Epictetus’ dates are uncertain, but we know that he was banished from
Rome, along with other philosophers, by the emperor Domitian in ad 89.
Freed from slavery, though permanently lamed, he set up a school in
Epirus; his admirer Arrian published four books of his discourses and a
handbook of his main teachings (enchiridion). Epictetus is one of the most
readable of the Stoics, and has a rugged and jocular style, making constant
use of cross-talk with imaginary interlocutors. Because of this, many
people beside philosophers have found him attractive. Matthew Arnold
lists him, along with Homer and Sophocles, as one of three men who have
most enlightened him:
He, whose friendship I not long since won,
That halting slave, who in Nicopolis
Taught Arrian, when Vespasian’s brutal son
Cleared Rome of what most shamed him.
Typical of Epictetus’ style is the following passage on suicide, where he
imagines people suVering from tyranny and injustice addressing him thus:
Epictetus, we can no longer endure imprisonment in this bodikin, feeding it and
watering it and resting it and washing it, and being brought by it into contact with
so-and-so and such-and-such. Aren’t these things indiVerent, indeed a very
nothing, to us? Death isn’t an evil, is it? Aren’t we God’s kin, and don’t we
come from him? Do let us go back where we came. (1. 9. 12)
He responds as follows:
Men, wait for God. When he gives the signal and releases you from this service,
then you may go to him. For the time being, though, stay at the post where he has
stationed you.
Rather than seek refuge in suicide, we should realize that none of the
world’s evils can really harm us. To show this, Epictetus identi W es the self
with the moral will (prohairesis).
When the tyrant threatens and summons me, I answer, ‘Who is it that you are
threatening?’ If he says, ‘I will put you in chains,’ I respond, ‘It is my hands and my
feet he is threatening.’ If he says, ‘I will behead you,’ I respond, ‘It is my neck he is
threatening.’ ...Sodoesn’t he threaten you at all? No, not so long as I regard all this
as nothing to me. But if I let myself fear any of these threats, then yes, he does
threaten me. Who then is left for me to fear? A man who can master the things in
my own power?—There is no such man. A man who can master the things that
are not in my power?—Why should I trouble myself about him? (Disc. 1. 29)
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ARISTOTLE TO AUGUSTINE