Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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124 part one—chapter two

gis that were to be delivered immediately aer the khan issued an

amended version of his document. In order to secure this, Zbrożek

was once more sent to the Crimea along with Sefer Ghazi. Yet, Selamet

Giray died shortly aerwards and the peacemaking procedure had to

begin anew.

365

Aer Selamet’s death, his nephew and adopted son, Djanibek Giray,

ascended the throne in June 1610. His rule was challenged by Mehmed

and Shahin Girays, whose father, Sa‘adet Giray, was Mehmed II

Giray’s son and nureddin, who had lost the struggle for the throne

in 1584 and died in exile in Muscovy. e older of the two brothers,

Mehmed Giray, had been the rst qalga of Selamet Giray, responsible

for killing Tokhtamısh Giray in 1608 (see above), but he had then

quarelled with the khan and went into exile. In 1610, the confronta-

tion was won by Djanibek Giray, but the two brothers did not resign

from the struggle and were to repeatedly frustrate Djanibek’s reign in

the following years.

e Crimean domestic chaos encouraged Tatar raids against Mus-

covy and Poland-Lithuania, unrestrained by the khan’s authority.

Nevertheless, in January 1611 Djanibek issued a letter of agreement

and sent it to Sigismund III through an experienced envoy, Djan

Anton Spinola.

366

In his document, the khan expressed his dismay that

although eight months had already passed since his accession, no royal

gis had reached his capital. As an inducement he added that in return

for the gis Tatar troops could be used in the current royal campaign

against Muscovy. Djanibek’s instrument, though referred to as a letter

of agreement and containing the khan’s engagement to keep peace,

was much shorter than the analogous documents sent previously by

Ghazi II and Selamet Girays.

367

e second decade of the 17th century brought a radical deterio-

riation of the Polish-Ottoman relations that had a direct impact on

the Polish-Crimean ones. ere were at least three reasons of the ris-

ing tensions, related to Moldavia, the Cossacks, and the Habsburgs.

Aer the Ottoman-Habsburg war had been terminated by the Treaty

of Zsitvatorok (1606), the Porte strove to regain its full inuence in the

Danubian principalities. In 1611, the Ottoman protégé Radu Mihnea

365

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 158–161.

366

Cf. n. 348 above.

367

See Document 45.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 125

replaced on the Wallachian throne the more independently minded

Radu Şerban. In the same year, the Polish client, Constantin Movilă

(Ieremia’s son), lost the Moldavian throne in favor of an Ottoman can-

didate, Stefan Tomşa II. is meant a radical end of the Polish inu-

ence in both principalities. As by that time the Movilăs had entered

kinship relations with several Polish magnate families, two semiprivate

Polish interventions occurred in Moldavia in 1612 and 1615–1616,

aiming to restore the Movilăs in power, but ending with ascos. In

the same period, the activity of Ukrainian Cossacks, remaining at least

in theory Polish subjects, reached its apex. By 1616, the Cossacks had

raided and pillaged not only the Crimea, but also the Black Sea shores

in the Ottoman Balkans (Varna) and Asia Minor (Sinop), reaching as

far as the Bosphorus.

368

e third factor that infuriated Istanbul was

the Polish-Habsburg rapprochement. Sigismund III Vasa, once elected

as an anti-Habsburg candidate, soon dismayed many of his supporters,

both foreign and domestic. Fascinated by the splendor of the House of

Austria and inuenced by the spirit of Counter-Reformation, he drew

inspiration from the Habsburg policy in both the internal and exter-

nal domain. In his domestic policy, he supported re-Catholisation and

strove to liberate himself from parliamentary bonds. In foreign policy,

his gradual rapprochement with Vienna was to result in straining his

relations with Istanbul. In 1613, a secret clause was entered into the

Polish-Habsburg treaty, providing mutual assistance in quelling rebel-

lions and permitting to recruit mercenaries in each other’s domains.

As a result, Polish mercenaries were soon to ght on the Habsburg

side against the Transylvanian prince and Ottoman protégé, Gábor

Bethlen (r. 1613–1629).

e years 1611–1616 parallelly brought rising tensions between Cra-

cow and Baghchasaray. Despite his overture in 1611, Djanibek Giray

waited in vain for the royal gis. During the Polish intervention in

Moldavia in 1612, the khan entered Poland but resigned from a full-

scale campaign. In 1614, he sent yet another embassy demanding the

royal gis. In response, Florian Oleszko was to depart to the Crimea

but his mission was rst delayed and then canceled aer a large Tatar

368

See the most recent and authoritative study by Victor Ostapchuk about the

impact of these raids on the Ottoman policy, economy, and everyday life: idem, “e

Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids,”

Oriente Moderno XX (LXXXI) (2001) = e Ottomans and the Sea. Edited by K. Fleet

(Naples, 2001): 23–95.

126 part one—chapter two

raid in September 1615.

369

Another ominous factor was the Crimean

rapprochement with Muscovy conrmed by a solemn embassy in

1614.

370

Fortunately for Poland, its war against Muscovy, ruled since

1613 by the new Romanov dynasty, was nearing its end. On the other

hand, renewed hostilities with Persia made the Ottomans more ready

for a compromise.

In the years 1617–1618, the majority of Ottoman troops, assisted by

Khan Djanibek Giray, were ghting in the east against the Safavids.

Nevertheless, following the second Polish intervention in Moldavia

of 1615–1616, in January 1617 Devlet Giray, Djanibek’s brother and

qalga, raided the Polish Ukraine. Later the same year, the Ottoman

commander in Moldavia, Iskender Pasha, was dispatched towards the

Polish border. On 23 September 1617, a last minute reconciliation was

reached on the Dniester river between Iskender Pasha and the Polish

eld hetman, Stanisław Żółkiewski. e Polish side engaged to prevent

the Cossack raids and to restrain from meddling in the aairs of Mol-

davia, Wallachia, and Transylvania by supporting anti-Ottoman pre-

tenders to their thrones. In return, the Ottomans promised to stop the

Tatar raids into Poland on the condition that the king sent annual gis

to the khan.

371

e agreement was duly conrmed by solemn docu-

369

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 172–187.

370

See Novosel’skij, Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, pp. 83–84.

Novosel’skij’s assertion that between 1607–1610 a formal anti-Muscovian alliance

existed between Warsaw and Baghchasaray is put in question by Skorupa, who

stresses the discontinuity of the Crimean politics and invokes several Tatar raids

eected against Poland-Lithuania in that period; cf. Novosel’skij, op. cit., pp. 50–55,

and Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 159–162. In a recent article, Dmitrij Lisej-

cev goes even further and argues that if any alliance existed, it was between Moscow

and Baghchasaray as Crimean troops assisted Tsar Vasilij IV in the years 1609–1610;

see idem, “Russko-krymskie diplomatičeskie kontakty v načale XVII stoletija,” in:

Tjurkologičeskij Sbornik (2005) = Tjurkskie narody Rossii i Velikoj stepi (Moscow,

2006): 238–282, esp. pp. 269–271 and 278. e truth seems to lie in between. Any

Tatar raid against Muscovy could be explained by the formal clause entered repeat-

edly in the Polish-Crimean treaties since the 16th century and was certainly greeted

with enthusiasm in Warsaw. In analogy, Tatar raids against Poland-Lithuania were

typically presented by the khans in their correspondence with Moscow as a fulll-

ment of the mutual alliance against Warsaw. e internal crisis, civil war, and foreign

intervention in Muscovy undoubtedly induced the Tatars to send troops, who could

side with either party and benet by raiding Muscovian lands and abducting cap-

tives. To be sure, the subsequent conquest of Moscow by the Polish troops in 1610

and a Polish candidacy to the Muscovian throne alarmed the Tatars and resulted in

a Crimean-Muscovian rapprochement and the acknowledgement of the new Russian

dynasty of Romanovs by Baghchasaray.

371

See Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 129–130, 345–353.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 127

ments, issued by Sultan Osman II and King Sigismund III respectively

in May and December 1619.

372

A Crimean plenipotentiary, Alish Mirza, was present at the Polish-

Ottoman negotiations of 1617. He insisted that the Commonwealth

should send gis due for the past seven years (i.e., since the accession

of Djanibek Giray), but the Ottoman-Polish treaty only stipulated that

the gis should be sent in the following years.

373

e Tatar disillusione-

ment became apparent in 1618 when, aer several minor raids in the

spring and summer, in September a large force, led by Qalga Devlet

Giray and Kantemir, the powerful Manghıt (Mansur) leader, outma-

neuvered Żółkiewski and devastated vast tracts of Poland. Neverthe-

less, early in the year 1619 Djanibek Giray sent an embassy to Poland,

announcing his return from the Persian front and demanding the pay-

ment of the gis. Although the Tatar embassy was coldly received, it

was decided to send Florian Oleszko once more to the khan. Oleszko

was provided with a royal instruction, dated 25 October 1619, and

a ready formula of the khan’s instrument, to be issued by Djanibek

Giray.

374

e khan’s proposed instrument, drawn by the royal chancery, was

almost identical in political contents with the royal instruments of

1601 and 1605 as well as Ghazi II Giray’s instrument from 1607.

375

was only updated by entering the new names of the khan and the

qalga (i.e., Devlet Giray), and by enlarging King Sigismund’s intitula-

tio that now also comprised Černihiv and Smolensk, lost to Muscovy

in 1503/1514, recaptured in 1611, and formally restored to Poland-

Lithuania by the terms of the Truce of Deulino (Divilino) in January

1619. e proposed document provided for mutual friendship and

military assistance against Muscovy, remission of past transgressions,

security of trade, and the right of the khan and his family members to

come as guests to Poland-Lithuania. e khan was to explicitly resign

from the gis due for the past years, and in the following years the

gis were to be amassed in Kamieniec by 1 November and further

transported to Akkerman on the khan’s cost. e number of Tatar

envoys, who would come to Kamieniec to collect the gis, was not to

exceed twelve, and they were to be provisioned by the Polish starosta

372

See ibidem, pp. 354–375.

373

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 199–201.

374

Ibidem, pp. 205–225.

375

Cf. Documents 39, 42 and 43.

128 part one—chapter two

of Kamieniec

376

no longer than two weeks. On his part, the khan was

to declare that the royal envoys would not be detained in the Crimea

longer than one month. e proposed document also contained the

controversial clause regarding the Polish territorial claims reaching

the Black Sea and the khan’s obligation not to pass through Poland

while heading for military campaigns. Last but not least, the khan

was to maintain friendship with the rulers of Moldavia and Walla-

chia, appointed in mutual consent between the Polish king and the

Ottoman sultan. At that moment, both Danubian thrones were again

occupied by rulers disposed in a friendly way towards Poland: Gaşpar

Graţiani (Graziani), a Catholic hospodar of Moldavia (r. 1619–1620),

and Gavril Movilă, the hospodar of Wallachia (r. 1618–1620) and the

son of its former ruler Simion.

377

Oleszko did not reach the Crimea until the spring of 1620.

378

By that

time, the Polish relations not just with Baghchasaray, but also with

Istanbul, deteriorated again due to the repeated Cossack raids and the

participation of Polish mercenaries, recruited by the Habsburgs, in the

irty Years’ War. When the Porte resolved to depose Gaşpar Graţiani

from the Moldavian throne, the hospodar asked for Polish support

and Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski entered Moldavia with his troops

in September 1620. Aer the Polish army encamped at Ţuţora (Pol.

Cecora), Ottoman and Crimean troops approached, led by Iskender

Pasha, Qalga Devlet Giray, and Kantemir. Unlike in 1595, no agree-

ment was reached and Żółkiewski decided to withdraw to Poland. On

7 October 1620, the retreating Polish army was annihilated while its

commander was killed. Encouraged by the victory, the Tatars raided

Polish provinces while the young Ottoman sultan, Osman II, resolved

to lead in person a full-scale invasion of Poland in the following year.

New hospodars were appointed to the thrones of Moldavia and Wal-

lachia and called to assist the Ottomans in the Polish campaign. A

similar order was delivered to Djanibek Giray.

e Polish-Lithuanian Diet, faced with the largest external threat in

the Commonwealth’s history, voted new taxes and called for a full-scale

military mobilization. As the Polish grand hetman had been killed and

his deputy, the eld hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, taken captive, the

376

Curiously referred to in the Polish document as the bey of Kamieniec (bek

kamieniecki).

377

See Document 46.

378

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 228–230.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 129

command was entrusted to the Lithuanian grand hetman, Jan Karol

Chodkiewicz. e Polish-Lithuanian regular troops were assisted by

Ukrainian Cossacks commanded by Petro Konaševyč-Sahajdačnyj.

In September 1621, the Commonwealth’s troops successfully resisted

Ottoman-Tatar assaults in a fortied camp constructed near Hotin.

Even the death of Chodkiewicz did not break the defence. Finally, an

agreement was reached on 9 October and provisional instruments in

Polish and Ottoman-Turkish were exchanged between the two sides,

to be later conrmed by solemn documents issued by the king and

the sultan.

According to the agreement of 1621, Cossack raids into the Black

Sea area as well as the incursions by Tatars and Moldavians into the

Commonwealth were to be stopped. Poland was to cease interfering

in Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Hungary. Polish relations

with the Crimean khans and Moldavian hospodars were to remain

friendly as stipulated by the previous treaties, with a specic provision

that the khans should receive annual royal gis, to be delivered in the

Moldavian capital of Jassy. Finally, the two sides were to appoint com-

missioners to undertake a demarcation of the common borders. Some

dierences between the two versions of the agreement, composed in

Polish and Ottoman-Turkish, led to future misunderstandings. For

instance, in the Polish version the annual gis for the khan were

referred to as żołd (“soldier’s pay”), while in the Ottoman as vėrgü

(“gi” or “tax”). Moreover, the Ottoman instrument provided that a

tting pişkeş (“gi” or “tribute”) should be sent to the sultan as well,

while in the Polish version this provision is missing! No wonder that

the results of the Hotin campaign were dierently presented in the two

countries, and are sometimes dierently presented even today.

379

e agreement, negotiated in Hotin, was conrmed in the years

1623–1624 by the exchange of solemn instruments between Istan-

bul and Warsaw.

380

Although the Polish reconciliation with the sul-

tan should have automatically resulted in the one with the khan, the

379

See Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 131–132, 376–387;

cf. idem, “Tratatul de la Hotin—un exemplu de diplomaţie premodernă,” Revistă de

Istorie a Moldovei (2004), 1 (57), pp. 20–25 and 74–78 (Polish version entitled: “Trak-

tat chocimski jako przykład dyplomacji wczesnonowożytnej”).

380

Aer Osman II was deposed and murdered in 1622, he was replaced by his men-

tally unt uncle, Mustafa. Mustafa issued his ‘ahdname in February 1623, but was in

turn replaced by Murad IV, who issued a new ‘ahdname in October 1623. e peace-

making procedure was completed with a royal instrument, issued by Sigismund III

130 part one—chapter two

matter proved more complicated. Djanibek Giray participated in the

siege of Hotin, but a Polish proposal to invite him to the negotia-

tions was rejected by the Ottomans, who maintained that the Tatars

should simply obey the Porte. Such a stand certainly did not please the

khan, whose relations with Sultan Osman II constantly deteriorated.

381

To make things more complicated, Kantemir, the khan’s unruly sub-

ject who had distinguished himself in the campaign of Ţuţora, was in

1621 rewarded by Osman II with the post of the Ottoman governor

of Očakiv. In the following years, Kantemir was to build a semi-inde-

pendent base of power, drawing its strength from the Nogay tribes

dwelling in Budjak, whose obedience to either the khan or the sultan

was highly questionable.

382

In April 1622, even before the Polish embassy le for Istanbul,

the royal chancery prepared a mission to the Crimea, performed by

Krzysztof Krauzowski. e Polish envoy was accompanied by Djan

Anton Spinola, who had come to Poland in 1620 and had been

detained during the war. Like Oleszko in 1619, Krauzowski was pro-

vided with a ready formula of the khan’s instrument, to be issued by

Djanibek Giray.

383

in April 1624; cf. Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 133–135,

388–426.

381

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 241–242; the Tatars did not participate

in the siege of Hotin very actively, though they eectively cut o the Polish lines of

communication and greatly devastated Poland’s southeastern provinces.

382

On Kantemir, cf. Mihnea Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques

Zaporogues, 1600–1637,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 1 (1977): 273–307, esp. pp.

291–293. e Ottoman province of Očakiv (Tur. Özü) was created in the late 16th

century in order to defend the western and northwestern Black Sea shores against the

Cossacks. e province was alternatively named aer Silistra, since its governor oen

resided in this Danubian fortress.

383

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 227 and 244–251. Skorupa convincingly

argues that, contrary to its heading (probably entered later), the document extant in

three Polish copies is merely a formula of the khan’s proposed instrument, drawn

by the royal chancery, and not the khan’s actual document. is conclusion is fully

conrmed by the document’s form and wording which closely resemble the royal

chancery formula drawn in 1619. On the other hand, Skorupa’s assertion that Krau-

zowski was given a royal instrument of peace, whose copy is not preserved (ibidem,

p. 246), seems unbased. Krauzowski’s instruction does not mention such a docu-

ment although it even refers to a copy of the Treaty of Hotin (egzempla pakt pod

Chocimiem z cesarzem tureckim zawartych) that the envoy took along to the Crimea

in order to refute possible Tatar claims regarding the amount of the gis. e envoy

apparently brought to the khan only an ordinary royal letter, whose copy is preserved

among the embassy papers; for the royal instruction to Krauzowski recorded along

with Sigismund’s letter to the khan, dated 30 April 1622, see Bibl. Kórn., ms. 326, pp.

997–1003, and Biblioteka PAN w Krakowie, ms. 1051, fol. 457a–459b.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 131

Apart from the changed name of the envoy, entered in the narratio,

the formula taken by Krauzowski to Baghchasaray was identical with

the one taken by Oleszko, as if nothing had happened between 1619

and 1622. It contained the notorious clause regarding the Polish ter-

ritorial claims reaching the Black Sea, even though a Polish-Ottoman

demarcation had been already decided in Hotin and it was unlikely

that the Porte would acknowledge the Polish pretensions. Moreover,

the formula again provided that the royal gis were to be delivered in

Kamieniec,

384

even though it had been agreed in Hotin that the deliv-

ery should take place in Jassy. Finally, the clauses regarding the rulers

of Moldavia and Wallachia, reportedly placed on their thrones upon

the wish of the Polish king, were completely anachronous aer 1620,

when the Porte had removed Polish protégés from both Danubian

principalities.

385

Given his strained relations with the Porte and the unattractive-

ness of the Polish peace oer, no wonder that Djanibek Giray did not

hasten to issue an instrument of peace, either in the form suggested

by the Polish side, or any other. In May 1623, while Krauzowski was

still in the Crimea, the khan was deposed by the Porte and exiled to

Rhodes.

e period of Crimean civil wars and the rise and fall

of Kantemir (1623–1637)

In June 1623, the new khan Mehmed III Giray arrived from Istanbul

to the Crimea. He was soon joined by his eccentric brother, Shahin

Giray, who had spent previous years in Iran, in the service of Shah

Abbas the Great, the archenemy of the Ottomans. Mehmed III Giray

was known for his ambitious and uneasy character. In 1608, appointed

the qalga of Selamet Giray, he helped him to secure the throne by killing

384

e only minor variation was that in 1619 the khan was to send his envoys “on

the 1st day of October” (na dzień pierwszego octobra posłów swoich . . . posyłać mam)

so that they could collect the gis in Kamieniec on 1 November, while the formula of

1622 merely provided that the delivery of the gis should take place on 1 November

in Kamieniec.

385

See Document 47; in 1622, Moldavia was ruled by Stefan Tomşa II (r. 1611–

1615 and 1621–1623) and Wallachia by Radu Mihnea (r. 1601–1602, 1611–1616, and

1620–1623, also in Moldavia in the years 1616–1619 and 1623–1626). Both hospodars

had been appointed by the Porte without consulting the Polish king, in fact against

the latter’s will.

132 part one—chapter two

his rival Tokhtamısh (see above), but soon aer quarelled with the

khan and went into exile. In 1610, he competed for the throne with

Djanibek Giray, but the latter was eectively supported by the Porte.

386

In 1623, Mehmed Giray managed to obtain the support of the Otto-

man grand vizier, Mere Hüseyin Pasha, and assumed the throne. e

decision was yet reversed, and in 1624 the Porte sent again Djanibek

to the Crimea with the assistance of the Ottoman eet and troops. To

Istanbul’s surprise, the brothers Mehmed and Shahin Girays refused to

obey, defeated the Ottomans and conquered Caa, forcing the sultan’s

unlucky protégé to return to Istanbul. e Porte then surrendered and

Mehmed III Giray was rearmed on the throne, although the humili-

ation was not forgotten.

387

Using sometimes cruel methods in quelling dissent within the

Giray family as well as among the Crimean aristocracy, the brothers

also faced domestic opposition. Moreover, many a Crimean Sunnite

regarded Shahin Giray, who had long served the Shiite shah of Iran,

as an heretic. Facing a virtual boycott from the side of the remaining

Giray princes, Mehmed III Giray promoted to the post of nureddin

an illegitimate son of Feth Giray nicknamed Choban Mustafa (“Mus-

tafa the shepherd”) and simultaneously gave him a new name: Devlet

Giray.

388

386

A crucial role in supporting Djanibek against Mehmed and Shahin Girays was

played in 1610 by the Ottoman governor of Caa, Rizvan Pasha. A local narrative of

the Crimean civil wars of 1610, 1623–1624, and 1628 can be found in the chronicle

authored by Rizvan’s son, Abdullah; see Zajączkowski (ed.), La chronique des Steppes

Kiptchak Tevārīh-i Dešt-i Qipčaq du XVII

siècle, pp. 41–64 and 85–94. Interestingly

the author, though praising his father’s role, knew to appreciate the dignity and virility

of the two brothers, who were able to defy the Ottoman suzerainty over the Khanate;

cf. Le khanat de Crimée, pp. 336–338.

387

Smirnov, Krymskoe xanstvo, pp. 480–494.

388

e Islamic law did not dierentiate between the sons born from wives and slave

women, yet, Feth Giray himself denounced the fatherhood of Mustafa. Mustafa was

reportedly born from a Polish captive, identied by some authors as Maria Potocka,

a legendary wife of a Crimean khan, in whose memory the famous Fountain of Tears

(Rus. Fontan slez) in the Palace of Baghchasaray was reportedly constructed; cf. Le

khanat de Crimée, p. 337. In fact, the legend is dubious as it was virtually impossible

for a woman from the magnate Potocki family to be captured and remain unran-

somed; besides, the Fountain of Tears was constructed in 1764. For the legend of

Maria Potocka, alternatively identied with Dilara Bikech, the favorite concubine

of Khan Qırım Giray (r. 1758–1764 and 1768–1769), cf. Kerstin Jobst, Die Perle des

Imperiums. Der russische Krim-Diskurs im Zarenreich (Constance, 2007), 255–282.

Choban Mustafa, renamed as Devlet Giray, was the protoplast of a side branch of the

Giray dynasty named Choban Girays; his son, Adil Giray, reigned in the years 1666–

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 133

e external and domestic threat forced Mehmed III Giray to secure

peace in the north. Although he did not issue a formal instrument,

for which Krauzowski had been sent to his predecessor, the new khan

received the Polish envoy and assured him of his peaceful intentions

provided that the king sent the customary gis, restrained the Cos-

sacks and did not support the Habsburgs against Gábor Bethlen. In

September 1623, Krauzowski was sent back to Poland along with

Ghazi Murad, the khan’s great envoy who carried a letter addressed

to the king.

389

In December 1623, Mehmed III Giray also received Rus-

sian envoys, who brought him annual gis from the tsar, and swore to

keep peace with Moscow.

390

In August 1624, when the Crimean-Ottoman conict was at its peak,

Qalga Shahin Giray sent a letter to Sigismund III, oering Tatar assis-

tance if the king wished to conquer Akkerman, Bender, and Kilia from

the Ottomans. e qalga also transmitted a letter of his former patron,

Shah Abbas, who had recently captured Ottoman Baghdad, proposing

1671. On the Choban Girays, cf. Halim Giray Sultan, Gülbün-i hânân yahut Qırım

tarihi = Rozovyj kust xanov, ili Istorija Kryma. Edited by A. Hilmi and K. Hüseyinov

(Simferopol, 2004), pp. 55–57.

389

Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 252–253. Interestingly, Krauzowski was

convinced that the khan’s letter entrusted to Ghazi Murad (referred to as Kaze Murat

in the Polish sources) was a sworn instrument of peace (Pol. poprzysiężone pakta);

such erroneous information is contained in the letter of Hetman Koniecpolski sent

to King Sigismund III from Podolia on 23 October 1623, aer the hetman had met

Krauzowski who was on his way back to Warsaw; see Źrzódła do dziejów polskich,

vol. 1. Edited by M. Grabowski and A. Przeździecki (Wilno [Vilnius], 1843), pp.

107–108; this erroneous information is repeated in Historia dyplomacji polskiej, vol.

2: 1572–1795. Edited by Z. Wójcik (Warsaw, 1982), p. 85 (the name of the khan’s

envoy is misspelled as Kara Murad). For the khan’s letter, issued near Akkerman “in

September 1032 A.H.” (i.e., September 1623 A.D.) and preserved in a Polish transla-

tion, see Bibl. Kórn., ms. 326, pp. 1051–1053 (another copy with an erroneous date:

27 November, is preserved in Bibl. Kórn., ms. 333, fol. 191a-193a). In fact, it is an

ordinary letter in which the khan explicitly engages that he will send a formal instru-

ment of peace only aer he receives the royal gis. e fact that Krauzowski returned

without a letter of agreement (poseł bez listu przymiernego przyjachał) is conrmed in

the royal instruction to Suliman Rubaj, a royal messenger dispatched to the Crimea

aer Krauzowski’s return; see Bibl. Kórn., ms. 326, pp. 1057–1058 (dated 12 Decem-

ber 1623). On his part, Sigismund III made clear in his letter to Mehmed III Giray

that the customary gis would not be released unless the khan rst issued a letter of

agreement required by the royal side (póki listu przymiernego [. . .] nie poślesz); see the

royal letter to the khan, entrusted to Suliman Rubaj and dated 12 December 1623, in

Bibl. Kórn., ms. 326, pp. 1059–1060.

390

Novosel’skij, Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, p. 111. e audience

took place on 29 November according to the Old Style.