ALI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR CULTURE
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writers merely rolled their eyes,’’ writes Remnick, ‘‘but no one had
ever seen anything like this before.... Traditionally, anything but the
most stoic behavior meant that a fighter was terrified, which was
precisely what Clay wanted Liston to believe.’’
An astute judge of character, Clay suspected Liston would train
lightly, so sure was he of Clay’s unbalanced condition, but Clay
himself was in top shape. His game-plan was to tire out Liston in the
first rounds, keeping him moving and avoiding his fearsome left until
he could dispatch him. ‘‘Round eight to prove I’m great!’’ he shouted
at the weigh-in. At the sparsely attended match, Liston called it quits
after the sixth round. Incapable or unwilling to take more abuse, he
ended the fight from his stool. ‘‘Eat your words!’’ Clay shouted to the
assembled press, and a new era in boxing had begun.
If Clay’s white backers, the cream of Louisville society who had
bankrolled him for four years—and it should be mentioned, saved
him from a career of servitude to organized crime—thought Clay,
having gained the championship, would then settle into the traditional
champion’s role—public appearances at shopping malls, charity
events, and so forth—they were sorely mistaken. Immediately fol-
lowing the fight, Clay publicly proclaimed his allegiance to Elijah
Muhammad’s Nation of Islam, a sect that had caused controversy for
its segregationist beliefs and bizarre theology. In a break with the
sect’s normative habit of substituting X for their ‘‘slave’’ surname,
the religious leader summarily bestowed upon Clay the name Mu-
hammad Ali; loosely translated as meaning a cousin of the prophet
who is deserving of great praise. Now his backers not only had a
fighter who preferred visiting in the ghetto to meeting celebrities, but
also one with a controversial religious affiliation.
In the press, the backlash was immediate and vindictive. True,
writers such as Norman Mailer, Gay Talese, and Tom Wolfe were
sympathetic, but the majority scorned him, disparaged him, taking his
very existence as an affront. For Ali, the championship was a bully
pulpit to launch a spirited attack against ‘‘the white power structure.’’
In time, he would drop the more arcane elements of Black Muslim
belief (like the African mother-ship circling the earth waiting for the
final confrontation between the races), but he would never lose his
Muslim faith, merely temper it with his customary humor and
lassitude. In the 1960s, he might ape Muhammad’s racist screeds to
reporters, but his orthodoxy was such that it allowed Ali to retain the
white men in his corner, or his Jewish accountant, who Ali jokingly
referred to as ‘‘my Jewish brain.’’
No one reacted so vehemently to Ali’s public radicalism as
Floyd Patterson. After Ali destroyed Liston in the first round of their
rematch, Patterson took it as his personal mission to vanquish Ali, to
return the crown to the fold of the NAACP, celebrity-endorsed, good
Negroes of America and out of the hateful clutches of this Black
Muslim upstart. He inveighed against Ali at every opportunity,
attacking him in print in a series of articles in Sports Illustrated in
which he staked his claim to the moral high ground. Ali called
Patterson an Uncle Tom, and visited his training camp with a bag of
carrots for ‘‘The Rabbit.’’ The fight, already something of a grudge
match, assumed all the solemnity of a theological debate.
For Patterson, the match itself was a humiliation. Ali was not
content to defeat Patterson: he was determined to humiliate him
utterly, and in so doing, his temperate integrationist stance. Ali
danced in circles around Patterson, taunting him unmercifully, and
then he drew out the match, keeping Patterson on his feet for twelve
rounds before the referee finally intervened.
Three months after the Patterson fight, Ali took on an opponent
not so easily disposed of: the Federal Government. It began with a
draft notice, eliciting from Ali the oft quoted remark: ‘‘I ain’t got no
quarrel with them Vietcong.’’ When he scored miserably on an
aptitude test—twice and to his great embarrassment; he told reporters:
‘‘I said I was the greatest, not the smartest’’—Washington changed
the law, so Ali alleged, solely in order to draft him. He refused the
draft as a conscientious objector, and was summarily stripped of his
title and banished from the ring. Many writers speak of this period—
from 1967 to 1970—as Ali’s period of exile. It was an exodus from
the ring, true, but Ali was hardly out of sight; instead, he was touring
the country to speak at Nation of Islam rallies and college campuses
and, always, in the black neighborhoods. Ali’s refusal of the draft
polarized the country. Scorn was his due in the press, hate-mail filled
his mail box, but on the streets and in the colleges he became a hero.
Three years later, in 1970, a Supreme Court decision overturned
the adjudication of his draft status, heralding Ali’s return to boxing.
But he had lost a valuable three years, possibly the prime of his boxing
career. His detractors, sure that age had diminished Ali’s blinding
speed, were quick to write him off, but once again they had underesti-
mated his talent. It was true that three years of more or less enforced
indolence had slowed Ali down, but his tactical brilliance was
unimpaired. And he had learned something that would ultimately
prove disastrous to his health: he could take a punch. While his great
fights of the 1970s lacked the ideological drama of the bouts of the
previous decade, they were in some ways a far greater testament to Ali
the boxer, who, divested of his youth, had to resort to winning fights
by strategy and cunning.
Though Ali lost his first post-exile fight to Joe Frazier (who had
attained the championship in Ali’s absence), many considered it to be
the finest fight of his career, and the first in which he truly showed
‘‘heart.’’ Frazier was a good fighter, perhaps the best Ali had yet to
fight, and Ali boxed gamely for fifteen rounds, losing in the fifteenth
round when a vicious hook felled him (though he recovered suffi-
ciently to end the fight on his feet). In the rematch, Ali beat Frazier in a
fight that left the former champion (who had since lost his title to
George Foreman) incapacitated after fourteen punishing rounds.
The victory cleared the way for a championship bout with
Foreman, a massive boxer who, like Liston, possessed a sullen mien
and a prison record. The 1974 fight, dubbed the ‘‘Rumble in the
Jungle’’ after its location in Kinshasha, capitol city of Zaire, would
prove his most dramatic, memorialized in an Academy Award-
winning documentary, When We Were Kings (1996). What sort of
physical alchemy could Ali, now 32, resort to to overcome Foreman, a
boxer six years his junior? True, Foreman was a bruiser, a street-
fighter like Liston. True, Ali knew how to handle such a man, but in
terms of power and endurance he was outclassed. To compensate, he
initiated the sort of verbal taunting used to such great affect on Liston
while devising a plan to neutralize his young opponent’s physical
advantages: the much-vaunted rope-a-dope defense, which he would
later claim was a spur-of-the-moment tactic. For the first rounds of the
fight, Ali literally let Forman punch himself to exhaustion, leaning far
back in the ropes to deprive Foreman of the opportunity to sneak
through his defenses. By the sixth round, Foreman was visibly
slowing: in the eighth he was felled with a stunning combination. Ali
had once again proved his mastery, and while Foreman slunk back to
America, the next morning found Ali in the streets of Kinshasha, glad-
handing with the fascinated populace.