Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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94 part one—chapter two
were legitimized by Ivan’s open claim to the heritage of the Golden
Horde.
283
Following the fall of Kazan and Astrakhan, some of their inhabit-
ants, dissatised with “indel” rule, found refuge in the Crimea. e
Nogay civil war of 1554 also resulted in a large Nogay immigration to
the west. e newcomers joined the clan of the Manghıts (Mansurs),
who had established themselves in the Crimean Khanate in the early
16th century. Another group of the Nogays, dissatised with Ibrahim
and his pro-Muscovian stand, joined Ghazi Mirza, who created the
so-called Little Nogay horde, whose grazing lands extended between
the Don and northern Caucasus.
284
e inux of refugees to the Crimea strengthened anti-Muscovian
feelings among the Tatars and augured well for a Crimean-Lithuanian
cooperation against Ivan IV. Yet, in 1556 Vilnius extended its armi-
stice with Moscow for another six years. Moreover, the Crimeans and
Ottomans were alarmed by constant raids of a royal subject, Dmytro
Vyšnevec’kyj, the starosta of Čerkasy and Kaniv. is adventurous
military commander created a semiprivate cossack army composed
of Lithuanian and Muscovian subjects and built a fortied camp on
the Dnieper island Xortycja, known as the Cossack Sič. In June 1556,
Vyšnevec’kyj besieged Očakiv, and in October 1556 he conquered
Islamkerman, taking along the captured Tatar guns to the Sič. Devlet
Giray retorted by destroying the Sič in 1557 and sending troops to
raid Lithuania in 1558. e Crimean-Lithuanian conict was appeased
with the help of Ottoman diplomacy and Vyšnevec’kyj, disenchanted
with his royal patron, entered the Muscovian service.
285
By maintaining hostile relations with both his northern neighbors,
Devlet Giray risked their possible alliance against the Crimea. Yet, a
cooperation between Vilnius and Moscow was prevented by mutual
283
Cf. Jaroslav Pelenski, Russia and Kazan. Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–
1560s) (e Hague-Paris, 1974), and Keenan, “Muscovy and Kazan,” pp. 548–558.
284
Trepavlov, Istorija Nogajskoj Ordy, pp. 270–311; cf. Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli
dvux materikov, vol. 1, pp. 238–239.
285
In the years 1558–1560, while in the Muscovian service, he organized several
attacks against Azov; having returned to Lithuania in 1561, he was captured in Mol-
davia, sent to Istanbul, and executed in 1563; on Vyšnevec’kyj’s career, cf. Chantal
Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Un condottiere lithuanien du XVI
e
siècle, le prince Dimitrij
Višneveckij et l’origine de la seč’ zaporogue d’après les archives ottomanes,” Cahiers
du Monde Russe et Soviétique 10 (1969): 258–279; Dziubiński, Stosunki dyplomatyc-
zne polsko-tureckie, pp. 190–192; Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, pp.
103–106 and 110–111.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 95
distrust and a new conict in the Baltic region. In 1557, Sigismund
Augustus engaged to defend the remnants of the Teutonic Order in
Livonia against a possible Muscovian invasion. e treaty only induced
Ivan IV to invade Livonia in 1558. A direct military confrontation
between Vilnius and Moscow was thus imminent, although both sides
chose to wait till the end of the armistice, due to extinguish in 1562.
In order to secure a Crimean assistance in the upcoming conict, in
1559 Sigismund Augustus sent his envoy, Skumin Tyškevyč, to renew
the treaty with the khan. Tyškevyč returned in 1560, accompanied by
a Crimean envoy, Hadji Ali Bey,
286
and carrying a new instrument of
peace, issued by Devlet Giray. In his document, the khan “granted”
to Lithuania the same localities as in his yarlıq of 1552,
287
and added
the usual clauses regarding his engagement to restore to Lithuania its
lands lost to Muscovy, the mutual forgiveness of past wrongs, and the
security of merchants. e document’s contents reected the recent
activity of Dmytro Vyšnevec’kyj and his cossacks in the Black Sea
steppes. Referring to the security of royal merchants, who traveled to
take salt in Kačybej, Devlet Giray declined any responsibility for any
harm done to them by the Lithuanian or Muscovian cossacks. Besides,
the royal side was made responsible for the transport of gis as far as
Perekop, and not Tavan’, as had been stipulated in earlier agreements.
e latter change could be easily explained by the recent destruction
of Islamkerman which deprived the khan of his major base to patrol
the lower Dnieper area. On his part, Devlet Giray reiterated his prom-
ise to prevent his own subjects as well as the Ottoman subjects from
Akkerman, Očakiv, and Azov, from raiding the royal lands, pledging
to severly punish any possible culprits and compensate any damages.
e rising presence of the Nogays in the making of the Crimean soci-
ety was reected by the fact that the Nogays were for the rst time
singled out among the Crimean subjects, on whose behalf the khan
engaged to keep peace and friendship.
288
286
Referred to as a Circassian (Hadčy Alej Petyhorec) in a letter by Sigismund
Augustus from 1571; see Kniga posol’skaja, vol. 1, p. 310. Perhaps identical with
Ali Hadji, a courtier (içki bek) of Sahib Giray Khan, sent in embassy to Cracow and
Vilnius in 1541? Cf. Document 29, n. 2, and Document 30, n. 1.
287
Only Luc’k was omitted, apparently by error.
288
Mentioning “the Nogays, who loyally serve us,” in his document, Devlet Giray
might have referred to Nogay newcomers, who had joined the Crimean clan of the
Manghıts (Mansurs), or the Little Nogay horde, whose leader, Ghazi Mirza, closely
cooperated with the khan (or perhaps both goups).
96 part one—chapter two
New precise regulations regarded the diplomatic exchange. e
document stipulated that Crimean merchants: Turks, Franks,
289
Arme-
nians, and Jews, should not join the khan’s embassies in the hope that
they would be granted tax exemptions and royal allowance which was
due solely to envoys and couriers. e deadline for sending royal gis
was moved from 1 November to Christmas. e gis were to be car-
ried by royal envoys as far as Perekop, where they were to be delivered
to the khan’s agents who would transport them further to Qırq Yer.
Finally, envoys were not to be mistreated or detained longer than a
month.
Invoking the past Lithuanian-Crimean cooperation against Mus-
covy in the times of Mehmed Giray (r. 1515–1523), the document
introduced two categories of gis: ordinary gis, apparently treated by
the khan as a tribute, which were to be sent irrespective of the politi-
cal situation on the sole condition that the Tatars preserved the peace,
and extraordinary gis, to be sent only in the years when the Tatars
raided Muscovy. e latter gis were to be delivered to the khan and
to his son and qalga, Mehmed Giray, amounting to the quotas once
received by Khan Mehmed Giray and his son and qalga, Bahadır Giray
Sultan. e document was corroborated with a solemn oath, sworn by
the khan, his qalga, and other retinue members.
290
In the fall of 1561, Sigismund Augustus urged Devlet Giray to raid
the Muscovian province of Novhorod-Sivers’kyj in cooperation with
Lithuanian troops.
291
In the spring of 1562, a large Crimean army,
headed by the khan and the qalga, set out against Muscovy. From his
camp on the Samara river (a le tributary of the Dnieper), Devlet Giray
urged Sigismund Augustus to join the attack. He also conrmed the
receipt of the royal gis, brought earlier that year by Skumin Tyškevyč,
although he complaied that the cloth was rotten and of poor quality.
292
In June, the Tatars reached the Oka and besieged Mcensk but failed
289
A term referring to Latin Westerners, in the given context apparently to the
Italians living in the Crimea.
290
See Document 33.
291
e royal letter to the khan is copied in Kniga posol’skaja, vol. 1, pp. 218–219.
292
e undated original letter in Ruthenian, provided with Devlet Giray’s seal, is
preserved in AGAD, AKW, Dział tatarski [hereaer, Dz. tat.], k. 65, t. 9, no. 585; it is
published under a wrong date (1571) in Jurij Mycyk, “Z dyplomatyčnogo lystuvannja
urjadu Kryms’kogo xanstva (druha polovyna XVI—počatok XVIII stolit’),” Zapysky
Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Ševčenka, vol. 240 (L’viv, 2000): 473–502, esp. pp. 478–
479. e letter is also copied in Kniga posol’skaja, vol. 1, pp. 224–225.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 97
to obtain any substantial gains. Somewhat paradoxically, the campaign
of 1562 resulted in a Crimean-Muscovian rapprochement. While the
khan was dismayed with Lithuanian passivity, the tsar realized that in
order to conduct a campaign in the west, he needed a peace from the
south.
293
When in 1563 Ivan IV launched a full-scale attack against
Lithuania, conquering the fortress of Polack, he simultaneously sent
an embassy to the Crimea. Prolonged negotiations resulted in a pre-
liminary reconciliation at the beginning of the year 1564.
294
e confrontation between Vilnius and Muscow over Livonia was
soon joined by Sweden and Denmark and the conict evolved into
the First Northern War. While both Nordic participants reached a
settlement in 1570, the war between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy
was to last until 1582.
295
Both belligerents were ready to lavish gis
onto Devlet Giray in order to get his military support and the khan
knew how to exploit it. Having entered negotiations with Moscow, he
did not break his relations with Vilnius and refused to enter an anti-
Lithuanian clause in his treaty with Ivan IV, thus securing that he
would receive gis from both the king and the tsar. Besides, a peace
with the latter was unpopular among the Crimean nobility. In a rare
unanimity, the leaders of the Shirins and Manghıts, Hadji and Devey
(appointed the Manghıt qaraçı in 1563), vehemently opposed a rec-
onciliation with Moscow. e already exchanged preliminary oaths
did not prevent Devlet Giray from raiding Muscovy in August 1564,
293
For a recent discussion of the Muscovian diplomacy of that period and conict-
ing priorities in regard to the southern (i.e., anti-Crimean) and northern (i.e., Baltic)
foreign policy, see Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, pp. 147, 171–179,
and 189.
294
Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 2, pp. 3–33. Devlet Giray swore
an oath to keep peace on 2 January, and Ivan IV on 5 March; the procedure was to
be completed by an exchange of solemn peace documents. Ivan’s preliminary instru-
ment (zapis’) from March 1564, referring to his oath, is published in Pamjatniki
diplomatičeskix snošenij Krymskago xanstva s Moskovskim gosudarstvom v XVI i XVII
v.v. xranjaščiesja v Moskovskom Glavnom Arxive Ministerstva Inostrannyx Del. Edited
by F. Laškov (Simferopol, 1891), pp. 26–29. See also Aleksandr Filjuškin, “Proekty
russko-krymskogo voennogo sojuza v gody Livonskoj vojny,” in: “V kratkix slovesax
mnogoj razum zamykajušče . . .”: Sbornik naučnyx trudov v čest’ 75–letija professora
Ruslana Grigor’eviča Skrynnikova. Edited by A. Dvorničenko (St. Petersburg, 2008):
309–337, esp. pp. 310–320.
295
In 1570, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy concluded an armistice, but in 1577
Ivan IV launched a new campaign in Livonia and Stephan Báthory reciprocated with
a full-scale oensive in 1579, repeated in 1580 and 1581. For a recent English narra-
tive of the First Northern War, see Robert Frost, e Northern Wars: War, State and
Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721 (Harlow, 2000), pp. 23–44.
98 part one—chapter two
October 1564, and October 1565.
296
In July 1566, the khan resumed
the negotiations with Muscovian envoys, although he admitted that
for the moment he could not swear an oath in the name of “the whole
land” (vsej zemlej in the Russian report) because many beys and
mirzas, along with Qalga Mehmed Giray, were overseas, participating
in an Ottoman campaign in Hungary (i.e., the Szigetvár campaign).
297
With a predictable logic, a major Tatar raid of Lithuania occurred in
the fall of the same year.
Ivan IV did not have time to enjoy his diplomatic success as another
shi in the Crimean policy occurred within a few months. Lured by
the promises of new gis coming from Vilnius, the Tatars were also
alarmed by the construction of a Muscovian fort on the Terek river
(1567). Combined with the alliance between Ivan IV and Temrük, a
Kabardinian prince, who had become the tsar’s father-in-law in 1561,
this was clear evidence of a Muscovian march towards the northern
Caucasus, regarded by the khans as their zone of inuence. For this
time, the Muscovian southward expansion also alarmed Istanbul.
298
Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu (in oce between 1565 and 1579),
who directed the Porte’s policy aer the death of Suleyman and acces-
sion of his son, Selim II, developed a visionary though hardly realistic
plan to dig a channel connecting the Don with the Volga. e channel
would enable the transport of galleys and heavy guns towards Astra-
khan, and, aer its recapture from Muscovian hands, introducing the
Ottoman eet on the Caspian Sea and reaching the silk-producing
Caspian provinces of the Ottoman archenemies, the Safavids. In order
to attain these goals, Crimean cooperation was indispensable, so the
khan was ordered to join the expedition. In the spring of 1569, a large
Ottoman-Crimean army, commanded by Qasım Pasha, the Ottoman
governor of Caa, and Khan Devlet Giray, set out against Astrakhan.
e campaign turned into a disaster as the allies soon faced extremely
unfavorable conditions: lack of water, fodder, and food, attacks by
Muscovian regular troops and cossacks as well as Tatar and Nogay
296
Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 2, pp. 38–48 and 56–57. Filjuškin
blames Ivan IV for missing an opportunity to “win the Crimean auction” in the sum-
mer of 1564 due to his temporizing and placing ritual, semiotic and nancial aspects
over political and military ones; see idem, “Proekty russko-krymskogo voennogo
sojuza,” pp. 309, 312 and 323.
297
Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, p. 66, vol. 2, pp. 63–64.
298
Cf. ibidem, vol. 2, pp. 66–77, and Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, p. 115.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 99
marauders, and the technical impossibility to dig the planned channel
within one season.
As Poland-Lithuania was also at war with Muscovy and the Polish-
Ottoman treaty was recently renewed between the king and the new
sultan in 1568, Sigismund Augustus was regarded as an ally by both
Muslim rulers. A royal envoy, Jędrzej Taranowski, received by Selim II
in Istanbul in July 1569, was then invited to join the invading army
and found Devlet Giray deep in the steppe. e envoy witnessed the
rising tensions between the Turks and the Tatars and le a vivid nar-
rative of the catastrophe.
299
Disenchanted with the failed expedition, in 1570 the Ottomans
turned their attention to the south and invaded Venetian Cyprus. By
an apparent paradox, only then Devlet Giray resolved a full-scale inva-
sion of Muscovy. Firstly, he feared that his previous lack of enthusiasm
might invite trouble from the side of the Porte and wanted to make
up for the failure. Secondly and more importantly, with the Ottomans
gone, he did not have to share the potential gains with the sultan. In
1571, a huge Tatar army attacked and burned Moscow. e humili-
ated tsar, who had le his capital on the eve of the invasion, promised
to “restore” Astrakhan to the khan, who then earned his nickname of
the “Capturer of Capitals” (Taht-Alġan). As it soon turned out that
Ivan IV was merely temporizing and had no intention to cede Astra-
khan, another major Tatar invasion occurred in 1572. Yet this time,
the Crimean troops, assisted by the Nogays, were defeated at Molodi,
not far from Moscow.
300
Although the shared enmity towards Muscovy should promote
cooperation between the king and the khan, their mutual relations
in the last years of Sigismund Augustus’ reign were not devoid of
tensions. Both sides accused each other in Istanbul, trying to win a
favorable Ottoman mediation in regard to border skirmishes and the
299
Taranowski’s relation, entitled “Krótkie wypisanie drogi z Polski do Kon-
stantynopola, a z tamtąd zaś do Astrachania zamku moskiewskiego, który leży na
wschód słońca ku granicom perskim, przytem jako wojsko tureckie, które jeździło
pod Astrachań roku 1569 zginęło [. . .],” is published in Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (ed.),
Podróże i poselstwa polskie do Turcyi, a mianowicie: Podróż E. Otwinowskiego 1557,
Jędrzeja Taranowskiego komornika j. k. m. 1569, i Poselstwo Piotra Zborowskiego 1568
(Cracow, 1860): 41–63. For a German contemporary translation, see István Vásáry
and Lajos Tardy, “Andrzej Taranowskis Bericht über seine Gesandtschasreise in der
Tartarei (1569),” AO ASH 28 (1974): 213–252.
300
Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 2, pp. 193–221.
100 part one—chapter two
amount of gis to be sent to the khan.
301
From a royal letter, sent to
the khan in 1571, we learn that Devlet Giray was unsatised with the
former agreement, negotiated by Skumin Tyškevyč, blamed his scribe
for changing several ancient clauses without his knowledge, and pro-
posed to issue a new instrument of peace. e king expressed his amaze-
ment that the khan had rst sworn to keep the treaty and observed it
for some time, only to change his mind aer a while. Nevertheless,
Sigismund Augustus admitted that he also was not entirely satised
with the treaty and sent another envoy, Jurij Bykovskyj, to collect a
new instrument from the khan.
302
e royal chancery provided Byk-
ovskyj with a ready formula, according to which the khan was to issue
his document. e formula, whose text is not preserved, provided that
royal envoys were to transport annual gis only as far as Kiev or Bra-
clav, and not to Perekop as had been provided by the document from
1560. e responsibility for further transport and incurred costs was to
be taken by the khan’s agents. If the Tatars rejected this amendment,
the royal envoy was instructed to accept the khan’s instrument in its
previous form but refuse any alterations.
303
We do not know, whether
the mission was successful, as no treaty instruments issued by Devlet
Giray have been preserved apart from the ones dated 1552 and 1560.
In 1569, a major change occurred on the map of Eastern Europe.
Sensing near death, Sigismund Augustus, the last member of the Jag-
iellonian dynasty without an heir, yielded to the general wish of Pol-
ish nobility and convened a Diet in Lublin, where the personal union
between Poland and Lithuania was converted into a permanent one.
e new federal state was to have one monarch, to be elected by the
whole nobility, and one Diet, although numerous institutions, such as
military command and chancellery, remained separate for the Polish
Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. e union was less popu-
lar among Lithuanian nobles, especially princely families who feared
Polish domination and losing their status. Facing opposition, on the
eve of the union Sigismund Augustus—still acting as an hereditary
grand duke—had ceded to Poland four Lithuanian provinces: Pod-
lachia, Volhynia, Kiev, and Braclav. is move persuaded the Lithu-
anian opponents to accept the union in vain hope that the monarch
301
Cf. Dziubiński, Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie, pp. 264–267.
302
See the royal letter to the khan, published in Kniga posol’skaja, vol. 1, pp.
309–311.
303
See the envoy’s instruction, published in ibidem, pp. 311–312.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 101
would reverse his move. In fact, numerous nobles from the four prov-
inces concerned accepted their transfer quite easily, and for various
reasons: the nobles from Podlachia, Polish or largely Polonized, were
already liaised by numerous links with neighboring Polish Mazovia,
while the nobles of southern provinces, predominantly Orthodox and
Ruthenian, hoped that Cracow would provide more eective defence
against the Tatars than Vilnius had done. In fact, due to the loss of its
southern provinces, aer 1569 Lithuania no longer bordered with the
Crimean Khanate. In result, the defence system against Tatar raids was
monopolized in the hands of Polish Crown hetmans while the Polish
Crown chancery was put in charge of the diplomatic relations with
Baghchasaray.
304
Polish interregna and the reigns of Mehmed II Giray (1577–1584)
and Islam II Giray (1584–1588)
Following the death of Sigismund Augustus in 1572, a erce com-
petition for the Polish-Lithuanian throne began. Ivan IV, lured with
a perspective of his own or his son’s candidacy, temporarily sus-
pended hostilities. A serious candidate came from the House of Hab-
sburg, but this option was equal with an Ottoman invasion. Finally,
a French prince, Henri de Valois, was elected in 1573 with the strong
French and Ottoman support. His election augured well to the Polish-
Crimean relations as the khan would not dare to attack an Ottoman
candidate.
305
Nevertheless, the young French prince was certainly not
pleased upon having received over three dozens of letters sent by the
304
As a matter of fact, Lithuania continued to nancially participate in the main-
taining of diplomatic relations with the Crimea, especially when Tatar embassies
traveled through the Grand Duchy as the king resided in Vilnius or headed cam-
paigns against Russia. Nevertheless, Zbigniew Wójcik has calculated that in the mid-
seventeenth century the Lithuanian share had not surpassed ve percent of the
Commonwealth’s expenditures for the diplomatic exchange with the Crimea; see idem,
“Some problems of Polish-Tatar relations in the seventeenth century,” pp. 91–92.
305
In a letter to Devlet Giray, the Ottoman sultan Selim II explicitly ordered the
khan to support the brother of the French king, recently elected to the Polish throne,
provided that the latter would pay the customary tribut to the khan; see Jan Rypka,
“Briefwechsel der Hohen Pforte mit den Krimchanen im II. Bande von Ferīdūns
Münšeāt,” in: Festschri Georg Jacob zum siebzigsten Geburtstag. Edited by . Menzel
(Leipzig, 1932): 241–269, esp. pp. 249–250; Selim’s letter is published in Feridun Bey,
Münşe’atü`s-Selatin, vol. 2 (Istanbul, 1275 A.H./1858 A.D.), pp. 557–558; the term,
translated by Rypka as Tribut, appears in the Turkish text as vėrgü.
102 part one—chapter two
Crimean princes, ladies, nobles, and functionaries, invariably demand-
ing gis for themselves and their retinue members in return for their
friendship.
306
To say that these letters prompted his escape would be
an overstatement, but they certainly added to his bewilderment with
the limits of royal power in Poland. Having learned about the death of
his brother, Charles IX, in June 1574 King Henry secretly le Poland
in order to assume the French throne.
A erce struggle resumed between the pro-Habsburg and anti-
Habsburg factions for the vacated Polish throne. Finally, in 1575
Stephan Báthory, the palatine of Transylvania and Ottoman vassal,
was elected with the substantial support wielded by Ottoman diplo-
macy, and crowned on his arrival to Poland in 1576.
307
As the new
king envisioned a war with Muscovy, he aimed to conrm the peace
with Istanbul and Baghchasaray. e rst task was attained already in
1577, but the second one proved less easy. Jędrzej Taranowski, sent
to the khan in January 1577, was detained in the Crimea,
308
while the
Tatars resumed negotiations with Moscow. Ivan IV, disillussioned by
Báthory’s election and endangered by his military plans, desperately
306
ese letters are preserved in AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 60, t. 76 and ; k. 65,
t. 85 and .
307
On the role of Ottoman diplomacy in the Polish elections, see Kemal Beydilli,
Die Polnischen Königswahlen und Interregnen von 1572 und 1576 im Lichte osmanis-
cher Archivalien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der osmanischen Machtspolitik (Munich,
1976); Janusz Pajewski, Turcja wobec elekcji Batorego (Cracow, 1935); and Wojciech
Hensel, “Uwagi o stosunkach polsko-tureckich w XVI wieku do panowania Stefana
Batorego,” in: Stosunki polsko-tureckie. Materiały z sesji naukowej zorganizowanej
przez Instytut Orientalistyczny i Towarzystwo Polska Turcja w 1988 roku. Edited by
T. Majda (Warsaw, 1995): 19–29.
308
Kazimierz Dopierała, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski z Turcją za Stefana Bator-
ego (Warsaw, 1986), pp. 43 and 48. Taranowski had earlier traveled to the khan in
1569. e royal instruction, issued in Toruń on 31 December 1576 and regarding
the conditions of a new treaty, is published in Kniga posol’skaja Metriki Velikago
Knjažestva Litovskago, soderžaščaja v sebe diplomatičeskija snošenija Litvy v gosu-
darstvovanie korolja Stefana Batorija (s 1573 po 1580 god). Edited by M. Pogodin
and D. Dubenskij (Moscow, 1843), pp. 11–13. In return for Crimean military assis-
tance against Muscovy, Taranowski was to propose the khan a yearly gi of 20,000,
or at most 24,000 thalers. Báthory’s negotiating position was weakened by the riot of
Danzig, the royal city and Baltic port mostly inhabited by the Germans, which had
supported the Habsburg candidate to the Polish throne—the emperor Maximilian II
himself (even the emperor’s death in October 1576 did not appease the conict). In his
instruction to Taranowski, the king admitted that due to his conict with the Germans
(i.e., the Habsburgs as well as Danzig) he was unable to obtain Western cloth, hence
he proposed that the whole gi be in cash and not partly in cash and partly in cloth
like in the previous years.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 103
tried to secure his southern border. In February 1577, the tsar resolved
to send a great embassy to the Crimea, even at the cost of his prestige.
309
Although the embassy’s departure was postponed due to the news of
the death of Devlet Giray and the enthronment of his son and former
qalga, Mehmed II Giray, in 1578 the Muscovian chancery prepared
a dra of a treaty. e skillfully drawn document contained Ivan’s
engagement that his “palatines and Livonian people” (voevody i livon-
skie ljudi) would not attack the Tatar lands.
310
If accepted by the khan,
this clause would legitimize Ivan’s claim to his Livonian conquests.
e Muscovian eorts provoked swi reaction of King Stephan, who
intervened at the Porte and reinforced his diplomatic mission in the
Crimea. Having no news from Taranowski, in April 1578 the king sent
yet another envoy, his secretary Marcin Broniowski. e royal envoy,
who would later gain due fame as the author of a detailed description
of the Crimea, le Poland in April 1578.
311
Taranowski and Broniowski
returned together in the summer of 1578, accompanied by a Polish
renegate, Ibrahim Bielecki, who brought the list of peace conditions.
Apart from overdue gis, unpaid for several years, Mehmed II Giray
demanded that the king supress the raids of the Dnieper Cossacks
and accept the khan’s right to keep peace simultaneously with Cracow
and Moscow (and consequently to obtain gis from both the king and
the tsar). Irritated by the prolonged negotiations, in September 1578
King Stephan sent Broniowski again to the khan with a warning that
invoked the sultan’s wrath and the possibility of a Polish-Muscovian
rapprochement. Consequently, Jędrzej Taranowski was sent to Istan-
bul in order to secure the Porte’s pressure on the khan.
In the spring
of 1579, Mehmed II Giray nally issued an instrument of agreement
309
Earlier, Ivan IV required that a great embassy be rst sent by the Crimean
side thus making an appearance that in was the khan who petitioned for peace; cf.
Filjuškin, “Proekty russko-krymskogo voennogo sojuza,” p. 325.
310
See ibidem, pp. 328–330; the project of a şartname to be issued by Mehmed II
Giray is published in ibidem, pp. 335–336.
311
Dopierała, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski z Turcją, pp. 77–78; the royal instruc-
tion, given to Broniowski on 4 April 1578, is published in Akta historyczne do panow-
ania Stefana Batorego, króla polskiego, od 3 marca 1578 do 18 kwietnia 1579. Edited
by J. Janicki (Warsaw, 1881), pp. 34–37. For Broniowski’s description of the Crimea,
see Martini Broniovii de Biezdzfedea bis in Tartariam nomine Stephani primi Poloniae
regis legati Tartariae descriptio (Cologne, 1595).