Kenny Anthony. An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy
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Figure 40 A contemporary photograph of Charles Darwin.
(Photo: akg-images)
between them reflected the design of the creator. An alternative explanation was
that different species within a genus might be descended from a common ancestor.
This idea long preceded Darwin: as we have seen, it was a speculation entertained
by several philosophers in ancient Greece, and more recently it had been put
forward by Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus Darwin, and by the French naturalist
Lamarck. Darwin’s great innovation was to suggest the mechanism by which a
new species might emerge.
Darwin observed, first, that organisms vary in the degree to which they are
adapted to the environment in which they live, in particular with respect to their
opportunities for obtaining food and escaping from predators. The long neck of
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a giraffe is an advantage in picking leaves from high trees; the long and slender
legs of the wild horse help it to run fast in open plains and thus escape from its
predators. Secondly, all plant and animal species are capable of breeding at a rate
which would increase their populations from generation to generation. Even the
elephant, the slowest breeder of all known animals, would in five hundred years
produce from a single couple fifteen million offspring, if each elephant in each
generation survived to breed. If an annual plant produced only two seeds a year,
and their seedlings next year produced two and so on, then in twenty years there
would be a million plants. The reason that species do not propagate in this way is
of course that in each generation only a few specimens survive to breed. All are
constantly engaged in a struggle for existence, against the climate and the ele-
ments, and against other species, striving to find food for themselves and to avoid
becoming food for others.
Darwin’s insight was to combine these two observations.
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight, and from whatever
cause proceeding, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to
external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual and will generally be
inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of
surviving, for, of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but
a small number can survive.
Human husbandmen have long selected for breeding those specimens of particu-
lar kinds of plant and animal which were best adapted for their purposes, and over
the years they often succeed in improving the stock, whether of potatoes or
racehorses. The mechanism by which advantageous variations are preserved and
extended in nature was called by Darwin ‘natural selection’, in parallel with the
artificial selection practised by stockbreeders. Unlike his predecessor Lamarck,
Darwin did not believe that the variations in adaptation were acquired by parents
in their own lifetime: the variations which they passed on were ones they had
themselves inherited. The origin of these variations could well be just a matter of
chance.
It is easy enough to see how natural selection can operate on characteristics
within a single species. Suppose that there is a population of moths, some dark
and some pale, living on silver birch trees, preyed upon by hungry birds. If the
trees preserve their natural colour, pale moths are better camouflaged and have a
better chance of survival. If, over the course of time, the trees become blackened
with soot, it will be the dark moths who have the advantage and will survive in
more than average numbers. From the outside, it will appear that the species is
changing its colour over time.
Darwin believed that over a very long period of time natural selection could go
further, and create whole new species of plants and animals. If this were the case,
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that would explain the difference between the species which now exist in the
world, and the quite different species from earlier ages which, in his time, were
beginning to be discovered in fossil form throughout the world. In explaining
even the most complex organs and instincts, he claimed, there was no need to
appeal to some means superior to, though analogous with, human reason. A
sufficient explanation was to be found in the accumulation of innumerable slight
variations, each good for the individual possessor.
In 1871 Darwin published The Descent of Man, in which he explicitly extended
his theory to the origin of the human species. On the basis of the similarities
between humans and anthropoid apes he argued that men and apes were cousins,
descended from a common ancestor.
The case for Darwin’s theory was enormously strengthened in the twentieth
century with the discovery of the mechanisms of heredity and the development of
molecular genetics. It would not be to my purpose, and would be beyond my
competence, to evaluate the scientific evidence for Darwinism. But it is necessary
to spend some time on the philosophical implications of his theory, assuming that
it is well established.
From Darwin’s time until the present, evolutionary theory has met opposition
from many Christians. At the meeting of the British Association in 1860 the
evolutionist T. H. Huxley reported that the Bishop of Oxford inquired from him
whether he claimed descent from an ape on his father’s or his mother’s side.
Huxley – according to his own account – replied that he would rather have an
ape for a grandfather than a man who misused his gifts to obstruct science by
rhetoric.
Darwin’s theory obviously clashes with a literal acceptance of the Bible account
of the creation of the world in seven days. Moreover, the length of time which
would be necessary for evolution to take place would be immensely longer than
the six thousand years which Christian fundamentalists believed to be the age of
the universe. But a non-literal interpretation of Genesis had been adopted by
theologians as orthodox as St Augustine, and few Christians in the twentieth
century find great difficulty in accepting that the earth may have existed for
billions of years. It is more difficult to reconcile an acceptance of Darwinism with
belief in original sin. If the struggle for existence had been going on for aeons
before humans evolved, it is impossible to accept that it was man’s first disobedi-
ence and the fruit of the forbidden tree which brought death into the world. But
that is a problem for the theologian, not the philosopher, to solve.
On the other hand, it is wrong to suggest, as is often done, that Darwin
disproved the existence of God. For all Darwin showed, the whole machinery of
natural selection may have been part of a Creator’s design for the universe. After
all, belief that we humans are God’s creatures has never been regarded as incom-
patible with our being the children of our parents; it is equally compatible with
our being, on both sides, descended from the ancestors of the apes. Some theists
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maintain that we inherit only our bodies, and not our souls, from our parents.
They can no doubt extend their thesis to Adam’s inheritance from his non-
human progenitor.
At most, Darwin disposed of one argument for the existence of God: namely,
the argument that the adaptation of organisms to their environment shows the
existence of a benevolent creator. But Darwin’s theory still leaves much to be
explained. The origin of individual species from earlier species may be explained
by the mechanisms of evolutionary pressure and selection. But these mechanisms
cannot be used to explain the origin of species as such. For one of the starting
points of explanation by natural selection is the existence of true-breeding
populations, namely species. Modern Darwinians, of course, do offer us explana-
tions of the origin of speciation, and of life itself; but these explanations, whatever
their merits, are not explanations by natural selection.
In the case of the human species, there is a particular difficulty in explaining by
natural selection the origin of language. It is easy enough to understand how
natural selection can favour a certain length of leg, because there is no difficulty
in describing a single individual as long-legged, and we can see how length of
legs may be advantageous to an individual. It does not seem plausible to suggest
that in a parallel way the use of language might be favoured by natural selection,
because it is not possible to describe an individual as a language user at a stage
before there was a community of language-users. For language is a rule-governed,
communal activity, totally different from the signalling systems to be found in
non-humans. Because of the social and conventional nature of language there is
something very odd about the idea that language may have evolved because of
the advantages possessed by language-users over non-language-users. It seems
almost as absurd as the suggestion that banks evolved because those born with an
innate cheque-writing ability had an advantage in the struggle for life over those
born without it.
The most general philosophical issue raised by Darwinism concerns the nature
of causality. The fourth of Aristotle’s four causes was the goal or end of a
structure or activity. Explanations falling in this category were called teleological
after the Greek word for end, telos. Teleological explanations of activity, in
Aristotle, have two features. First, they explain an activity by reference not to
its starting point, but to its terminus. Secondly, they do their explaining by
exhibiting arrival at the terminus as being in some way good for the agent
whose activity is to be explained. Thus, Aristotle will explain downward motion
of heavy bodies as a movement towards their natural place, the place where it
is best for them to be. Similarly, teleological explanations of structures in an
organism will explain the development of the structure in the individual organism
by reference to its completed state, and exhibit the benefit conferred on the
organism by the structure once completed: thus, ducks grow webbed feet so that
they can swim.
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Descartes was contemptuous of Aristotelian teleology; he maintained that the
explanation of every movement and every physical activity must be mechanistic,
that is to say it must be given in terms of initial conditions described without
evaluation. Descartes offered no good argument for his contention; but in the
subsequent history of science, blows were dealt at each of the two elements of
Aristotelian teleology, by Newton and Darwin separately. Newtonian gravity, no
less than Aristotelian natural motion, provides an explanation by reference to a
terminus; gravity is a centripetal force, a force ‘by which bodies are drawn, or
impelled, or in any way tend, towards a point as to a centre’. Where Newton’s
explanation differs from Aristotle’s is that it involves no suggestion that it is in
any way good for a body to arrive at the centre to which it tends. Darwinian
explanations, like Aristotle’s, demand that the terminus of the process to be
explained shall be beneficial to the relevant organism; but unlike Aristotle,
Darwin explains the process not by the pull of the final state but by the initial
conditions in which the process began. The red teeth and red claws involved in
the struggle for existence were, of course, in pursuit of a good, namely the
survival of the individual organism to which they belonged; but they were not in
pursuit of the good which finally emerged from the process, namely the survival
of the fittest species.
Not that Darwin’s discovery put an end to the search for final causes. Far from
it: contemporary biologists are much keener to discern the function of structures
and behaviours than their predecessors were in the period between Descartes and
Darwin. What has happened is that Darwin has made teleological explanation
respectable, by offering a general recipe for translating it into mechanistic explana-
tion. His successors thus feel able to make free use of such explanations, whether
or not in the particular case they have any idea how to apply the recipe.
The major philosophical question which remains is this: is teleological explana-
tion, or mechanistic explanation, the one which operates at a fundamental level of
the universe? If God created the world, then mechanistic explanation is under-
pinned by teleological explanation; the fundamental explanation of the existence
of anything at all is the purpose of the creator. If there is no God, but the uni-
verse is due to the operation of necessary laws upon blind chance, then it is the
mechanistic level of explanation which is fundamental. But even in this case there
remains the question whether everything in the universe is to be explained
mechanistically, or whether there are cases of teleological causation irreducible to
mechanism. If determinism is true, then the answer is in the negative; mechanism
rules everywhere. It is not a matter of doubt that we possess free will: but it is
open for discussion whether or not free will is compatible with determinism. If
the human will is free in a way that escapes determinism, then even in a universe
which is mechanistic at a fundamental level, there operates a form of irreducibly
teleological causality. So far as I am aware, no one, whether scientist or philo-
sopher, has produced a definitive answer to this set of questions.
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John Henry Newman
If the nineteenth century set the stage for the fiercest ever battle between science
and religion, it was also spanned by the lifetime of a thinker who made a greater
effort than any other to show that not just belief in God, but the acceptance of a
religious creed, was a completely rational activity: John Henry Newman.
Newman was born in London in 1801, and was educated in Oxford, where
he became a Fellow of Oriel in 1822, and Vicar of St Mary’s in 1828. After an
evangelical upbringing, he became convinced of the truth of the Catholic inter-
pretation of Christianity, and as a founder of the Oxford movement he sought to
have it accepted as authoritative within the Church of England. In 1845 he
converted to the Roman Catholic Church, and worked as a priest for many years
in Birmingham. He did not share the enthusiasm of Cardinal Manning, head of
the Catholic Church in England, for the exaltation of Papal authority which led
to the definition of Papal infallibility in 1870; but in 1879 he was made a Cardinal
by Pope Leo XIII. Most of his writings are historical, theological, and devotional;
but he was the author of one philosophical classic, The Grammar of Assent, and of
all the philosophers who wrote in English his style is the most enchanting.
Newman’s principal concern in philosophy is the question: how can religious
belief be justified, given that the evidence for its conclusions seems so inadequate?
He does not, like Kierkegaard, demand the adoption of faith in the absence of
reasons, a blind leap over a precipice. He seeks to show that the commitment of
faith is itself reasonable, even if no proof can be offered of the articles of faith. In
the course of dealing with this question in The Grammar of Assent, Newman has
much to say of general philosophical interest about the nature of belief, in secular
as well as religious contexts.
Newman philosophized in the empiricist tradition, and disliked German meta-
physics. Only the senses give us direct and immediate acquaintance with things
external to us: and they take us only a little way out of ourselves. Reason is the
faculty by which knowledge of things external to us, of beings, facts, and events,
is attained beyond the range of sense. Unlike Kant, Newman believed that reason
is unlimited in its range. ‘It reaches to the ends of the universe, and to the throne
of God beyond them.’ Reason is the faculty of gaining knowledge upon grounds
given; and its exercise lies in asserting one thing, because of some other thing.
The two great operations of the intellect, then, are inference and assent; and
these two are always to be kept distinct. We often assent when we have forgotten
the reasons for our assent. Arguments may be better or worse, but assent either
exists or not. Some arguments may indeed force our assent, but even in the case
of mathematical proof there is a difference beetween inference and assent. A
mathematician would not assent to the conclusion of a complex proof he had
produced himself, without going over his work and seeking the corroboration of
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Figure 41 Cardinal John Henry Newman.
(Photo: akg-images)
others. Sometimes assent is given without argument, or on the basis of bad
argument; and this commonly leads to error.
Is it always wrong, then, to give assent without adequate argument or evidence?
Locke believed so: he gave, as a mark of the love of truth, the not entertaining
any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant.
‘Whatever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the
love of it, loves not truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end.’
If Locke were right, Newman observes, then no lover of truth could accept
religious belief; and Hume and Bentham would be right to accuse believers of
credulity. For, as Newman agrees, the grounds of faith are conjectural, and yet
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they issue in the absolute acceptance of a certain message or doctrine as divine.
Faith starts from probability and ends in peremptory statements.
Newman is thinking not just of any kind of belief in the supernatural, but of
faith strictly so called, contrasted on the one hand with reason and on the other
hand with love. ‘Faith’, in the tradition in which he is writing, is used in a
narrower sense than ‘belief’. Aristotle believed that there was a divine prime
mover unmoved; but his belief was not faith in God. On the other hand, Marlowe’s
Faustus, on the verge of damnation, speaks of Christ’s blood streaming in the
firmament; he has lost hope and charity yet retains faith. So faith contrasts both
with reason and with love. Faith is belief in something as revealed by God; thus
defined, it is a correlate of revelation. If we are to believe something on the word
of God, it must be possible to identify something as God’s word.
Faith of this kind would be condemned on Locke’s criterion: for the reasons
for taking any concrete event or text as a divine revelation fall short of certainty.
But Newman argues that faith is not the only exercise of reason which when
critically examined would be called unreasonable and yet is not so. The choice
of sides in political questions, decisions for or against economic policies, tastes
in literature: in all such cases if we measure people’s grounds merely by the
reasons they produce we have no difficulty in holding them up to ridicule, or
even censure.
Many of our most solid beliefs go well beyond the flimsy evidence any of us
could offer for them. We all believe that Great Britain is an island; but how many
of us have circumnavigated it, or met people who have? We believe that the earth
is a globe, covered with vast tracts of earth and water, whose regions see the sun
by turns. I believe, with the utmost certainy, that I shall die: but what is the
distinct evidence on which I believe it? On all these truths we have an immediate
and unhesitating hold, nor do we think ourselves guilty of not loving truth for
truth’s sake because we cannot reach them through the steps of a proof.
If we refused to give assents going beyond the force of evidence, the world
could not go on, and science itself could never make progress. Probability is the
guide of life. If we insist upon being as sure as is conceivable, in every step of our
course, we must be content to creep along the ground, and can never soar. ‘If we
are intended for great ends, we are called to great hazards; and whereas we are
given absolute certainty in nothing, we must in all things choose between doubt
and inactivity.’
Someone may object that there is a difference between religious faith and the
reasonable, but insufficiently grounded, beliefs to which Newman appeals. In the
ordinary cases, we are always ready to consider evidence which tells against our
belief; but the religious believer adopts a certitude which refuses to entertain any
doubts about the articles of faith. But Newman denies that it is wrong, even in
secular matters, to hold a belief with a magisterial intolerance of contrary sugges-
tions. If we are certain, we spontaneously reject objections as idle phantoms,
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however much they may be insisted on by a pertinacious opponent, or present
themselves through an obsessive imagination.
I certainly should be very intolerant of such a notion as that I shall one day be
Emperor of the French; I should think it too absurd even to be ridiculous, and that
I must be mad before I could entertain it. And did a man try to persuade me that
treachery, cruelty, or ingratitude was as praiseworthy as honesty and temperance,
and that a man who lived the life of a knave and died the death of a brute had
nothing to fear from future retribution, I should think there was no call on me to
listen to his arguments, except with the hope of converting him, though he called
me a bigot and a coward for refusing to enter into his speculations.
To be sure, we can sometimes be certain of something and then later find out
that we were wrong. This does not mean that we should give up all certainty, any
more than the fact that we are sometimes told the wrong time means that we
should dispense with clocks.
How does Newman apply all this to the evidences of religion? The strongest
evidence for the truth of the Christian religion, he believes, is to be found in the
history of Judaism and Christianity; but this evidence only carries weight to those
who are already prepared to receive it. To be ready to accept it, one must already
believe in the existence of God, the possibility of revelation, and the certainty of
a future judgement. The persuasiveness of any proof, Newman says, depends on
what the person to whom it is presented regards as antecedently probable.
Two objections may be made to this. The first is that antecedent probabilities
may be equally available for what is true and what merely pretends to be true, for
a counterfeit revelation as well as a genuine one. They supply no intelligible rule
to determine what is to be believed and what not.
If a claim of miracles is to be acknowledged because it happens to be advanced,
why not for the miracles of India as well as for those of Palestine? If the abstract
probability of a Revelation be the measure of genuineness in a given case, why not
in the case of Mahomet as well as of the Apostles?
Newman, who is never more eloquent than when developing criticisms of his own
position, nowhere succeeds in providing a satisfactory answer to this objection.
Secondly, we may ask why one should have in the first place those beliefs which
Newman regards as necessary for the acceptance of the Christian revelation. What
are the reasons for believing at all in God and in a future judgement? Traditional
arguments offer to prove the existence of God from the nature of the physical
world; but Newman himself has no great confidence in them.
It is indeed a great question whether Atheism is not as philosophically consistent
with the phenomena of the physical world, taken by themselves, as the doctrine of a
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creative and governing Power. But, however this be, the practical safeguard against
Atheism in the case of scientific inquirers is the inward need and desire, the inward
experience of that Power, existing in the mind before and independently of their
examination of His material world.
The inward experience of the divine power, to which Newman here appeals, is to
be found in the voice of conscience. As we conclude to the existence of an
external world from the multitude of our instinctive perceptions, he says, so from
the intimations of conscience, which appear as echoes of an external admonition,
we form the notion of a Supreme Judge. Conscience, considered as a moral sense,
involves intellectual judgement; but conscience is always emotional, therefore it
involves recognition of a living object. Our affections cannot be stirred by inanimate
things, they are correlative with persons.
If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken hearted sorrow which over-
whelms us on hurting a mother; if on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity
of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving
praise from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, to whom
our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we
yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and
waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an
intelligent being.
It is not the mere existence of conscience which Newman regards as establishing
the existence of God: intellectual judgements of right and wrong can be explained
– as they are by many Christian philosophers as well as by Utilitarians – as con-
clusions arrived at by reason. It is the emotional colouring of conscience which
Newman, implausibly, compares to our sense-experience of the external world.
The feelings which he engagingly describes may indeed be appropriate only if
there is a Father in heaven; but they cannot guarantee their own appropriateness.
If the existence of God is intended simply as a hypothesis to explain the nature
of such sentiments, then other hypotheses must also be taken into consideration.
One such is that of Sigmund Freud, to whose philosophy we next turn.
Sigmund Freud
Freud was born into an Austrian Jewish family in 1856 and spent almost all of his
life in Vienna. He trained as a doctor and went into medical practice in 1886. In
1895 he published a work on hysteria which presented a novel analysis of mental
illness. Shortly afterwards he gave up normal medicine and started to practise a
new form of therapy which he called psychoanalysis, consisting, as he put it
himself, in nothing more than an exchange of words between patient and doctor.
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