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50. “Trend: Another Company Refuses to Talk to Reporters Who Don’t Have

Time to Listen,” pr reporter, Vol. 22, October 29, 1979, pp. 1–2.

51. Ibid. Curtis Linke further explained that Johns-Manville was initially very co

operative with the media in line with its policy of openness and candor. When

management discovered, however, that it was consistently treated unfairly, it

entered the second stage of becoming combative, taking a tough media stance.

“We argued with the media, and we were uncooperative. This did not work, so

we became aggressive. We threatened to sue, and we published in our annual

report accounts of biased reporting.” The next stage [fourth] for us was being

selective. “We simply refused to work with a reporter if he or she did not under

stand the issue and was not willing to take the time to try and understand this

very complex issue. If we were called 20 minutes before deadline on a story that

had been in the works for days or weeks, we simply explained how unfair we

thought that was and hung up without providing any comment to legitimize

the story.” This selectivity stage lasted the longest—from 1980 to 1982. Then

in August of last year we declared bankruptcy and the tables turned. “We be

came the injured party, the aggrieved entity—and the media wrote more posi

tive things about the situation in the next few days than they had in the prior 4

years.” Today, we are more tolerant of the media, “which is another way of

saying we did not expect much on the asbestos issue, but we do try to work

with them, judiciously applying selectivity.”

52. The case is described in “Trend: Business Takes Hard Line Media Stance; 60

Minutes Is Latest Target,” pr reporter, Vol. 23, February 18, 1980, pp. 3–4.

53. Lesher, op. cit., p. 169.

54. “60 Minutes/Our Reply,” material from a press kit provided by Illinois

Power Company, p. 1.

55. Ibid., p. 2.

56. Lesher, op. cit., p. 170.

57. Ibid., p. 177.

58. “Trend: Business Takes Hard Line Media Stance,” op. cit., p. 4.

59. Lesher, op. cit., p. 171.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Based on Roderick L. MacLeish, Jr., “Eye to Eye With a Media Crisis: BCS Inc.’s

‘Eye to Eye With Connie Chung’ Television Program; Behavior Research Insti

tute, Inc.” Across the Board, Vol. 31, November 1994.

63. “National News Council Report,” Columbia Journalism Review, Vol. 18, Sep

tember–October 1979, pp. 85–87.

64. Schmertz and Novak, op. cit., pp. 71–72.

65. This approach was in sharp contrast to Kodak when the company was un

happy about what it felt was false analysis. Forbes did a tough piece about

the company’s problems and its management and Kodak decided to prove

Forbes wrong with bottom line results in the months ahead. “Mobil Should

Get the Picture from Kodak,” editorial, Forbes, December 1984.

66. “IRQ Roundtable: Life With or Without IR,” IRQ (Investor Relations Quar

terly), Vol. 1, Summer 1997, p. 68.

67. Kate Kelly, “One Analyst Learns Candor Doesn’t Pay,” Wall Street Journal,

February 5, 2003, p. C1.

68. “IRQ Roundtable,” op. cit., p. 68.

69. “National News Council Report,” op. cit.

70. Richard Gibson, “Analyst Takes Heat for ‘Sell’ Rating on Archer-Daniels,”

Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1995, p. C1.

132 I CHAPTER 4

71. Kate Kelly, “One Analyst Learns Candor Doesn’t Pay,” Wall Street Journal,

February 5, 2003, p. C1.

72. Michael Moss, “Reverse Gocha: Companies Are Paying Big Fees to Get News

About Beat Reporters,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 1995, p. A1.

73. Ibid, p. A4.

74. Ibid.

75. Tedd Rodman, “Technology in Public Relations Today,” term paper (Corpo

rate Public Affairs, Boston University, College of Communication, May 5,

1997).

76. Woodward, op. cit., p. 41.

77. Steve Singer, “Auto Dealers Muscle the Newsroom,” Washington Journalism

Review, Vol. 13, September 1991, pp. 24–28.

78. Ibid., p. 42.

79. Those who contend that this tactic is unwise can point to the fact that this

threat made matters worse for GM because host Phil Donahue disclosed the

attempt and publicized filmmaker Michael Moore’s charge that big U.S.

companies, and GM in particular, were selling out U.S. workers for profit.

Joseph B. White, “GM Seeks to Keep Ads off Talk Show About ‘Roger & Me,’”

Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1990, p. A6.

80. Russ Baker, “The Squeeze,” Columbia Journalism Review, 36, September–Oc-

tober 1997, p. 30. Also see G. Bruce Knecht, “Hard Copy: Magazine Adver-

tisers Demand Prior Notice of ‘Offensive’ Articles,” Wall Street Journal, April

30, 1997, p. A1.

81. Dave Phillips, “Chrysler Drops Censorship Policy,” Detroit News, October

14, 1997, p. B1.

82. G. Bruce Knecht, “No Offense: Big Retail Chains Get Special Advance Looks at

Magazine Contents,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1997, p. A1.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., p. A13.

85. For an excellent summary of this case, see “P&G, News Leaks, and The Wall

Street Journal, Parts (A) and (B),” in Raymond Simon and Frank Winston

Wylie, Cases in Public Relations Management (Lincolnwood, Ill.: NTC Business

Books, 1994), pp. 11–23.

86. Peter Foster, “Anticorporate Crusader,” Canadian Business, January 1994, p.

76.

87. James S. Hirsch and Mil Geyelin, “P&G Says Inquiry on Leak to Journal Was

Done Properly,” Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1991, p. A3.

88. James S. Hirsch, “P&G Search for News Leak Led to Sweep of Phone System

Wider Than Thought,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 1991, p. A3.

89. Simon and Wylie, op. cit., p. 22.

90. A simple definition in a high school text, Norman B. Moyes, Journalism

(Lexington, Mass.: Ginn & Company, 1984), p. 5. He adds that news usually

concerns events that have just occurred or are about to occur.

91. Carole M. Howard and Wilma K. Mathews, On Deadline: Managing Media Re

lations, 2nd edition (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1994), p. 15.

92. Bernard Rubin and Associates, Big Business and the Mass Media (Lexington,

Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 77.

93. Technical formulas are used to measure readability. See Dennis L. Wilcox and

Lawrence W. Nolte, Public Relations Writing and Media Techniques (New York:

Harper & Row, 1990), p. 446.

94. Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public

Policy (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982), p. ix.

PROACTIVE MEDIA RELATIONS I 133

95. Ibid., p. 64.

96. “Key Decisions of Great PR Teams,” a full-page ad in Public Relations Tactics,

September 2003, p. 2.

97. Gandy, op. cit., p. 67.

98. Gandy, op. cit., p. 69.

99. Robert J. Griffin and Sharon Dunwoody, “Impacts of Information Subsidies

and Community Structure on Local Press Coverage of Environmental Con

tamination,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 72,. Summer

1995, pp. 271–284.

100. Whether the community had a pluralistic structure—a diversified popula

tion and economy and a greater number and variety of interest groups—

had no significant influence on coverage.

101. Ronald N. Levy, “Public Policy Publicity: How to Do It,” Public Relations Jour

nal, Vol. 31, June 1975, pp. 19–21, 35–36. Telephone call on February 28,

2004 to New York City office confirmed that this service is still provided.

102. “Using VNRs Without Sparking Controversy,” PR Week, May 17, 2004, p. 26.

103. “Labeling to Be Clarified; Newsource Will Name Funders of Video News Re

lease, Television Week, March 22, 2004.

104. “Video News Releases: What Works and Why?” In The Video News Release

Handbook (New York: Medialink Video Broadcasting, 1991), p. 8.

105. Glenn Cameron and David Blount, “VNRs and Air Checks: A Content Anal-

ysis of the Use of Video News Releases in Television Newscasts,” Journalism

and Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 73, Winter 1996, p. 891.

106. “The Television Version of the Printed Press Release,” Medialink Worldwide,

http://www.medialink.com/vnr.htm.

107. Steve Coe, “Mixed Blessings of Video News Releases,” Broadcasting and Ca-

ble, Vol. 123, June 28, 1993, p. 17.

108. Ibid., pp. 896–900.

109. See “Medialink List of Top Ten VNRs for 1993 Breaks Viewership Record,”

Business Wire, February 15, 1994.

110. Coe, op. cit.

111. Anne R. Owen and James A. Karrh, “Video News Releases: Effects on Viewer

Recall and Attitudes,” Public Relations Review, Vol. 22, Winter 1996, pp.

369–378.

112. Cameron & Blount, op cit., p. 901.

113. “Score More Coverage by Avoiding These Leading VNR Distribution, Pro

duction Pitfalls,” Bull Dog Reporter’s Media Relations Insider, Sample Issue,

2001, p. 7.

114. Richard Weiner, Webster’s New World Dictionary of Media and Communica

tions (New York: Webster’s New World, 1990).

115. Krisztina Marton and Lowndes F. Stephens, “The New York Times’ Confor

mity to AAPOR Standards of Disclosure for the Reporting of Public Opinion

Polls,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 78, Autumn 2001,

p. 486.

116. Lori Robertson, “Poll Crazy,” American Journalism Review, Vol. 25, Janu

ary–February 2003, p. 40.

117. Marton and Stephens, op. cit., pp. 498–499.

118. Mervin D. Field, “Polls and Public Policy,” Journal of Advertising Research,

Vol. 19, October 1979, p. 14.

119. Warren Miofsky and Martin Plissner, “A Reporter’s Guide to Published

Polls,” Public Opinion, Vol. 3, June–July 1980, p. 16.

134 I CHAPTER 4

120. Michael R. Gordon, “The Image Makers in Washington—PR Firms Have

Found a Natural Home,” National Journal, Vol. 12, May 31, 1980, p. 884.

121. Ibid. It should be noted that the press conference news release was not

cleared with the vice president of Group Attitudes, who, as a member of

the American Association of Public Opinion Research, would have been

obligated by the association’s Code of Professional Ethics and Practices

to disclose the sponsorship of the survey. The code reads, “When we be

come aware of the appearance in public of serious distortions of our re

search we shall publicly disclose what is required to correct the

distortion” (section II.A.2). The code also states, “We shall not know

ingly make interpretations of research results, nor shall we tacitly per

mit interpretations, which are inconsistent with the data available”

(article IX, section I.B.3). A Hill & Knowlton memorandum subse

quently told the staff to clear release with Group Attitudes when its sur

vey findings were reported.

122. From owneraapornet@usc.edu, January 3, 2002.

123. Philip Meyer, Precision Journalism, 2nd edition (Indiana University Press,

1979), pp. 185–186.

124. Marton and Stephens, op. cit., pp. 491–492.

125. John V. Pavlik, New Media Technology: Cultural and Commercial Perspectives

(Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996), p. 141.

126. Holtz, op. cit., p. 159.

127. Coy Callison, “Media Relations and the Internet: How Fortune 500 Com-

pany Web Sites Assist Journalists in News Gathering,” Public Relations Re-

view, Vol. 29, March 2003, pp. 38–39.

128. Ibid., p. 39.

129. Ibid., p. 34.

130. Ibid., p. 39. Originally mentioned in Michael Lissauer, “Online Media Strat-

egy: Reaching dot-com Newsrooms,” The Public Relations Strategist, Vol. 6,

No. 3, 2000, pp. 26–28.

131. “Survey: Media Are Becoming Wired,” op. cit.

132. “The New Business—Stop Press,” Economist, July 4, 1998, p. 17.

133. Herb B. Berkowitz and Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., “Impact of the Communica-

tions Revolution on Public Affairs: Pervasiveness of Public Affairs Messages

Today,” in Practical Public Affairs in an Era of Change, ed. Lloyd B. Dennis

(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), p. 51.

134. Brent Baker, “Decisions at the Speed of TV Satellites,” Vital Speeches of the

Day, Vol. 58, July 15, 1992, p. 581.

135. Brent Baker, “War & Peace in a Virtual World,” Proceedings, April 1997, p.

37.

136. Ibid., p. 38.

137. Ibid., p. 39.

138. Ibid., p. 40. In the context of the Gulf War, Baker didn’t like what he saw,

namely, that the government and the military were falling behind the

changes in the news media industry.

139. “CNN in the Doldrums: The Network’s Not Working,” Economist, August

2001, p. 54.

140. ComNews, a private newsletter distributed by former Dean Brent Baker,

Boston University, College of Communication, January 30, 2002.

141. Stempel, op. cit., pp. 550–551.

142. Ibid., p. 552.

PROACTIVE MEDIA RELATIONS I 135

143. PEW Research Study on Nightly News Viewership, Spring 2002, www.people-

press.org.

144. Elisabeth Bumiller, “White House Letter; It’s Not Time or Newsweek, By

Design,” New York Times, September 30, 2002, Late Edition, p. A22.

145. “Of All Media, the Most Powerful Are Talk Show Hosts Because They’re the

Most Personal,” pr reporter, Vol. 35, June 8, 1992, p. 3.

136 I CHAPTER 4

Chapter 5

Gaining Semicontrol Over the

Media: Broadcast Appearances

Broadcast appearances by corporate executives and other spokespersons

allow corporations to gain greater control over messages disseminated

through the mass media. Messages are no longer delivered to newspa-

pers, magazines, and broadcasters and left there for their gatekeepers to

decide on whether or how to use the materials. With broadcast appear-

ances, the “sender” delivers the messages directly to television and radio

audiences. As someone who is interviewed on a broadcast medium or

appears on a panel, he or she has wide latitude in deciding what to say.

The interviewer or moderator, of course, sets the agenda and asks ques-

tions, but the interviewee or participant can carefully compose answers

and skillfully interpose messages he or she wants to transmit.

The sender in the communication process thereby establishes semi-

control over the media, the degree depending largely on the communi

cation skills of the spokesperson. Although these skills vary widely

among corporate individuals, they can be enhanced through training

programs and advice, such as this chapter provides.

Semicontrol, however, does involve risks. On television the camera

reveals all and, in Ronald Reagan’s words, “The camera doesn’t lie.”

Larry King, the well-known talk show host, elaborated on Reagan’s

statement: “People are transparent when you put them in front of the

cameras, which is why we use lots of close-ups. No one, not the most

disciplined performer, can control every gesture, every expression all

the time—but those things all transmit important information to view

ers.”

As stated by Vice President Al Gore, “The television camera really

is a kind of personality X-ray machine.… Over time the character of the

individuals being judged by the American people will be more or less ac

curately assessed” through television.

137

POLITICS ILLUSTRATES THE POWER OF TELEVISION

Of the two broadcast media, radio and television, television is usually

the most effective and efficient means of communicating to large audi

ences. Local and network television is the source from which most

Americans receive their news. Viewers actually watch television pro

grams about 12 hours a week (although their TV sets are on between 22

and 28 hours a week).

From a propaganda viewpoint, the major advantage of reaching au

diences through television is people simply receive what is dished out to

them through inadvertent exposure. They do so uncritically because

their defense mechanisms are set at “low” or “off.” Communication the

orists call this behavior information processing, which is variously de

scribed as passive learning or learning without involvement, in contrast

to “information seeking.”

Television has another attribute: viewing has become a habit similar

to a drug. An addicted person spends a great deal of time using a sub-

stance, uses it more often than intended; makes repeated unsuccessful

efforts to reduce use; gives up important social, family, or occupational

activities to use it; and reports withdrawal symptoms when use is

stopped. When researchers beeped into people who were watching TV,

people reported feeling relaxed and passive. EEG studies similarly

showed less mental stimulation during viewing than during reading.

TV has such a hold on people because of their orienting response—the in-

stinctive visual or auditory reaction to any sudden or novel stimulus.

It’s a built-in sensitivity to movement and potential predatory threats.

People remember what they have seen when the program has many ed-

its—a change from one camera angle to another in the same visual

scene. However, there’s a limit: If the number of cuts exceeds 10 in 2

minutes, recognition drops off sharply.

The effectiveness of television is best illustrated by its widening use

and success in political campaigns. Reflecting the properties of infor

mation processing, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, in her book Dirty Politics:

Deception, Distraction, and Democracy, tells how television grants cre

ators of campaign discourse “some Svengalian powers” that print and

radio lack. The visual capacity of television enables politicians to “re

configure ‘reality’ in ways that heighten the power of the visceral ap

peal” and “make the analytic processing of rapidly emerging claims all

but impossible.”

Cognitive psychologists explain this effect by pointing out that visu

als are processed peripherally “on the edges of consciousness, where crit

ical acuity does not come into play.”

The testing of evidence and

evaluating of propositions does not occur in the absence of central pro

cessing. What counts, therefore, is not the quality of arguments but the

presumed expertise or attractiveness of the communicator.

138 I CHAPTER 5

This attribute of visual communication is exploited in negative politi

cal advertising. Jamieson describes the Bush campaign’s famous Willie

Horton ad, which dramatized the message that George Bush was tough

on crime and Michael Dukakis was soft on crime. A bright picture of a

smiling Bush says, “Bush supports the death penalty for first-degree

murderers.” A dark photo of Dukakis (in which his hair is unkempt)

then appears and a voice says, “Dukakis not only opposes the death pen

alty, he allows first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from

prison.”

The emotional words “kidnapping,” “stabbing,” and “raping”

appear on the screen with Horton’s picture, and the announcer adds,

“Horton fled, kidnaping a young couple, stabbing the man and repeat

edly raping his girlfriend.” Another “revolving door” ad sequence

showed a bleak prison scene and “then cut to a procession of convicts

circling through a revolving gate and marching toward the nation’s liv

ing rooms.”

Argument, engagement, and accountability—Jamieson’s criteria

for judging political discourse—are absent in this political ad. An as-

sertion made in a 30-second ad is not the same as argument, which is

backed up by facts and logical reasoning intended to demonstrate the

truth or legitimacy of a proposition. Argument takes more time than a

sound bite allows.

Gone, however, are the hour-long speeches typical of the 19th cen-

tury, which allowed the advancement of the argument. In 1988, an

average stump speech was under 17 minutes, answers in debates be-

tween 1 and 2 minutes, candidate sound bites on CBS, ABC, and NBC

evening news programs 9.8 seconds, and presidential campaign ads 30

seconds.

Candidates have learned to speak in sound bites. Even

low-key Walter Mondale, in a debate with Gary Hart in 1984, skew-

ered his opponent by saying, “When I hear your new ideas, I’m re-

minded of that ad, ‘Where’s the beef?’”

Because political debates do

not allow sufficient time for in-depth arguments, “beef” is in short

supply. The criterion of engagement—“a process of comparison that

enables audiences to determine which argument has the greater

force”—was thus violated.

At least accountability was present be

cause the audience heard words spoken by the actual candidates and

not some faceless announcer as in the Willie Horton ads.

If corporations were allowed to present advocacy ads on television,

the “marketplace of ideas” would be in jeopardy of deteriorating into

the kind of abbreviated sound bites characteristic of political advertis

ing. In broadcast appearances by corporate executives and other em

ployees, however, accountability is at least assured, and depending on

the professionalism of the interviewer, arguments may be demanded.

On programs such as the Lehrer News Hour, where both sides of an issue

are typically presented, engagement is also possible. However, as par

ticipants in broadcast appearances become increasingly sophisticated,

GAINING SEMICONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 139

the pressure to win an argument drives them to copy the methods of

political campaigning, as a subsequent section on learning how to

“speak TV” will demonstrate.

OPPORTUNITIES ABOUND FOR BROADCAST APPEARANCES

With increased opportunities to appear on radio and television talk

shows, executives and spokespersons, such as scientists, are learning to

take advantage of the semicontrol they can exercise through these ac

cess media. The challenges in dealing with these media are (a) to select

those that best reach desired audiences and (b) to enlarge the semi

control aspect in your favor.

There is no lack of broadcast stations in the United States. As of Sep

tember 2002, there were 1,714 television stations and 13,296 radio sta

tions.

Network television talk shows include Good Morning America,

The Today Show, CBS This Morning, The Tonight Show With Jay Leno, Larry

King Live, Late Show With David Letterman, and Sunday Today. Syndi-

cated shows include Geraldo, Oprah, Regis and Kelly, Maury Povich,

Sally Jesse Raphael, and Jenny Jones.

Talk radio has also flourished, as these facts show:

• The early 1990s witnessed an explosion of talk programs, reaching

1,168 stations in 1994 from 360 in 1990.

• Fifty-six percent of carbound adults and 85% of all Americans aged

12 and older tune into the radio during morning driving time

(6–10 a.m. weekdays).

• During afternoon driving time (3–7 p.m.), 60% of commuters and

80% of all Americans tune in.

• The popular Rush Limbaugh show broadcasts on more than 650

stations, representing about 20 million listeners. His audience is

97% white, 60% male and middle-aged, and it generally dislikes the

national press, according to the Times Mirror Center for People and

the Press.

The impact of radio talk shows is enormous. They are credited with

the passage of California’s Proposition 13 and the spreading of the idea

of local tax limits across the nation. In Massachusetts, Jerry Williams,

host of Boston’s WRKO, singlehandedly forced repeal of his state’s

seatbelt law.

Talk shows were also credited for the November 1994 Re

publican election victory, partly because about 70% of the country’s

talk radio hosts call themselves conservative.

In the 2002 elections, the

talk shows may have contributed to the Democratic election losses of

the Senate majority and six House seats. These hosts are recipients of

faxes and talking points from Republican leaders. Many brag about

their new status as political power brokers.

Some of their methods,

however, are often outrageous, as illustrated in Box 5.1.

140 I CHAPTER 5

Most talk shows are conservative, ranging from right to extreme

right, says Joe Conason. Following Rush Limbaugh is Sean Hannity,

with an audience of more than 10 million. Among the top 10 radio hosts

there is not a single liberal.

Looking for ways to deliver their message

to voters beyond the Beltway, Democrats were planning to launch a na

tional talk show, Democracy Radio, in January 2004. Ed Schulz, a radio

personality with a liberal bent. who hosts a radio program broadcast on

seven stations in the Dakotas, has been signed on.

Talk shows affect business as well as politics, partly because business

coverage has grown in recent years. A well-known example is the ap

pearance of a Florida man on CNN’s Larry King Live who said his wife

died of cancer because she used a cellular phone. Eight days later, the

stock price of Motorola, the biggest maker of cellular phones, dropped

20%—despite the lack of scientific studies on the question.

Some major corporate executives have also been treated like celebrities

by the media—first built up by the media and then taken down. This hap-

pened to Robert C. Stempel of General Motors, John F. Akers of IBM, and

James D. Robinson III of American Express. These executives are viewed

as “shared talismans, points of reference in a fragmented society.”

INCREASED CORPORATE USE OF BROADCAST

APPEARANCES

For over two decades, the corporate use of broadcast appearances has

grown. One study of 1,300 Fortune corporations found that 62 % of 395

GAINING SEMICONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 141

Box 5.1 Examples of Excesses of Some Talk Shows

1. Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.), former Speaker of the House, lost

his seat partly because he took round-the-clock hits from three radio

stations. In one, Richard Clear of KGA-AM asked Mr. Foley, married to

the same woman for 24 years, if he was a homosexual (something

Clear picked up from one of the anti-Clinton broadsides faxed to hun

dreds of talk shows every week). Mike Fitzsimmon, another conserva

tive host, was bothered by this and said, “The mean-spiritedness, the

desire to create an us-versus-them, that bothers me.”

2. Bob Mohan of KFYI, in criticizing the wife of Jim Brady (Presi

dent Ronald Reagan’s former press secretary who was shot in an as

sassination attempt on the president), said, “You know, she ought to

be put down. A humane shot at a veterinarian’s would be an easy way

to do it. Because of all her barking and complaining, she really needs

to be put down.”

3. Don Baker of KVOR in Colorado Springs, Colorado, said of At

torney General Janet Reno, “We ought to slap Janet Reno across the

face” and “send her back to Florida where she can live with her rela

tives—the gators.”