Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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184 part one—chapter two
Crimean elite members other concerns—apart from spoils, gis, and
proverbial bribes—mattered, too. ey gained experience and broad-
ened geographic horizons far beyond the triangle of Istanbul-Moscow-
Warsaw by joining Ottoman campaigns in Iran and Hungary, or by
participating in embassies to Vienna, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.
Along with the advent of Sweden, another factor, namely the massive
westward migration of the Nogays and Kalmyks complicated the East
European politics in the 17th century. When united with the Crimean
Tatars and obeying the khan, the Nogay cavalrymen could seriously
strengthen the Khanate’s military power. But when in riot or aspiring
to a separate statehood, as was the case in the times of Kantemir, they
constituted a formidable challenge to the khan’s domestic and foreign
policy. Unlike the Nogays, the Kalmyks never recognized the khan’s
suzerainty and caused constant fear among the Crimean population.
Many examples demonstrate the eorts of the Crimean khans to
prevent a rise of one dominant power in their surroundings. In the
1560s, the Tatars, alarmed by Ivan IV’s conquests on the Volga, con-
tributed towards the failure of his Baltic plans by de facto participat-
ing in the First Northern War. Half-a-century later, Baghchasaray was
in turn concerned with the Polish domination of Eastern Europe. In
consequence, in 1614 the khan came to terms with the new Muscovian
dynasty—the Romanovs, and in the following years the Tatars helped
the Ottomans to evict the Poles from Moldavia. When in 1640s, the
Polish court developed another expansionist plan that was danger-
ous to the Crimea, it was met with a terrible response in 1648, when
Islam III Giray supported the great Cossack rebellion. Having placed
Poland-Lithuania on the verge of disaster, the Crimean court then
realized that it opened the pathway to an uncontrollable rise of Rus-
sia, especially aer the Cossacks acknowledged the tsar’s suzerainty
in 1654. e Tatars then reversed their policy and faced Russia and
Sweden in the Second Northern War, loyally ghting alongside the
Poles and Danes.
e Crimean political impact was also apparent precisely when it
was absent. Two heavy blows to the Muslim prestige in the region,
the fall of Kazan to the Russians in 1552 and the fall of Azov to the
Cossacks in 1637, had been preceded, and perhaps enabled, by politi-
cal crises in the Crimea that culminated in the deposals and killings of
Sahib Giray (1551) and Inayet Giray (1637), respectively. In a seem-
ingly paradox, both deposals and killings were instigated by the Otto-
man Porte.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 185
On their part, also the khans knew how to eectively frustrate the
plans of their Muslim brethren, the Ottoman sultans, when these plans
endangered the Khanate’s sovereignty. e Ottoman expedition against
Russia in 1569, though proclaimed in the name of Islam and formally
aimed to deliver the Volgine Tatars from the tsar’s yoke, was less than
enthusiastically supported (if not openly sabotaged) by Devlet Giray,
who feared that a strong Ottoman presence in the region would ham-
per his own freedom of action. Other similar conicts were to come,
with the most notorious one under the walls of Vienna in 1683.
CHAPTER THREE
IN THE SHADE OF ISTANBUL AND MOSCOW (1671–1783)
e Crimean role in the Ottoman-Polish war of 1672–1676
and in the following reconciliation
e Ottoman direct engagement in the Ukraine led predictably to a
limitation of the Crimean zone of political inuence. Even a khan like
Adil Giray, regarded as the creature of the Köprülüs and detested in
the Crimean society, tried to prevent the Porte’s meddling in his aairs
and ultimately paid with his throne for this insubordination. His suc-
cessor, Selim Giray, who was to rule with interruptions until 1704
(1671–78, 1684–91, 1692–99, 1702–04), turned out to be the Porte’s
most loyal ally during its military confrontation with Christian Europe,
but also he knew to struggle for the Crimean proper interests.
In August 1672, the key Polish fortress of Kamieniec Podolski sur-
rendered aer a short siege. e Ottoman army, headed by Sultan
Mehmed IV and commanded by Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü, was
assisted by nearly all major vassals: the rulers of Wallachia and Mol-
davia, the Crimean khan, Selim Giray, and the Cossack hetman, Petro
Dorošenko. e Ottomans were also joined by the Lipka Tatars,
525
who
had settled in Lithuania in the 15th century and recently rioted against
the Commonwealth, frustrated by the rise of anti-Muslim prejudices,
symptomatic for the Counter-Reformation.
Aer the fall of Kamieniec, the khan and an Ottoman commander,
Kaplan Mustafa Pasha, proceeded as far as Lwów and forced the city
to ransom its freedom while minor Tatar detachments raided the
countryside. Nevertheless, the major Ottoman army slowed down
its march, satised with the conquest and ready for negotiations. On
18 October 1672, an agreement was reached at Bučač (Pol. Buczacz),
stipulating that the Polish king would become an Ottoman vassal by
paying a yearly tribute to the sultan. e palatinate of Podolia, cen-
525
On the term, cf. n. 15 above. e Lipkas usually claimed descent from the fol-
lowers of Tokhtamısh. e truth was more complicated as many of them arrived later
and descended from other hordes.
in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 187
tered in Kamieniec, was converted into a regular Ottoman province
(eyalet), and the Cossack Ukraine was to remain under the Ottoman
suzerainty, retaining its autonomy. Dorošenko’s position was secured
by a clause, entered into the treaty, which forbade his pro-Polish rival,
Xanenko, an entry to the Ukraine. e former governor of Očakiv,
Khalil Pasha, who had earlier supported Dorošenko, became the rst
Ottoman beylerbeyi of Podolia. On 23 October, Sultan Mehmed IV
conrmed the conditions of the Bučač agreement by issuing a solemn
‘ahdname in a military camp near Žvanec’.
526
e Polish king was surely humiliated, but the Crimean khan did not
fare much better. e southeastern provinces of the Commonwealth,
which had long constituted a “reservoir” of spoils and slaves for the
Tatar warriors, became the appendages of the Ottoman Empire, pro-
tected now by the sultan against Tatar raids. e Cossacks, who had
enjoyed the Crimean protection since 1648, now entered direct rela-
tions with the Porte and shied their allegiance from Baghchasaray to
Istanbul. e devaluation of the prestige of the Crimean khan, whose
ancestors had once independently negotiated sophisticated instru-
ments of peace with the Polish kings, is best illustrated by the instru-
ment, issued by Selim Giray on 23 October 1672 in the military camp
near Žvanec’—the very same date and place as those of the sultan’s
instrument—and delivered to the hands of the Polish commissioners
who negotiated the peace with the Porte. e khan merely engaged
that he would restrain his subjects from raiding the Polish Kingdom
on the condition that he received the annual gis, augmented by a
recently promised supplement amounting to a thousand golden o-
rins. If the khan failed to restrain his troops, he was not to demand
the gis due for the year when such unauthorized raid occurred. Curi-
ously, the de facto lowered status of the khan was compensated by his
megalomaniac claim to rule over Siberia and the Bashkirs, reected in
the instrument’s intitulatio.
527
526
On the campaign and pacication of 1672, see Kołodziejczyk, Podole pod panowa-
niem tureckim, pp. 56–66; Mehmet İnbaşı, Ukrayna’da Osmanlılar. Kamaniçe Seferi ve
Organizasyonu (1672) (Istanbul, 2004), pp. 135–182; Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka
w latach 1672–1676, pp. 228–292; on the Ottoman conquest and administration of
Podolia, see Kołodziejczyk (ed.), e Ottoman Survey Register of Podolia (ca. 1681).
Deer-i Mufassal-i Eyalet-i Kamaniçe (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 2 pts.; the Polish and
Ottoman instruments of the Treaty of Buczacz and the sultan’s ‘ahdname issued at
Žvanec’ are published in idem, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 494–514.
527
See Document 70.
188 part one—chapter three
Selim Giray was perfectly aware that the strengthening of the Otto-
man position in the Ukraine would limit the Crimean sovereignty.
Although he previously authorized the Tatars to raid Poland-Lithuania,
he feared its total collapse and repeatedly oered his mediation before,
during, and aer the fall of Kamieniec. In October 1672, the khan and
his vizier, Subhan Ghazi Agha, actively participated in the Ottoman-
Polish pacication.
528
In 1673, the Polish-Ottoman war was resumed aer the Diet had
rejected the humiliating Treaty of Buczacz. On 11 November, the Polish-
Lithuanian army commanded by Hetman Sobieski defeated the Otto-
mans at Hotin. Selim Giray, who maintained regular diplomatic
contacts with Warsaw,
529
excused himself from the campaign by the
necessity to defend the Crimea against the pro-Muscovian Kalmyks
and the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who had refused to acknowledge the
Ottoman suzerainty.
In 1674, the newly elected king John III Sobieski, who owed his
throne to the victory of Hotin, addressed the khan with new peace pro-
posals. Sobieski understood very well Selim Giray’s concerns regarding
the rise of Muscovy and the parallel loss of the Khanate’s autonomy
versus the Porte. A year later, the king instructed his envoys whom he
sent to the Crimea to persuade the khan that “the stronger the [Polish-
Lithuanian] Commonwealth is, the stronger respect the Crimea will
enjoy from the side of the Porte.”
530
e chances of a successful Tatar mediation between Istanbul and
Warsaw increased when in 1674 the Russians invaded the Ottoman
Ukraine and the Porte had to defend Dorošenko against a new enemy.
Yet, the Ottomans were unwilling to restore Podolia to Poland, so the
Ottoman-Polish hostilities continued along with the Ottoman-Russian
ones. Aer another year of campaigning, in October 1676 an armi-
stice was reached in a military camp near Žuravno (Pol. Żurawno),
528
On the Crimean eorts of mediation in 1672, cf. Wójcik, “Mediacja tatarska
między Polską a Turcją w roku 1672,” pp. 39–47; Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w
latach 1672–1676, pp. 225–226, 255, 289–290; Michał Sikorski, Wyprawa Sobieskiego
na czambuły tatarskie 1672 (Zabrze, 2007), pp. 170, 202–203.
529
Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, p. 320.
530
czym Rzeczpospolita mocniejsza, tem Krym w większym u Porty respekcie; quoted
in Janusz Woliński, “Pośrednictwo tatarskie w wojnie polsko-tureckiej 1674–1675,” in:
idem, Z dziejów wojny i polityki w dobie Jana Sobieskiego (Warsaw, 1960): 139–159,
esp. p. 157.
in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 189
where the Polish-Lithuanian troops, commanded by King John III,
were besieged by an Ottoman-Crimean army, commanded by an
Ottoman serasker, Sheytan Ibrahim Pasha, and Selim Giray. e khan
not only participated in the campaign and negotiations, but his name
honorably preceded the names of Ottoman dignitaries listed in the
narratio of the peace instruments exchanged at Žuravno: the Polish
one, issued in Latin by the Commonwealth’s commissioners, and the
Ottoman one, issued in Turkish by Sheytan Ibrahim Pasha.
531
Like in
1672, no separate treaty was negotiated between Poland-Lithuania and
the Crimean Khanate.
e Truce of Żurawno ocially relieved the Polish king from the
tributary dependance, stipulated by the Treaty of Buczacz, but con-
rmed the Ottomans in their possession of Podolia and Ukraine. e
Porte had still to ght for the latter against Russia, especially since
Dorošenko, disenchanted with weak Ottoman and domestic support,
abdicated from the hetmanate and defected to the tsar in September
1676. e new Ottoman grand vizier, Kara Mustafa Pasha, replaced
Dorošenko with Jurij Xmel’nyc’kyj, Bohdan’s son and the former het-
man, released on that occassion from the Istanbul prison of Yedikule.
532
In 1677, the Ottoman-Crimean army, again commanded by Ibrahim
Pasha and Selim Giray, failed to install Xmel’nyc’kyj on the hetman’s
seat in Čyhyryn, which was valiantly defended by the Russians and
pro-Muscovian Cossacks. Only in 1678, the Russian garrison evacu-
ated the ruined Cossack capital and by 1681 an Ottoman-Russian
peace was reached that divided the Ukraine along the Dnieper.
Selim Giray paid with his throne for the unsuccessful Čyhyryn cam-
paign of 1677 and was replaced with his cousin, Murad Giray. Before
the new khan le Istanbul to ascend the throne in the Crimea, he
was asked for mediation by Jan Gniński, the Polish ambassador and
Sobieski’s trusted condent, who had arrived at the Porte in order to
conrm the Truce of Żurawno. e Polish king, who had begun his
career as an ardent pro-French factionist, secretly hoped to enter an
531
e Polish and Ottoman instruments of the Truce of Żurawno are published in
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 515–527.
532
See Kara Mustafa’s letter dated 26 Zilkade 1087 A.H. (30 January 1677), order-
ing the kaymakam, Osman Pasha, to nd the “giaour, being the former Cossack het-
man” and if alive, to send him immediately to Edirne; published in Franz Babinger
(ed.), Das Archiv des Bosniaken Osman Pascha. Nach den Beständen der Badischen
Landesbibliothek zu Karlsruhe (Berlin, 1931), p. 47.
190 part one—chapter three
alliance with Louis XIV, directed against Brandenburg-Prussia, and
less formally against Vienna. In order to attain this, he needed a last-
ing peace with Istanbul that would also secure him from the side of
Russia. He hoped that through the French mediation he would regain
at least a part of Podolia in order to appease the domestic opposi-
tion. All these expectations were dashed by a frank statement of the
khan, expressed during his meeting with Gniński on 26 February 1678:
“whether you are sore or you bow, it is equal to us, as the Porte cares
neither about your friendship nor your anger.”
533
e ‘ahdname, issued by Sultan Mehmed IV in April 1678, in fact
merely conrmed the Treaty of Buczacz with a few notable exceptions
such as the abolishment of tribute and the concession of two Ukrai-
nian fortresses, Bila Cerkva and Pavoloč, to Poland. Sobieski unwill-
ingly accepted the peace, but his disillusion with Paris and Istanbul
was to result in his future rapprochement with Vienna and his crucial
decision to assist the Habsburgs in 1683.
In the shade of the great war 1683–1699
e uncompromising stand of the Porte, recalled in the above quoted
dialogue between Murad Giray and the Polish envoy, well reected
the megalomany of the then grand vizier, Kara Mustafa Pasha, that
was soon to irritate the khan, too. In 1683, Murad Giray participated
in the Hungarian campaign of Kara Mustafa. When the grand vizier
decided to besiege Vienna ignoring the warnings of his advisers, the
khan openly sabotaged his orders. In result, he was replaced by Hadji
Giray, who had gained fame during the battle of Vienna by rescu-
ing the Holy Standard of the Prophet.
534
Yet, aer his return to the
533
Lubo się gniewacie, lubo się kłaniacie, nam to jedno, o przyjaźń waszą, jako i o
gniew Porta nie dba; see Franciszek Pułaski (ed.), Źródła do poselstwa Jana Gnińskiego
wojewody chełmińskiego do Turcyi w latach 1677–1678 (Warsaw, 1907), p. 78; cf.
Wójcik, Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679. Studium z dziejów polskiej
polityki zagranicznej (Wrocław etc., 1976), pp. 123–125.
534
e conict between Murad Giray and Kara Mustafa Pasha is described in
numerous sources, including an almost contemporary Crimean chronicle, whose
author, Mehmed Giray, openly criticised the Ottoman haughtiness; see Markus Köh-
bach, “Der Tārīh-i Mehemmed Giray—eine osmanische Quelle zur Belagerung Wiens
durch die Türken im Jahre 1683,” in: Studia Austro-Polonica 3 = Zeszyty Naukowe
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 672 // Prace Historyczne, no. 75 (1983): 137–164; cf. a
Polish translation of the relevant fragment in Abrahamowicz (ed.), Kara Mustafa pod
in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 191
Crimea, the new khan soon faced a noble rebellion and in 1684 was
in turn replaced by Selim Giray.
e creation of the Holy League in the aermath of the Christian
victory at Vienna completely changed the geopolitical situation of the
Crimean Khanate, now endangered in its very existence. Interestingly,
initially the Polish king secretly oered Selim Giray peace, and even
international warranty of the Khanate’s independence, to be sworn
by the League members, on the sole condition that the Tatars would
remain neutral. e oer was submitted through Tomasz Golczewski,
sent to the Crimea in 1685. e king tried to play on Tatar noble
ambitions and the envoy was instructed to wish Selim Giray that “the
slaves [i.e., Ottoman viziers] should no longer rule over the free, bold,
and ancient [Tatar] nation” and that the khan should reign as a sov-
ereign Muslim monarch “just as the padishah of Bukhara, the king
of Persia, the king of India, and some Arab emirs, do.”
535
Repeatedly
urged by his Habsburg allies to invite the tsar to the League, Sobieski
hoped that it would not be necessary if the khan remained neutral. e
king preferred a rapprochement with Baghchasaray, or even an exotic
alliance with Isfahan,
536
to an alliance with Moscow as he knew that
the latter would imply the Commonwealth’s nal resignation from the
lands lost to Russia by 1667.
Although Selim Giray did not openly reject the oer, he procrasti-
nated his answer, and the Polish king nally made up his mind to con-
clude a lasting peace with the tsar. Aer the latter joined the League
(albeit informally) in 1686, the political situation of the Khanate
became dramatic. Even if unrealistic and nourished by war enthusi-
asm, some projects drawn in Warsaw and Moscow did not augur well
to the Tatars. While some Poles expressed their hope that the Russians
would invade the Crimea, “put all the Tatars, like chicken, into a sack,
and eat them, so that their name be no longer heard in the world,”
the Russian government contemplated a forced resettlement of the
Wiedniem. Źródła muzułmańskie do dziejów wyprawy wiedeńskiej 1683 roku (Cracow,
1973), pp. 309–316.
535
See Czesław Chowaniec, “Sobieski wobec Tatarszczyzny 1683–85,” Kwartalnik
Historyczny 42 (1928): 52–66, esp. pp. 60–61.
536
On Sobieski’s eorts to invite the Pershian shah to join the anti-Ottoman alli-
ance, see Chowaniec, “Z dziejów polityki Jana III na Bliskim Wschodzie 1683–1686,”
Kwartalnik Historyczny 40 (1926): 151–160.
192 part one—chapter three
Tatars to Anatolia.
537
In order to survive, the Khanate had to loyally
ght at the side of the Porte and entrust its fate to the Ottoman might,
still drawing on the impressive human and economic resources. In
1687 and 1689, two major Russian oensives against the Crimea,
commanded by Vasilij Golicyn, ended in failure. e defenders were
backed by extreme ecological conditions and their own decision to set
the steppe on re, which made it impassable for the horse-driven Rus-
sian artillery.
538
Interestingly, the failed expeditions against the Crimea
prompted the Russian government to suspend its expansion on the
Amur river and reach an agreement with China in 1689.
539
e Tatars proved invaluable as Ottoman allies in provisioning the
Ottoman garrison of Kamieniec Podolski and defending Moldavia and
Hungary against the Polish and Habsburg troops.
540
Yet, supporting
Ottoman armies in distant Hungary was hardly popular in the society
that faced an imminent threat from Russia. Unwilling to join the Otto-
man troops in Hungary and struck by the death of his most beloved
son, Selim Giray abdicated in the spring of 1691. His successors, Sa‘adet
Giray (1691) and Safa Giray (1691–1692), disappointed both the Porte
and the Crimean subjects. In result, Selim Giray returned to the throne,
having performed in the meantime a pilgrimage to Mecca that earned
him an honorary title of the Hadji (Tur. Haci or el-Hacc).
541
537
See Vladimir Artamonov [W. Artamonow], “Rosja, Rzeczpospolita i Krym w
latach 1686–1699,” in: Studia i materiały z czasów Jana III Sobieskiego. Edited by
K. Matwijowski (Wrocław, 1992): 19–46, esp. pp. 29 and 32.
538
For a recent English language narrative of Golicyn’s two expeditions, see Brian
Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700 (London-New
York, 2007), pp. 178–182. e author seems to have largely overestimated the number
of Russian combatants (180,000 in the rst campaign!).
539
See Artamonov, “Rosja, Rzeczpospolita i Krym w latach 1686–1699,” p. 21.
Another link between the Crimea and China was the personage of A. Ruslanov, a bap-
tized Crimean Tatar turned Russian diplomat in the service of the Yakutsk governor,
who in turn deserted to Peking and spent over two decades in the Manchu dynasty’s
service. By presenting the Russian tsar as a Crimean tributary, Ruslanov weakened
Russia’s prestige and position in the Russian-Chinese negotiations that took place in
the 1670s; see Vladimir Mjasnikov [Miasnikov], e Ch’ing Empire and the Russian
State in the 17th Century (Moscow, 1985), pp. 86 and 159–160.
540
In some years, the Crimean troops were divided in the following way: the khan
remained in the Crimea to defend it against a possible Russian invasion, the qalga
assisted the Ottoman troops in Hungary, and the nureddin fought against the Poles
in Podolia and Moldavia; see Wagner, “Tatarskie elity władzy w latach 1684–1699,”
in: idem, W cieniu szukamy jasności i chwały. Studia z dziejów panowania Jana III
Sobieskiego (1684–1696) (Siedlce, 2002): 97–109, esp. p. 101.
541
Smirnov, Krymskoe xanstvo, pp. 630–632 and 638–645.
in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 193
e year 1691 also brought the last major Polish oensive in Molda-
via, led in person by the ageing king. Aer its failure, the Polish court
contemplated a rapprochement with Paris, who oered its mediation
in reaching a separatist peace with the Porte. A Polish-Ottoman rec-
onciliation was also favored in Baghchasaray as it would remove the
threat of a joint Polish-Russian attack from the north.
542
In the spring of
1692, Khan Safa Giray sent to Poland his envoy, Dervish Ghazi Mirza,
whose father, Subhan Ghazi Agha, had once commanded the Crimean
auxiliary corps in the Polish war against Sweden and had participated
as the Crimean vizier in the Polish-Ottoman pacication of 1672.
Having arrived in June 1692, Dervish Ghazi was received by Grand
Hetman Stanisław Jabłonowski and then by the king and the Senate.
e envoy oered his patron’s assistance in persuading the Porte to
restore to the Commonwealth the territories lost in 1672 (Podolia
and the right-bank Ukraine). Despite the interest arisen by the oer,
Warsaw decided to postpone the answer and detain the envoy, fearing
that the embassy merely aimed to stir conicts between Warsaw and
Vienna on the one side, and Warsaw and Moscow on the other.
543
542
Probably not by accident, precisely in that period direct contacts were estab-
lished between Baghchasaray and Paris; in the French archives one encounters a
“friendly letter” (muhabbetname) sent to the French king through an envoy named
Abdusselam from the qalga, Tokhtamısh Giray, referred to on the impressed seal as
Toqtamış Gėrey Sultan bin Safa Gėrey Sultan (thus Tokhtamısh must have been a
younger brother of Khan Safa Giray; their father was also named Safa but had never
become the khan, hence was titled merely as sultan; I was unable to nd any other
reference in regard to Tokhtamısh’s short time qalgaship; the authors of Le khanat de
Crimée maintain that Safa Giray’s qalga was Dervish Giray, a son of Selim Giray). e
letter does not contain any political clauses but invokes the embassy sent previously by
“our elder brother, his excellency the khan” (Qırım hanı aġaçamız hazretleri) and asks
the French king to maintain longterm friendship and brotherhood with the Crimea
(uzun uzaq dost ve qardaş olmaq üzere) and to show due respect to the Crimean
envoy; see Paris, Archives du Ministère des Aaires Etrangères, Correspondance poli-
tique, Turquie supplément, vol. 27, fols. 109a–109b (a note in French by the Archives’
clerk attributes the letter to the khan de Crimée [sic] Toktamich Guéraï Soultan and
provides the Christian year 1692).
543
See the undated letter of Safa Giray, announcing the dispatch of Dervish
Mirza to Poland, in AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 60, t. 25, no. 28. On this embassy,
cf. Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja 1683–1792, pp. 20–21, and Kazimierz Piwarski,
“Sprawa pośrednictwa tatarskiego w wojnie polsko-tureckiej (1692–1693),” in: Stu-
dia Historica. W 35–lecie pracy naukowej Henryka Łowmiańskiego (Warsaw, 1958):
351–372, esp. pp. 357–362. Earlier in the same year, secret negotiations regarding a
separatist peace were also led between Baghchasaray and Moscow; among the reasons
of their failure were the Crimean refusal to resign from the Russian gis and the Otto-
man recent decision to restore the Holy Sites in Jerusalem to the Catholics, aimed at