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How Does Terrorism End? 265

support seem to determine whether some sort of conciliation strategy is

necessary (Sederberg, 1990).

Other factors that aﬀect whether direct state actions are eﬀec-

tive include the motivation of terrorists (ideological versus ethnical),

their relative isolation or representativeness, the nature and the role of

(population and external) support, the nature of the stakes involved,

characteristics of their organizations and their internal dynamics, the

role of terrorism in the overall strategy, the nature of the state’s politi-

cal system, and the strength of its political foundations and govern-

ment. ese factors appear to be interrelated in complex ways.

What

matters for the success of counterterrorism is whether they combine in

a way that gives the state both the physical and political means nec-

essary to destroy the organization while preventing the emergence of

new recruits and new sources of support.

What is “enough,” though,

appears to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent groups and in diﬀerent circum-

stances: at is, more than one pattern of factors can lead to the suc-

cessful outcome.

Currently, the social-science literature on terrorism does not oﬀer

a satisfactory account of the various circumstances that can lead to

the success of direct actions. But it does suggest some interesting reg-

ularities. Strong authoritarian states appear to have little problem in

suppressing terrorist organizations.

Laqueur (1977) has shown that

terrorism has succeeded in transforming many liberal societies into

authoritarian ones, which then have little trouble controlling it (Ham-

ilton, 1978).

However, it should be noted that repression by an author-

itarian government can eliminate terrorism in the country in question

but may push it elsewhere (Muslim Brotherhood is a case in point)

(Lizardo, 2007, p. 159; Pluchinsky, 1987).

Ethnically based terrorism appears harder to end decisively—

except in cases of successful anticolonial struggles against a retreating

empire—not in the least without government addressing important

underlying grievances and oﬀering new alternatives through accom-

modation and cooptation. Broad-based, mostly rural ethnic/separatist

or politically motivated insurgencies, when they do not succeed, might

come to an end through some combination of changes in leadership

(Shining Path), loss of popular or external support, collapse of internal

266 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

cohesion, or appearance of new alternatives enabling transition to a

legitimate political process or other modus operandi (full insurgency or

criminality). Small radical leftist groups in Western Europe (such as the

Baader-Meinhof group, Red Brigades, Action Directe, 17 November),

despite their unrealistic, vague, and inconsistent demands, had sprung

out of larger protest movements (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986; Merkl,

1995; Wieviorka, 1993) and enjoyed a measurable support among the

leftist groups—students, workers, and intellectuals—and thus proved

hard to repress. eir terrorism subsided because at least one of the

following dynamics played a part: the declining commitment of mem-

bers to the organization caused by fatigue and government amnesty or

repentance legislation, loss of support, and unsuccessful generational

transition as a result of public backlash and waning fortunes of the

Marxist-Leninist ideology after the end of the Cold War. ese devel-

opments, in turn, made it far easier for the government to hunt down

the remaining active group members.

Cautions. Repression of a terrorist group is sometimes counter-

productive—a fact well known to counterterrorism scholars and prac-

titioners (Crelinsten and Schmid 1993; Simon, 1987; Sederberg 1995).

is is more likely in cases where neither the requisite degree of repres-

sion nor eﬀective government control on the spread of information

is achievable due to physical or political constraints on government

action. Democracies and weak authoritarian regimes are especially vul-

nerable in this regard, whereas strong authoritarian regimes appear to

be immune from the threat (for the relevant arguments see Crenshaw,

1981; Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Li,

2005; Piazza, 2007; Schmid, 1992; Wilkinson, 2006).

Subject to this caveat, repression is more likely to be counterpro-

ductive if it is indiscriminate (Art and Richardson, 2007; Crelinsten

and Schmid, 1993; Sederberg, 1995). Discriminate use of force is diﬃ-

cult when a signiﬁcant portion of the population sympathizes with the

terrorists and their cause: e terrorists can blend in with the popula-

tion and good intelligence is hard to come by. In those cases, what are

or are perceived to be indiscriminate actions undermine the legitimacy

of the state and generate public backlash, which is ampliﬁed by terror-

ist propaganda. Publicity is the lifeblood of the terrorist (see Schmid,

How Does Terrorism End? 267

1989; Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Wilkinson, 1997). In advanced

democracies with civil liberties, free press, and an emphasis on human

rights, repression gone awry can enable even marginal groups to score a

strategic success. In fact, provoking indiscriminate repression is a part

and parcel of strategic logic of terrorism (Kydd and Walter, 2006).

e potential for negative fallout from repression is even greater with

modern communications and increased transborder population move-

ment that allow the terrorists to reach out to the remotest parts of the

world and discover new sources of support.

Disintegration Through Burnout

e end of terrorism often occurs as a result of organizational disinte-

gration for reasons internal to the organization (Crenshaw, 1987). e

notable examples include the Weather Underground, FLQ, and Red

Brigades. Collapse of the organization, in these cases, is thought to

have stemmed from intra-organizational dynamics channeled through

the psychological process of burnout—loss of the members’ commit-

ment to the organizations and its goals (Ross and Gurr, 1989). Burn-

out often manifests itself through the collapse of organizational cohe-

sion, resulting in risk-avoidance and loss of discipline, factionalization,

desertions, and defections (Ross and Gurr, 1989). Several factors work

to undermine organizational unity, such as prior cleavages among sup-

porters (ethnic groups or states), disagreement over strategy, ideological

diﬀerences, power struggles among generational leaders, and personal-

ity clashes (Alterman, 1999; Crenshaw, 1987).

However, organizational disunity does not necessarily imply

declining commitment to terrorism and, hence, does not always signal

the end of terrorism. A common response to disunity is punishment of

dissenters and purges. When eﬀective, this strategy enables the organi-

zation to retain its identity and restore cohesion. Sometimes the orga-

nization splits into several parts as the defectors join a rival organiza-

tion or establish new ones. Splits and mergers can in fact result in more,

rather then less, terrorism. e violence often escalates as the moderates

leave the organization, defecting radicals join more militant groups,

and the rival groups compete for support by trying to outbid each other

268 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

(Bloom, 2004; Crenshaw, 1991; Jaeger and Paserman, 2006; Kydd and

Walter, 2006; Toft, 2007).

e circumstances that set the stage for the collapse of internal

cohesion and end of terrorism are unclear. e analysis is made dif-

ﬁcult by the fact that the literature on the end of terrorism focuses on

individual organizations and does not address the reasons for the end of

terrorism beyond the particular organization’s lifetime. One thing that

seems clear is that the terrorism is likely to continue, or even increase

in intensity, at least over the short term, when the organization splits

into rival factions. A workable hypothesis would be that organizational

disintegration does not put an end to terrorism when a sizable demand

for terrorism remains (that is, sympathy exists for an action agenda

that may employ terrorism as a tactic or even as an end in itself, such

as revenge).

A combination of several processes may erode commitment to

the organization and lead to organizational disintegration and, pos-

sibly, the end of terrorism: fatigue and collective perceptions of failure,

backlash from increased destructiveness, loss of support, and the emer-

gence of attractive paths out of violence. A government amnesty or

repentance legislation may precipitate widespread defections when the

organization faces defeat and support dwindles but seem to be of little

eﬀect otherwise (Cronin, 2006). e unraveling process often works

through a virtuous circle: e availability of new alternatives or a col-

lective sense of failure resulting from setbacks generates internal dis-

agreements and factionalization; this in turn leads to an escalation in

destructiveness followed by backlash from alienated or frightened sym-

pathizers and aggressive government intervention, generating further

internal disagreements.

Loss of Leaders

ere is some evidence that the loss of leaders through death or impris-

onment may in some cases inﬂict a decisive blow to the terrorism move-

ment, precipitating a signiﬁcant decline of the group and its activities

and ultimately leading to the end of terrorism. However, the evidence

is uncertain. Shining Path, PKK, the Real IRA, and Aum Shinrikyo

are often cited as examples of cases when loss of the leaders severely dis-

How Does Terrorism End? 269

rupted an organization (Cronin, 2006; Hosmer, 2001), but the validity

of the claim in each case is still being debated.

It is reasonable to assume that the loss of a leader must be disrup-

tive in one or more ways by producing a break in ideology, strategy,

command and control, or competence. Nonetheless, for a decapitation

to be successful, good leaders within the terrorist groups must be a

scarce resource making it hard for terrorist groups to ﬁnd replacements

(Byman, 2006; Freeman and McCormick, 2007).

e research base

on such matters is spotty, mainly to the lack of hard data about the

internal workings of terrorist organizations.

Several plausible categories of factors with some basis in the lit-

erature can be identiﬁed and it is often the interaction of factors across

these classes that appears to be critical. ese include the role of the

leader in a group, the character of the leader (for example, a leadership

foundation that is not “routinized,” as in the case of a cult of personal-

ity) (Cronin, 2006; Eisenstadt, 2001; Jenkins, 1987; Jordan, 2004), the

structure of the organization (hierarchical and centralized or distrib-

uted), the nature of internal disagreements over ideology and strategy

(for example, whether the views of the leadership are widely shared and

understood in the organization), the size of the organization (Byman,

2006; Eisenstadt, 2001; Gazit, 2002), and the strengths of its support

base.

It is now widely believed that the distributed terrorist network,

such as the one practicing “leaderless resistance,” is less susceptible

to disruption through removal of leaders. It is certainly reasonable to

assume that when the leadership is “singular” and centralized, removal

of the leader is more likely to be eﬀective than when it is abundant or

diﬀuse (Byman, 2006; Freeman and McCormick, 2007).

It is notable

that the United States claims to have killed an inordinate number of

very high-level al-Qaeda leaders, with seemingly no dramatic conse-

quences. Replacements have come forth.

ere are some logical issues with conventional wisdom on these

matters, however. First, unless “distributed network” is deﬁned in a

way that makes the conclusion correct by circular argument, the con-

clusion about decapitation being ineﬀective in distributed networks is

not obviously valid. Not all nodes of a network are equal and a net-

270 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

work’s ability to replace a lost node depends on what that node con-

tributed. For example, a charismatic or intellectual leader might be

essential to the coherence and motivation of the organization, even

though he had little direct administrative or operational control. He

might be very diﬃcult to replace. Further, as suggested by correlational

evidence, distinctions should be made between simply removing “the”

leader and removing most of the entire upper echelon of an organiza-

tion (Jordan, 2004).

In our view, the fact is that we do not know whether elimina-

tion of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri would have modest,

intermediate, or profound eﬀects. We are skeptical of social-science

claims on the matter.

We should also note that the eﬀectiveness of “targeted killing”

in the context of Israel’s continuing battles with Palestinian terrorists

remains controversial. It seems that some recent discussions tend to

disparage eﬀectiveness (see Gazit, 2002; Hosmer, 2001, pp. 24–27;

Kaplan et al., 2006; Kaplan et al., 2005; Stein, 2001). However, other

authors (and Israeli oﬃcials and oﬃcers) disagree (see Byman, 2006;

David, 2002; Eisenstadt, 2001; Ganor, 2005; Gazit, 2002; Jaeger and

Paserman, 2005; Lotrionte, 2003; Luft, 2003; Zussman and Zussman,

2006), and it is diﬃcult to imagine that a strong conclusion could be

valid: Surely, details must matter.

Cautions. Whether or not eﬀorts to remove leaders may some-

times be eﬀective, it is clear that a policy of killing or arresting promi-

nent terrorist leaders may backﬁre, at least in the short run. Decapi-

tation, especially that involving extrajudicial actions and unintended

casualties, may create increased publicity for the terrorist cause and

weaken the state’s claim on legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and

the international community, inspire and mobilize terrorist sympathiz-

ers, enhance the organization’s standing in the population, radicalize

the moderate faction, promote unity among diﬀerent terrorist factions,

and enable even more-radical leaders to rise to the top. Targeted killing

often has the eﬀect of worsening the medium-term prospects of reach-

ing a negotiated settlement.

(See Byman, 2006; Cronin, 2002; David,

2002; Ganor, 2005; Jenkins, 1987; Luft, 2003.)

How Does Terrorism End? 271

Some authors suggest that killing political leaders is more likely

to backﬁre than killing operational leaders, as the latter are usually

less known to the public and their deaths tend to get far less atten-

tion (see David, 2002; Ganor, 2005; Gazit, 2002; Zussman and Zuss-

man, 2006). However, the distinction is sometimes diﬃcult to make

in practice. In this regard, capturing “the” leader rather than assas-

sinating him may be more eﬀective in damaging the group, provided

that the counterterrorists manage to undermine his credibility and cut

oﬀ inﬂammatory communications (Cronin, 2006). At the same time,

imprisonment is likely to cause further violence as the release of impris-

oned terrorists is an important motivation for terrorist attacks (Jen-

kins, 1987).

It should also be noted that the authors who argue for the eﬀec-

tiveness of the policy of targeted killings tend to do so primarily because

they believe in the long-tem cumulative eﬀect—via degrading organi-

zational capability, disrupting organizational routine, and undermin-

ing morale—of the sustained campaign against the leaders on the

ability and willingness of the terrorist organization to wage campaign

of terror (see Byman, 2006; David, 2002; Ganor, 2005; Luft, 2003).

ese authors usually view, not without certain caveats, the “boomer-

ang eﬀect” (Ganor, 2005)—backlash to targeted killings—more as a

short-lived reaction than as a signiﬁcant contributor to the “cycle of

violence.”

Unsuccessful Generational Transition

e failures to pass a cause to the next generation seems to have been

associated with several interacting and compounding factors: a radical

ideology, typically left wing/anarchist,

coupled with unclear, incon-

sistent, and increasingly unrealistic demands for social change (Cronin,

2006); erosion of public support and subsequent marginalization and

isolation (often against the background of repression, accommoda-

tion, and cooptation by the state); and a large-scale socioeconomic and

political change that diminishes the attractiveness of the terrorist ideol-

ogy. Examples include Red Brigades, the Second June Movement, the

Japanese Red Army, Weather Underground, the Symbionese Libera-

tion Army, and the Baader-Meinhof group (Cronin, 2006; della Porta,

272 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

1995a; della Porta and Tarrow, 1986; Merkl, 1995; Ross and Gurr,

1989)

Loss of Popular or External Support

e U.S. National Military Plan for the War on Terrorism, reﬂecting

a good deal of accumulated social-science lore, considers popular and

organizational (state and nonstate supporters) support to be a center

of gravity of the terrorist enemy (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staﬀ, 2006, p. 14). Historical evidence suggests that loss of support

can indeed spell the end of terrorism by catalyzing the group demise

or abandonment of the strategy. It is thought to have been a critical

factor in the collapse of terrorism by such organizations as Weather

Underground in the United States, FLQ in Quebec, the Real IRA, Red

Brigades, Shining Path, and ASALA (Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2006;

Ross and Gurr, 1989).

Loss of support adversely aﬀects the capabilities of the terrorist

organization by reducing the amount of its resources—materials, fund-

ing, recruitment, sanctuaries, and expertise. Cooperation or acquies-

cence from terrorists’ erstwhile supporters gives the state better control

over the operational terrain through improved access and intelligence,

leading to greater terrorist attrition and disrupting their operations and

organization. ese setbacks put further pressure on the organization

and drive it into hiding. ey reinforce a sense of failure among the

terrorists and their remaining supporters and bring about fatigue and

disenchantment, spurring internal dissent and defections, which in

turn lead to further group isolation and marginalization. is process

is often self-reinforcing, thrusting the organization into a downward

spiral (Crenshaw, 1991; Ross and Gurr, 1989). Loss of qualiﬁed per-

sonnel, internal dissent, and isolation lead to poor decisionmaking and

strategic miscalculations.

In an attempt to reverse their waning for-

tunes, terrorists often escalate the violence, embarking on ever-riskier

missions and taking on targets considered illegitimate by supporters

and the sympathetic public; descend into internecine, interfactional, or

intergroup warfare; enter unpopular alliances; change their claims to

ﬁt the need of the moment; and advance a more radical, hence, less rel-

evant and realistic agenda in search of ever more-elusive support (Cren-

How Does Terrorism End? 273

shaw, 1991). What ensues is the series of cascading eﬀects of grow-

ing operational and organizational failures; backlash and dwindling

support from active supporters, sympathizers, and the international

audience; increased calls for tougher measures from citizens; and more

intrusive and eﬀective government action. As a result, the organization

is physically destroyed or else the terrorists opt to abandon terrorism—

either individually or as a group—realizing the futility of their eﬀorts

(Crenshaw, 1991; Ross and Gurr, 1989).

A number of developments can lead to diminished popular sup-

port. Strategic miscalculations can generate a backlash from actual or

potential constituencies. Government repression that raises costs of tol-

erating terrorists for the sympathetic public often leads to exhaustion

and loss of support. Political and socioeconomic reforms targeting the

underlying grievances of passive and active supporters also work for

the same eﬀect (Cronin, 2006; Ross and Gurr, 1989). In places where

neither government nor markets function well, groups that are engaged

in terrorism can take up provision of social welfare for the vulnerable

groups in exchange for their support (Hamas, Hizballah, and Taliban).

When this is the case, policy measures aimed at improving social wel-

fare and building eﬃcient markets can undercut incentives to provide

support for the terrorists (Berman, 2003; Burgoon, 2006).

ere is some evidence that oﬀering amnesty or reduced prison

terms to individual members in exchange for repentance or collabora-

tion contributes to the erosion of support by bringing about desertions,

defections, and internal disagreements. However, such a policy appears

to be eﬀective only when support is already low or waning and cannot

generate decline on its own. (Crenshaw, 1991; della Porta, 1995a; della

Porta and Tarrow, 1986).

Success of both repressive and conciliatory measures in under-

mining population support seems to depend on a wider political con-

text (Alterman, 1999; Sederberg, 1995). e key is whether the gov-

ernment measures enjoy support, or at least acquiescence, from major

political forces as well as important segments of the population: Failure

by the state and its constituencies to present a uniﬁed front against a

dissident movement reduces the range of options available to the gov-

ernment and undermines its eﬀorts. e requisite degree of internal

274 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together

unity is more likely to be attained in strong consolidated democra-

cies and strong authoritarian states than in states with weak political

foundations, democratic or otherwise. However, democratic societies

are unlikely to reach consensus on using repression against the popula-

tion sympathetic to terrorism (Charters, 1994; Eyerman, 1998; Piazza,

2007; Schmid, 1992). e timing of government initiatives can make a

diﬀerence, as repression is more likely to succeed when the government

is in a strong position—for example, when outrage against terrorist

atrocities rallies the public behind it—and the dissident movement is

in disarray. Strong authoritarian states, in contrast, face no problem of

unity. Some initially semidemocratic states under sizable pressure from

terrorists enjoyed considerable success when they scrapped democratic

institutions and relied heavily on repression against the population in

their ﬁght against terrorism.

A better security environment is another factor that can chip away

population support for the terrorist organization. Counterterrorism

and counterinsurgency research suggests that population support is

not always entirely voluntary: When an adequate security environment

is lacking, intimidation and coercion of the population by the terror-

ists, or their taking over the task of security provision from the state

(such as in a protection racket), is often an important source of support

(Adams, 1986; Horgan and Taylor, 1999; Nagl, 2005; O’Neill, 1990;

Shafer, 1988). is implies that the government’s success in improving

security on the ground can contribute to a signiﬁcant erosion of sup-

port in cases where a sizable portion of the population is vulnerable to

depredation and retribution.

State propaganda helps impair support but only in conjunction

with other factors. Furthermore, support can be signiﬁcantly under-

mined if the terrorist group overly depends on external support and

the state is able to persuade or compel various state or nonstate external

supporters to cut their aid through provision of politico-diplomatic,

military, and economic incentives and disincentives, such as diplomatic

pressure, economic sanctions, and the use or threat of use of military

force. Finally, support for terrorist groups and their causes can decline

as a result of a large-scale social and political change that renders their

ideology and objectives irrelevant or a dramatic shift in international