Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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154 part one—chapter two

with a royal envoy, Jerzy Ilicz, who carried gis for the new khan in

the amount regarded proper by the royal side. Mehmed IV Giray con-

rmed their receipt in a letter sent to King Vladislaus in November

1642, although he remarked that the gis were of decient value.

441

Two months earlier, the khan had also conrmed the peace with Mus-

covy by issuing an ocial şartname.

442

Even if the new khan sincerely wished to keep peace, he had limited

control over his subjects, who made their living by raiding neighbor-

ing lands. In the summer of 1643, a “private” Tatar raid devastated the

estates of a Polish magnate, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki,

443

which extended

on the eastern side of the Dnieper. Wiśniowiecki chased the invaders

and defeated them already in the steppe.

444

Five months later, Tughay

Bey, the commander of Perekop from the Arghın clan, led a major

raid to the Polish Ukraine, but was defeated by Hetman Koniecpolski

at Oxmativ (Pol. Ochmatów) on 30 January 1644.

445

e news of the victory of Oxmativ, disseminated by numerous

pamphlets in Poland and Christian Europe, served as a propagandic

tool for those who dreamed of an anti-Crimean, or even anti-Ottoman

crusade. In February 1644, the Polish-Lithuanian Senate decided to

cease the payment of gis to the khan.

446

Neither the Porte nor the Crimean subjects were satised with the

rule of Mehmed IV Giray. e former expected him to honor the

441

AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 63, t. 51, no. 518; published in Materialy dlja istorii

Krymskago xanstva, pp. 285–286; dated in Shaban 1052 A.H., i.e., between 25 Octo-

ber and 22 November 1642; see also the letter of the new qalga, Feth Giray, issued in

Aq Mesdjid on 29 Shaban 1052 A.H. (i.e., 22 November 1642) and sent along with

the khan’s letter: AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 63, t. 50, no. 516; published in Materialy

dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 287–290. Both are referred to as “friendly letters”

(muhabbetnames); besides, the khan’s letter is much shorter than a typical ‘ahdname;

hence, Baranowski’s assumption that both the khan and the qalga sent “letters of

agreement” (the Polish term list przymierny, used by Baranowski, is equivalent to

the Turkish term ‘ahdname) is incorrect; cf. Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w

latach 1632–1648, pp. 118–119 and 123–124.

442

For the khan’s instrument, dated in September (sic) 1052 A.H. and preserved

only in Russian translation, see RGADA, f. 123, op. 2, no. 50; published in Pamjatniki

diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, pp. 99–102.

443

By the 17th century, the members of this ancient Ruthenian, Orthodox princely

family had become Polonized Roman-Catholics, therefore I use here the Polish form

Wiśniowiecki and not the Ruthenian [Ukrainian] one, Vyšnevec’kyj.

444

Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 125–128.

445

Ibidem, pp. 131–143; on Tughay Bey, see Senai, Historia chana Islam Gereja III,

pp. 162–163, n. 169.

446

Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, p. 148.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 155

peace with Poland, while the latter to lead successful campaigns that

would provide Tatar warriors with spoils. In June 1644, the Porte

summoned Islam Giray, the former qalga of Bahadır Giray and once

prisoner in Poland, from his exile in Rhodes and appointed to the

Crimean throne. He owed his accession to the diplomatic skills of his

agha and future vizier, Sefer Ghazi.

447

Islam III Giray appointed his brother, Qırım Giray,

448

the qalga, and

his nephew, Ghazi Giray,

449

the nureddin. In order to gain popularity

among his subjects, the new khan had to authorize a raid against either

Poland-Lithuania or Muscovy. At rst, it seemed more likely that the

Tatars would invade Poland aer Warsaw had detained a Crimean

envoy, Mustafa Bey, who had arrived in the fall of 1644 with the noti-

cation of the khan’s accession and his proposal to renew the peace.

450

Islam III Giray indeed renewed the peace with Moscow in Decem-

ber 1644 but, aer the death of Michael Romanov in July 1645 and

the accession of his son, Alexis, the khan was liberated from his oath.

Besides, the notorious activity of the Don Cossacks convinced Istanbul

to authorize a Tatar raid against Muscovy. In the winter of 1645–1646,

Nureddin Ghazi Giray led a large raid to the north. e raid helped

to consolidate the Crimean nobility aer a domestic conict, which

had almost caused Sefer Ghazi’s death and temporarily removed him

from power.

451

Poland-Lithuania was not attacked, but the enthusiasm aer the

battle of Oxmativ resulted in military plans aiming at no less than the

conquest of the Crimea. Already in the fall of 1644, Hetman Stanisław

447

On Sefer Ghazi and his role in the Crimean politics, see Senai, Historia chana

Islam Gereja III, p. 144, n. 51.

448

On Qırım Giray, the former nureddin of Bahadır Giray, see Senai, Historia

chana Islam Gereja III, pp. 152–153, n. 95; he perished in June 1651, in the battle at

Berestečko between the Crimean-Cossack and Polish forces.

449

On Ghazi Giray, son of Mübarek Giray, see Senai, Historia chana Islam Gereja

III, pp. 154, n. 107; his raid against Muscovy is erroneously dated there in 1644–1645

instead of 1645–1646.

450

In his letter, sent through Mustafa Bey, Islam III Giray engaged to keep peace

on the condition that he received the customary gis, and urged Vladislaus IV to send

a royal envoy in order to negotiate a new ‘ahdname; see the khan’s original letter in

AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 63, t. 41, no. 504, and its Polish translation in ibidem, k.

65, t. 144, no. 724; the letter is undated, but its date can be established by comparison

with the qalga’s letter, sent with the same embassy and dated in the third decade of

Djumada II 1054 A.H., i.e., between 25 August and 2 September 1644; cf. AGAD,

AKW, Dz. tat., k. 60, t. 69, no. 74.

451

See Novosel’skij, Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, pp. 342–353.

156 part one—chapter two

Koniecpolski authored a memorial, proposing to ally with Muscovy

and attack the Tatars. While Russia would conquer and colonize the

Crimean peninsula, Poland would annex the Tatar and Ottoman lands

on the Black Sea shores, extending as far as the Danube.

452

An even

greater enthusiasm aected Vladislaus IV. e king, whose ambitions

had been nourished with grandiose plans since his childhood, dreamed

of a great military adventure. Having failed to secure the thrones of

Sweden and Muscovy, he now turned his attention to the south. In

June 1645, the Ottomans invaded Venetian Crete, so Venice was des-

perately looking for allies. Inspired by a Venetian envoy, Giovanni

Tiepolo, the Polish king developed the idea of an anti-Ottoman cru-

sade, seing himself at its head. Soon the plan became widely known,

especially as the Venetian diplomacy in Istanbul did not try to conceal

it, hoping for a last-minute settlement with the Porte. To be sure, the

Ottomans did not want a two-front war so they severely ordered the

khan not to provoke Poland. Islam III Giray obeyed as he was equally

afraid of a possible coalition between Moscow and Warsaw.

453

In winter, during the Tatar raid against Muscovy, Polish forces were

ordered to assist the Russians, albeit their action was not particularly

successful. In February 1646, the worried khan sent another embassy

to Poland and provided it with an ‘ahdname in the hope to restore the

peace and renew the payment of the royal gis. e Tatar envoy, Islam

Agha, accompanied by the envoys of the qalga, nureddin, and other

Crimean dignitaries, was received in Warsaw on 24 April.

454

In the ‘ahdname, brought by Islam Agha, the khan complained that

his earlier envoy, sent in the previous year and also furnished with

an ‘ahdname, had been detained and then sent back empty-handed,

without any gis.

455

Islam III Giray invoked the ancient friendship that

452

Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, pp. 67 and 704–705 (in the earlier

scholarship, the memorial was dated to 1645). On the ensuing Polish-Russian nego-

tiations regarding an anti-Crimean alliance, see Boris Florja [Floria], “Plany wojny

tureckiej Władysława IV a Rosja (1644–1646),” Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce 36

(1991): 133–145.

453

Cf. Kołodziejczyk, “e Ottoman northern policy as seen from the Venetian

archives,” in: CIÉPO Osmanlı Öncesi ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Uluslararası Komitesi

XIV. Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 18–22 Eylül 2000, Çeşme. Edited by T. Baykara (Ankara,

2004): 417–426, esp. pp. 422 and 425.

454

Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 160–166.

455

We have no information about the khan’s embassy to the king from 1645. In a

letter that reached Hetman Koniecpolski on 3 April 1645, Islam III Giray complained

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 157

had once enabled safe contacts and trade between the two countries.

He admitted that the Porte urged him to maintain peace with Poland,

yet this peace was conditioned by the timely payment of the royal gis.

Complaining on the recent raids of the Cossacks, the khan extolled

his patience: “from the autumn months until the present time your

Cossacks, serving as guards on the Dnieper river, and your other hunt-

ers and brigands, have come four or ve times and driven away the

Crimean cattle; moreover, they have taken away many Muslims cap-

tured as prisoners. What kind of peace, brotherhood, and friendship

is that? If you wish to make peace, you should observe your oath and

punish your villains.” In conclusion, Islam III Giray engaged in his

name and in the name of the qalga, nureddin, other Giray princes, the

Shirin and Manghıt clans as well as all Tatar and Nogay commanders

to maintain the peace on the condition that the king restrained the

Cossacks and renewed the payment of the gis.

456

King Vladislaus rejected the oer, yet, in the following months his

grandiose war plan was wrecked at the hands of his subjects. Hetman

Stanisław Koniecpolski, whose authority could help the king, died on

11 March 1646, even before the Crimean embassy reached Warsaw.

e majority of Polish and Lithuanian nobles did not wish for a war

and feared a confrontation with the Porte. In the fall of 1646, the Diet

forced the king to publicly denounce his war plans and dissolve the

troops that he had recruited for Venetian money. Still not discour-

aged, Vladislaus deliberately humiliated a Crimean envoy during the

public audience in June 1647

457

and continued secret negotiations with

the Cossacks, urging them to attack the Crimea and thus provoke a

full-scale military response that would force the Diet to authorize war.

on the detention of his rst envoy, Mustafa Bey, sent to Poland in 1644 with the noti-

cation of his accession; see Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, pp. 673–674.

It was rather unlikely that the khan would send a new solemn embassy before Mustafa

Bey returned home. Perhaps in 1646 Islam III Giray still referred to his rst embassy,

yet the document brought by Mustafa Bey was not an ‘ahdname; cf. n. 450 above.

456

See Document 58.

457

e Crimean envoy, Ali Bey, brought a letter from Islam III Giray, in which the

khan complained that his earlier ‘ahdname, sent through Islam Agha, had not been

reciprocated by a Polish embassy and gis; see AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 63, t. 56,

no. 526. e envoy was received at the royal court on 17 March 1647 and, aer a two-

months’ delay, was given a farewell audience on 20 June. e king not only refused

to send gis but also did not allow Ali Bey to kiss his hand; see Baranowski, Stosunki

polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 184–186.

158 part one—chapter two

Yet, also these plans were exposed by the opposition and entirely frus-

trated. Even the prospect of an anti-Tatar league with Moscow became

stale aer the Crimean-Muscovian rapprochement in 1647.

458

e royal game proved disastrous for Poland-Lithuania. e Cos-

sacks, who regarded themselves as noble warriors, long yearned for

noble privileges that were repeatedly denied to them. Whenever they

were needed against the Ottomans or Muscovy, their number was for-

mally augmented and they were entered on the royal payroll (so-called

ants and reduced to serfdom. Besides, the Cossacks adhered to the

Orthodox Church that was suppressed aer the Union of Brest (1596),

when the majority of the Orthodox hierarchs in Poland-Lithuania had

acknowledged the pope’s authority. Even though Vladislaus was more

tolerant than his father and the Orthodox Church was relegalized to

exist along with the Uniate Church, the Orthodox subjects of Poland-

Lithuania felt like second-class citizens. ese social and religious fac-

tors, combined with the recent disappointment aer the asco of the

royal plans, led to a great Cossack rebellion that erupted in the spring

of 1648 under the leadership of Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj, the former par-

ticipant of the secret negotiations with King Vladislaus. A talented

politician, Xmel’nyc’kij initially presented his cause as the defence of

royal authority against unruly lords and that earned him even more

popular support in the Ukraine. Simultaneously, he secured the mili-

tary assistance of the Crimean khan, who sent Tughay Bey, the once

unlucky commander at Oxmativ, to help the Cossacks.

Vladislaus IV, who could perhaps appease the situation, died on

20 May 1648. Six days later, the Polish army was annihilated at Korsun’

by Cossack-Tatar troops and both Polish hetmans, the grand and the

eld one, were sent as prisoners to the Crimea. Aer another Polish

army, hastily mobilized in the summer, was routed at Pyljavci in Sep-

tember 1648, the Cossack-Tatar forces, commanded by Xmel’nyc’kij

and Qalga Qırım Giray, besieged Lwów, whose inhabitants had to

ransom their immunity. Aer Vladislaus’ brother, John Casimir, was

458

On the asco of a Polish-Muscovian league, see Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-

tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 187–190; on the Muscovian-Crimean reconciliation

in 1647, see Novosel’skij, Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, pp. 397–400;

the şartname of Islam III Giray, issued in September 1647 and conrming the peace

with Muscovy, is preserved in RGADA, f. 123, op. 2, no. 54a; published in Materialy

dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 383–393; its Russian translation is published in

Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, pp. 114–122.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 159

elected to the Polish throne in November 1648, the hostilities were

temporarily suspended but no agreement was reached.

In May 1649, Islam III Giray set out in person for a new campaign.

In July, the allied Crimean-Cossack forces began the siege of a Pol-

ish fortied camp at Zbaraž. e relief expedition, commanded by

the new king, almost ended with a disaster when also the royal forces

were surrounded at Zboriv (Pol. Zborów) on 15 August. In the des-

perate situation, John Casimir addressed a peace proposal to Islam III

Giray. e ensuing negotiations between the Polish chancellor, Jerzy

Ossoliński, and the Crimean vizier, Sefer Ghazi, took place in a tent

set up between the two armies. Xmel’nyc’kyj realised that the Poles

hoped to isolate him and stir a Tatar-Cossack conict, so he resolved

to join the talks, albeit unwillingly. An agreement was reached on 18

August 1649, and on the following day both sides exchanged instru-

ments of peace.

459

e Polish instrument, delivered to the khan on 19 August by a Pol-

ish envoy, Andrzej Miaskowski, provided that the king would resume

the payment of the customary gis to the khan. e royal gis were to

be sent each year to Kamieniec and collected there by Tatar envoys. In

return, the khan and his subjects were not to raid the royal domains.

e second clause regarded the Cossacks, on whose behalf the khan

had interceded. While the Cossacks were to return under the royal

rule, John Casimir was to remit their rebellion and conrm their tra-

ditional liberties. e articles resulting from the direct Polish-Cossack

negotiations were to be recorded in a separate document. e follow-

ing clause regarded mutual assistance to be given by the king and the

khan against their common enemies. Although the Tatars hinted dur-

ing the negotiations that a common alliance might be directed against

Muscovy, the “common enemy” was not dened by name in the docu-

ment. A separate, vaguely formulated clause provided that the Tatars

should do their best to cause the least possible damage on their way

home through the royal lands. Finally, the Tatars and Cossacks were

to li the siege of neighboring Zbaraž and allow the Polish troops, who

459

Senai, Historia chana Islam Gereja III, pp. 128–132 and 187–190, notes 486, 490,

498, and 502; Historia dyplomacji polskiej, vol. 2, pp. 192–193; on the negotiations, see

also Ludwik Kubala, “Oblężenie Zbaraża i pokój pod Zborowem,” in: idem, Dzieła,

vol. 2: Szkice historyczne, serja I i II (Lwów [L’viv], 1923), pp. 98–101 and 121–122;

and Hruševs’kyj [Hrushevsky], History of Ukraine-Rus’, vol. 8: e Cossack Age, 1625–

1650. Translated by M. D. Olynyk (Edmonton-Toronto, 2002), pp. 579–597.

160 part one—chapter two

had vigorously defended their camp for over one month, to join the

royal army at Zboriv.

460

e instrument of Islam III Giray consisted of merely two articles:

the rst one obliged the king and his ministers to display benevolence

towards Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj and the Cossacks, whose number (i.e.,

all the remaining provisions, obliging the king to send the customary

gis to the khan, not to interfere in the traditional Tatar pasturages on

the rivers Ingulec’, Ingul, and Chubartıl (Ukr. Velykaja Vis’), extend-

ing to the north into the lands claimed as the Polish Ukraine,

461

display friendship and provide military assistance to the khan, and not

to commit any harm to the domains of the Ottoman sultan. In return,

Islam III Giray merely engaged that neither he nor his subjects would

raid the royal domains. No mention was even made of a Tatar military

assistance to Poland. In addition, Islam III Giray openly warned John

Casimir against any violation of the treaty.

462

In sum, both the wording and the contents of the Polish and

Crimean instruments were very dierent. Besides, neither the Polish

nor the Crimean document mentioned some of the important issues.

e most humiliating condition could not be entered in the formal

treaty as it would be devastating for the king’s public image: there

was tacit consent that the Tatars could take along their slaves, already

captured in the royal lands, and even keep on collecting them on their

way home. e clause providing that the Tatars should cause “the least

possible damage” while returning home, entered in the Polish instru-

ment, served only as a face saving device. During the negotiations, the

Tatars also insisted that they should obtain the gis due for the past

years. Hence, it was agreed that Islam III Giray would receive 200,000

thalers in the following way: 30,000 on the spot, another 30,000 on

his way back to the Crimea, and the remaining 140,000 in the near-

est future. As a guarantee of its timely payment, Zygmunt Denho,

the starosta of Sokal’, was to remain with the khan. Moreover, the

khan was to receive an extra payment as ransom for liing the siege

of Zbaraž. In the following direct negotiations between the defenders

460

See Document 59.

461

e Ingulec’ is a right tributary of the Dnieper, the Ingul is a le tributary of

the Boh, and the Velykaja Vis’ is a le tributary of the Synjuxa, which in turn is a le

tributary of the Boh; on their identication, cf. Document 60, n. 7.

462

See Document 60.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 161

of Zbaraž and the Tatars, held in the presence of royal commissioners

on 22 August, its amount was agreed on as 40,000 thalers.

463

A separate document, issued by John Casimir, addressed the Cos-

sack demands. Xmel’nyc’kyj obtained less than he had wished for but

the khan, satised in his own demands, forced the Cossack hetman

to accept the deal. Notwithstanding Xmel’nyc’kyj’s dismay, the royal

document set foundations for an autonomous Orthodox Cossack state

within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Apart from granting

amnesty, conrming Xmel’nyc’kyj in his post, and augmenting the

ocial number (i.e., register) of Cossacks to 40,000, the document

established a Cossack Hetmanate, comprised of the three palatinates

of Kiev, Černihiv, and Braclav, where only Orthodox nobles could

hold oces. e Orthodox metropolitan of Kiev was to obtain a seat

in the Polish-Lithuanian Senate and the Jesuits and Jews, equally

hated by Orthodox Cossacks, were to leave the Hetmanate. e Cos-

sack postulate to abolish the Union of Brest and restore all Greek-

Catholic churches to the Orthodox clergy, was postponed to future

negotiations.

464

In fact, neither side intended to honor these conditions and soon the

war broke out anew.

465

In June 1651, a bloody three-day confrontation

at Berestečko brought a major defeat of the Crimean-Cossack coalition

at the hands of the Polish troops commanded in person by King John

Casimir. Aer the qalga, Qırım Giray, and Tughay Bey perished in

the battle, the disheartened khan imprisoned Xmel’nyc’kyj and le the

battleeld, enabling the Poles to surround and slaughter the abandoned

Cossacks. Set free again, Xmel’nyc’kyj managed to reach a new agree-

ment with the king in September 1651, but the Cossack register was

463

On these additional conditions, see Kubala, “Oblężenie Zbaraża i pokój pod

Zborowem,” pp. 100–101 and 108. Denho returned from the Crimea in March 1650;

see his biography by Eugeniusz Latacz in Polski Słownik Biograczny (hereaer, PSB),

vol. 5 (Cracow, 1939–1946), pp. 118–119.

464

Kubala, “Oblężenie Zbaraża i pokój pod Zborowem,” p. 103.

465

e invitation to a joint invasion of Muscovy, pronounced by the Tatars dur-

ing the negotiations in Zboriv, was turned down by Warsaw which was satised with

the existing peace with Moscow dating from 1634. Besides, such an invasion would

be unthinkable without Cossack cooperation which was unlikely due to the mutual

distrust between the royal court and Xmel’nyc’kyj; see Jan Seredyka, “Nieudana

próba włączenia w 1650 r. Kozaków Zaporoskich do antyrosyjskiego sojuszu polsko-

tatarskiego,” in: Między Wschodem a Zachodem. Rzeczpospolita XVI–XVIII w. Studia

oarowane Zbigniewowi Wójcikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin (Warsaw, 1993):

125–132.

162 part one—chapter two

diminished to 20,000 and the Cossack Hetmanate reduced to just one

palatinate of Kiev. e fortune turned again in favor of the Crimean-

Cossack allies, when in June 1652 a Polish army was massacred at

Batoh. e Polish eld hetman, Marcin Kalinowski, and numerous

nobles (including Marek Sobieski, a brother of the future king) died

in the battle or were taken prisoner and then executed.

466

e victory of Batoh enabled the Crimean-Cossack army to invade

Moldavia, whose ruler, Vasile Lupu, was forced to break with Poland

and give away his daughter to marry Xmel’nyc’kyj’s son. Yet, in 1653

a coalition was formed between Poland and Transylvania that pushed

out the Tatars and Cossacks from Moldavia. In the hope to nally

crush the Cossack rebellion, John Casimir led a large army to Podo-

lia, but in November 1653 he was again—like in 1649—trapped by

the Crimean-Cossack forces, commanded by Islam III Giray and

Xmel’nyc’kyj. As neither side felt like ghting, negotiations began. In

December 1653, Islam III Giray appointed Sefer Ghazi his head repre-

sentative, while John Casimir appointed ve commissioners: Stanisław

Lanckoroński, the palatine of Ruthenia, Stanisław Witowski, the cas-

tellan of Sandomierz, Michał Czartoryski, the castellan of Volhynia,

Jerzy Lubomirski, the Crown grand marshal, and Stefan Koryciński,

466

Primary sources as well as modern historians dier in explaining the massacre

of prisoners, unusual in scale even considering the seventeenth-century standards;

one explanation blames the Cossacks as instigators and simultaneously ascribes them

a pragmative motive, unconnected with the wish to avenge Berestečko: by killing cap-

tives, the Cossacks deprived the Tatars of a booty that would otherwise discourage the

latter from continuing the campaign. No wonder that—according to a Polish eyewit-

ness—many rank and le Tatars tried to hide and rescue their captives by dressing

them in Tatar clothes. Also the nureddin, Adil Giray, who commanded the Crimean

army, initially opposed the massacre but was later persuaded by Xmel’nyc’kyj and

some of the Tatar elders; see Tomasz Ciesielski, Od Batohu do Żwańca. Wojna na

Ukrainie, Podolu i o Mołdawię 1652–1653 (Zabrze, 2007), pp. 34–37. Polish sources

and secondary literature conrm that the Tatars were commanded at Batoh by the

nureddin, but do not provide his name; cf. Wojciech Długołęcki, Batoh 1652 (War-

saw, 1995), pp. 117–118. Aer Qırım Giray’s death at Berestečko, the post of qalga

was given to Ghazi Giray, while the vacant post of nureddin was given to the latter’s

brother, Adil Giray; see Seyyid Muhammed Riza, Es-seb‘u`s-seyyar  ahbari muluki

Tatar, p. 162. In the scholarly literature, the chronicler’s phrase birader-i digeri (“his

other brother”) has been mistaken as referring to Qırım Giray and not Ghazi Giray

(Le khanat de Crimée, p. 364). Adil Giray could not be a brother of Qırım Giray, since

the latter’s father (and also the father of Islam III Giray), Selamet Giray, died in 1610,

while the nureddin is described as young and inexperienced in the Polish sources.

Besides, Adil Giray’s tuġra proves unequivocally that he was a son of Mübarek Giray,

hence Ghazi’s brother and Islam Giray’s nephew; cf. Materialy dlja istorii Krymskago

xanstva, p. 532.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 163

the Crown chancellor.

467

On the Polish request, the Cossack delegates

were not admitted to the negotiations so they were represented by the

Tatar side. On 13 December, the delegates met at a distance of three

bow shots from the Polish camp at Žvanec’. e atmosphere was so

tense that they negotiated without dismounting their horses. Never-

theless, by 15 December an agreement was reached, which conrmed

the conditions from Zboriv. e khan was to obtain 200,000 thalers

plus 30,000 a year in the future, while two Polish nobles were to per-

manently reside in the Crimea as guarantors of the treaty. As to the

Cossacks, their number was again to be augmented to 40,000. Both

sides agreed not to write down the negotiated conditions so the Treaty

of Żwaniec does not exist in a written form. Like in 1649, the Poles

distributed extra presents, especially to Sefer Ghazi, in order to soen

his stand during the negotiations, and tacitly agreed that the Tatars

“collect” captives on their way home.

468

e long Polish-Crimean alliance 1654–1666

For Xmel’nyc’kyj, the patronizing attitude of the Tatars combined

with the fact that his allies repeatedly ravaged the Ukraine and kid-

napped Ruthenian peasants, was more and more intolerable. From

the beginning of his uprising, the Cossack hetman had negotiated a

possible submission to the tsar. Aer initial hesitations about break-

ing with Poland, Moscow accepted the proposal in 1653. e agree-

ment was nalized on 18 January 1654, when the Cossacks gathered

in Perejaslav to swear allegiance to Tsar Alexis in the presence of his

representative.

Contemporary observers as well as modern historians have diered

whether it was a union of two East Slavic nations or rather an annex-

ation of the Ukraine to Russia. Whatever our conclusion might be,

the act was of tremendous importance for the geopolitics of Eastern

467

For the khan’s sealed credentials, appointing Sefer Ghazi and other unnamed

Tatar plenipotentiaries, composed in Polish and addressed to the king, see AGAD,

AKW, Dz. tat., k. 62, t. 19, no. 350 (dated at Husjatyn on 19 December, apparently

by error; the date is corrected in the Archives manuscript catalogue to 12 December);

the royal sealed full powers for the Polish commissioners is extant in ibidem, k. 62,

t. 14, no. 345 (undated).

468

On the Polish-Tatar negotiations in December 1653, see Ciesielski, Od Batohu do

Żwańca, pp. 261–270, and Dariusz Milewski, Rywalizacja polsko-kozacka o Mołdawię

w dobie powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego (1648–1653) (Zabrze, 2011), p. 282.