Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
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Chapter V
The Planning of Saratoga
1
A Need for Victory
As the New Year dawned on 1777 Germain could look back with pride on his first year in office. Large armies had
been conjured from nothing, wafted across the Atlantic, and maintained there. Canada had been cleared of the
enemy. New York had been secured. The last despatches to arrive in 1776 told of Cornwallis's victorious advance
across New Jersey, and of Clinton's departure to take Rhode Island, which Germain regarded1 as vital for the
future in war and peace. Nevertheless the campaign had not been decisive. The swift and overwhelming blow
which Germain had designed had all but crushed the rebellion; but still a further effort was needed.
To deploy so much of England's resources beyond the ocean had been a bold but calculated risk. Against the
danger of a French attack had been weighed the advantage of overcoming the American rebellion before Europe
could intervene. The more cautious policy of insuring at home might well in the long run prove the less safe. But
time was vital. And in the course of 1776 France had made it clear how much would turn on a speedy solution in
America.
The magnitude of the British effort had encouraged rather than checked the hopes of the French. In the Cabinet
only Turgot opposed preparations for war. To him it was internal reform which mattered; and ten years later many
had cause to regret that he had lost the debate. He believed that the whole colonial system was doomed by the
American example, and that the colonies of France herself were no longer worth a war to defend. For him the real
danger was that England would collect the profits of the new economic system which would replace the restrictive
colonial one; and the cost of armaments might make internal reform for ever impossible and prevent France from
collecting the fruits of peace.2 His views were parallelled by the most far-sighted opinion in England; but they
were shrugged off as a narrow focussing on internal affairs. The great game of foreign policy carried the day.
Whether America were freed or subjected, said Vergennes, the prospect for France was equally dangerous, and she
must arm. The Ministers of Marine
1 Sackville, II, 43.
2 Turgot, OEuvres *, V: 'Réflexions . . . suite de la querelle entre la Grande-Bretagne et ses colonies.'
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and War supported him; and Sartine, the Minister of War, looked forward openly to an offensive war.
Vergennes' reasoning was strengthened by the English parliamentary debates of March 1776. Member after
member exhorted the Ministry to beware of France and not to strip the British Isles of their defences. The chargé
d'affairs in London painted the picture of a government slothful yet imprudent; pacific, yet, in its weakness, at the
mercy of the actions of bellicose generals and admirals. The French Ministry resolved to give immediate assistance
to the rebels, and to begin arming the navy. Unofficial relations were established with the Americans. Silas Deane
arrived in Paris, armed with congressional warnings to avoid the pleasures of the great city. Money was advanced
for munitions, and technical advice made available. From Nantes the first trickle of supplies began to cross the
Atlantic, and young officers of noble family Lafayette, Noailles, Ségur embarked as volunteers in the cause of
liberty. In the naval bases the replenishing of storehouses and refitting of ships went forward. Twelve sail of the
line were to be kept ready for manning in Brest; and since the port would probably be blockaded in the event of
war, a squadron of eight was commissioned in the Mediterranean, to intervene wherever it might be needed. Thus,
two years before the breach with England the strategic stroke of April 1778 was planned.
Much of this was known in England. From the Paris Embassy, the British Minister in Brussels, and a continental
intelligence centre in Amsterdam, a stream of accurate information arrived to be digested by William Eden's
bureau. And there was a more remarkable source. For William Bancroft, the secretary and confidant of the
American Commissioners in Paris, was a British spy.1
During the summer of 1776 Vergennes was feeling his way towards war; wary of the dangers, fending off his
bellicose rival Choiseul, yet sure that France faced a great opportunity. In August he presented the case for war to a
Cabinet committee and passed it on to Madrid. Yet all depended on what was happening in America. 'From the
indications of the present campaign', wrote the Spanish Prime Minister, 'we shall discover how far one can count
on American resistance if the war continues.' About the same time Lord George Germain warned the Spanish
Ambassador that though the Declaration of Independence might encourage other powers to make treaties with the
United States, he expected news which would change their tone.2
1 There is much material about intelligence in the Auckland Papers (British Museum). See also Amer. Hist.
Rev., XXIX (S. F. Bemis, 'British Secret Service and the Franco-American Alliance'). For Bancroft, who
was a double-spy, see William aud Mary Quarterly, 1959 (Julian P. Boyd, 'Silas Deane: Death by a kindly
teacher of treason').
2 Doniol, I, 579, 586.
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Lord North, depressed by Howe's delay to wait for reinforcements, did not share Germain's optimism, an attitude
which deprived his opposition to naval rearmament of its most solid justification. But the news from Long Island
came as Germain had promised. The Brooklyn victory created a general contempt for the Americans; and Germain
was right when he wrote to Howe on the news of the battle that great success in his operations would be the
country's best security against France and Spain. Vergennes drew back. Now he talked of the financial need for
peace, and argued with a strange ignorance of maritime possibilities that a safe winter base at New York made the
British less dangerous than if they had been seeking an asylum on the seas. 'Rien ne presse plus en effet', he
declared. Thus England's victory in America held her enemies in check.1
2
Germain and the Generals
The despatches which told of Cornwallis's swift advance into New Jersey arrived on 30 December, and were
followed by the expected news that Rhode Island had fallen. Germain could feel that Howe had finished his
campaign honourably and gloriously. He did not share the view that he had been too cautious. For though the
Americans had not stood against the King's troops in the open, their skill at entrenching called for uncommon
ability to keep the casualties low, and Howe had 'infinite merit in that particular'. Germain's only reservation about
the campaign concerned the offer of pardon, which seemed to him to offer indemnity for rebellion and oblivion for
loyalty. 'A sentimental manner of making war', he called it in private. But in the military sphere he had given
Howe a free hand in the last campaign, and saw no cause to interfere with his plans for the next.2
Very different were his feelings towards Carleton. The mutual antipathy at which Walpole hints had been
increased by an incident at the beginning of the year. When the reinforcement for Canada was mounted early in
1776, Germain had named his friend Colonel Christie as Quartermaster-General of the force. But before the force
was sent, Carleton had asked that his own brother should be appointed; and Horace Walpole described the choice
of Christie as a signal affront to the Governor. He called him obscure and a Scot (two decisive disqualifications in
Walpole's eyes); yet Christie was a competent officer who later rose to be a Major-General, and the choice had
Amherst's approval. At the time of the appointment it was still possible that Quebec had fallen; and Germain
argued that the experience of Christie, who knew Canada intimately, would be needed by the force sent for its
recapture.
1 Doniol, I, 61020, 6808; Add. MSS. 37833, f. 32; Sackville, II, 42.
2 Knox, 128; Add. MSS. 34413, f. 2.
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On Christie's arrival he found that Carleton had already appointed his brother, an appointment which Germain
confirmed in due course. In the meantime Christie, who had incurred Carleton's hostility in the past by signing a
petition against the Quebec Act, had been packed off up country and subjected to such ill-treatment that he had to
be recalled, and returned to England with no favourable account of Carleton's management of supply and transport.
Carleton was certainly intemperate in his quarrels. In 1777 he broke with his Chief Engineer, who appealed to
Germain for leave to come home, alleging that the service was being mangled and his suggestions dismissed as
impertinences.1
Perhaps with the treatment of Christie in mind, Germain opposed the award of a red ribband to Carleton. And in
June, after congratulating him on the defence of Quebec, he lamented that he had said nothing in his despatches of
the enemy's force, the attitude of the Canadians, or his own intentions, which made it impossible to send him any
instructions. Carleton replied with asperity that he could have only one great object, the expulsion of the rebels,
which was done long before he could profit by any instructions with which Germain might think it necessary to
favour him; and in retaliation he complained that he had not been sent the boats and materials he had demanded for
the next phase of his operations, the crossing of the lakes.2 Neither the manner nor the content of this letter was
warranted. 'Expelling the rebels' was not a sufficient object to assume in a commander who had asked for his
reinforcement with the intention of invading the rebel colonies; nor a clarification of the Canadians' attitude
unreasonable to ask of a Governor who was indirectly known to have reversed his earlier assessment; nor
information about the enemy superfluous when he intended to advance on a line which would carry him into the
rear of the rebels facing Sir William Howe.
It will be remembered that since Carleton was not a member of the Peace Commission, Germain had not intended
him to command the troops which would cross the frontier3; and in August 1776 he ordered him to return to
Quebec and leave the pursuit to Burgoyne. He softened the blow by stressing the importance of Carleton's civil task
of restoring peace and order after the rebel invasion; an argument supported by the Law Officers' opinion that he
ought not, as Governor, to advance beyond the borders of his province. By the same ship Germain wrote privately
to Burgoyne, referring in un-
1 CL, Germain, 23 Aug. 1776, to Burgoyne; 11 Sept. 1777, from Gordon; Add. MSS. 38210, f. 8;
Sackville, II, 45; Walpole, Last Journals, II, 21, 61; Burt, Canadian Hist. Rev., 1930.
2 CO 42/35, ff. 40, 1712.
3 Above, p. 76.
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friendly terms to Carleton's treatment of Christie and his hesitation about using Indians.1
The officer carrying these letters failed to get up the St Lawrence before it froze, and Carleton continued to lead
the frontier operations. At the beginning of December Burgoyne arrived to spend the winter in England, bringing
amongst other letters Carleton's insolent reply to Germain's remonstrance. It naturally increased Germain's
hostility, and he began to agitate for the Governor's recall. This the King refused, for there was no mistaking the
American Secretary's rancour. He warned Lord North to expect an attack on Carleton at the next Cabinet dinner,
and advised him to play for time till all the Cabinet were in London. Nevertheless both the King and the Prime
Minister shared some of Germain's dissatisfaction. The information available suggested that only Carleton's
slowness had prevented the frontier of New England from being burst open. Instead, Lake Champlain would have
to be crossed a second time, and Ticonderoga still stood intact in the invaders' path. There was a general clamour
at the withdrawal from Lake Champlain, and one M.P. commented that it was not conceivable that Carleton should
be relied on to conduct the operations of the next campaign. Even North wondered at the delay in embarking on the
Lake; and on learning that Carleton had closed his campaign by abandoning Crown Point, the King agreed that he
had not been sufficiently warm and active, and that a more enterprising officer should lead the thrust to the
Hudson.2
The obvious choice was Burgoyne. Not only was he at hand; he knew Canada, and claimed to have opposed the
evacuation of Crown Point. Burgoyne had had a curious career, His father was a baronet's son who had died a
debtor in the rules of the King's Bench. As a young officer Burgoyne had eloped with a school friend's sister, the
daughter of the Earl of Derby. Finding that two could not make ends meet where one had failed, he sold his
commission in 1747 and retired for seven years to the continent till Lord Derby forgave him. In 1756 at the age of
thirty-four he was re-gazetted in the army as a junior captain, an almost unprecedented favour probably engineered
by the Derby influence; and after seeing service in the raids on Cherbourg and St Malo he was favoured again with
a commission to raise the Sixteenth Light Dragoons. When war broke out with Spain his regiment was sent to
serve with the army defending Portugal against the French and Spaniards. Burgoyne, now acting as brigadier,
distinguished himself by a daring regimental exploit, the raid on Valencia d'Alcantara, where he surprised and
destroyed a Spanish regiment. His only other notable experience was the direction of a raid on Vilha Velha which
was executed by Washington's
1 Sackville, II, 39; G 1930; CL, Germain, 22 Aug. 1776 to Carleton; Fonblanque, 227.
2 Hastings, III, 189; G 1930, 1936 1938.
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future second in command, Colonel Lee. In temperament, experience and interest Burgoyne was a light
cavalryman.
The war over, he returned to England. He had not done badly for himself. On the strength of two or three coastal
raids and some skirmishing in Spain, he had risen in six years from junior captain to brigadier, with the command
of a regiment to line his pockets. He and his regiment were favourites of the King, whose intervention may have
saved the Sixteenth from being disbanded at the peace. Their Colonel continued to flourish. The lucrative
governorship of Fort William fell to him in 1768, a sinecure rarely held by an officer below the rank of general.
With this and the fortune which his wife inherited about the same time, he could give rein to his expensive tastes.
Acting and playwriting kept him amused, and politics and the society of Charles Fox employed his money. In 1769
he barely escaped imprisonment for inciting his supporters to violence in a contested election.
Burgoyne had many of the qualities of a good regimental commander and leader of men. But merit alone was not
enough to explain his success. He had pushed the claims of family connection so ruthlessly as to shock even a
hardened Secretary at War.1 About his intrinsic worth the diarists on both sides of politics were for once agreed. 'A
vain, very ambitious man', wrote Horace Walpole, 'with a half-understanding which was worse than none.' Wraxall
gave credit to Junius's portrait of him at the gaming table, waiting with sober attention to engage some drunken
young nobleman at picquet. But he had no lack of energy, which he employed in pushing his own claims to high
employment. On his appointment to America in 1775 he exerted pressure in many quarters to shake off the
seniority of Sir William Howe and obtain an independent command at New York; and failing, filled the idle
months at Boston with letters of enormous length to all the Ministers he knew. In a very long letter complaining of
his position to Lord Rochford, he gave this estimate of General Gage, his Commander-in-Chief: 'capable of
figuring upon ordinary and given lines of conduct; but his mind has not resources for great, and sudden and hardy
exertions, which spring self-suggested in extraordinary characters, and generally overbear all opposition'. The
denigration of Gage was careful and moderate, the contrasted character a fantasy-projection of himself.2
This was the officer who arrived on the eve of the planning period for the campaign of 1777, armed with a letter
from Carleton referring the Minister to him for advice. He landed at Portsmouth on the afternoon of 9 December,
1 Fonblanque, 478. In America he evidently did not consider it necessary to expand his social charm on
General Riedesel's German wife (see, e.g. Mme Riedesel's Memoirs, 199).
2 Anderson, 45; Wraxall, II, 293; Fonblanque, 125 et seq., 1489.
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and was in Germain's office at noon on the following day. After Saratoga he strenuously denied the report that he
had tried to undermine and supplant his Commander-in-Chief, and was always afterwards careful to praise
Carleton in the House of Commons. It is probably true that he put on a show of loyalty for his friends at large. But
he informed Germain that he had opposed the withdrawal from Crown Point; and a précis among the papers of the
American Department shows that what he told Germain of the summer's operations was not all to Carleton's
advantage. He gave Germain detailed observations on Carleton's requirements for the next campaign, in a tone
which conveys the feeling that he was supplanting his chief. And in his own suggestions for the campaign there is a
reference to Carleton which his biographer omits. He wrote that in the matter of supply everything depended on the
'peremptory powers, warm zeal, and consonant opinion of the governor; and though the former are not to be
doubted, a failure in the latter indicated . . . by the plausible obstruction that will not fail to be suggested by others,
will be sufficient to crush such exertions as an officer of sanguine temperament, entrusted with the future conduct
of the campaign, and whose personal interest and fame therefore consequentially depended upon a timely outset,
would be led to make'. Here is the same technique of tempered criticism and suggestive contrast which he had used
against Gage. 'Under these considerations', he continued, 'it is presumed that the General Officer employed to
proceed with the army will be held out of the reach of any possible blame till he is clear of the province of Canada,
and furnished with the proper supplies.'1
3
Howe's Plans of Campaign
Thus it happened that by the end of 1776 General Howe enjoyed the Ministry's confidence; but Carleton did not.
Howe's proposals for the next campaign arrived on 30 December in a despatch written a month earlier which
brought news of the swift pursuit across East Jersey.2 He expected the enemy to stand on the Raritan or perhaps not
till the Delaware, and to try to cover Philadelphia, and he expected to close his operations for the winter in
possession of East Jersey, which he needed as a foraging area. He had learnt of Carleton's withdrawal from Lake
Champlain; but he assumed that though the northern army was unlikely to reach Albany till the following
September, its advance from Canada would be renewed in the spring, and
1 Fonblanque, 226; Parl Hist., XIX, 1187; CO 5/253, ff. 269; CL, Germain, 28 Feb. 1777, Burgoyne to
Germain, and his observations on Carleton's requirements placed at the end of the 1777 papers; G 1936.
2 Howe's of 30 Nov. (Sackville, II, 49-50).
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that both armies would continue their concerted offensive against New England.
Howe therefore proposed to switch the main weight of his own army back to the northward. He would leave 8,000
men to cover New Jersey and check Washington, and 7,000 to hold New York and Rhode Island. Two offensives,
each 10,000 strong, would be mounted against New England and Upper New York: one on the Hudson towards
Albany and the Canadian army, the other from Rhode Island toward Boston. If these operations were successful, he
would reduce Pennsylvania and Virginia in the following autumn and South Carolina and Georgia in the winter.
By this design he hoped to finish the war in one more campaign.
This plan called for 35,000 men. By the last returns Howe had some 27,000 effectives, and the Cabinet might
reasonably infer that 7,000 reinforcements would give him the strength he needed. But his proposals ended with a
highly ambiguous and very disturbing paragraph: 'South Carolina and Georgia must be the objects for the winter,
but to complete this plan, not less than ten ships of the line will be absolutely requisite, and a reinforcement of
troops to the amount of 15,000 rank and file.' This reinforcement, he continued, would give him 35,000 'effective
men' which he would need to face the 50,000 which Congress had voted for the next campaign.
What could be made of this? The 35,000 he demanded were, in fact, the force postulated in detail in his plan of
campaign; but 15,000 effective reinforcements would give him many more than this, and the figure was coupled
with the southern colonies in a manner which suggested that it was what he would ultimately need to re-occupy the
whole of the rebellious provinces. The impression that the requirement was an ultimate and not an immediate one
was strengthened by his suggestion that the troops might be had from Russia or Hanover, which he could not
suppose could be done in a hurry.
The precise meaning was important; for though 7,000 reinforcements might be collected for him, there was no hope
whatever of finding 15,000. Not many Germans could be got; and those sure recruiting grounds, the Highlands of
Scotland, were said to have been exhausted in the previous winter. England was producing a mere trickle of
recruits, and the few formed regiments left at home could not be spared in face of the uncertain intentions of
France. The only means of finding more troops would have been to raise new regiments, for which men were
easier to find; but the expense would be heavy, the regiments could not be ready for the field till 1778, and the
King was as reluctant to raise troops as to commission ships for a campaign which might never be fought. Germain
talked of new Highland regiments, but the King and Lord North nipped the plan in the bud.1
1 G 1938; Add. MSS. 37883, ff. 16570.
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To later eyes it appears that in spite of his phrase 'effective men' Howe was not reckoning in effectives, a term
which included sick, prisoners of war, and detachments, but from a base figure of his 20,000 men who were
present and fit for duty. But the inducement to interpret the phrase literally was strong. Moreover Germain was
rightly incredulous of Congress's ability to raise anything approaching 50,000 men; and could they have done so,
he was confident that they would not stand up to Howe's splendid troops. He read Howe's despatch to the Cabinet
on 10 January, and it was agreed that 4,000 additional Germans should be taken into British pay, making a total
reinforcement including recruits of 7,800, which it was understood from the latest returns would give Howe 35,000
effectives. Germain therefore wrote to Howe on 14 January that he hoped these reinforcements would meet his
requirements. Not all of them would reach him at the outset of the campaign; but, Germain argued to Eden (though
here perhaps he was stretching the point), the mention of Russians and Hanoverians suggested that his need was
not pressing. In the event the Northern Department was to be disappointed of its full quota of additional Germans,
and only 1,285 were obtained; but by giving Howe priority over Canada, about 6,100 reinforcements were sent to
New York in the course of the summer, of which the bulk arrived in May and the balance of 1,700 recruits in
September.1
Comment on the details of Howe's operational plan was deferred till the end of the campaign was known. Howe's
next despatch was written on 20 December, but it limped in to Whitehall two months later on 23 February. Events
had moved rapidly in New Jersey, and instead of halting on the Raritan he had pushed forward across the whole
state to the Pennsylvania boundary on the Delaware. He was now within easy distance of the seat of Congress at
Philadelphia, and the rebellion seemed to be on the brink of complete disintegration. Here rather than in New
England he was now sure of finding the main army of the rebels. The inhabitants of New Jersey and Pennsylvania
were flocking in to collect their pardons. The apparent change in American sentiment persuaded Howe that the fall
of Philadelphia would be decisive, and that one short stroke would end the rebellion in the Middle Colonies. He
therefore proposed a change of plan to seize the opportunity. Instead of waiting for reinforcements to mount his
offensive against New England, he would exploit his success to the southward, and strike with 10,000 men at
Philadelphia. This would mean cutting his other commitments to the bone. The Rhode Island offensive towards
Boston would have to wait for fresh
1 The above reading of Howe's despatch and the reinforcement figures differs from those in most
authorities. For the despatch and its interpretation see Sackville, II, 4950, 567; CO 5/253, f. 256; Thynne
Papers, Cabinet Minute of 10 Jan. (précis in Dartmouth II, 432); Add. MSS. 34413, f. 2 (31 Jan. Germain to
Eden). For the reinforcements, see p. 118 below.
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troops from England; New York would lose a thousand men of its intended garrison; and instead of 10,000 men to
surge towards Albany and the Canadian army, there would be a defensive corps of 3,000 on the Lower Hudson to
cover New Jersey and 'facilitate in some degree the approach of the army in Canada'.1
With this despatch Howe broke from the design which had ruled British strategy since Bunker Hill. Instead of a
concerted thrust into the back of New England by the full weight of both the Canadian and Atlantic armies, he
intended Carleton's force to make its dilatory way against the disintegrating enemy, while his own army overran the
Middle Colonies and the political capital of the rebels, and thus put an end to the rebellion. This was still Howe's
intention when the plans for Canada were worked out in London. But the Ministers were aware that there had been
some change of fortune since it was drawn up; for simultaneously with its arrival came the official news of a sharp
reverse in New Jersey.
To cover the loyalist areas which he had overrun, and enable the army to drive across the Delaware as soon as it
froze, Howe held a very wide cantonment area, protected by a chain of posts extending from the Hudson as far as
the Delaware, and anchored at its southern extremity on two Hessian posts at Trenton, on the high road to
Philadelphia, and at Bordentown. He knew that the line was too extended, but trusted to the submission of the
country beyond the southern end of his line, and the strength of his advanced positions.2 In Trenton Colonel Rahl
had 1,300 men. He was close to the Delaware, the enemy had boats, and he had been ordered to entrench. But he
had neglected to build redoubts, and his immediate superior General Grant had failed to visit the post. Early on
Christmas morning Rahl was surprised and killed by Washington. His brigade laid down its arms. The
neighbouring Hessians at Bordenton abandoned their heavy baggage and beat a hasty retreat, and Washington
raided deep into the British winter quarters. The rebels recovered their nerve. Many who had taken King George's
pardon now took the precaution of submitting to Congress. The loyalist units forming in New Jersey dispersed to
protect their homes. And though Howe drove the Americans from Trenton he did not stay, but fell back and
abandoned all his gains in New Jersey except a shallow bridgehead at Brunswick and Amboy. This was the first of
many evacuations which were to shatter loyalist confidence.
4
The Plan for Canada
On New Year's Day Burgoyne had written to tell Germain that he was going for a cure to Bath. He told him that he
had informed the King of his departure, and 'as the arrangements for the next campaign might possibly
1 Sackville, II, 523.
2 Cornwallis Corr., I, 25.
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