Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
114 part one—chapter two
was to secure that the khan’s instrument be written word for word in
accordance with the royal version.
Due to nancial problems, Kossakowski le Poland only in Decem-
ber 1598, but he never reached the court of Ghazi II Giray as the latter
participated in the Ottoman campaign in Hungary. e Polish envoy
remained in Suceava, the old Moldavian capital, corresponding with
the khan and the new qalga, Selamet Giray, and negotiating with their
envoys. In result of these negotiations, in the summer of 1599 Ghazi II
Giray, still in Hungary, issued a letter of agreement and sent it through
his envoy, Djan Temir Agha. e Crimean envoy traveled through
Moldavia and, having met Kossakowski in Suceava, continued his trip
to Poland. On 8 October 1599, he delivered the khan’s document at
a solemn audience in Radom. As the khan’s instrument diered in
some details from the royal one, Djan Temir Agha was made to draw
a provisory document in which he engaged that the khan would issue
an “amended” version and until that time no raid should occur in
the royal lands.
339
In sum, the royal side was satised with the result.
Kossakowski was nally ordered to release the gis and returned from
Moldavia late in the year 1599.
e charges of the royal chancery, regarding discrepances between
the royal instrument from 1598 and the khan’s instrument from 1599,
seemed ungrounded.
340
In fact, Ghazi II Giray easily accepted all the
proposed conditions. He did not even object to the contradictory
clause regarding the Polish territorial claims and the closure of Tatar
339
See Document 38. e instrument, preserved in Polish translation, is dated 3
Rebi I 1008 A.H. (miesiąca po naszej liczbie Rebel Avela die 3 roku 1008), i.e., 23 Sep-
tember 1599, yet apparently it was issued in October, aer or shortly before the audi-
ence in Radom, which took place on 8 October; cf. Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie,
p. 88. Possibly, being far away from the Crimea, the Tatar envoy lost track of time
or the error should be attributed to a Polish translator or scribe who confused Rebi I
(Rebi‘ü`l-evvel) with Rebi II (Rebi‘ü`l-ahir).
340
Unfortunately, a list of discrepances between the two documents, reportedly
prepared by Jan Zamoyski, is not preserved. ese charges are upheld by Skorupa,
yet, he does not provide convincing evidence; cf. ibidem, p. 88. Contrary to Skorupa’s
assertions, the khan engaged to assist the king against Muscovy and admitted that
the royal gis should be reciprocated by the Crimean friendship and assistance (the
provision, regarding the Crimean military assistance as a necessary condition of the
delivery of royal gis, had been oen rejected by the khans who regarded the gis as
a form of unconditional tribute). From a contemporary report on the deliberations
of the royal councilors, one learns that their most serious concern was the lack of
the khan’s great seal (nişan) on the document; see Bibl. Czart., ms. 97 (Teki Narusze-
wicza), pp. 917–918; cf. also n. 341 below and n. 270 in Part II.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 115
trails leading to Hungary, promising that “we will not enter his [i.e.,
Sigismund’s] lands and soils [extending] as far as the Black Sea [. . .]
and if we, along with our troops, are to go to the states of our enemies,
we should not pass through the states of the king of Poland.”
341
One
gets an impression that the khan did not really care what he promised,
being primarily interested in receiving the royal gis.
Ghazi II Giray did not blindly follow the Ottoman lead in Hun-
garian campaigns that, apart from spoils, did not bring him political
advantages. e mutual Crimean-Ottoman mistrust, so apparent in
the campaign of 1569, had not diminished.
342
e khan eagerly acted
as a mediator: in 1595 between Istanbul and Cracow, and since 1597
between Istanbul and Vienna, entering secret negotiations with the
pro-Habsburg Transylvanian ruler, Sigismund Báthory, and then from
1599 by negotiating directly with Vienna.
343
In the years 1599–1601,
all the neighboring powers were alarmed by the rise of Michael the
Brave, the Wallachian hospodar, who invaded Transylvania (October
1599) and Moldavia (May 1600), aiming to unite the three principali-
ties under his rule. Ieremia Movilă took refuge in the fortress of Hotin,
sending letters to Poland and waiting for a relief. In October 1600,
Zamoyski invaded Moldavia, reinstalled Ieremia on its throne, and
pursued Michael into Wallachia, enthroning Ieremia’s brother, Simion
Movilă, in Bucharest. In August 1601, Michael was murdered upon an
341
See Document 37. e instrument is preserved only in Polish translation that
possibly diered from the Turkish original. e latter was corroborated merely with
the khan’s signet seal, because his great seal (nişan) was le in the Crimea while the
khan was campaigning in Hungary.
342
For instance, in 1605 Ottoman provincial ocials were ordered not to let the
Tatar auxiliaries to cross to the southern, “Muslim” side of the Danube; see Le khanat
de Crimée, p. 143. e order probably resulted from previous experience as in 1598
the Tatars had devastated the Ottoman lands while marching along the southern shore
of the Danube; see Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism, p. 165.
343
Mária Ivanics [Ivanič], “Posol’stva krymskix tatar pri Venskom dvore v
1598–1682 gg. (iz istorii krymsko-tatarskoj diplomatii XVI–XVII vv.),” in: Turcica
et Ottomanica. Sbornik statej v čest’ 70–letija M. S. Mejera. Edited by I. Zajcev and
S. Oreškova (Moscow, 2006): 226–237, esp. pp. 228–229. On the contacts between
Ghazi II Giray and Sigismund Báthory, which resulted in a formal agreement, con-
rmed by the khan’s instrument of peace (‘ahdname) issued in 1598, see eadem, “Der
Bündnisplan zwischen dem Chan Gazi Giray II. und dem Fürsten Sigismund Báthory
aus dem Jahre 1598,” in: Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in
the Age of Süleyman the Magnicent. Edited by G. Dávid and P. Fodor (Budapest,
1994): 183–198.
116 part one—chapter two
instigation of a Habsburg general to a visible relief in Vienna, Warsaw,
Istanbul, as well as Baghchasaray.
While the Polish troops reached the Danube, another conict was
pending in the north. Sigismund III, who inherited the throne of
Sweden aer the death of his father in 1592, was unpopular in his
hereditary kingdom due to his ardent Catholicism. In 1599 he was
dethroned, but never acknowledged the loss. In order to draw Pol-
ish support against his Protestant uncle, Charles of Södermanland
(crowned as Charles IX in 1604), in 1600 Sigismund declared the
incorporation of Swedish Estonia to Poland-Lithuania, additionally
heating the conict that was to last until 1660. In the face of a war
with Sweden, a reconrmation of peace in the south was indispens-
able. In April 1601 a royal envoy, Ławryn (Wawrzyniec) Piaseczyński,
set out to the Crimea, provided with a new instrument of peace. e
document, issued in Warsaw on 20 March 1601, repeated the clauses
of the royal instrument from 1598, with a few detectable variations:
1) the king no longer promised to deny refuge to the khan’s enemies,
although he still required that the khan deny refuge to the enemies
of Ieremia Movilă;
2) the Polish-Crimean patronage over Moldavia and its ruler was
extended towards Ieremia’s brother, Simion, who ruled in Wallachia;
3) the document mentioned by name the qalga Selamet Giray, who
was to observe the peace along with his older brother, the khan.
344
e two latter additions proved short-lived as was evidenced by future
events: Simion Movilă lost the Wallachian throne in the summer of
1601, to regain it a few months later due to another Polish interven-
tion, and to be nally replaced by Radu Şerban in the summer of 1602;
also Selamet Giray did not remain in his post for long.
Piaseczyński was received by Ghazi II Giray on 23 August 1601. In
the following days, he negotiated the contents of the future Crimean
instrument along with Djan Ahmed Chelebi, the experienced Crimean
diplomat and former envoy to Poland, who was appointed to this task
by the khan. Aer the khan’s document was issued, on 4 September
Piaseczyński was also received by the qalga, Selamet Giray. Yet, on
10 September he recorded in his diary that Selamet escaped from the
344
See Document 39.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 117
Crimea to the Ottoman lands, and on 20 September the post of qalga
was given to the khan’s twelve-year old son, Tokhtamısh Giray. Late
on the same day, Piaseczyński was given a farewell audience by the
khan, and on 4 October he embarked a ship from Közlev to Akker-
man, accompanied by Djan Ahmed. Curiously enough, though the
Polish envoy remained in the Crimea until early October, the Crimean
chancery did not try to amend the khan’s instrument and replace the
name of Selamet by that of Tokhtamısh. Aer both envoys arrived at
Vilnius, Djan Ahmed delivered the khan’s document at a solemn audi-
ence on 27 December 1601.
345
Piaseczyński could not control the nal result of his negotiations
since the khan’s instrument, entrusted to Djan Ahmed, was unpacked
only in Vilnius. Aer its contents were made known, the Polish envoy
as well as the royal chancery were deeply disappointed. e somewhat
amusing fact that Poland was not listed among Sigismund’s domains
could be attributed to a scribal error. Yet, other omissions were not so
innocent. While the khan guaranteed security to Moldavia, no men-
tion was made of Wallachia. e document did not contain provisions
concerning the royal claim to the Black Sea shores or the eort to ban
the Tatars from passing through Poland. In fact, the khan’s instrument
of 1601 better conformed with the Crimean chancery tradition than the
document of 1599, issued in a military camp and simply mirroring
the royal instrument. Instead of referring to the agreement of Ţuţora,
the document of 1601 invoked the memory of the ancient khans:
Hadji, Mengli, Mehmed, and Devlet Girays. e khan required that
the royal gis, already amassed in Kamieniec, be immediately released
to his envoy, yet in the future the king was to send his gis not to
Kamieniec, but along the ancient route across the steppe, towards the
Dnieper crossing. e remaining clauses referred to customary mat-
ters such as mutual military assistance, restraining Cossack and Tatar
raids, and security of trade.
346
345
On Piaseczyński’s three embassies to the Tatars in the years 1601–1603, see
a lengthy article, based on the envoy’s diary that contains his correspondence and
related documents, by Kazimierz Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego do Kazi
Gireja, hana Tatarów perekopskich (1601–1603). Szkic historyczny,” Przewodnik Nau-
kowy i Literacki 39 (1911): 135–145, 244–256, 358–366, 467–480, 553–566, 645–660,
756–768, 845–864, 945–960; the manuscript diary, entitled “Księga poselstwa Ławryna
Piaseczyńskiego,” is extant in Warsaw, Biblioteka Narodowa, ms. III. 3086. On these
embassies, see also Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 96–117.
346
See Document 40. For Piaseczyński’s critique of the khan’s instrument, cf.
Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” pp. 554–555.
118 part one—chapter two
As the royal court refused to accept the khan’s instrument,
Piaseczyński was sent anew in order to procure a “better” document.
He was to return the khan’s document and exchange it for a new,
amended version. e latter was to be based on the Polish instrument
of 1601, whose Arabic-script translation was also given to the envoy.
347
On 3 March 1602, Piaseczyński set out from Vilnius, again accom-
panied by Djan Ahmed. e Tatars were infuriated by the Polish
reluctance to conclude a nal peace, and especially by the delayed
delivery of the royal gis, still detained in Kamieniec. Piaseczyński’s
reception in the Crimea in June 1602 was very cold, not devoid of
open threats. Ghazi II Giray refused to issue a new instrument, and
especially to accept the Polish claim regarding the Black Sea border.
He only agreed to prolong a temporary peace and Piaseczyński was
sent back to Poland. Aer he returned to Cracow in August 1602,
the royal court resolved not to risk an open break with the Crimea
and consented to release the gis. In October 1602, Piaseczyński once
more departed to the khan. Since the latter was campaigning in Hun-
gary, the envoy did not reach him and traveled only as far as Jassy.
ere, in January 1603 he nally released the gis to the Tatar envoy,
Ali Mirza, and in February returned to Poland.
Late in the year 1603, a new tension occurred between Istanbul and
Baghchasaray aer the khan deserted the Ottoman campaign in Hun-
gary. Ghazi II Giray secretly notied the Polish court through his spe-
cial envoy, Djan Anton Spinola, of his intention to ally with Poland,
and conrmed his intentions by a proposal to send his son as a hos-
tage. While Zamoyski and other royal councilors cautiously advised
to procrastinate with a denite answer, the Ottoman-Crimean tension
relaxed and the issue became stale.
348
347
According to Piaseczyński’s relation, at the audience in Közlev on 30 June 1602,
he returned to Ghazi II Giray the latter’s original document from 1601 and delivered
an Arabic-script translation of the royal instrument from 1601 (i podałem mu kopią
tego listu [. . .] po arabsku teraz przełożoną, co sam czytał), so that the khan could
compare both texts and issue his instrument in accordance with the royal one; see
Pułaski, “Trzy poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” pp. 758–759. Skorupa maintains that in
1602 Piaseczyński was given a new royal instrument, although identical in contents
with the one from 1601 and therefore not entered in the envoy’s diary and not pre-
served; cf. idem, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, p. 109.
348
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 121–123; on Djan Anton or Gianantonio
Spinola, a diplomat of Italian origin in the Crimean service, see Document 45, n. 8.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 119
In November 1604, a new great Crimean embassy, headed by Sefer
Ghazi Bey,
349
arrived at Cracow. e envoy brought a new instrument
of peace, issued by Ghazi II Giray. e document openly referred to
Piaseczyński’s embassy and the khan’s previous instrument from 1601.
ough the omission of Poland among Sigismund’s domains, which
had infuriated the royal side in 1601, was corrected, and the document
was updated by replacing the name of Selamet Giray with the name
of the new qalga, Tokhtamısh Giray, its political contents remained
unchanged, to the dismay of the royal court. e khan guaranteed
security to Moldavia, but no mention was made of Wallachia. e
Polish claims to the access to the Black Sea were ignored. Although
the khan promised his military assistance against royal enemies, in
return he expected an extra reward apart from the usual gis. e lat-
ter were to be transported at the royal cost along the ancient road to
the Crimean side of the Dnieper, and not to Kamieniec. e khan also
repeated his rather unrealistic demand that the king should remove
the Cossacks from the Dnieper.
350
Like in 1601, the document was not accepted, although the Crimean
envoy was assured that the king was still willing to conclude an agree-
ment. Sigismund also promised to send the annual gis as soon as his
conditions were fullled. Aer Sefer Ghazi le Cracow on 7 January
1605, a new Polish embassy was prepared, to be headed by a royal
secretary, Florian Oleszko.
351
According to the royal instruction, dated
6 May 1605, Oleszko was to require that the khan’s instrument be
written “word for word” in accordance with the royal one. e Polish
Black Sea claims were to be recognized as it had already been done in
Ghazi II Giray’s instrument from 1599. Any reference to the Ottoman
Porte was to be ejected since the agreement was negotiated with the
khan and not with the sultan. e king and the khan were to politically
cooperate in both Moldavia and Wallachia. e khan was to resign
from the royal gis due for previous years and not to demand any
extra payment for his military assistance. Finally, the Cossacks were
not to be mentioned in the treaty, since they did not obey the king and
committed as much damage in Poland as in the Crimea. In addition,
349
On Sefer Ghazi Bey, see Document 41, n. 5. His father, Dervish Bey, was the
leader of the Külük clan and probably the envoy to Poland in 1552 (then referred to
as Dervish Mehmed Mirza); cf. Document 41, n. 2.
350
See Document 41; on its contents, cf. Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 126–127.
351
On Florian Oleszko, see Document 42, n. 7.
120 part one—chapter two
Ghazi Giray was asked to protect the Carmelite friars, probably sent
earlier from Poland to look aer the Catholic captives. Aer success-
ful negotiations, the khan was to receive the royal gis, amassed in
Kamieniec.
352
Oleszko was provided with a new royal instrument, almost identi-
cal in contents with the previous instruments of 1598 and 1601. It
commenced with a long narration referring to the unsuccessful mis-
sions of Djan Ahmed Chelebi (1597), Nikodem Kossakowski (1598),
Djan Temir Agha (1599), Ławryn Piaseczyński (1601), and Sefer Ghazi
Bey (1604), who had all failed to reach a nal agreement. Apart from
listing the name of the new qalga, Tokhtamısh Giray, the instrument
dierred from the previous one by a more vaguely formulated clause
regarding the mutual protection over Wallachia. e change was easily
explainable: aer the Polish protégé, Simion Movilă, lost the throne
of Wallachia in 1602, the Polish court was less concerned about the
safety of its new ruler, Radu Şerban (r. 1602–1611), although it did
not entirely resign from the idea of a Polish-Ottoman condominium
in Moldavia as well as Wallachia. e royal side also insisted on trans-
porting the gis for the khan only as far as Kamieniec, and not by the
ancient, dangerous road through the steppe to the Dnieper crossing at
Tavan’, which was obviously more costly.
353
Finally, a minor but perhaps signicant change was detectable in the
clause regarding the alliance against Muscovy. While the document
of 1601 referred to “the ancient kings of Poland and the grand dukes
of Lithuania,” in 1605 the grand dukes of Lithuania were no more
recalled. Already in 1598, the royal chancery instructed Kossakowski
that under no circumstances was he to accept the humiliating clause
granting Kiev and other lands to Lithuania, as this clause originated
from the Crimean treaties with Lithuania, but not with Poland, and
aer the Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin (1569) it lost any rele-
vance.
354
Admittedly, the omission of Lithuania could be accidental,
but it more probably reected a conscious eort to eace any trace of
the former Tatar hegemony in Eastern Europe.
Several reasons postponed Oleszko’s departure, to mention only
usual nancial problems and the death of Hetman Zamoyski on 3 June
352
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 127–130; cf. Bibl. Czart., ms. 1640, pp. 841–844.
353
See Document 42.
354
See Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, p. 79. On this issue, cf. notes 143–144
in Part II.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 121
1605. In August, Ghazi II Giray, disillussioned with the prolonged
negotiations and encouraged by the death of the famous military com-
mander, led a massive raid against the Polish southeastern provinces.
Oleszko, who by that time did not even reach the Polish border, was
ordered to return to Cracow.
355
In the years 1606–1607, Sigismund III conrmed the peace with the
new Ottoman sultan, Ahmed I (r. 1603–1617). ough the Habsburg-
Ottoman war was over, the Porte was already engaged in a new cam-
paign against the Safavids, therefore it needed a peace in the north. A
Polish complaint against the khan caused an Ottoman diplomatic inter-
vention in Baghchasaray. Ghazi II Giray bitterly reminded Sigismund
that “up to this time the Ottoman [sultan] has not interfered between
us,” but he complied with the sultan’s wish and returned to negotia-
tions. In the spring of 1607, Oleszko again set out to the Crimea and
returned through Moldavia in the fall of the same year, accompanied
by a Crimean envoy, Ahatey Mirza, who carried the khan’s instrument
of peace.
356
e khan’s document, dated 24 July 1607 (29 Rebi I 1016 A.H.), is
today preserved only in Latin translation by Grzegorz Kochański, a
royal chancery translator. Yet, the khan’s intitulatio as well as the oath
formula are correctly rendered. In its form, the document reected
the Muslim chancery tradition, but in content it closely followed the
political clauses of the royal instrument of 1605. At last, the royal
chancery obtained what it wanted. Aer a long narration, recalling the
agreement of Ţuţora and the unsuccessful missions of Djan Ahmed
Chelebi, Nikodem Kossakowski, Djan Temir Agha, and Sefer Ghazi
Bey,
357
the khan referred to his consent to grant a solemn document
requested by Oleszko. e instrument, issued in the name of Ghazi II
Giray, the qalga Tokhtamısh Giray, and the nureddin Sefer Giray,
guaranteed peace to Poland-Lithuania, Moldavia, as well as Wallachia,
military assistance against Muscovy, remission of past transgressions,
and security of trade. Like in the times of Mengli Giray, the khan and
his family members were allowed to come as guests, allies, or refugees
to Poland-Lithuania. e khan was also entitled to the customary royal
gis, to be sent each year by St. Demetrius’ Day (i.e., 5 November).
355
Ibidem, pp. 131–136.
356
Ibidem, pp. 139–146.
357
e missions of Piaseczyński and Djan Ahmed Chelebi (1601) are not men-
tioned. e latter was not mentioned in the royal instrument either.
122 part one—chapter two
Even the controversial clause, regarding the Polish territorial claims
reaching the Black Sea, was entered in the khan’s instrument.
358
Aer Oleszko’s return, the long awaited royal gis, divided into
several installments, were released to the Crimean envoys between
October 1607 and February 1608. On 15 February 1608, the king sent
his courier, Florian Zbrożek, notifying the khan of his acceptance of
the new treaty.
359
Probably at the same time, Ghazi II Giray died aer
almost twenty years of reign.
360
e violent period 1608–1623
Aer the death of Ghazi II Giray, his son and qalga, Tokhtamısh
Giray, ascended the Crimean throne, but the Porte resolved to support
his uncle, the former qalga Selamet Giray. Although Tokhtamısh duly
abdicated, he was killed in a skirmish with Selamet’s qalga, Mehmed
Giray (the latter soon quarreled with the khan and was replaced by
Djanibek Giray). e accession of Selamet Giray was followed by two
Tatar raids of Poland-Lithuania in the summer and fall of 1608. Only
in the following year the new khan released Zbrożek, who had been
sent to his predecessor, and sent his own courier, Muzaer Agha, with
a formal notication of his accession followed by a request to send him
customary gis. e Crimean courier was received in Vilnius in July
1609. e royal side promised to send the gis on the condition that
the khan issued an instrument of peace identical with the one of Ghazi
II Giray. On his way back, Muzaer Agha was accompanied by Florian
Zbrożek, again sent to the Crimea.
358
[. . .] in locis provinciisque illorum ad Mare usque Nigrum in pascuis pecoribus
damnum nullum faciemus; see Document 43. is clause had already been entered
in Ghazi II Giray’s instrument from 1599 (Document 37), but disappeared from his
successive documents of 1601 and 1604.
359
Admittedly, some minor matters still needed to be settled. For instance, the
king continued to insist that the gis should be delivered in Kamieniec and not on
the Dnieper crossing; see Sigismund’s letter to Ghazi II Giray, dated 15 February,
preserved in a copy in: Biblioteka Uniwersytecka w Warszawie, ms. 51 [Liber legatio-
num], pp. 197–199. On Florian Zbrożek and his several missions to the Crimea, see
Document 44, n. 8.
360
Skorupa convincingly argues that the death of Ghazi II Giray probably occured
in February 1608; see idem, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 145–147. e date and cir-
cumstances of the khan’s death are also discussed in Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism,
pp. 230 and 234 (n. 14).
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 123
In December 1609, Zbrożek was received in Baghchasaray and sent
back along with a great Crimean embassy. It was headed by Sefer Ghazi
Bey, who had already been in Poland in 1604. e Crimean envoys
brought a solemn instrument of peace, issued by Selamet Giray. ey
were received by Sigismund III in April 1610, in a military camp near
Smolensk.
361
In his document, dated 20 December 1609 (old or new style),
Selamet Giray referred to the earlier mission of Muzaer Agha and
reiterated his wish to live in brotherly friendship with the king, just as
his brother, Ghazi Giray, had done, or “even more” as he recalled the
oath that he and Alp Giray had sworn in 1581, when they had been
captured in Poland.
362
e document was issued on behalf of the khan
and his two nephews, who were simultaneously his adopted sons, the
qalga Djanibek Giray and the nureddin Devlet Giray.
363
It contained
usual clauses regarding the military assistance against Muscovy, the
security of trade, and the protection of the current Moldavian ruler,
the Polish protégé Constantin Movilă. Wallachia was not included,
although the document admitted that “the kings of Poland used to
appoint hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia.” Unlike the document
of 1607, where the touchy issue of Cossack raids was not even men-
tioned, the instrument of 1609 stipulated that a future peace depended
on their eective suppressing by the royal side. In return, the clause
regarding the Polish territorial claims to the Black Sea shore was miss-
ing altogether.
364
As the khan’s instrument diered from the “ideal” one of 1607,
Sigismund III did not accept it and refused to send gis. Neverthe-
less, the Tatar envoy received 1,000 orins on account of the future
361
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 148–158. A semi-private Polish support,
given in 1604 to False Dimitrij, evolved by 1610 into a full-scale intervention in Mus-
covy and the candidacy of King Sigismund’s son, Vladislaus, for the tsar’s throne.
e conict culminated in the siege and conquest of Smolensk (1610–1611) and the
garrisoning of Polish troops in Moscow (1610–1612).
362
Cf. n. 314 above. Already in 1601, when he held the post of the qalga and
received a Polish envoy in the Crimea, Selamet Giray assured that he did not forget
the promise that he had given along with his brother, Alp Giray, and the benecence
that they had experienced in Poland from the side of King Stephan; see Pułaski, “Trzy
poselstwa Piaseczyńskiego,” p. 365.
363
Djanibek Giray (the future khan) and Devlet Giray (his future qalga) were the
sons of Selamet’s older brother, Mübarek Giray, whose widow remarried twice, rst
to Feth Giray, and then to Selamet Giray.
364
See Document 44; on its dating, cf. 478 in Part II.