Lerbinger O. Corporate Public Affairs. Interacting with Interest Groups, Media, and Government

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

public goodwill and enhance its reputation. Product advertising is not

included in corporate advertising.

Political issue advertising should be distinguished from advocacy

advertising, although the line between them is not always clear. A clear

but narrow definition of issue advertising in politics is that it supports

the election of a candidate or political party. However, issue advertis

ing may be used by business, labor, and other interest groups to influ

ence public opinion positions that are espoused by particular

candidates. For example, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer in 2001 broad

cast its own issue advertisement on prescription drug affordability in

seven congressional battleground states. It did so up front rather than

working through various organizations.

Anytime an ongoing public

policy issue, such as privatization of Social Security, becomes a cam

paign issue, the line between advocacy advertising and political issue

advertising becomes muddied.

Another ambiguous advocacy advertising campaign was a 30-sec-

ond advertisement, prepared by the Bush administration, assuring

Medicare beneficiaries that the new Medicare prescription drug law

passed in 2003 would not affect them in any way except to provide

“more benefits.” The government planned to spend $9.5 million to run

the ad on national network and cable programs over 6 weeks. Demo-

cratic members of Congress and some liberal advocacy groups, how-

ever, complained, saying the ad amounted to a taxpayer-subsidized

political commercial for the administration. CBS consequently stopped

running the ads while the accuracy of the ad was investigated by Con-

gress’s General Accounting Office.

When the tobacco industry runs an ad to oppose a congressional

antismoking bill, that is an advocacy ad intended to influence congres-

sional votes. However, when an antismoking bill ad appears in the con-

text of political campaigning and, as occurred during the spring and

summer of 1998, the ad shows a voter who pledges “to remember this

fall what the politicians do this summer,” the ad crosses over into a po

litical ad. This and other ads were shown in five markets of choice, in

cluding Atlanta, Denver, and St. Louis, which happen to be markets

where Republican senators who opposed the bill were up for election.

Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) told his fellow Republican colleagues

that the industry would advertise to support those who voted against

the bill.

Issue advertising of this kind is no longer clear advocacy adver

tising but crosses the line to political issue advertising, a controversial

subject discussed in chapter 11.

USE OF ADVOCACY ADS GROWS

In 2002 various organizations spent a total of $645 million on advocacy

ads, up from $520 million the year before, according to TNS Media in

telligence/CMR.

Much of this money is spent in the nation’s capital.

152 I CHAPTER 6

The Annenberg School study, Print and Television Legislative Issue Adver

tising in the Nation’s Capital in 2001, states that more than $45 million

was spent by about 375 advocacy groups on ads designed to influence

federal policymakers. About half of it was spent to purchase print or

television issue ads in the Washington, DC, media market.

“This is cer

tainly a growing niche,” said Linda Dove, senior vice president at the

Washington office of the American Association of Advertising Agencies.

Many of the largest public relations firms maintain advocacy practices

in the Washington, DC, area, as well as a slew of political shops that spe

cialize in the practice. Among the large firms are WPP Group’s Burson-

Marsteller, Omnicom Group’s Fleishman-Hillard and Porter Novelli,

and independent Edelman.

Corporations and business interest groups are the major sponsors of

advocacy ads. Their superiority in economic resources gives them a

relative advantage over nonbusiness interest groups in being able to

afford such ads. Energy and power, education, telecommunications,

and health care issues lead in the capital area, accounting for 61% of

the total spending there. The top spender in 2001 was Balanced Energy

Choices, which spent more than $5 million on ads promoting coal as

“affordable, clean, efficient and reliable.”

As shown by the Annenberg study, of the $15.4 million spent on is-

sues relating to national energy policy, about 94% ($14.5 million) came

from energy and business interests; environmental interests accounted

for a mere 6%. The largest spender promoting the president’s policy was

the Alliance for Energy and Economic Growth, whose members include

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Gas Association, the

American Petroleum Institute, BP, Chevron Texaco, and other energy

firms and associations. In contrast to the $1 million spent by them, the

environmental coalition Save Our Environment, the largest spender in

opposition, spent only about $40,000. The spending pattern was re

versed, however, on the issue of the Arctic National Wildlife Preserve

with ads opposing its development beating out those in favor of drilling

with 53% of total spending, led by the National Audubon Society.

Although most interest groups find the cost of ads prohibitive and

save their dollars for public relations activities, in a recent trend some

interest groups are willing to budget for ads supporting their views be

cause they recognize the effectiveness of advocacy advertising. People

for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was an early adopter of cor

porate advertising techniques. “Grassroots flavor and moral weight can

no longer compete with the polished, engaging tone of consumer adver

tising,” said Dan Mathews, PETA’s vice president for campaigns. PETA

learned over a decade ago in its antifur campaign that an ad showing

models posing in the buff was much more effective than showing ani

mals writhing in leg-hold traps. “Once upon a time, when hippies ruled

the earth, you wanted to avoid looking too slick,” said Mathews, “Now

adays, slick is the only thing that much of the masses understand.”

Further impetus may have been given to interest group advertising by

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 153

the success of MoveOn.org, an electronic advocacy organization that

said it raised $250,000 in 18 hours to run an antiwar newspaper ad

campaign in more than 111 cities in 50 states.

Besides PETA, other interest groups have also used advocacy advertis

ing in their campaigns:

• The Communications Workers of America broadcast a high-gloss

commercial immediately after the September 11 attack that called

on Verizon Communications, their employer, to abandon plans to

lay off thousands of workers.

• The Evangelical Environmental Network created the “What Would

Jesus Drive?” fuel-efficiency campaign, a lighthearted play on

“What Would Jesus Do,” a popular evangelical Christian slogan. It

hoped to turn its $65,000 budget into a blizzard of media coverage

in outlets like Time magazine, NBC Nightly News, The Wall Street

Journal, and The New York Times.

• Survival International in London added focus to its advertising by

linking diamond exploration by De Beers to the dislocation of na-

tive Bushmen in central Africa. Instead of television or the print

media, it replaced a billboard, showing model Iman wearing a De

Beers diamond, with a near-exact mock-up of a woman from the

Bushmen group and parodied the De Beers slogan, “A diamond is

forever,” with the line, “The Bushmen aren’t forever.”

Broadcast Networks Restrict Advocacy Advertising

Unlike political issue advertising where television dominates, newspa-

pers and magazines have been the major outlets for advocacy advertis-

ing because broadcast networks have generally rejected such ads. Before

1987 broadcasters resisted these ads because the Fairness Doctrine

forced them to provide free airtime for opposing viewpoints. Resistance

to advocacy advertising lessened when this requirement was eliminated

and more advertising time was available with which to earn extra reve

nue. For example, in September 1990, NBC dropped the ban and allowed

its seven owned and operated stations to accept such spots.

Despite the absence of legal restrictions, networks have imposed their

own restrictions. CBS’s policy is not to “sell time for the advocacy of

viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.” Specifically, a

commercial is considered unacceptable if it explicitly takes a position on

such an issue, or without taking an explicit position, presents argu

ments parallel those made by one side or the other.

For example, CBS

rejected MoveOn.org’s ad “Child Play” for broadcast during the Super

Bowl. Set to slow music, the 30-second spot features a montage of chil

dren working in menial adult jobs as janitors, dishwashers, and garbage

collectors and asks, “Guess who’s going to pay off President Bush’s tril

lion-dollar deficit?”

154 I CHAPTER 6

CNN follows a similar policy. It refused to air a pair of 30-second an

nouncements from two Jewish groups, saying, “CNN does not take in

ternational advocacy ads concerning regions in conflict. This is the same

policy we applied when turning down ads that dealt with Egypt, Qatar,

UAE and Saudi Arabia.” The ad read: “America is Israel’s only real ally in

the Middle East. Israel is a democracy that respects the rights of individ

uals and gives all citizens a right to vote.… All people—Christians, Mus

lims, and Jews—enjoy freedom of religion, press and speech.”

Disagreeing with CNN, The American Jewish Committee and Israel 21

said the TV spots stress common values between America and Israel and

should not be classified as issue advocacy.

Fortunately for users of advocacy advertising, these network policies

have not been forced on local television stations, nor does cable televi

sion follow them. These outlets are often willing, and even eager, to ac

cept advocacy ads. For example, only 3 of 14 television stations in

Michigan rejected the Right to Life adoption reform ads. One reason

broadcasters give for viewing advocacy advertising more positively is

that it looks tame and is less likely to upset viewers compared with the

trend toward below-the-belt political advertising.

Although a common explanation for rejection of ads is that contro-

versial issues are best handled in regular news programs where bal-

anced treatment can be provided, it is clear broadcasters accept or reject

ads on the basis of a mixture of economic and political considerations.

For example, when WNBC in 1990 rejected a 30-second ad from Neigh-

bor to Neighbor, a national group that favors ending U.S. investments

in El Salvador, David Vacheron, standards and license manager for

WNBC, explained, “There was no proof for the ad’s claim that American

aid was used to murder four Jesuit priests and 40,000 other innocent ci-

vilians in El Salvador.”

Another factor may have been the fear of of-

fending Procter & Gamble. The network had good grounds for this fear:

when WHDH in Boston ran a Neighbor to Neighbor spot in which con-

sumers were urged to boycott P&G’s Folgers coffee, the company can

celed approximately $750,000 in annual advertising at the station.

Print Media More Hospitable Toward Advocacy Ads

In contrast to television, free-speech protection allows the print media

to accept all kinds of politically and socially controversial ads following

the argument that pages are readily available, whereas broadcast fre

quencies are limited relative to the many who wish to use them. Never

theless, because advocacy ads are attacked by those who feel offended, a

newspaper may also restrict such advertising. For example, on

Thanksgiving Day in 1991, Minneapolis’ Star Tribune published an ad

by the Citizens Committee to Stop the Northwest Airlines Loan, asking

readers to voice their dissent regarding government loans. Northwest

Airlines was outraged, but the newspaper pointed out it could not limit

its ads to those with which the paper agrees.

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 155

OBJECTIVES OF ADVOCACY ADVERTISING

Advocacy ads can achieve four objectives: (a) correct media errors and

distortion, (b) attract public attention to, and support for, an issue ne

glected by the media, (c) stimulate news coverage, and (d) attract the at

tention of and inform the legislature.

Correct Media Errors and Distortion

As mentioned in chapter 4, advocacy advertising can be viewed as

“counter advertising to counter the news.”

It is a way to hold the

media accountable. Advocacy ads allow a company to fight back when

reporters, commentators, and editorial writers are perceived as misin

forming the public. As stated by Herbert Schmertz, former Mobil Oil

vice president of public affairs:

The use of advertising in controversial situations is not designed to con-

vince—to get people with different viewpoints to say, “I agree,” (or “I be-

lieve”). It is designed to “give pause”—to arrest the process of easy

assumptions, to establish that there is another point of view. This is a nec-

essary preliminary stage to “open debate with open minds.”

Mobil initiated intensive communication efforts to set the record

straight in the early 1970s. (See Box 6.1 for a celebrated example.) As

stated by Rawleigh Warner, Jr., then Mobil’s chairman, “People know

that if they take a swipe at us, we will fight back.”

At first Mobil sim-

ply joined other companies that believed in speaking out, but soon “the

fact that we were different came out,” says Warner. Mobil’s aim, he said,

is to educate people on the intricacies of the petroleum industry and the

American economic system:

156 I CHAPTER 6

Box 6.1 Mobil’s “Hatchet Job” Ad

Mobil’s 1976 “hatchet job” ad headline was “What ever happened to

fair play?”—referring to a miniseries titled “The Great Gasoline War,”

on New York City’s nightly WNBC-TV news. In this show’s five seg

ments, adding up to 36 minutes, Liz Trotta set out to reveal the eco

nomics of the oil industry and why gasoline prices were high in the

New York area. The implication was that the oil industry was engaged

in a scheme to cheat consumers. Within a week, Mobil responded with

ads in the New York Times, the Daily News, and the eastern edition

of the Wall Street Journal. The ad charged, “WNBC-TV’s recent series

on gasoline prices was inaccurate, unfair, and a disservice to the peo

ple.” The ad was festooned with 17 small hatchets to highlight each

distortion of truth as seen by Mobil.

In short, we wanted to speak our piece. If we didn’t make sense, if we

proved not credible over a long period of time, then we would take our

lumps. But we wanted to broaden the spectrum of ideas, information and

viewpoints, and we were willing to take our chances on the good sense of

the people.

Schmertz expanded on this strategy. He said Mobil’s public affairs

program was an integral part of the energy business—“not something

extraneously designed to get our name in the paper, or make friends in

high places, or persuade people to love us.”

Great statesmen, he said,

don’t make decisions based on popularity polls. “They move ahead on

the course that right and nation require.”

Furthermore, Mobil in

tended to go beyond merely responding to the media. “We expect to con

tinue in our attempts to influence events rather than act on them after

the fact.”

Sometimes a film rather than a news story requires correction, as

happened with The Insider, a docudrama about whistle blower Jeffrey

Wigand, who exposed what Brown & Williamson knew about the rela-

tionship between smoking and cancer. The tobacco company, concerned

about the film’s allegation that it threatened Wigand and his family,

used a full-page ad to tell readers otherwise. The ad, “A Letter to Disney

Shareholders,” signed by Nick Brookes, chairman & CEO of Brown &

Williamson, states:

We are compelled to communicate with you in this fashion because we

have no other recourse. Your company is defaming us in a movie and has

refused our repeated attempts to set the record straight.… The film clearly

suggests that Brown & Williamson threatened Wigand. We state here cate-

gorically that Brown & Williamson did not threaten Wigand or his family in

any way.… Although Disney and Touchstone [the film’s producer] try to

absolve themselves of any responsibility for the many inaccuracies in the

movie by saying, “certain events depicted in the film have been fictional

ized for dramatic effect,” such disclaimers are too little too late. No dis

claimer can overcome the effect of such scenes on the audience,

particularly where an actor of Al Pacino’s stature asserts repeatedly, “he’s

telling the truth.”

Garner Public Attention and Support

One of the cornerstones of a proactive policy is to garner public atten

tion and support and thereby shape the outcome of an issue. Schmertz

sees advocacy ads as being in the pamphleteering tradition: “It’s a feisty,

frisky, free-swinging tradition that goes back at least to John Locke in

1689. We try to wear Tom Paine’s hat when we’re writing an advocacy

message or producing one for TV.” The ads are directed at “those who

make news, who write the newspapers and produce the TV—and at all

the other opinion-molders and thought-leaders who shape public dis

course in this country.”

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 157

Mobil’s advocacy campaign took four forms, as described by Donald

S. Stroetzel, Mobil’s manager of communications programs:

Op-eds, begun in September 1974, have been the mainstay of Mobil’s pro

gram. They appear every Thursday in the New York Times at the lower

quarter-page opposite the editorial page. They also appear in eight other

major newspapers and two news magazines. The ads are aimed at opinion

leaders, primarily politicians in Washington and state government, com

mentators and editors on TV and radio, newspaper editors, educators, and

senior business executives.

Observations, a column targeted at a popular audience, published in

Sunday supplements about every other week. The ad goes to about 500

newspapers, reaching about 40 million households. The column uses car

toons and woodcuts, and bold typeface to spark reader interest.

TV commercials, a 60-second spot on the same themes as the op-ed ads,

seen on evening news programs of 80 TV stations, reaching about 25 mil-

lion households a month.

Special ads, a full-page treatment, usually for fire-fighting situations.

When a major issue arises, Mobil organizes “media blitzes” to have

their executives appear on broadcast shows and to meet with local

newspaper editors. In one of these, 21 executives were dispatched to 21

target cities, and within a day or two, they appeared on more than 100

talk shows, news broadcasts, and radio call-in programs.

The nuclear industry wanted to activate public support, motivated

by the fact that a number of plants were seeking 40-year license renew-

als. A flashy image campaign sponsored by the Nuclear Energy Institute

(NEI) seeks to activate support from the “silent majority” of educated

Americans. The NEI believes they back nuclear power but are afraid to

go public because they are certain most Americans are rabid antinuclear

activists. The ads carry the tag line, “Nuclear: More Than You Ever

Imagined,” and they position nuclear power as safe, efficient, and clean.

“Influentials” are targets via full-page ads in publications such as The

New York Times, Washington Post, the Economist, New Republic, and At

lantic Monthly.

Stimulate News Coverage

Well-crafted advocacy ads not only draw public attention but, as the

Harry and Louise ads during the health care reform debates in 1994

demonstrated, also provide a media event that engenders news stories,

which, of course, attract more public attention.

Advocacy ads are use

ful, therefore, when proactive media relations efforts to obtain free me

dia coverage are inadequate or ineffective.

Research conducted by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Annenberg School’s

dean, concluded, “Several ad campaigns succeeded in generating news

158 I CHAPTER 6

coverage worth many times the cost of the ad placements themselves.”

One half-page ad, “Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco (STAT),” accused

media CEOs of “taking blood money by helping to promote a product

that the Surgeon General says is harmful and addictive.”

The ad re

ceived widespread news coverage, partly because it was timed to appear

the day before the Surgeon General’s annual report on tobacco products

was released. Even more publicity was generated by stories about the re

fusal of The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times to run the ad.

Another example of publicity generation is the California Poultry In

dustry Association’s 1994 ad, drawing attention to the fact that the Ag

riculture Department’s definition of “fresh chicken” included frozen

birds—a definition to which the association objected. Three months af

ter the ad appeared, The New York Times’s Living section featured a story

entitled “If It Clucks Like a Bowling Ball.”

Influence Government Action

Advocacy advertising is also aimed at lawmakers and government offi-

cials to discourage legislation and regulation. Thus, as mentioned in

Part IV of this book, advocacy advertising can extend into the legislative

stage of an issue’s life cycle. The aim is not only to influence lawmakers

and officials directly—and thereby become an arm of direct lobbying—

but also to influence public opinion that will enhance grassroots lobby-

ing efforts. Some past and recent examples are:

• West Publishing used an advocacy ad to pressure the Justice De-

partment into holding a meeting with it about a proposal that would

allow the government to compete directly in case law publications.

After West ran a series of ads featuring cartoons with a trick-or-treat

theme, the Justice Department agreed to a meeting.

• The health care industry used advocacy ads to influence govern

ment in the 1994 debate over the Clinton health plan. Besides the

Harry and Louise ad by the Health Association of America, other

threatened interests used advocacy ads. Delta, an insurance com

pany, placed a low-key, relatively high-frequency ad in the Washing

ton Post, showing the value of dental insurance and the danger of

proposed changes. The ad also included image material, that Delta

was the nation’s oldest provider of group dental insurance. Accord

ing to Delta, Majority Leader George Mitchell told Delta company

lobbyists he was aware of this message from having read the ads.

• The AFL-CIO launched a major advertising blitz in July 1998 for

a sweeping managed-care overhaul bill; it warned congressional can

didates they would pay a price in November if they did not back the

measure. The ads were scheduled to run in 20 House districts and in

five states where senators were targeted. The ads were part of a larger

grassroots effort supporting Patients’ Bill of Rights legislation and in

GAINING COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA I 159

cluding the shipment of fliers on the issue to regional councils, to be

distributed to workers at hundreds of work sites around the country.

• The tobacco industry has engaged in the most extensive use of

ads to arrest legislative action and to influence public opinion. On

May 23, 1994, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, a unit of RJR Nabisco Hold

ings, began a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign to present its

views in the debate on smoking. The company announced that it

planned to follow up on the theme of individual freedom, a theme

that James W. Johnston was thought to have effectively communi

cated during the congressional hearings the previous month.

(See

Box 6.2 for examples of tobacco company ads.)

• The probusiness group Arctic Power, Inc., led a $4 million adver

tising campaign to support President Bush’s plan to open the Alaska

National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas exploration. The ads were

timed to appear just as the Audubon Society planned to air its own

commercial in the Washington, DC market reminding people of the

rescue of oil-coated birds after the Exxon Valdez spill.

• The Tax Relief Coalition, a group with more than 400 member

associations, planned to publish ads around the country in spring

2001 to promote Bush’s tax plan. It was joined by the tax-cut advo-

cacy group, Club for Growth, which had already started with its $1.5

million ad campaign. Illustrating the increasing use of advocacy ads

in politics, a group of Republican political consultants planned to

spend $5 million on ads bolstering Bush policies, starting with the tax

cut. “We will run ads depending on where the debate is and where

help is needed,” said Bill Dal Col, director of the Issues Management

Center, an activist public relations agency set up by conservatives.

HOW EFFECTIVE ARE ADVOCACY ADS?

The assumption underlying advocacy ads is that they are effective. With

reference to tobacco company ads, Jay Mathews, writing for the Wash

ington Post, states, “Advertising experts say that advocacy campaigns

can have a marked effect on the strength of voter support for more re

strictions on smoking.” He cites Tim Elliot, a partner in the firm that

produced Reynolds’s ads, saying such advocacy campaigns have been

shown to change minds and ease political problems “if the point is a real

one and you are prepared to commit to it over time.”

Advertising exec

utives who benefit from such advertising are, of course, inclined to ex

aggerate its effectiveness—claiming, in this case, the ability of issue ads

to change attitudes.

A 1981 survey of business and media executives, which explored the

basis of claims in support of issue advertising, was less confident about

its effectiveness. These executives generally rated issue advertising aver

age or very good as a vehicle for achieving exposure of the market audi

160 I CHAPTER 6

161

Box 6.2 Tobacco Company Ads

The first ad, which appeared in the May 23, 1994, issues of The New

York Times, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Washington Post,

the National Journal, and Roll Call, carried the headline “Second

hand Smoke: How Much Are Non-smokers Exposed To?” It answered,

“Very little,” and buttressed it by presenting three calculations. One

was, “In a month, a non-smoker living with a smoker would, on aver

age, be exposed to second-hand smoke equivalent to smoking ap

proximately 1½ cigarettes.”

The ad said, “We believe that the

solution to most smoking issues can be found in accommodation.

There are ways for smokers and non-smokers to co-exist peacefully.

And we encourage discussion that will help solve the issues without

resorting to Government intervention.”

The ad indirectly addresses the EPA’s 1993 announcement that ex

posure to second-hand smoke causes lung cancer. In a subsequent

ad on May 26, 1994, R. J. Reynolds reprinted a Wall Street Journal

editorial by Jacob Sullum called “Smoke & Mirrors: EPA Wages War

on Cigarettes.” It states, “The EPA twisted the evidence to arrive at a

predetermined conclusion.” The editorial becomes technical when it

refers to the agency’s blatant trick of using an unconventional defini-

tion of statistical significance. It refers to an article in Science stating

that the EPA was able to claim only a weak association between “envi-

ronmental tobacco smoke” (second-hand smoke) and lung cancer,

even by using “fancy statistical footwork.”

Philip Morris also took out ads in a four-part series on second-hand

smoke. The first was an article from Forbes MediaCritic, written by Ja-

cob Sullum (identified as managing editor of Reason magazine).

An-

other ad headline echoes the theme of “Accommodation” and refers

to a recent USA Today/CNN poll reporting that “nearly 7 out of 10 re

spondents said they think that rather than banning smoking in public

places, smokers should be allowed to smoke in separate, designated

areas. The ad then refers to a program that “helps owners of busi

nesses, such as restaurants, bars and hotels, to accommodate the

choices of both their smoking and nonsmoking customers by setting

up designated smoking and nonsmoking areas.” The ad ends, “We

want you to know where we stand.”

R. J. Reynolds also used humor in some ads, for example, showing

a suburban house surrounded by police cars with the caption, “We’ve

got you surrounded. Come out with your cigarettes.”

Joining the hu

mor theme, an ad by Philip Morris poked fun at smoking restrictions

by showing workers puffing cigarettes at desks floating outside their

upper story office windows; the caption read, “Have you noticed find

ing a place to smoke is the hardest part of your job?”

(continued)