,
prep and
implementation
Amount of
situational
awareness
information
available
to group
Amount of
technical
knowledge
available
to group
Access to
external
knowledge
sources
Insulation of group
from pressure
(e.g., safe haven)
Amount of money
available to group
Amount of
technology available
to group
(e.g., weapons)
Number of
appropriate
people in
group
Ability to
gather new
information
Breadth and
depth of
internal
“knowledge
stocks”
Legitimacy and
acceptability of
target, means,
action, etc.
Perceived
intensity of
need to act to
preserve group
cohesion
Level of “bias
to action”
within group
Intensity of
idiosyncratic
preferences
toward
particular
activity
Intensity of
idiosyncratic
preferences among
leadership
Intensity of
idiosyncratic
preferences among
membership
Forestalling a negative
event an included case of
a perceived positive
outcome?
Group perceptions
of other elements
that shape public
support for
terrorist activity
t5BSHFUFEHPWFSONFOU
t(FOFSBMQPQVMBUJPO
t4VQQPSUQPQVMBUJPO
Decisionmaker beliefs about:
and and
and
or or
(+/–)
(+/–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
Amount action will
advance group
strategy or interests
Scope of positive reaction
action will generate
inside group
Amount and
quality of group
communications
capability (to get
information to
decisionmaker)
Acceptability of
risks associated
with action
Level of resources
group is willing to
commit to action
Perceived sufficiency
of information to
make decision
Level of
“knowledge
threshold”
demanded
for decision
(+)
(–)
Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups 237
Figure 6.1
Factors Shaping Terrorist Group Decisionmaking
RAND MG849-6.1
Likelihood of
decision to act
Scope of positive reaction
action will produce in
relevant population
Legitimacy and
acceptability of
target, means,
action, etc.
Consistency
with group
ideology
Level of
pressure to act
imposed by
competing
groups
Level of
pressure to act
imposed by
external events
or demands
Consistency with
group goals/
interests
Consistency
with
preferences of
state sponsors
Level of
alignment of
action with
any external
influences
Consistency with
preferences of strategic
or operational
influences in networks
or movements
Consistency
with
preferences of
cooperating
groups
Permissiveness
of group
success criteria
Defenses at
desired
targets
Group OPSEC
effectiveness
Scope of group
dynamics that
skew preferences
(e.g., groupthink)
Effect of past
behavior bias on
future preferences
Effects of
clandestinity on
group activities
Effectiveness
of state CT
activities
Group
capability
level
Level of
member risk
tolerance
Biasing effect
of recent
experience
(positive and
negative)
Group risk
tolerance
Group effects
on risk
decisions
Availability
of resources
from others
Amount of time
for planning,
prep and
implementation
Amount of
situational
awareness
information
available
to group
Amount of
technical
knowledge
available
to group
Access to
external
knowledge
sources
Insulation of group
from pressure
(e.g., safe haven)
Amount of money
available to group
Amount of
technology available
to group
(e.g., weapons)
Number of
appropriate
people in
group
Ability to
gather new
information
Breadth and
depth of
internal
“knowledge
stocks”
Legitimacy and
acceptability of
target, means,
action, etc.
Perceived
intensity of
need to act to
preserve group
cohesion
Level of “bias
to action”
within group
Intensity of
idiosyncratic
preferences
toward
particular
activity
Intensity of
idiosyncratic
preferences among
leadership
Intensity of
idiosyncratic
preferences among
membership
Forestalling a negative
event an included case of
a perceived positive
outcome?
Group perceptions
of other elements
that shape public
support for
terrorist activity
t5BSHFUFEHPWFSONFOU
t(FOFSBMQPQVMBUJPO
t4VQQPSUQPQVMBUJPO
Decisionmaker beliefs about:
and and
and
or or
(+/–)
(+/–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(–)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
Amount action will
advance group
strategy or interests
Scope of positive reaction
action will generate
inside group
Amount and
quality of group
communications
capability (to get
information to
decisionmaker)
Acceptability of
risks associated
with action
Level of resources
group is willing to
commit to action
Perceived sufficiency
of information to
make decision
Level of
“knowledge
threshold”
demanded
for decision
(+)
(–)
238 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
sympathizer community or by the international community seek to
shape a variety of different elements of decisionmaking and also the
apparent value of pursing them; diplomatic efforts to end state spon-
sorship seek to constrain group resources and reduce the chance that
the group will be willing to devote enough people and technology to
operations of concern; and so on.
72
Drawing on current social-science literature and other available
data on group decisionmaking, the model represented in Figure 6.1
captures the range of elements that shape group choices, from what
those choices are intended to accomplish to the risk and information
thresholds a group may impose on its on decisions. In framing these
factors, some elements go back through decades of terrorism research
and are supported by broad bodies of knowledge in related fields. For
example, the influence of organizational dynamics on decisionmak-
ing has been recognized for many years, has been examined in a vari-
ety of terrorist organizations, and—given the much broader interest
in how all groups make choices—has been examined in a variety of
other types of organizations as well. Others factors are more provi-
sional, being based on smaller amounts of data or less direct study
of the behavior in terrorist groups. An example of this latter class is
questions about the effect of organizational risk tolerance on group
decisionmaking. Although there are enough data to make a case that
it is an important factor that needs to be considered and included, it
has not itself been systematically studied. As a result, in some cases,
concepts are framed just as they are in literature sources and my model
summarizes those concepts in a uniform structure; in others, I have
crafted categories to bring together separate (and sometimes still thin)
strands of thought that have not yet been fully explored or placed into
a useful framework.
When considering application of this model to guide thinking
about strategy and policy, some caveats are appropriate. First, for sim-
plicity the model is framed as a group considering a single choice, with
the factors shaping the likelihood of making a decision. In reality, deci-
sionmakers generally consider multiple options and make comparisons
among them—even if only to compare the consequences of an action
against the consequences of taking no action at all. As a result, the
Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups 239
additional complication of making those comparisons among options,
and the effect of which options groups choose to weigh against each
other, is a factor that I have not considered explicitly.
Second, although understanding the factors that shape group
choices can make it possible to make more informed projections about
what groups may or may not do, real limits constrain the ability to
do so. ere are limits on the intelligence that is available about inter-
nal group deliberations. As a result, just as the terrorist group deci-
sionmaker will invariably have limits on available data, so too will the
policymaker or operator in counterterrorism.
ird, even a systematic and deliberative terrorist group that makes
the best decision it can at a given time can simply be wrong, meaning
that even with an excellent model that captures and integrates all avail-
able information on how choices are made, it may still not be possible
to predict the group’s future behavior. To be rational does not mean
to be perfect. A variety of elements can affect the quality of a group’s
choices, including divergence between what the group thinks and what
“truly is” (for example, a group’s assumptions about how its actions will
be interpreted by their target audiences). A group can similarly have
misperceptions about its own levels of skills or knowledge that can
lead to miscalculation and error (Drake, 1998). Incorrect knowledge,
bad situational awareness, too little information, or too much data to
assess in the time available to the decisionmakers can similarly degrade
the quality of an organization’s choices.
73
e situation the group faces
may also simply change, making choices that might have been benefi-
cial in one environment detrimental under new circumstances. As with
all groups, terrorist organizations have bounds on their understanding
and knowledge that make it difficult to project their own actions into
the future and understand their consequences with certainty.
Fourth, although many analyses approach terrorist groups as
“single decisionmakers,” the reality is that they (and all organizations)
are made up of individuals whose interests may or may not be entirely
congruent with those of the group as a whole. Individual actors “look-
ing out for themselves” can therefore inject different sets of preferences
into a decision process. Some authors have framed this as a principal-
agent problem given that central terrorist actors have difficulty con-
240 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
trolling what other members do, thus opening the opportunity for
self interested behavior (Chai, 1993; Shapiro, 2005a). Such individual
behaviors also arise as a result of rivalry within groups and contests for
power or resources.
74
Finally, although a group may make “the right choice” to advance
its interests in a specific situation, it is not certain that it will actually be
able to implement its decisions. Some of the same factors that were dis-
cussed above—such as command and control issues,
75
organizational
structure constraints, security concerns limiting communication, and
the bringing together of resources—can also get in the way of a group’s
ability to translate thought into action.
As a result, even armed with the best that social-science research
currently has to offer, the task of understanding terrorist group deci-
sionmaking and anticipating group behavior must be approached with
humility. In doing so, the analyst (and a decisionmaker relying on the
analysis) must know something of the nature of the group itself. Exam-
ination must focus on the appropriate decisionmaking units within
an organization, where the results of social-science research on group
behavior are applicable, and should not assume that identical processes
apply in groups as vastly different as individual terrorist cells and loosely
coupled collections of individuals linked only by a common ideology.
Although both the interplay of ideas and the deliberative processes that
occur at all points on the spectrum of terrorist organizational behavior
are important, variations in the processes in different types of organiza-
tions must be understood and taken into account.
e fact that decisionmaking and the factors that shape it are
inherently idiosyncratic in individual terrorist groups means that gen-
eral models that can predict “terrorist behavior” will be elusive at best.
However, at the same time, even if models may not be predictive,
laying out the range of factors that shape terrorist group decisions can
still aid in understanding how groups of interest might behave and can
guide counterterrorist thinking. In examining a specific group and the
factors that are most important given the available information on its
leadership, membership, and environment, such models can help to
assess the possible effects of different strategies for deterrence or influ-
Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups 241
ence and to prioritize those likely to be more or less likely to be effec-
tive against it.
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