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ence to the desired message or messages.

However, they thought that

effectiveness was limited because the public would perceive ads as being

too self-serving.

Furthermore, business executives of Fortune 500 companies thought

the use of the “good corporate citizen” copy focus had been overused “to

the point it is now counter-productive in enhancing the image of an in-

dividual firm.”

Several noted, “The often repeated symbolism of a

company who sees no evil, does no evil, and speaks no evil gets very

hard to swallow.” What target groups want answered by ads is, “What

have you done for me today and what will you do for me in the fu-

ture?”

The real problem, some executives contended, is subject matter:

“Substance is lacking and there is little or nothing to build the campaign

around.” The fundamental question is whether the types of problems,

issues, and topics corporations now address in their corporate issue

campaigns can really be dealt with through advertising.

The effectiveness of advocacy advertising depends on many factors.

One factor is whether the ads themselves become newsworthy. The fa

mous Harry and Louise TV ads for the defeat of the Clinton administra

tion’s 1994 health care reform bill, which were targeted only in the

home districts of key members of Congress and the Washington, DC

market, were successful because they stimulated millions of dollars of

free publicity on network news shows. Even more attention was inad

vertently drawn to the ads when groups supporting the Clinton plan

ran ads attacking Harry and Louise. Further awareness of the ads was

created by a White House parody by President Clinton and his wife, Hil

lary, at a gridiron dinner.

Achieving public awareness, however, is

only one of several levels of effectiveness.

Determine the Criteria for Effectiveness

The Harry and Louise ads attracted attention and stimulated news cov

erage, but is that enough? To be effective by themselves, the ads had to

also influence attitudes toward health care reform and, ultimately, con

162 I CHAPTER 6

Box 6.2 (continued)

Together, R. J. Reynolds and Philip Morris tried to sway public opin

ion by presenting three negative consequences of a smoke-free soci

ety: the loss of the contribution of tobacco tax to government

budgets, a black market of tobacco products, and more unemploy

ment. Referring to the previous prohibition of alcohol, an R. J.

Reynolds ad says, “These most recent anti-smoking proposals repre

sent nothing less than an attempt at tobacco prohibition, something

that will have serious implications for Americans.” This ad, like others,

optimistically ends with the slogan “Together, we can work it out.”

gressional voting behavior. As indicated in the well-known hierarchy of

effects, effectiveness must be measured on at least four levels:

1. Attracting attention or creating awareness. Ads are highly likely

to be effective in achieving this objective. An ad serves to place an is

sue on the public agenda. According to an Opinion Research Corpora

tion (ORC) study, 90% of U.S. adults said they had read or heard an

advocacy ad in the past 2 years.

2. Creating understanding and comprehension. This result is less

likely and depends on such factors as public interest in the issue, its

complexity, and its emotional character. An ORC study reports that

58% of adults see the ads as at least “fairly believable,” with 64%

claiming they help them understand the issue under discussion.

However, a survey of congressional and other government leaders by

Yankelovich, Skelly, and White turned up less sanguine results. Al

though 90% said they read Mobil advocacy ads on the energy issue,

66% found them of little use in understanding energy deregulation is-

sues; nor did the ads influence their opinion on any policy matter.

Furthermore, the ads were found to be “abrasive,” “unpersuasive,”

and “antagonistic.”

3. Influencing attitudes. Communication theorists contend infor-

mation by itself rarely influences attitudes; it must be reinforced by

other activities, such as interpersonal communication. However, this

conclusion is tempered by the ORC study finding that 51% said the

ads changed their minds. Furthermore, the Harry and Louise ads cre-

ated “negative” attention to the health care reform measure.

4. Influencing behavior. This result is the least likely. It should be

noted, however, that 25% in the ORC study said they took action by

writing to a public official about an issue and 12% said they wrote a

letter to an editor about it. Special situations, as described later, ac

count for some successes.

The quality of an advocacy ad and its many attributes determine how

effective it is in reaching one or more of these four levels. Although les

sons from product advertising apply, a few specific studies of the effec

tiveness of advocacy advertising suggest some special factors. One

study, which sought the reactions of a company’s internal stake

holders, identified three criteria: professionalism, creativeness, and con

sistency. Professionalism meant that an ad was distinctive or unique,

credible, up to date, recognizable, made a clear promise, addressed tar

get audiences, was typical of the company, and was appealing to its own

employees. Professionalism was necessary to educate stakeholders; that

is, to create understanding.

To change attitudes, creativeness was needed—exhibiting such attrib

utes as being striking, authentic, original, surprising, unique, and hu

morous. To change behavior, consistency as well as professionalism

were required. Consistency refers to being consequent and coherent,

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 163

having a single concept and long-term focus. Judgment and skill are ob

viously required to translate these attributes into the design and

composition of an ad.

Additional variables are described in an academic study conducted in a

classroom. Students were asked to contact their congresspersons to help

defeat impending legislation that would ban saccharin. The study found

that students considered a message in an advocacy ad more interesting

and informative, and hence more persuasive, than a news story. This

finding refutes the general belief that a news story about a controversial

subject is more effective than a similar message in a paid advertisement

becausethesourceofthelatterisassumedtobebiased.Furthermore,

what can make an ad more effective is its superior format—layout, larger

type size, and straightforward presentation. The study also refuted the

premise that a corporate source has lower credibility. For example, ads by

Pepsiwereaseffectiveininducingwrittencorrespondencetocongress

persons as ads attributed to the American Cancer Society.

Two cases, those of Allstate Insurance and W. R. Grace & Company,

suggest circumstances when advocacy advertising can affect behavior.

Ray Ewing, former director of Allstate’s issues management effort, re-

ported that a 1971 ad headlined “New York State Supports Auto

Thieves” influenced one key person at the time: Governor Nelson

Rockefeller. Reporting on the ad to the governor, his staff interpreted it

as implying the insurance industry might oppose his upcoming bid for

reelection. After the ad was run, Rockefeller announced that although

he would not include a title law in his legislative package, he would not

oppose one either. The law was passed that session.

In the second case, W. R. Grace’s “Disincentivization of America” cam-

paign, the then director of advertising, Stephen Elliott, concluded,

“While many other factors were at work regarding this issue, Grace be-

lieves the campaign was an influential contributor to the congressional

action which reduced the capital gains tax to 20 percent instead of the

proposed increase to 52 percent.”

What should be noted of this

4-month campaign is advocacy advertising was coordinated with press

relations and with formal and informal contacts with congressmen and

senators. Each ad was keyed to specific issues debated in Congress at the

time. Readers were asked to write to their member of Congress on the

capital gains tax issue. Direct mail, which included ad reprints and a

49-page report titled “The Disincentivization of America,” supple

mented the newspaper ads. The targets of direct mail were U.S. con

gressmen and senators, chief executives of Fortune 1000 companies, and

editors of 665 U.S. newspapers. A by-product of the campaign was

widespread publicity.

Conditions That Enhance Effectiveness

A fair conclusion to the debate over the effectiveness of advocacy adver

tising is that it can be effective—even to the point of influencing atti

164 I CHAPTER 6

tudes and behavior—if carefully designed and under special conditions,

such as the following:

1. The ad is part of a larger public affairs campaign and thus supple

mented by such activities as proactive media relations, grassroots

lobbying, and political action committee (PAC) contributions. As

stated by Joseph Klapper in the early literature of communication

theory, mass communication is “a contributory agent, but not the

sole cause” in producing attitudinal and behavioral changes.

2. The advertiser has high source credibility. Often this means the

company has a history of public communication and does not try

to reach the public only during a crisis. Recognizing they have to

build credibility slowly, some companies begin by talking about

things of interest to their audiences and with which they can agree.

3. The ad is based on facts and persuasive reasoning, not flag-wav

ing, posturing, and preaching. One reason the Harry and Louise

ads were so effective is that of the $15 million the Health Insurance

Association of America (HIAA) spent on the campaign, between

$300,000 and $400,000 went for survey research. The aim was to

find message themes that bridged the concerns of HIAA with those

of the public. Focus groups tested the wording of the message and

the setting; for example, Harry and Louise were found to be more

persuasive when seated at their kitchen table than on a sofa in their

living room.

4. The ad creates interest and involvement by talking in terms of the

audience’s own life and the things that are important to them.

5. Present both sides of an issue. Because the less attractive facts

about your firm or industry are likely already known, critics can

be defused by the ad’s admitting these.

6. Initiate layout innovations and develop a signature style.

7. Use targeted messages and media whenever possible. For example,

DuPont began running “Voice of the American Farm” ads on televi

sion, on radio, in major newspapers, and in farming publications

that focus mainly on farm issues, problems, and solutions.

A review of political campaign ads (see chap. 11) suggests other ways

in which advocacy ads can be effective.

TRENDS IN CORPORATE ADVERTISING

Some trends in advocacy advertising also affect image advertising,

which is a major part of overall corporate advertising. Image advertis

ing is about the character of a corporation. Its objectives are to increase

public familiarity with a company, improve attitudes toward it, and as

sociate favorable personality traits with it. Image advertising supports

advocacy advertising when favorable attitudes toward a company in

crease the credibility of its issue messages.

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 165

Image ads can also be used to influence regulatory decisions while not

explicitly advocating legislation. In 1998 several utility companies with

expiring licences to operate nuclear plants were seeking 40-year license

renewals.

To help them, the Nuclear Energy Institute launched an

image campaign that positioned nuclear power as a safe and environ

ment- friendly energy source. Ads were targeted at influentials through

publications such as The New York Times, Washington Post, the Economist,

New Republic, and Atlantic Monthly. The ads’ tagline is “Nuclear: More

Than You Ever Imagined.” The ads promote nuclear power as safe, effi

cient, and clean. Radio spots were also used on popular radio shows

such as Don Imus.

Corporate Branding

A fundamental change in the nature of corporate ads during the 1990s

holds implications for both image and advocacy advertising. There is

more “corporate branding” than “corporate image,” says James R. Greg-

ory, a consultant hired by the Association of National Advertisers. Corpo-

rate branding is “more marketing-oriented, much more aggressive,

much more savvy.” In contrast, image ads “are viewed as fluff and not re-

ally valuable, except for self-gratification.… That type of corporate ad-

vertising is eyewash and people don’t pay attention to it.” Furthermore,

says Gregory, “corporate image ads are the chairman of the company and

the 100th anniversary of the company; they’re past tense.… What peo-

ple are interested in is the future, the company’s vision.”

Branding is also distinguished from identity, which is concerned

with “defining and shaping the entity behind the brand.” Identity con-

centrates on management and leadership as opposed to marketing. In

other words, the difference between branding and identity, as in the

corporate context, is “who is doing the talking as opposed to what they

are talking about.” With corporate identity, public image both inside

and outside of an organization is of great importance as well. For in

stance, Philip Morris has yet to shake “Philip Morris, tobacco com

pany.” To remove this stigma placed on it by the public, Philip Morris

has come up with a new name—Altria (meaning higher in Latin). The

logo accompanying the new name is a mosaic—inspired by a “com

partmented shelf in the Philip Morris corporate reception area that fea

tures packages sold by its several companies.” The new symbol is both

appropriate and fun, with its splashes of color representing the multi

plicity and diversity of Altria.

Schmertz says fundamental changes in the marketplace dictate a more

compelling response than companies have been making; the public wants

to know more about a company than just the quality of its goods and ser

vices. People want to know who the company is, what it stands for, and

how it differs from the competition. They also want to know why the

company is relevant to them.

A corporation must speak with a clear, co

herent, and distinctive voice. It can spring from a powerful corporate

166 I CHAPTER 6

voice of an inspired leader (e.g., Sony founder Akio Morita), or a strongly

defined culture (e.g., McDonald’s or Herman Miller’s).

Because it is directed at issues, advocacy advertising should be more

rational and less fluffy than image advertising. Schmertz stated in an

interview with Bill Moyers on Public Broadcasting Service in 1993:

I think corporate America should be dealing in hard aspects of the issues

rather than in emotional kinds of appeals.… If you look at the Conoco ads

with the penguins and seals clapping, you have an emotional appeal. That

doesn’t tell you anything about what they are doing or the consequences of

what they are doing, or alternative policies.… Corporate America should

create a dialogue and debate on important public-policy issues. These

kinds of ads don’t do that. The real issue in the debate ought to be on prior

ities. And the debate ought to be nonemotional.

CONCLUSIONS

Advocacy advertising provides corporations with another way to gain

control over the mass media—by buying space or time to disseminate

chosen messages to the general public or a selective audience. Although

most organizations have this privilege, only those who can pay can use

it. Large corporations, with their considerable wealth, have a compara-

tive advantage over others. Even if a corporation is willing to pay for an

adversary’s reply, as Mobil has done, it has the upper hand because it

sets the agenda.

Although advocacy advertising’s ability to influence attitudes and

behavior on a particular issue is questionable, it does more than simply

attract attention to an issue. Together with other forms of corporate ad-

vertising, such as image advertising, it keeps the public aware of the cor-

porate presence in society. This awareness can serve the function of

legitimizing an individual corporation, an industry, and the business

system as a whole. Whether it succeeds depends on the public accept

ability of its messages. Too often the public is told what the corporation

is against but not for what the corporation stands.

ENDNOTES

1. Marc Rosenberg, “The Power of Advocacy Advertising in Newspapers,” Editor

& Publisher, February 11, 1995, p. 48.

2. S. Prakash Sethi, Advocacy Advertising and Large Corporations: Social Conflict,

Big business Image, the News Media, and Public Policy (Lexington, Mass:

Lexington Books, 1977), p. 7.

3. Stuart Elliott, “The Media Business: Advertising,” New York Times, January

18, 1995, p. D5.

4. Jonathan Weisman, “Adopting Union Tactics, Firms Dive More Deeply Into

Politics; Employees Targeted With Voter Guides, Turnout Efforts,” Washing

ton Post, October 24, 2002, p. A08.

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 167

5. Robert Pear, “CBS Pulls Advertisement on Medicare Prepared by Administra

tion,” New York Times, February 14, 2004, p. A20.

6. Jeffrey Taylor, “Is Tobacco Industry Playing Politics With Issue Ads?,” Wall

Street Journal, September 1, 1998, p. A20.

7. Lisa van der Pool, “Ad Units of PR Shops Seek More Advocacy Work, Marsteller

Adds Specialist in D.C. to Chase Growing Niche,” Ad Week, October 6, 2003, p. 9.

8. Peter Roff, “Study: $45m Spent on Issue Ads in D.C.,” United Press Interna

tional, January 7, 2003. The study was conducted by the Annenberg Center

at the University of Pennsylvania. To be included in the study, the ads had to

run in 2001 in the Washington Times, Washington Post, The Hill, Congress Daily

AM, or Roll Call, all of which are Washington publications read by significant

numbers of legislators, federal officials, and others who have an influence on

public policy formulation.

9. Van der Pool, op. cit.

10. Roff, op. cit.

11. “Study Finds Energy Issues Account for Most Policy Advertising,” Oil Daily

[Online], June 19, 2003.

12. Ibid.

13. Lucia Moses, “Advocacy-Ad Dollars Flow,” Editor & Publisher Magazine,

March 3, 2003, p. 4.

14. Nat Ives, “The Media Business: Advertising; Unions and Advocacy Groups

Are Putting a Madison Avenue Finesse on Their Protest Ads,” New York Times,

December 26, 2002, p. C3.

15. Joann S. Lublin, “TV Networks Gingerly Lift Prohibition on ‘Issue Ads’,”

Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1990, p. B1.

16. Pear, op. cit. Also see “CBS Statement on Advocacy Advertising,” PR News-

wire, January 28, 2004.

17. “Anti-Bush Ads Rejected by CBS Are Slated to Air on CNN During Super

Bowl,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, January 30, 2004, p. 1. Also

see Danna Harman, “Advertising or Advocating?,” Christian Science Monitor,

February 20, 2004, p. 11.

18. Jennifer Harper, “CNN Rejects Ads by Jewish Groups,” The Washington Times,

September 20, 2002, p. AO8.

19. Lublin, op. cit.

20. Ibid.

21. James A. Diazi and Carol VanOrnum, “Star Tribune Cannot Limit Ads to

Those It Agrees With,” Star Tribune, December 5, 1991, p. 25A.

22. Sethi, op. cit.

23. Herbert Schmertz, letter to editor of pr reporter, January 3, 1978.

24. Ibid.

25. Irwin Ross, “Public Relations Isn’t Kid-Glove Stuff at Mobil,” Fortune, Sep

tember 1976, pp. 106–111, 196–202.

26. “Mobil … A Case History,” Brochure, No. PR1102, prepared by Time, 1976.

27. “Top Line,” Madison Avenue, Vol. 25, February 8, 1983, p. 32.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 36.

30. Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1999, p. C24.

31. Ibid., p. 34.

32. Donald S. Stroetzel, “Why Mobil Uses Advocacy Advertising,” Public Affairs

Review, Vol. 3, 1982, pp. 32–33.

33. Ross, op. cit.

34. “Nuclear Industry Seeks to Activate ‘Silent’ Supporters,” O’Dwyer’s Report,

Vol. 12, September 1998, pp. 1, 49.

168 I CHAPTER 6

35. Rosenberg, op. cit.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Laurie McGinley and Glenn Burkins, “AFL-CIO Ad Blitz on Revamp of Man

aged Care Has Warning on the Political Cost of Opposition,” Wall Street Jour

nal, July 15, 1998, p. A16.

42. Eben Shapiro, “R. J. Reynolds Fights Back in Campaign,” Wall Street Journal,

May 23, 1994, p. B5.

43. Tom Hamburger and Jim VandeHei, “Ads Backing Bush Proposals Proliferate

as Advocacy Groups Become Permanent,” Wall Street Journal, March 19,

2002, p. A4.

44. The ad that appeared in the Wall Street Journal on August 9, 1994, p.

A11, showed four individuals, each with a quote, and the ad’s headline

was “We Have Never Smoked. But It Was Our Choice, Not the Govern

ment’s.”

45. See Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1994, p. A9.

46. Ibid.

47. The ad appeared in the Wall Street Journal, May 26, 1994, p. B3. The opinion

editorial by Jacob Sullum appeared on March 24, 1994.

48. See Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1995, p. A5.

49. An ad appeared in the Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1994, p. B9.

50. Rosenberg, op. cit.

51. See Andrew Eolfson, “Embattled Companies Fight Back With Ads,” Courier-

Journal, May 27, 1994, p. 1A.

52. Eva Hoeffelman, “The Crisis of the Tobacco Industry,” class paper in Manag-

ing Corporate Crises, Boston University, College of Communication, No-

vember 16, 1994, p. 18.

53. Barbara J. Coe, “The Effectiveness Challenge in Issue Advertising Cam-

paigns,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1983, p. 27.

54. Ibid., p. 29.

55. Ibid., p. 28.

56. Ibid., p. 32.

57. Rosenberg, op. cit.

58. A study of 1,010 persons in the United States conducted by ORC reported

that 90% said they had read or heard an advocacy ad in the past 2 years.

When asked about the source of the ad, 70% answered television. Unfor

tunately this raises doubt about the accuracy of respondents’ impres

sions because television is the least likely source as networks have

generally refused to accept advocacy ads. But Kenneth Schwartz of ORC

explains that, “because of the predominance of television, this medium

tends to be cited by the majority of people as the source of almost any

kind of information about which they are questioned.” Stephen A.

Kliment, “Advocacy Advertising by U.S. Corporations—Can Money Buy

Friends?” Madison Avenue, Vol. 23, February 1981, p. 40.

59. Lynn Adkins, “How Good Are Advocacy Ads?” Dun’s Review, June 1978, p.

76.

60. Cess B. M. van Riel and Gerrit H. van Bruggen, “Impact: A Management

Judgment Tool to Predict the Effectiveness of Corporate Advertising

Campaigns,” Journal of Brand Management, Vol. 11, September 2003,

p. 22.

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 169

61. Charles T. Salmon, et al., “The Effectiveness of Advocacy Advertising Relative

to News Coverage,” Communication Research, Vol. 12, October 1985, pp.

546–567.

62. Raymond P. Ewing, “Advocacy Advertising: The Voice of Business in Public

Policy Debate,” Public Affairs Review, Vol. 3, 1982, pp. 35–39.

63. Ibid.

64. See S. Prakash Sethi, W.R. Grace and Company, New York—A Short-Burst, High

Intensity, Saturation Campaign in Advocacy Advertising. (Center for Research

in Business and Social Policy, School of Management and Administration,

University of Texas at Dallas, 1980).

65. Joseph Klapper, “What We Know About the Effects of Mass Communication:

The Brink of Hope,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 21, Winter, 1957–58, pp.

453–474.

66. James A. Barnes, “Privatizing Politics,” National Journal, Vol. 27, June 3,

1995, pp. 1330–1334.

67. Coe, op. cit., p. 33.

68. Ibid., pp. 33–34.

69. Debbie Coakley, “Ag Advocacy Advertising Alive and Well,” Agri Marketing,

Skokie, Vol. 35, April 1997, pp. 74–76.

70. Two of the companies whose plant licenses date back to the 1950s are Duke

Power’s Oconee plant in South Carolina and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.’s

Calverg Cliffs plant in Maryland. “Nuclear Industry Seeks to Active ‘Silent’

Supporters,” O’Dwyer’s Report, Vol. 12, September 1998, pp. 1, 49.

71. Ibid.

72. Elliott, op. cit.

73. Tony Spaeth, “The Name Game,” Across the Board, Vol. 39, March–April

2002, pp. 27–31.

74. Alan Siegel, “Defining the Corporate Voice; Corporate Identity,” Across the

Board, Vol. 31, November 1994, p. 56.

75. Ibid.

170 I CHAPTER 6

Chapter 7

Holding the Media

Accountable and Suing

A long-term corporate strategy is gradually to change the behavior of

journalists and news organizations by exerting various kinds of pres-

sures on them, with the aim of reforming their policies and practices.

This strategy extends the short-term options already discussed—taking

full advantage of current media practices, outsmarting the media, and

buying time and space in the media.

The new strategy is to hold the media accountable to their own jour-

nalistic standards and the same laws and standards of society the media

expect others to uphold. Unfortunately, many reporters reflect the atti-

tude attributed to them by William Greider at a seminar: “Are the news

media responsible to their audience? Are they responsible for what their

audience knows and understands? A dozen reporters and TV types …

said, ‘Hell no, that’s not what we do. We do news.’”

Greider’s cynical comment overlooks a major development in the

past decade: a significant increase in “media reporting” and “media criti

cism.” In Media Ethics & Accountability Systems,

Claude-Jean Bertrand

considers these forms of self-regulation as part of larger “media

accountability systems,” which he defines as “any non-State means of

making media responsibility towards the public.”

Included among

these systems are press councils, codes of ethics, journalism reviews,

ombudsmen, and some nongovernmental institutions concerned with

media issues. He urges media owners, media professionals, and media

consumers to hold the news media accountable.

Some of these systems flourished in the late 1960s and early 1970s

when social unrest grew. During this time and after, however, media

criticism languished because the news media turned blind eyes on the

failings of colleagues. That changed in the mid-1990s when there was

171