ADVERTISINGENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR CULTURE
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mass-circulation magazines as Life, Look, and the Saturday Evening
Post first lost advertising support and circulation, and in the case of
the first two, went out of business. Meanwhile, the number of special-
interest magazines increased from 759 in 1960 to 2,318 in the early
1990s. These magazines appealed to smaller audiences that shared
common interests—hobbies, sports, fashion, and music. By the 1970s
sleeping bags could be advertised in Outside magazine, rock albums
in Creem, and gardening implements in Herb Quarterly.
Up until the 1990s, advertisers still had a relatively well-defined
task: to determine where money would best be spent based on four
primary criteria: reach, or how many people could possibly receive
the message; frequency, or how often the message could be received;
selectivity, or whether the advertisement would reach the desired
potential customers; and efficiency, or the cost (usually expressed in
cost per thousand people). However, during the 1980s, changes in
society (government deregulation during the Reagan era) and techno-
logical changes (the broad acceptance of VCRs, cable television, and
remote controls) forced advertisers to seek out new venues and to
embrace new techniques. As the media became increasingly more
complex and fragmented, corporations footing the bill for advertising
also demanded more specific data than ever before, to the point
where, in the late 1990s, there were serious—and increasingly effec-
tive—attempts to measure whether a specific ad led to a specific
purchase or action by a consumer.
Advertisers in the late 1990s sought to regain some of the control
they lost in targeting ads on television. Before the 1980s, most major
markets had half a dozen or so outlets—CBS, NBC, ABC, PBS, and
one or two independent stations. In addition, remote controls and
VCRs were uncommon. Viewers’ choices were limited, changing the
channel was difficult, and it was difficult to ‘‘zap’’ commercials
either by channel ‘‘surfing’’ (changing channels quickly with a
remote control) or by recording a program and fast-forwarding over
ads. ‘‘Advertisers are increasingly nervous about this recent, if
superficial, level of power audiences have over their electronic media
viewing,’’ wrote McAllister. ‘‘New viewing technologies have been
introduced into the marketplace and have become ubiquitous in
most households. These technologies are, in some ways, anti-
advertising devices.’’
Cable television had also, by the late 1980s, become trouble-
some for advertisers, because some stations, like MTV and CNN
Headline News, had broken up programs into increasingly short
segments that offered more opportunities to skip advertising. Sports
programming, an increasing mainstay of cable, also puzzled advertis-
ers, because commercials were not regularly scheduled—viewers
could switch between games and never had to view a commercial.
Attempts to subvert viewer control by integrating plugs directly into
the broadcast had some success—and one advertiser might sponsor an
ever-present running score in one corner of the screen, while another
would sponsor instant replays and a third remote reports from other
games. These techniques were necessary, as at least one study
conducted in the 1980s indicated that when commercials came on,
viewership dropped by 8 percent on network TV and 14 percent on
cable stations.
Cable television, which had existed since the 1950s as a means
of delivering signals to remote communities, blossomed in the 1970s.
Home Box Office (HBO), became, in 1972, the first national cable
network. By 1980, 28 percent of U.S. households had cable televi-
sion, and by 1993 this figure reached 65 percent. Cable, with the
ability to provide up to 100 channels in most areas by the late 1990s,
provided the means for niche marketing on television, and by the mid-
1980s, advertisers took for granted that they could target television
commercials at women via the Lifetime Network, teenagers through
MTV, middle-class men through ESPN, blacks through BET, the
highly educated through the Arts and Entertainment Network, and so
on. Many advertisers found the opportunity to target specific audi-
ences to be more cost-efficient than broadcasting to large, less well-
defined audiences, because in the latter group, many viewers would
simply have no interest in the product, service, or brand being pitched.
Advertising, in short, had a direct impact on television content.
By the early 1990s, many individual programs had well-defined
audiences, and could become ‘‘hits’’ even if they reached only a small
portion of the potential general audience. For example, the WB
network’s Dawson’s Creek, which debuted in 1998, only attracted
nine percent of all viewers watching at the time it was broadcast, but it
was considered a hit because it delivered a large teen audience to
advertisers. Similarly, Fox’s Ally McBeal achieved hit status by
attracting only a 15 percent share of all viewers, because it appealed to
a vast number of young women. These numbers would have been
considered unimpressively small until the 1990s, but by then the
demographics of the audience, rather than the size, had become all
important to network marketers. In 1998, advertisers were paying
between $75,000 and $450,000 for a 30-second commercial (depend-
ing on the show and the day and time it was broadcast), and demanded
to know exactly who was watching. In the 1980s and 1990s, three new
networks—Fox, UPN, and WB—had emerged to compete with the
well-established CBS, NBC, and ABC, and succeeded by targeting
younger viewers who were attractive to certain advertisers.
Despite strong responses to the many challenges advertisers
faced, some groups remained elusive into the 1990s. People with
active lifestyles were often those most desired by advertisers and
could be the most difficult to reach. Non-advertising supported
entertainment—pay cable (HBO, Showtime), pay-per-view, videos,
CDs, laser disks, CD-ROMS, video games, the Internet, etc.—was
readily available to consumers with the most disposable income. As
opportunities to escape advertising increased, it paradoxically be-
came more difficult to do so, as corporate and product logos found
their way to the most remote places on earth. For example, outdoor
gear manufacturer North Face provided tents for Mount Everest
expeditions; these tents were featured in the popular IMAX film
‘‘Everest’’; corporate logos like the Nike ‘‘swoosh’’ were embedded
on every article of clothing sold by the company, making even the
most reluctant individuals walking billboards who both carried and
were exposed to advertising even in the wilderness.
As advertising proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s, so did its
guises. Movie and television producers began to charge for including
products (product placement) in films and programs. In exchange for
money and tie-ins that plugged both the film and product, producers
displayed brands as props in films, excluding competing brands. One
of the most successful product placements was the use of Reese’s
Pieces in the movie E.T. (1982), which resulted in a sales increase of
85 percent. In Rocky III, the moviegoer saw plugs for Coca-Cola,
Sanyo, Nike, Wheaties, TWA, Marantz, and Wurlitzer. Critics viewed
such advertising as subliminal and objected to its influence on the
creative process. The Center for the Study of Commercialism de-
scribed product placement as ‘‘one of the most deceitful forms of
advertising.’’ Product placement, however, was a way of rising above
clutter, a way to ensure that a message would not be ‘‘zapped.’’
Identifying targets for ads continued, through the late 1990s, to
become increasingly scientific, with VALS research (Values and