Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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74 part one—chapter two

lands around Perekop (Tur. Ferahkerman or Or).

222

e new politi-

cal division in the Crimea was convenient for Poland-Lithuania. e

khan, dependent on the Ottoman support, was expected to behave

properly towards the sultan’s ally, while the qalga, who controlled

the Khanate’s northern territories bordering on Lithuania, had to

maintain good relations with Vilnius as only that secured his semi-

independent position vis-à-vis the khan. Another auspicious factor for

Vilnius was the rise of anti-Muscovian feelings in the Crimea caused

by the arrival of Safa Girey, recently expelled from Kazan by a pro-

Muscovian coup d’état. In the summer of 1533, Safa and Islam Girays

raided the areas of Kasimov and Perejaslavl’ Rjazan’skij. Sahib Giray

proudly informed Sigismund about this anti-Muscovian raid, demand-

ing that in return the king should send him the gis that used to be

sent to his predecessors.

223

e Crimean oer of an anti-Muscovian alliance could not be

ignored, especially aer the death of Vasilij III in December 1533 and

the accession of his three-year-old son, Ivan IV (the future Ivan the

Terrible). Sigismund did not waste the opportunity and waged war on

Muscovy, hoping to recapture the Lithuanian lost territories. Early in

the year 1534, an experienced diplomat, Anikij Hornostaj, was sent to

the Crimea to negotiate an alliance.

224

In the spring of 1534, the Tatars

again raided the province of Rjazan’, but then a new domestic war

broke out in the Crimea. Following the unspoken rules of the Crimean

policy, Islam Giray reacted to Sahib’s rapprochement with Vilnius by

oering his allegiance to Moscow and raised arms against his uncle.

225

222

Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han (Histoire de Sahib Giray, Khan de Crimée de 1532 à

1551). Edited by Ö. Gökbilgin (Ankara, 1973), pp. 21–22 (French translation: 157–

158). e chronicle was authored by Remmal Hodja, Sahib Giray’s retinue member

and an eyewitness.

223

Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 1, p. 193; Acta Tomiciana, vol. 15,

pp. 683, 703.

224

e date of Hornostaj’s departure is unknown; cf. Banionis, Lietuvos Didžiosios

Kunigaikštystės pasiuntinybių tarnyba, p. 199. Borys Čerkas suggests that he set out

already in the summer of 1533; see idem, “Polityčni vidnosyny Velykoho knjazivstva

Lytovs’koho z Kryms’kym xanatom u 1533–1540 rr.,” in: Ukrajina v Central’no-

Sxidnij Jevropi (z najdavnišyx časiv do kincja XVIII st.), vol. 3 (Kiev, 2003): 117–128,

esp. p. 119. However, from Sigismund’s letter dated 14 October 1533, it appears that

his envoy had not yet departed; see Acta Tomiciana, vol. 15, p. 703. It is likely that

Hornostaj, who ranked as the great envoy (see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 15, p. 246),

was sent only aer the decision to wage war on Muscovy had been taken.

225

Kolankowski, Zygmunt August, wielki książę Litwy, pp. 123–124; Smirnov,

Krymskoe xanstvo, p. 401.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 75

A Tatar raid of Volhynia in October 1534 was probably related to this

shi in the qalga’s policy.

226

Due to the Crimean domestic conict, Lithuanian troops could not

be reinforced by the Tatars in the Muscovian campaign of 1534 and

Hornostaj was forced to nd temporary shelter in Ottoman Caa.

227

Nevertheless, late in that year he was sent back, accompanied by the

khan’s envoy, Devey Mirza from the Manghıt (Mansur) clan.

228

In a

letter delivered to Sigismund, Sahib Giray invoked his negotiations

with Hornostaj and his consent to issue an instrument of peace that

conformed with the ready blank formula prepared by the royal chan-

cery, just as the king had requested.

229

Although the khan blamed Lith-

uanians for their previous inactivity during the Crimean-Muscovian

war, he accepted Hornostaj’s proposal to renew the alliance that would

be cemented by annual gis of 7,500 orins in cash and 7,500 orins

in cloth, to be sent to the khan. Sahib Giray announced that he had

already sworn an oath in the presence of Hornostaj and sent his envoy

Devey Mirza, furnished with his solemn letter of agreement (Ruth. lyst

dokončal’nyj), to repeat this oath in the royal presence. He also warned

that unless he received the gis he would regard his oath as void.

230

226

On the raid, see Acta Tomiciana, vol. 16, pt. 2 (Wrocław etc., 1961), p. 314. e

Polish-Lithuanian court realized that even if peace were maintained by both the khan

and the qalga, poor Tatars, living on the verge of subsistence, would raid the royal

domains on their own initiative; cf. Sigismund’s comment in his letter to the Polish

councilors from September 1535: multi tamen sunt in imperio dicioneque illius, qui

cum mendicitate atque extrema inopia egestateque laborent, nullius auctoritate con-

tineri possunt, quominus incursionibus et rapinis vitam suam sustentent, fame alioqui

morituri, published in Acta Tomiciana, vol. 17 (Wrocław etc., 1966), p. 614.

227

Čerkas, “Polityčni vidnosyny Velykoho knjazivstva Lytovs’koho z Kryms’kym

xanatom,” p. 122. In September 1534, Sigismund informed from Vilnius his Polish

councilors that Hornostaj still remained in Caa due to the Crimean civil war; see

Acta Tomiciana, vol. 16, pt. 2, p. 183.

228

e choice of Devey reected Sahib Giray’s conscious policy of promoting the

Manghıts against the once omnipotent Shirins; on Devey’s career, see Document 25,

n. 1.

229

Pryslal esy do nas posla svoeho pana Onykeja Hornostaja, xotjačy s namy učynyt’

pryjazn’ bratckuju y večnyj myr, y pryslaly este kopeju do nas, jakovyj lyst mel by

byty dokončal’nyj; y my vodluh kopej takovyj dokončal’nyj lyst poslaly esmo; see Akty

otnosjaščiesja k istorii Zapadnoj Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arxeogračeskoju kom-

missieju, vol. 2: 1506–1544 (St. Petersburg, 1848), p. 186. e letter is undated and

erroneously attributed by the editors to the period between 1527–1533. Judging by the

fact that it referred to Hornostaj’s sojourn in the Crimea and mentioned a planned

Tatar campaign against Muscovy in the approaching winter (“when the rivers freeze”),

it could have been written in the fall of 1534.

230

Ibidem, pp. 185–187. In one place the khan mentioned that he had sent two

versions of his instrument and asked Sigismund to keep the one of his preference and

76 part one—chapter two

Sigismund received the khan’s envoy, but for unclear reasons he

refused to accept the khan’s document. e oath of Devey Mirza was

heard by the king in January 1535. Its wording closely reminded the

oath taken by Evliya Mirza in 1522, but on the royal request it also

contained the Tatar engagement to keep peace with Sigismund’s son,

the young king Sigismund II Augustus, enthroned in Vilnius (1529)

and Cracow (1530) during his father’s lifetime.

231

Unlike Evliya’s oath

that referred to the khan’s instrument (Ruth. lyst prysjažnyj) which

the envoy had already delivered, Devey’s oath referred to the khan’s

future instrument that was to be collected in the Crimea by the fol-

lowing royal embassy.

232

e reason for that was the royal refusal to

accept the letter of agreement, brought by Devey. e Crimean envoy

was formally informed that:

In regard to the letter of agreement that you have brought from Khan

Sahib Giray to His Royal Majesty, this letter of agreement does not con-

form with the letters of agreement that had been previously exchanged

to assure eternal peace between the grand dukes of Lithuania and the

ancestors of Khan Sahib Giray. erefore, His Royal Majesty ordered to

return the khan’s letter to you, and you should return it to Khan Sahib

Giray and forward him the request of His Royal Majesty that the khan

should act according to the ancient custom [. . .] and order to compose

his [letter of] agreement properly, and send it to His Royal Majesty

through His Majesty’s envoy, Pan Vasyl’ Tyškevyč, as was the custom in

the times of his ancestors, the great khans.

233

send back the other one (poslal esmy do vašej mylosty dva lysty dokončal’nyx [. . .] y

s tyx obejux lystov, v kotorom by vaša mylost’ upodobala pryjazn’ bratckuju so mnoju

deržaly [sic], tot by lyst vaša mylost’ u sebe ostavyl, a ynyj ko mne otoslal; a kotoryj lyst

vaša mylost’ u sebe ostavyš, y vaša mylost’ by, podluh toho lystu, y pomynok svoj k nam

pryslal). Yet, elsewere only one document is mentioned. Also Sigismund, who invoked

Devey’s embassy in his response to Sahib Giray dated 10 January 1535, referred to the

khan’s document in the singular; see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 15, pp. 246–247. As

neither version of the khan’s document is extant, it is impossible to guess what was

the dierence between them.

231

On Sigismund’s diplomatic eorts to include in the Polish-Ottoman treaty

of 1533 also the king’s and the sultan’s sons, Sigismund Augustus and Selim, cf.

Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, p. 117.

232

For the recorded text of Devey’s oath, see Document 25; for Evliya’s oath, see

Document 22.

233

Što sja dotyčet’ toho lystu dokončalnoho, kotoryj esy ot cara Sahap Kyreja Korolju

Eho Mylosti prynes, yno tot lyst dokončalnyj ne po tomu spraven, jako pered tym velykyi

knjazy lytovskyi s predki carja Sahap Kyreevymy lysty dokončalnyi na myr večnyj day-

valy. A tak Korol Eho Mylost’ tot lyst carev zasja kazal tobe daty, y ty by eho carju

Sahap Kyreju otdal y ot Korolja Eho Mylosti emu movyl, ažby car podle obyčaju staro-

davnoho v tom sja k Eho Mylosti zaxoval y dokončan’e svoe obyčaem slušnym kazal

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 77

Vasyl’ Tyškevyč, sent as a Lithuanian great envoy along with return-

ing Devey Mirza, was provided with a royal treaty document, issued

by Sigismund in Vilnius on 10 April 1535. Its form and wording were

similar to those of the royal documents from 1513 and 1516. e king

promised in his name and in the name of his son, Sigismund Augus-

tus, to maintain peace and friendship with Sahib Giray, referred to as

Sigismund’s brother, and with Islam Giray, referred to as Sigismund’s

son although he was not younger than his uncle, the khan. Further

standard clauses referred to the expected Tatar help in reconquering

of the Lithuanian lands lost to Muscovy, mutual forgiveness of past

wrongs, and the freedom of Lithuanian and Polish merchants to import

salt from Kačybej and travel to the Crimea, including Ottoman Caa.

For incomprehensible reasons, the Lithuanian chancery removed its

traditional engagement not to support “the children of Ahmed and

Mahmud” against the Girays, although this clause could serve well

to cement the anti-Muscovian alliance.

234

Besides, three clauses were

formulated dierently than in the previous documents:

1) the king diminished almost by half the annual gis sent formerly

to Mengli and Mehmed Girays, and oered to send each year, by

30 June, 200 pieces [postaws] of English cloth for the khan, and

60 pieces for the qalga. Calculating one piece as being worth ca.

33 orins, these gis would amount to 6,600 and 1,980 orins

respectively;

235

spravyty, y čerez toho posla Eho Mylosti, pana Vasyl’ja Tyškevyča do Korolja Eho Mylo-

sti pryslal tak, jako za predkov eho, velykyx carej byvalo; the written royal explanation,

delivered to Devey Mirza in April 1535, is recorded in Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr.

15, pp. 247–249.

234

e descendants of Küchük Muhammed then reigned not only in Astrakhan, but

also in Kasimov and Kazan, where they enjoyed Muscovian protection. As recently as

1532, Safa Giray had lost the throne of Kazan to Djan Ali, a Muscovian client and the

former khan of Kasimov. In 1535, aer Djan Ali was murdered, Safa was to regain

the Kazan throne.

235

On the terms postaw and “London cloth,” see Document 26, n. 5; in Sahib

Giray’s document from 1539 (Document 28) one postaw of London cloth was cal-

culated as being worth 33 orins. Čerkas regards this and the following two clauses

as evidence of political success of Hornostaj’s embassy; cf. Čerkas, “Polityčni vidno-

syny Velykoho knjazivstva Lytovs’koho z Kryms’kym xanatom,” p. 122. Yet, in the

aforementioned letter sent to Sigismund through Devey Mirza in 1534, Sahib Giray

referred to Hornostaj’s consent to send 15,000 orins yearly (cf. Akty otnosjaščiesja

k istorii Zapadnoj Rossii, vol. 2, pp. 185–187). If the khan’s statement was genuine,

one might guess that either Hornostaj exceeded his instructions or rather Sigismund

changed his mind aer his envoy’s return and therefore rejected the khan’s instrument

78 part one—chapter two

2) in return, Sigismund asked Sahib Giray to secure that not only his

own subjects, but also the loose Tatars (referred to as cossacks)

dwelling in the steppes near Akkerman, should not raid the royal

lands;

3) the king also asked not to send him great embassies, because pro-

viding them with horses and allowances caused “great detriment”

to the royal treasury; this clause touched a somewhat confusing

economic and cultural aspect of mutual contacts, whereas numer-

ous members of the Crimean society regarded their right to send

separate embassies as a mark of their social status and a source of

personal enrichment through the extortion of royal gis.

Sigismund’s document was conrmed with his oath sworn in the pres-

ence of Devey Mirza. e ceremony was attended by the members of

the Lithuanian Council, of whom ten were mentioned by names and

functions. Yet, unlike in 1513 and 1516, their seals were not appended

to the document, which was corroborated only by Sigismund’s seal

used in the Lithuanian chancery.

236

In order to assure the proper form and contents of the docu-

ment requested from Sahib Giray, the Lithuanian chancery provided

Tyškevyč with a ready formula of the khan’s future letter of agree-

ment.

237

e envoy was instructed to ask Sahib Giray to issue his

instrument accordingly. e formula was apparently based on the

yarlıq from 1517, sworn by Bahadır Giray in Čerkasy in the presence

of Olbracht Gasztołd. It seems that Gasztołd, who once accepted this

document in Čerkasy, treated it as a model for the rest of his life.

Having become the Lithuanian chancellor, already in 1532 he secured

that Islam Giray’s instrument was based on that copy.

238

In 1535,

the yarlıq from 1517 was again to serve as a model for Sahib Giray’s

instrument. e dependence of the Lithuanian chancery’s formula on

Bahadır’s instrument from 1517 is best visible in referring to Mengli

Giray as “our granfather” (sic, Sahib Giray was Mengli’s son) and in

misspelling the Ruthenian word belcom as beloholovym, to be found

brought by Devey Mirza. Consequently, it is quite possible that in turn Sahib Giray

did not accept the new conditions entered in the royal instrument, which merely

reected the royal chancery’s wishful thinking.

236

See Document 26.

237

Such a formula (not preserved) was already given in 1534 to Hornostaj (cf.

n. 229 above).

238

Cf. Document 24 and the discussion above.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 79

in both documents.

239

e formula begins from a usual list of lands

to be “granted” to Lithuania. A characteristic change was the addi-

tion of Ljubeč in the proposed document from 1535. Ljubeč, a castle

situated to the east of the Dnieper and lost to Muscovy in 1503, was

the only important stronghold restored to Lithuania aer the war of

1507–1508. Hence, no wonder that it was added by the Lithuanian

chancery, even though it had never gured in original yarlıqs.

240

should be expected, the conditions entered in the proposed Crimean

document were identical with those present in the royal document. e

Lithuanian chancery even provided a proper oath formula, invoking

“124,000 prophets and our righteous prophet, His Majesty Muham-

mad Mustafa.”

241

We do not know how Sahib Giray reacted to the fact that his origi-

nal instrument, sent through Devey Mirza, was returned, and whether

he was ready to issue an “amended” version that he was asked for. In

fact, Tyškevyč never reached Sahib’s court. Two years later, in a letter

sent to the khan, Sigismund explained that Tyškevyč had been arrested

by Islam Giray, who had also intercepted the royal gis. Nevertheless,

in the summer and fall of 1535 the anti-Muscovian military alliance

made some progress. While the Lithuanians, reinforced by the Poles,

conquered Homel’ and Starodub, the Crimeans raided southern Mus-

covian provinces, and Safa Giray restored his rule in Kazan. e most

unexpected blow to Moscow came from the direction of Islam Giray,

who again changed sides and devastated the province of Rjazan’. e

last fact made Borys Čerkas

believe that the “interception” of the royal

gis by the qalga was not accidental. Rather, it served to persuade

Islam Giray to reconcile with Vilnius and eectively raid Muscovy.

Two years later, aer Islam’s death, Sigismund could safely blame the

late qalga and assure Sahib Giray that the release of the gis into his

rival’s hands occurred against the will of the royal envoy.

242

239

Cf. Document 27, n. 5, and Document 24, n. 7. e error was corrected in Islam

Giray’s document from 1532; cf. Document 24, n. 7.

240

In comparison with Bahadır’s yarlıq from 1517, Ljubeč is added, but Vicebsk

and Nycjany are missing in the Lithuanian formula from 1535; the latter two varia-

tions should be attributed to careless copying.

241

See Document 27.

242

Čerkas, “Polityčni vidnosyny Velykoho knjazivstva Lytovs’koho z Kryms’kym

xanatom,” p. 123; idem, Ukrajina v polityčnyx vidnosynax, pp. 219–221; the fact that

aer his “failed” mission Tyškevyč was rewarded with the post of the starosta of

Čerkasy and Kaniv may further conrm the author’s thesis; cf. Document 26, n. 1.

For the royal letter issued in Cracow on 7 December 1537, in which the king explained

80 part one—chapter two

By 1536, the war lost its impetus as Sigismund had budgetary prob-

lems while Sahib Giray faced another rebellion of Islam Giray, who

resumed negotiations with Moscow. In 1537, a ve-year truce was

negotiated between Vilnius and Moscow, restoring Homel’ to Lithu-

ania, but leaving Starodub within the Muscovian borders. In the same

year, the khan nally succeeded in disposing of his rebellious nephew,

who was killed by two brothers, Baki and Devey (the former envoy to

Vilnius), the Nogay leaders of the Manghıt clan. In 1538, the Ottoman

and Polish troops invaded Moldavia, whose ambitious ruler, Peter

Rareş (the son of Stephan the Great), caused trouble to both Istanbul

and Cracow. Suleyman invited Sahib Giray to join his expedition, and

the Crimean troops participated in the Ottoman conquest of Suceava.

In 1539, the khan led his troops to the Caucasus, reducing to submis-

sion a number of Circassian leaders, but also facing erce resistance

in Kabarda that was strengthened by extreme climatic conditions.

Having returned from his rather unsuccessful campaign just before

winter, Sahib Giray sent his son and new qalga, Emin Giray, against

Muscovy, but the Crimean troops were attacked by the unruly Nogay

leader, Baki. e khan initially imprisoned the latter’s cadet brothers,

Devey and Ak Bibi, but then forgave all the three Manghıts, apparently

recollecting their help in removing Islam Giray.

243

In spite of their de facto cooperation in Moldavia, the relations

between Sahib Giray and Sigismund entered a cold phase in 1538.

Aer Sigismund concluded the truce with Moscow, the khan no lon-

ger regarded him as his ally. Having removed Islam Giray, Sahib Giray

also felt safer on his throne and displayed his rising irritation with the

reduced amount of the royal gis that had once been sent to Mengli

and Mehmed Girays. He might have also resented the royal rejection of

his instrument once sent through Devey. e freezing of mutual rela-

tions was best illustrated by a two-year detainment of a royal courtier,

Myxajlo Tyškevyč, sent to renew the peace with Sahib Giray aer the

death of Islam Giray in 1537. e khan notied Sigismund that his

to the khan the whereabouts of Tyškevyč’s embassy, see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr.

15, pp. 253–255. On the military campaign of 1535, see also Kolankowski, Zygmunt

August, wielki książę Litwy, pp. 135–137.

243

On Emin Giray, see Document 31, n. 10; on the Nogay brothers Baki, Devey,

and Ak Bibi, cf. Document 25, n. 1. Many details on the Crimean policy of that period

are contained in the chronicle by Remmal Hodja, cf. n. 222 above.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 81

previous consent to the diminished amount of gis had been tempo-

rary, conditioned by his feeble position on the throne due to Islam’s

rebellion and by the long absence of his Ottoman protector, Sultan

Suleyman, who had been campaigning in distant Persia. In the rst

year of Tyškevyč’s detainment, Sigismund rejected the khan’s request

to augment the gis, arguing that they had always been given out of

his free will and should not be regarded as an obligation.

244

Yet, the

king did not want to openly break with the Crimea and nally con-

sented. In December 1539, Myxajlo Tyškevyč was sent home along

with the great Crimean envoy, who carried a new instrument of peace.

A Crimean courier, Araqchı, sent to announce the embassy’s arrival,

simultaneously notied Sigismund of the aforementioned raid of Mus-

covy, eected by Qalga Emin Giray at the same time.

245

e yarlıq from 1539 began as usually with a list of lands “granted”

to Lithuania. In comparison with the earlier yarlıqs and the Lithu-

anian chancery formula from 1535, the list was seriously shortened

and over thirty place-names were missing. Not only Ljubeč was omit-

ted, but also numerous towns traditionally listed in the yarlıqs, such

as Luc’k, Kačybej, Kursk, Starodub, Tula, Dašov/Očakiv, Pskov, Velikij

Novgorod, and many others. e only addition was Čerkasy that had

been present in the rst two yarlıqs of Mengli Giray, but later forgot-

ten. A tempting explanation would be that the khan at last looked at

the map and refused to grant the lands that he himself or the Ottoman

sultan claimed (Kačybej, Dašov/Očakiv), those that had never been

actually controlled by Vilnius (Tula, Pskov, Velikij Novgorod), and

those that had been formally ceded by Vilnius to Muscovy (Kursk,

Starodub), or, nally, were so distant from the Crimea that their grant

would be entirely ctitious (Luc’k). Yet, such an explanation can be

true only in part. While the omission of the Black Sea lands, claimed

by the khan or the sultan especially aer the Moldavian campaign of

1538, might have been conscious and seemed consistent, the yarlıq

244

Kolankowski, Zygmunt August, wielki książę Litwy, pp. 171–172; Sahib Giray’s

new conditions and Sigismund’s initial refusal are known from the king’s letter to the

khan, dated 1 November 1538; see Russkaja Istoričeskaja Biblioteka, vol. 30: Litovskaja

Metrika. Otdely pervyj-vtoroj. Čast’ tret’ja: Knigi Publičnyx Del. Tom pervyj. Edited by

I. Lappo. (Jur’ev [Tartu], 1914), cols. 11–14.

245

For the contents of the khan’s message brought by Araqchı, see Sigismund’s

response sent through the returning Tatar courier on 10 January 1540, published in

Russkaja Istoričeskaja Biblioteka, vol. 30, cols. 58–60.

82 part one—chapter two

still listed territories situated beyond the then Lithuanian frontiers,

such as Smolensk, Putyvl’, and Kozel’sk. e remaining clauses of

the yarlıq referred to the mutual friendship, the future Tatar assis-

tance to reconquer the Lithuanian lands lost to Muscovy, forgiveness

of past wrongs, the promise to punish by death future evildoers and

compensate incurred damages, and the right of Polish and Lithuanian

merchants to import salt and conduct trade. Sahib Giray specically

referred to the three clauses entered by Sigismund in his document

from 1535:

1) the annual royal gis were to be worth again 15,000 orins, like

in the times of Mengli and Mehmed Girays; these gis were to be

sent by St. George’s Day (i.e., 23 April), partly in cash (2,000 golden

orins) and partly in kind; the gi in kind was to consist of 394

pieces [postaws] of English cloth (197 pieces from Poland and 197

pieces from Lithuania), whereas one piece was calculated as being

worth 33 golden orins; the fact that the number of pieces was not

rounded up to four hundred seems to reect a hard bargaining on

both sides; the khan conceded that the king was not obliged to send

his gis in a year, when the Tatars would raid Poland or Lithuania

“in small or large numbers;”

2) in a reference to the royal request that the khan should prevent

raids comitted by the inhabitants of the steppes near Akkerman,

Sahib Giray retorted that Akkerman as well as Očakiv and Azov

belonged to the Ottoman emperor and it was not in the khan’s

power to control their inhabitants; nevertheless, he promised to

punish evildoers from the above regions if they would appear in

his domains;

3) the khan agreed to limit the number of Crimean notables entitled to

send envoys to the king; these were: the khan, his wives, daughters,

and daughters-in-law, the qalga and all the remaining Giray princes

(i.e., the sultans), the four qaraçıs, and two prominent mirzas from

the retinue of each qaraçı (i.e., eight mirzas altogether).

Apparently alluding to the fate of Myxajlo Tyškevyč, who had been

detained for two years, the khan also promised that future envoys sent

by Sigismund or the latter’s son, the young king Sigismund Augus-

tus, would not be mistreated. e document was corroborated with

a reference to the oath sworn by the khan and his retinue members.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 83

Unfortunately, the name of the great Crimean envoy, who brought the

yarlıq of 1539, is unknown.

246

Aer the failed raid of Muscovy by Qalga Emin Giray in the winter

of 1539/1540, Qırq Yer and Moscow resumed peace negotiations and

even exchanged great embassies in 1540. Yet, the anti-Muscovian

atmosphere in the Crimea, resulting from the conict over Kazan, was

further heated by the arrival of an aristocratic defector from Muscovy,

Prince Simeon Bel’skij. A descendant of the dukes of Belyj, who also

claimed his rights to Rjazan’, Bel’skij aimed to orchestrate an anti-

Muscovian coalition composed of Poland-Lithuania, the Tatars, and

even the Ottoman Empire. Received at Sahib Giray’s court, he oered

his guide services in an invasion of Muscovy.

247

By the end of 1540, a decision to invade Muscovy prevailed in the

Crimea. Consequently, a Tatar envoy, Ali Hadji (Alihača),

248

was sent

to Poland in order to renew the alliance with King Sigismund. A pro-

visory document was negotiated in Cracow between the Polish lords

councilors and the Crimean envoy, who promised that the khan would

issue his letter of agreement in accordance with the mutually accepted

conditions. e document consisted of thirteen clauses, regarding

respectively: the mutual friendship and alliance (no. 1); the Tatar help

in reconquering the Lithuanian lands lost to Muscovy (no. 2); the right

of royal merchants to import salt from Kačybej and to be compensated

for any damage suered from the khan’s men (nos. 4–5); the freedom

of royal merchants to travel to the Crimean Khanate and Caa (no. 6);

246

See Document 28. e yarlıq, preserved in a Polish translation, is dated in the

Muslim year 946 A.H. (19 May 1539–7 May 1540) and simultaneously in the Christian

year 1542 (the second dating is apparently wrong). A more precise dating is possible

thanks to the preserved royal letter, sent to the khan on 10 January 1540 through the

latter’s courier who had announced the great embassy’s arrival (see n. 245 above).

From its contents we learn that the great Crimean embassy was already on its way and

expected at the royal court. Hence, we can assume that it departed from the Crimea

in December 1539.

247

Zajcev, “‘Pozabyv Boga, i naše žalovan’e, i svoju dušu . . .’ (Priključenija knjazja

Semena Fedoroviča Bel’skogo),” in: idem, Meždu Moskvoj i Stambulom. Džučidskie

gosudarstva, Moskva i Osmanskaja imperija (nač. XV—per. pol. XVI vv.). Očerki

(Moscow, 2004): 131–158; cf. Kolankowski, Zygmunt August, wielki książę Litwy, pp.

175–184. e role of Bel’skij in instigating the Crimean invasion of Muscovy in 1541

is attested by the Crimean chronicle of Remmal Hodja; see Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han,

pp. 55–56 (French translation: 194–195).

248

On Ali Hadji Bey, a courtier (içki bek) of Sahib Giray Khan, who later partici-

pated in the summer campaign against Muscovy, cf. Document 29, n. 2.