Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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134 part one—chapter two

a Persian-Crimean-Polish alliance against the Porte. In return, Shahin

Giray asked the king to send him gunpowder and munitions and dis-

patch the Cossacks in order to assist him and his brother. e oer

was so unusual that it caused mixed feelings in the royal entourage

and the royal answer was extremely cautious.

391

While Shahin Giray

still tried to win support among some Polish magnates, he did not

waste time and also directly contacted the Cossacks, without asking

for a royal permission. On 3 January 1625, the qalga met the Cos-

sack elders at Karayteben, an elevated spot surrounded by the Dnieper

and Kins’ki vody rivers, which served as a traditional place of border

exchange. e negotiations resulted in a Tatar-Cossack alliance, con-

rmed with the exchanging of formal instruments between the two

sides.

392

For Shahin Giray, the alliance was directed against the Porte,

but the Cossacks hoped that it might be equally useful against Poland.

391

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 29–31. e shah’s

undated letter, composed in Ottoman Turkish and brought to Warsaw in October

1624, has been preserved in the original; see AGAD, AKW, Dział perski, no. 4; its con-

temporary Polish translation, apparently made by Samuel Otwinowski, is published

(with a wrong date: 1628) in Stanisław Przyłęcki (ed.), Ukrainne sprawy. Przyczynek

do dziejów polskich, tatarskich i tureckich XVII wieku (Lwów [L’viv], 1842), pp. 19–20.

Interestingly, Abbas referred to Shahin Giray as the Crimean khan “who sits on the

throne of the Genghis-khanid sultanate” (calis-i evreng-i saltanat-i Çingiz-hani [. . .]

Şahin Gėrey Han). e letter did not openly refer to an anti-Ottoman alliance but

only invoked the unity and friendship between the shah, the khan, and the king, titled

as “one who commands over the Polish kingdoms” (ferman-fermay-i memalik-i Leh).

More delicate details were discussed orally with the Persian envoy.

392

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 36–38; cf. idem,

“Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego z 1648 r.,” Przegląd Historyczny 37 (1948):

276–287, esp. pp. 278–279. e qalga’s instrument, dated 24 December 1624 (accord-

ing to the Old Style, since in his later correspondence Shahin Giray mentioned the

date 23 Rebi I 1034 A.H., i.e., 3 January 1625), has been preserved in a Polish copy.

It is published in Stepan Golubev, Kievskij mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvižniki

(Opyt istoričeskago izsledovanija), vol. 1 (Kiev, 1883), appendix: Materialy dlja istorii

zapadno-russkoj cerkvi, p. 276. We do not know who corroborated the unpreserved

Cossack document, perhaps Kalenyk Andrijevyč, the Cossack hetman between October

1624 and January 1625; cf. Myxajlo Hruševs’kyj, Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy, vol. 7 (Kiev,

1995), p. 527, also the English translation by B. Strumiński: Hrushevsky, History of

Ukraine-Rus’, vol. 7: e Cossack Age to 1625 (Edmonton-Toronto, 1999), p. 412. On

Karayteben, referred to as a market place which served for trade between the Cossacks

and the Tatars (uroczysko Karajteben, które jest forum, albo rynek, gdzie Tatarowie z

Kozaki wszelkie targi swe miewają), see Bartosz Paprocki, Herby rycerstwa polskiego.

Edited by K. Turowski (Cracow, 1858), p. 159 [originally published in 1584]; for the

etymology of its Turkic name, see Jurij Kravčenko, “Tjurkizmy v hidronimnij systemi

kolyšn’oho Velykoho Luhu Zaporoz’koho—II,” Visnyk Zaporiz’koho nacional’noho

universytetu (2009), Filolohični nauky, no. 1, pp. 91–95, esp. p. 93.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 135

To their disappointment, when in the following months they rebelled

against Poland, the awaited Tatar relief did not come.

It is hard to resolve whether Mehmed III Giray authorized the

adventurous plans of his younger brother. Yet, their close cooperation

lasting till the nal catastrophe suggests a tacit division of roles: while

the qalga negotiated an anti-Ottoman “crusade,” the khan led a more

prudent policy, aiming at a reconciliation with Istanbul and stabilizing

his rule. In September 1624, the Porte conrmed Mehmed III Giray on

the Crimean throne.

393

Almost simultaneously, the khan issued a for-

mal instrument of peace (şartname) for Muscovy.

394

Having received

the sultan’s pardon, in late October 1624 he also issued an instrument

of peace for Poland that he had earlier refused to Krauzowski. In the

changed political situation, when the Tatars no longer needed Polish

assistance against Istanbul but, on the contrary, they could count on

Ottoman protection, no wonder that the document largely diered

from the formula proposed by the royal side in 1622.

Paradoxically, the document issued by Mehmed III Giray, who had

successfully deed the sultan’s will, bore distinct traces of the Otto-

manization of the Crimean chancery, especially apparent in the invo-

cation, full of Koranic citations, and in the closing formula. For the

rst time, the name of the Polish king was followed by an Islamic

salutatio, alluding to the hope for his conversion to Islam. ese exter-

nal changes apparently reected the conscious policy of centralization,

applied by Mehmed III Giray.

395

e khan’s instrument contained a

393

is fact was reported in September by a Muscovian envoy sent to the Crimea;

see Novosel’skij, Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, p. 115; the khan’s

ocial conrmation was also reported on 24 October in the correspondence of the

Venetian bailo from Istanbul; see Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques

Zaporogues,” p. 295.

394

e document, dated 11 September 1624 (28 Zilkade 1033 A.H.), is preserved

in a contemporary copy in Arabic script; see RGADA, f. 123 “Snošenija Rossii s Kry-

mom,” opis’ [hereaer, op.] 2, no. 36; published in Materialy dlja istorii Krymskago

xanstva izvlečennyja, po rasporjaženiju Imperatorskoj Akademii Nauk, iz Moskovskago

Glavnogo Arxiva Ministerstva Inostrannyx Del. Edited by V. Vel’jaminov-Zernov and

X. Faizxanov [Fejzxanov] (St. Petersburg, 1864), pp. 20–24. Its Russian translation is

published under a wrong date (8/18 September 1623) in Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix

snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, pp. 47–50.

395

On Mehmed III Giray’s domestic policy that followed the Ottoman example,

cf. Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 2, pp. 86–88. A characteristic scene

was recorded by the Muscovian envoys, received by Mehmed III Giray in December

1623; when the khan was requested that also his courtiers should take an oath to keep

peace, he retorted that they were not his companions, as had been the case in the

136 part one—chapter two

lengthy narration, referring to the ancient friendship dating back to

the times of the khans Mengli Giray and Devlet Giray, and the kings

Sigismund I and Sigismund Augustus. In this idealized past, “the poor

and [other] subjects of the two states lived in peace,” and the “Tatars

and Nogays, who dwelled on both sides of the Dnieper, drinking the

Dnieper water and grazing, obeyed the imperial [i.e., Ottoman-DK]

authority and remained in peace. Also the Dnieper Cossacks remained

in peace, always respecting the illustrious [Ottoman-DK] emperor,

without any violation of his will.” According to Mehmed III Giray, the

reason of this pristine state was the timely delivery of the annual royal

gis, “partly in cash, partly in beautiful textiles, partly in other cus-

tomary goods,” which the kings used to send “as far as to the Crimea,

to our prosperous seat in Baghchasaray, having loaded them on their

own carts.” e khan stressed that the gis used to be sent not merely

to the khans, but also to the qalga and nureddin,

396

other Giray princes,

the court ocials and aghas, as well as the leading beys and mirzas,

who represented the Crimean nobility. e document also referred

to the Treaty of Ţuţora (1595) and the peace between Sigismund III

and Ghazi II Giray, admitting that in their times the royal gis were

transported only as far as Očakiv.

397

Expressing his wish to revive the ancient friendship, Mehmed III

Giray simultaneously acted as a self-appointed representative of the

Ottoman sultan. e rst provision of his document required that the

royal subjects stop raiding not merely the Crimea, but also Molda-

via, Wallachia, and the sultan’s lands around Akkerman, Bender, and

Kilia, ironically the same three Ottoman castles that had been oered

by Shahin Giray to Poland only two months earlier. e second pro-

vision regarded the timely delivery of the royal gis, destined not

only for the khan, but also for Qalga Shahin Giray, the nureddin and

other Giray princes, twelve leading aghas, and the leading beys and

mirzas. In return, the khan oered mutual military assistance, secu-

rity of trade, and engaged that his subjects, both Tatar and Nogay,

would not raid the royal lands or march through them while heading

times of Djanibek Giray, but merely his slaves (Rus. xolopy); see Novosel’skij, Bor’ba

Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, p. 111.

396

In fact, the post of nurreddin did not exist before 1581.

397

In fact, they were transported to Kamieniec along the road that led further to

Jassy and Akkerman.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 137

for campaigns. Curiously, the document also contained the contro-

versial clause regarding the Polish territorial pretensions, which the

royal chancery had tried to enter so many times in the Polish-Crimean

treaty documents. It is hard to guess what Mehmed III Giray had in

mind when he engaged that “no [Tatar] troops and no Tatar should

be seen [in the lands extending] as far as the Black Sea.”

398

To be sure,

his resignation from the pasturages extending to the north of the Black

Sea was highly unlikely.

Mehmed III Giray’s embassy to Poland was entrusted to the expe-

rienced Tatar envoy, Sefer Ghazi Bey, who delivered the khan’s ‘ahd-

name at the royal court probably in January 1625. For the envoy, who

participated in numerous embassies to Poland since 1604, it turned

out to be his last mission. On his return way, he embarked a ship in

Akkerman and died in an accident on the Black Sea.

399

Although the pacication process was frustrated by the death of the

Tatar envoy, mutual relations were at least temporarily appeased. In

1625, Mehmed III Giray received the royal gis, though not in the

expected quantity. e khan ignored his brother’s treaty with the

Cossacks and allowed the royal troops to quell the Cossack rebel-

lion.

400

Even before the Poles pacied the Ukraine, Shahin Giray

defeated Kantemir near Akkerman and forced him to settle down in

398

In the Polish contemporary translation: aż do samego Czarnego Morza wojska

żadne, ani Tatarzyn widzian nie będzie.

399

For the khan’s ‘ahdname, whose contents are summarized above, see Document

48. e document, preserved in Polish translation, is dated “in the middle” (appar-

ently in the second decade) of Muharrem 1034 A.H., i.e., between 24 October and

2 November 1624. It also contains a confusing dating according to the Christian era,

namely “in the middle of the month of January of the year 1625,” which perhaps refers

to the month when the document was delivered at the royal court. e identity of the

Crimean envoy is not disclosed in the document, but we learn it from a later letter by

Mehmed III Giray, sent to Sigismund III in 1627 (dated in the month of Safer 1037

A.H., i.e., 12 October—9 November 1627 A.D.), where the khan recalled that he had

sent “Sefer Ghazi Bey along with our exalted letter of agreement, written in golden

script” (Sefer Gazy Bega z listem naszym wielmożnym przymiernym, złotem pismem

pisanym, posłaliśmy byli) and deplored that upon reaching Akkerman on his return

way, the envoy had embarked a ship in desire to reach the khan’s court as soon as pos-

sible and had perished at sea (do Białogrodu przyszedszy, a stamtąd w okręt wsiadszy, u

nas prędko bydź chcąc, na morzu zginął); the letter, preserved in a seventeenth-century

Polish translation, apparently made by Samuel Otwinowski, is published in Stanisław

Przyłęcki (ed.), Ukrainne sprawy, pp. 14–17, see esp. p. 15; on Sefer Ghazi’s earlier

career, see Document 41, n. 5.

400

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 41–42.

138 part one—chapter two

the Crimea.

401

is was a great relief for the royal side as between May

1622 and June 1624 Kantemir, the then Ottoman governor of Očakiv

and simultaneously the Nogay leader, had led four raids to Poland, dis-

regarding both the khan’s authority and the peace between the sultan

and the king.

402

Although the Polish court sent frequent complaints to

Istanbul, Kantemir could be secure of his position as he remained the

Porte’s major defence against the Cossacks and a counterweight to the

rebellious Crimean khan.

e Polish-Crimean peace did not last long. In February 1626,

Mehmed III Giray led a devastating raid into Poland. Polish protests

in Istanbul were met with a retort that the king had failed to stop the

Cossack raids and the gis for the khan were inadequate, as they cov-

ered only a half-year period instead of the expected three years. e

Giray brothers apparently still played their “good and bad cop” roles:

Shahin Giray did not participate in the raid and even warned—rather

belatedly—Hetman Koniecpolski of the danger.

403

In the following months, the situation turned still worse as Het-

man Koniecpolski along with the main Polish troops, which usually

garrisoned in the southeastern provinces, headed to Royal Prussia in

order to ght against the Swedes. e clash between Catholic Poland

and Protestant Sweden could be justly regarded yet another theatre

of the irty Years’ War, so the members of the anti-Habsburg coali-

tion, especially the Dutch diplomacy in Istanbul, tried to direct the

Porte against Poland. e plan was supported by the Orthodox patri-

arch Kyrillos Lukaris, who envisioned a broad Orthodox-Protestant

coalition against the Catholics. Moreover, King Gustavus Adolphus

of Sweden encouraged the Crimean khan to raid Poland, oering to

triple the gis if he assumed the Polish throne. is broader politi-

cal background combined with prospects of spoils created a favorable

atmosphere for a new raid against Poland both in the courts of Istan-

bul and Baghchasaray and among the rank and le Tatars and Nogays.

In October 1626, a large army, recruited in the Crimea and Budjak,

401

Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues,” p. 294.

402

Podhorodecki, Chanat krymski i jego stosunki z Polską, pp. 141–147. e last

raid was successfully repulsed in the battle at Martyniv. Kantemir “merited” a sepa-

rate mention in the royal instrument conrming the Polish-Ottoman peace, issued

in Warsaw on 1 April 1624. e document stipulated that neither the khan, nor the

qalga, Kantemir Mirza, other mirzas, and [rank and le] Tatars should cause harm to

the royal domains; see Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, p. 421.

403

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 43–51.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 139

entered the Polish Ukraine. anks to a skillful command, the Polish

troops assisted by the Cossacks defeated the invaders at Bila Cerkva.

404

Aer the fateful year of 1626, remembered for two Tatar invasions of

Poland, the Polish-Crimean relations calmed down due to the revival

of tensions between Kantemir and the Giray brothers. In 1627, the

Nogay leader managed to return to Budjak and revived hostilities with

the Girays. In 1628, Shahin Giray invaded Budjak and Dobrudja, but

was defeated by Kantemir at Babadagh. In his turn, Kantemir chased

Shahin Giray into the Crimea and besieged the two brothers in Bagh-

chasaray. In a seemingly hopeless situation, the khan and the qalga

were rescued by the Cossacks, who answered Shahin’s call and arrived

led by their hetman, Myxajlo Dorošenko.

405

Now, it was Kantemir

who had to seek for refuge in Ottoman Caa, besieged by the Tatar-

Cossack coalition. e conict was resolved by the Porte that grabbed

the opportunity to dispose of the troublesome brothers. In June 1628,

a large Ottoman eet anchored in Caa, carrying on board Djanibek

Giray, who was appointed the khan for the third time. Aer a panic

broke out in the Tatar camp, Mehmed and Shahin Girays along with

their Cossack patrons retreated to the Polish Ukraine. Having sworn

loyalty to Poland-Lithuania, the brothers, assisted by the Cossacks,

returned in November, and then again in June 1629, trying in vain to

recapture the Crimean throne. During the second failed expedition,

Mehmed III Giray was killed by disappointed Cossacks while Shahin

Giray escaped to Iran.

406

Although Sigismund III did not ocially support the rebelious

brothers in their struggle against the Porte, he tacitly accepted the

Cossack interventions in the Crimea as a mode to divert the Tatar

energy from raiding Poland. It certainly did not dispose the Porte, and

particularly Djanibek Giray and Kantemir, well towards the northern

neighbor. In August 1629, a Tatar-Nogay army, commanded by Qalga

Devlet Giray and Kantemir, entered Poland. e raid was only partly

successful as many invaders were killed or captured at the Dniester

crossing of Ustja (Pol. Uście) in October 1629. Among the captives

404

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 57–65; on the polit-

ical plans of Lukaris, cf. Gunnar Hering, Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische

Politik 1620–1638 (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 30.

405

Dorošenko was killed shortly aer his arrival to the Crimea.

406

Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues,” pp. 298–300;

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 76–99.

140 part one—chapter two

was the future khan, Islam Giray, who was to remain in Poland until

1634, imprisoned in the castle of Rawa.

407

In order to appease the situation and prevent a possible Ottoman

invasion, a Polish envoy, Aleksander Piaseczyński, was sent to Istanbul

in 1630. During his negotiations with the kaymakam Redjeb Pasha,

who substituted for the grand vizier then campaigning in Persia,

Piaseczyński was assured that the ‘ahdname, issued by Sultan Murad IV

in 1623, was still in force. Nevertheless, the kaymakam and the envoy

wrote down ve articles, whose observance was deemed necessary to

preserve the peace. e rst, most important article provided that the

king should remove the Cossacks from the Dnieper islands and stop

their raids. In return, the Porte oered to resettle the Nogays from

Budjak to the Crimea. Moreover, the king was to send annual gis

to the khan, and in return the khan was to restrain his subjects from

raiding Poland. At the same time, negotiations were led on the spot

between Murtaza Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Očakiv, and Het-

man Koniecpolski. e latter had recently returned from the Swedish

campaign and pacied yet another Cossack rebellion in June 1630,

hence the Polish authorities could claim that they cooperated with the

Porte in restraining the Cossacks. On 9 September 1630, an agreement

was reached, consisting of seven articles. Articles 1 and 3 regarded

the removal of the Cossacks from the Dnieper islands; article 4—dis-

banding of troops gathered by both sides; article 5—the obligation

of the Polish king to send the customary gis to the Crimean khan;

article 6—the Ottoman engagement to prevent the Tatars from raiding

Poland; article 7—the Ottoman engagement to prohibit Kantemir, his

brother Aytemir, his cousin Oraq Mirza, and other Nogays dwelling

in Budjak to raid Poland; nally, article 2 provided that the Crimean

prince, Islam Giray, should be set free from the Polish captivity.

408

407

Baranowski, Polska a Tatarszczyzna w latach 1624–1629, pp. 105–115;

Przemysław Gawron, “Najazd tatarski na przełomie września i października 1629

roku. Kartka z dziejów współpracy polsko-kozackiej,” in: 350–lecie unii hadziackiej

(1658–2008). Edited by T. Chynczewska-Hennel and M. Nagielski (Warsaw, 2008):

459–486, esp. p. 481. On the date of Islam Giray’s delivery, see Baranowski, Stosunki

polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, p. 87.

408

See Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 135–136 and 427–

431. My mistaken interpretation of article 2, regarding Islam Giray, was corrected by

Mária Ivanics in her review of my book published in AO ASH 54 (2001): 367–372,

esp. pp. 369–370. Indeed, the fragment içerüde esir olan Tatarlardan sultanı asitaneye

göndürmek should be translated: “to send the Tatar prince [sultan] imprisoned within

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 141

It was easier to write down the above promises than to fulll them.

Even the seemingly uncomplicated task of setting free Islam Giray was

not executed. Nevertheless, the following years witnessed a Polish-

Crimean rapprochement. Aer the calm year of 1631, when the Tatars

participated in the Ottoman campaign against Persia, in April 1632

Sigismund III died aer over fourty-four years of reign. e election of

his older son, Vladislaus, went uncontested, but the procedures took

some time while there was a risk that the neighbors would benet

from the interregnum and invade Poland-Lithuania. A confrontation

was most likely from the side of Sweden and Muscovy as Vladislaus

did not resign from his claims to the thrones in Stockholm and

Moscow, assuming the titles of the hereditary king of Sweden and of

the tsar of Russia, elected during the Time of Troubles in 1610. e

Swedish troops were busy ghting in Germany, but in the fall of 1632,

Muscovy invaded Lithuania in the hope of reconquering the lands

lost by the terms of the truce of 1619. It was clear that the result of

the confrontation could be inuenced by the stand(s) of Istanbul and

Baghchasaray.

Fortunately for Poland-Lithuania, the East European politics of

the Muslim courts in the years 1632–1634 was quasi-schizophrenic.

In the late spring of 1632, Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the famous former

rebel against the Porte, replaced Murtaza Pasha as the governor of

Očakiv. During his rst year in post, he duly cooperated with Hetman

Koniecpolski and even executed the Polish-Ottoman demarcation,

stipulated by the agreements of 1621–1624. Yet, at the same time he

tolerated Kantemir’s raid into Poland, and in October 1633 he per-

sonally crossed the Dniester and attacked the Polish forces, gathered

by Koniecpolski near Kamieniec. Aer an indecisive battle, Abaza

returned to Moldavia, to be soon accused by the Porte of insubordi-

nation and executed. e question, whether his action was performed

with or without the sultan’s consent, remains unresolved. It is likely

that the Porte, or at least some of its members, tacitly authorized his

attack but then, upon seeing his failure and the simultaneous Polish

triumph over Muscovy, dissociated themselves from the risky action

and disposed of the troublesome pasha.

409

[Poland] to the [imperial] threshold” and not “to send the Tatars imprisoned within

[Poland] to the sultanic threshold.”

409

Cf. Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 137–138; somewhat

amusingly, in a recent article focused on Abaza Mehmed Pasha, Gabriel Piterberg

142 part one—chapter two

e inconsistent Ottoman policy towards the Polish-Muscovian

conict was hesitantly followed by Djanibek Giray, who at rst seemed

to support Warsaw, then promised his assistance to the tsar, and nally

reconciled with Poland. Unlike Kantemir and his Budjak Nogays, for

whom Muscovy was too distant, the Crimean Tatars could choose

between raiding Poland or Muscovy. Besides, though Djanibek owed

his throne to Kantemir, he soon found himself in the shoes of his pre-

decessor, growing uneasy with the ambitions of the Nogay leader. In

the fall of 1632, long aer Sigismund’s death but still before Vladislaus’

election, the khan issued an instrument of peace and sent to Poland

through his envoy, Ibrahim Bey from the prominent Külük clan, whose

members had supported the royal interests in Baghchasaray already in

the 16th century.

410

e instrument, referred to as ‘ahdname and simultaneously as

yarlıq, was addressed to the king of Poland, without mentioning the

addressee’s name. In the narratio, it referred to the earlier correspon-

dence between the Crimean vizier,

411

Mehmed Agha, and Hetman

Koniecpolski, and the latter’s promise to expel the Cossacks from the

Dnieper, send the customary gis, and maintain friendship with the

khan. e Crimean document displayed familiarity with the politi-

cal system of Poland-Lithuania, as it invoked the authorization, given

to Koniecpolski by the king and the Diet (Tat. sem < Pol. sejm), to

lead the negotiations. e khan concluded that “because our agha,

Mehmed Agha, trusted your hetman, I accepted the peace [and] sent

our Crimean troops, which were to set out in hostility to your coun-

try, to the Muscovian dominions [instead].” ereaer, the instrument

reiterated the conditions of peace: the payment of royal gis due for

the past ve years, the expulsion of Cossacks from the Dnieper, the

release of Islam Giray, and mutual assistance in troops and money

against common enemies. Djanibek Giray still feared a possible return

of Shahin Giray, so he obliged the Polish side not to give assistance to

dated his execution to 1632 and thus deprived his protagonist of a chance to play a

major role in East European politics, simultaneously narrowing the factographic base

of his own study; cf. idem, “e Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa: Historiog-

raphy and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century,” in: Mutiny and Rebellion in

the Ottoman Empire. Edited by J. Hathaway (Madison, 2002): 13–24, esp. p. 15.

410

On Ibrahim and the Külük clan, see Document 49, notes 6–7.

411

e post of the vizier, also known as the head agha (baş aġa) or the khan’s agha

(han aġası), was introduced in the Crimean Khanate by Ghazi II Giray; see Halim

Giray Sultan, Gülbün-i hânân, p. 44.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 143

the former qalga and to arrest him if he arrived in the Polish Ukraine.

Apart from sending the customary gis to the khan, the king was

expected to send presents to the Giray family members, including the

khan’s mother and two wives, and to numerous Crimean dignitaries,

mentioned by names or functions. e document was strengthened

by a solemn oath, taken by Djanibek Giray on behalf of his qalga and

nureddin, the leaders of the Shirin, Manghıt, Arghın, and Sedjevüt

clans, and the remaining nobles, ocials, and subjects in the presence

of Ibrahim Bey. e envoy was empowered to represent the khan and

discuss any remaining matters.

412

Ibrahim arrived at Cracow on 1 March 1633. King Vladislaus IV

warmly received the news of the khan’s friendship and encouraged

the Tatars to repeat their raid of Muscovy, but the royal treasury was

empty so the Crimean embassy was detained. Instead, the king sent his

interpreter to appease the khan. In the following months Vladislaus

organized a relief of Smolensk, besieged by Muscovian troops, so the

next Crimean embassy found him in a military camp near the for-

tress, in November 1633. e khan impatiently demanded the release

of Ibrahim Bey and the immediate payment of the royal gis. At the

same time, Djanibek Giray intensied his contacts with Moscow and

in January 1634 even issued an instrument of peace, promising Tsar

Michael Romanov military assistance against Vladislaus.

413

e khan’s

anger was yet soon mitigated by the news of the royal victory at Smol-

ensk. Moreover, in February 1634 Ibrahim Bey was nally sent back to

the Crimea along with a Polish envoy, Stefan Narajowski, who carried

the royal gis, though not in the amount expected by the Tatars.

414

Aer the execution of Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the Polish-Ottoman

relations improved as well. In the spring of 1634, Murtaza Pasha

returned from the Persian front and resumed responsibilities on the

Polish border as the commander-in-chief of Ottoman troops charged

with the specic task to restore the peace. In August 1634, an agreement

412

See Document 49; the document was dated in the second decade of Rebi I 1042

A.H., i.e., between 26 September and 5 October 1632.

413

e şartname of Djanibek Giray, issued in the rst decade of Redjeb 1043 A.H.

(1–10 January 1634), is preserved in RGADA, f. 123, op. 2, no. 41 (due to its bad state

of preservation the present author was unable to consult it); it is published in Mate-

rialy dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 100–104; its Russian translation is published

in Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, pp. 55–59.

414

See Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 18–20; on

Narajowski, cf. Document 50, n. 7.