Kennedy G. Imperial Defence. The Old World Order, 1856-1956
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in the Far East grew throughout 1938 and 1939, the RN became even more
anxious to ensure American naval support if Japan attacked British inter-
ests in the region. While Australia, India, New Zealand, and South Africa
were asked to prepare their naval forces for a higher level of operation with
the RN, in order to protect the Indian Ocean- and Pacific-sea lines of com-
munication, it was American naval power that was seen as being more
important for any RN success, especially in offensive operations, if British
forces were forced to meet the IJN while the RN was involved in operations
in Europe.
35
Plans for allowing the American Far Eastern Fleet to use Sin-
gapore in time of war, as well as requests for American naval units to
operate openly from the British base in time of peace (acting as a signal to
the Japanese of the closeness of the Anglo-American naval relationship),
were all part of the RN’s attempts to bolster its ability to safeguard Britain’s
Far Eastern position.
36
By March 1939, the American Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO) was reported to the Admiralty as declaring:
he [CNO] does not consider it likely that the United States would be
at war with Japan without the United Kingdom being equally at war
with the Japanese, this perhaps explains why the Navy Department do
not seem particularly nervous about fortifying Guam.
37
Following the outbreak of the general war in Europe, in September
1939, and the resulting drain on RN ships, particularly with regard to light
vessels such as cruisers and destroyers, the USN served a vital role in
helping set up an informal system of using its own light forces in the Far
East to provide some of the patrols, in an informal manner, that now-
absent RN vessels would have done. With the fall of France in June 1940
and the loss of The French Marine for any further operations, the USN
continued to grow in importance for Britain’s Far Eastern imperial
defence. Efforts to create an open and formal naval alliance, the American,
British, Dutch, Australia (ABDA) negotiations, met with success by early
1941, with USN forces being the key element in the operational capabilities
of the group. As well, in an attempt to re-create the success of the blockade
of the First World War, initially in European waters with operations aimed
at Germany and Italy and later, in early 1941, against Japan, the USN was
an integral part of the setting up and maintenance of the success of the
naval blockade constituted to protect the British Empire.
38
The initial stages of the Second World War witnessed the RN performing
its traditional role of guardian of the global sea lines of communication that
poured material, manpower, and fiscal strength into the British Empire’s
war effort. Canadian warships joined with Atlantic units of the RN, while
Australian, New Zealand, South African and Indian crews and vessels
patrolled the Mediterranean, Indian, and Pacific oceans in order to ensure
the safe passage of vital war stocks.
39
And while the Empire brought all its
naval might to bear, the course of the war in Europe proved to be all that
142 G. Kennedy
the RN and its associates could do. Increasingly, the protection of the Far
Eastern elements of the empire fell to the USN, which was willing to fill the
role of deterrent to any Japanese plans to exploit the RN’s weakened state
for its own advantage. However, on 7 December 1941, even that deterrent
failed. Japan, understanding the strategic maritime linkage between the
United States and British Empire, meant that it would have to defeat the
USN as well as the RN if it was to pick the low-hanging fruit of the British
Empire of the Far East for itself and attacked the American fleet in Pearl
Harbor. From that moment on, and after the destruction of Force Z off Sin-
gapore, the RN was the junior partner in naval operations in the Pacific. If it
was to protect British imperial interests in that region, its actions would have
to be as much diplomatic as they were military, and they would have to be
aimed as much at its naval partner, the USN, as they were against the IJN.
By 1943, it was very clear to the Admiralty that American naval power
was the dominant force in the war in the Pacific. That power gave great
credence that the United States would play the determining role in both
the creation and implementation of the post-war system of defence in the
Far East. Therefore, after naval supremacy was assured in the European
theatre of operations, the RN turned its attentions to the Pacific “doing its
share”. The Admiralty recognized that if the USN was seen to have been
the only substantial force to have waged war against Japan, Britain would
be placed in a far weaker position in the post-war negotiations concerning
how that region would be organized and run. In particular, the retention
of Singapore, continued good relations with Australia and New Zealand,
the re-establishment of Britain’s financial dominance in Hong Kong, as
well as the forging of a new set of relations with a more powerful China,
all meant that the British war effort had to make an impact in the Pacific.
And the best tool for that job was the RN. In Washington, the RN’s repre-
sentatives to the various joint planning committees pushed American
naval and political leaders into allowing the RN to take on a greater role
in the naval operations being conducted in the Pacific. Against some
strong opposition, this condition was achieved. Once the political battles
had been won, it was up to the operational commanders of the British
Pacific Fleet (BPF) to ensure that the RN performed well and that the
entire world, especially the Americans, would know about it. The perform-
ance of the BPF during the last two years of the war in the Pacific achieved
its objective. Despite inferior equipment, especially in carrier aviation, few
vessels, a lack of basing, overstretched supply lines, and a lack of an under-
way replenishment system that would allow it to maintain the operational
tempo of the USN, the RN did what it was asked to do to the best of its
ability. Its close professional ties and sterling performance won Britain a
major role in the re-organization of the region in the post-war period
thereby protecting Britain’s imperial interests in the Far East.
40
The end of the Second World War, the second global naval war fought
by the RN in thirty-one years, saw an operationally effective, modern,
The Royal Navy and imperial defence 143
powerful force in place by 1945. Carrier aviation and submarines were two
areas of weakness however, a situation that would have some impact on
the RN’s post–Cold War operational capabilities but little on operations
designed for Imperial Defence in the post-war world. More important for
the RN and its imperial defence role were three non-naval factors: the
existence of the atomic bomb; financial restrictions on a war-ravaged
Britain, and a greater sense of nationalism extant throughout the Empire
due to the imperial war effort.
41
The advent of the atomic bomb created a
challenge to the RN as being the only British service that could achieve
strategic effect. The Royal Air Force (RAF), now able to claim the ability
to destroy whole cities with one aircraft, once more challenged the RN as
to which service would have pride of place in any funding. That funding
was now extremely limited and the rationale for why the RN needed the
lion’s share would have to be carefully crafted. Finally, with the loss of
India and restricted basing right in the dominions, the RN’s ability to
sustain operations at a high tempo was impaired. If RN ships were to serve
around the world, the question asked was: why could not Australian, New
Zealand, or Canadian forces take on a greater presence, particularly in the
Pacific? The swift downsizing of the naval forces of those nations did not
allow, however, for any creation of a global, imperial navy.
That restricted circumstance was obvious during operations in the
Korean War. While major RN and dominion naval forces operated con-
stantly throughout the entire war, the strain on replenishment and supply
highlighted the limitations at the operational level now facing the RN.
With a long supply line from the Indian Ocean and few logistic vessels
available, the RN was still very reliant on support at all levels from the
USN.
42
However, Korean War operations were not RN imperial roles in
the new post-war world. Those were UN- or NATO-styled operations all
linked to large-scale, conventional war scenarios.
The RN’s imperial defence role in the period from 1945 to 1956 was to
be found predominantly in small ship actions, patrols, humanitarian aid,
and the other assorted tasks that only naval power can perform so effect-
ively but which scholars chose to ignore due to their lack of battle and
derring-do. Scholars who wish to understand the operational reality of
that period and the influence of empire on those operations have some
work still to do. Thus, the literature on the imperial nature of RN opera-
tions from 1949 to 1956 is almost non-existent, apart from small studies
of RN operations during the Suez Crisis of 1956 itself.
43
However, the
reality for the RN of this period was that it very much still thought in
terms of imperial defence. While, as some could rightly argue, the “impe-
rial angle” was one which allowed another budget line to be presented to
the Treasury, such a limited view of the place of imperial defence in the
post-war RN psyche would be mistaken. The RN as an institution still very
much believed its job was to defend the global interests of greater Britain,
no matter what condition that collective might be in. Admiralty policy,
144 G. Kennedy
planning, and strategic documents of all types from that era are littered
with this belief. That corporate identity, the RN’s view of imperial
defence in the mid-1950s, is best described at length by one of the RN’s
greatest First Sea Lords and a man who understood the RN’s place in the
imperial defence system exactly, Lord Chatfield:
In imperial defence it is not enough merely to defend the approaches
to these islands, or even the North Atlantic. Our defence must be
worldwide. It is often not understood that there are coastal areas in
which we cannot act against the enemy – their coastal areas – and that
they have similar difficulty in acting against ours. It is those areas which
the mine and the submarine render dangerous. Those areas of ours
must be defended by anti-mine and anti-submarine ships, minesweep-
ers and frigates; and they must be assisted by coastal aircraft. As time
goes on and weapons improve, these coastal areas are always increas-
ing. But outside them lie the great oceans, and in those oceans we have
to hold the seas and defend our merchant ships. It is impossible to do
that merely by being what is called “on the defensive”. There has been
a lot of talk lately on this subject, and people have been saying how sad
it is that the Navy is becoming a defensive service. But the Navy always
has been a defensive service to defend the seas against an enemy.
There is nothing offensive about it. That is why, I think, it is respected
by our countrymen, in particular – at least, it has been in the past. But
although it is becoming a commonplace to speak about defence, thee
defence of the seas is not like a military defence, where men sit in
trenches and wait for the enemy to attack them. It is an offensive
defensive. The Navy’s defensive is an offensive defensive. To pursue
the enemy all over the world until it finds him and destroys him – that
is the role of the Navy in maritime defence ...
44
Defence of global interests, of an empire, was not a dead concept in the
RN by 1956. Indeed, the idea of empire and the values of law, order,
justice, and righteousness were as strong as ever for the senior service and
their ethos of what they were defending. The British Empire was not just a
territorial or geographic possession for the RN. Seldom it was in the
history of that service. It was much an intellectual and philosophical belief
system as anything, and it was that image of values, of good, that the RN
still saw itself as a defender by 1956.
Notes
1 Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis, MD, 1994); David
French, “The Royal Navy and the Defense of the British Empire, 1914–1918”,
in Keith Neilson and Elizabeth Jane Errington, eds, Navies and Global Defense:
Theories and Strategy (Westport, CT, 1995).
The Royal Navy and imperial defence 145
2 The best summary of all these post-war changes to the international system is
found in Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed: European International History,
1919–1933 (Oxford, 2005); Patrick Finney, ed., Palgrave Advances in Inter-
national History (London, 2005); Stephen W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the
Wars, Vol. 1 (London, 1968); Malcolm H. Murfett, “Look Back in Anger:
The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921–1922”, in B.J.C.
McKercher, ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899–1939
(Westport, CT, 1992), pp. 83–104.
3 Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars
(London, 2000); Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the
Versailles Order, 1919–1939 (Cambridge, 2006); Keith Neilson and Greg
Kennedy, eds, Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald
Mackenzie Schurman (London, 1997).
4 C.I. Hamilton, “Expanding Naval Powers: Admiralty Private Secretaries and
Private Offices, 1800–1945”, War in History, 10 (2003), pp. 127–156; C.I. Hamil-
ton, “British Naval Policy, Policy-makers and Financial Control, 1860–1945”,
War in History, 12 (2005), pp. 371–395; G.C. Peden, The Treasury and British
Public Policy (Oxford, 2000); G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury
(Edinburgh, 1979); Clavin, Patricia, The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain,
Germany, France and the United States, 1931–36 (Basingstoke, 1996).
5 Greg Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939
(London, 2002); Joseph A. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany,
1933–1939: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War
(London, 1998); Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and
the Imperial Japanese Navy (Oxford, 1981); Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl
Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–1941 (London, 1995); Carolyn J.
Kitching, Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference (Basingstoke, 2003);
Tadashi Kuramatsu, “The Geneva Conference of 1927: The British Preparation
for the Conference, December 1926 to June 1927”, Journal of Strategic Studies,
19 (1996), pp. 104–121; P. Haggie, Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British
Empire Against Japan, 1931–1941 (Oxford, 1981).
6 Richard Fanning, “The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarry”
in McKercher, Arms Limitation. pp. 64–79; Christopher Hall, Britain, America
and Arms Control, 1921–1937 (London, 1987); Gaines Post Jr, “Mad Dogs and
Englishmen: British Rearmament, Deterrence and Appeasement, 1934–35”,
Armed Forces and Society, 14 (1988), pp. 329–357; Carolyn J. Kitching, Britain and
the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919–1934 (London, 1999).
7 W.R. Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939 (Oxford, 1971): Ian
Cowman, Dominion and Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations in the Pacific,
1937–1941 (Oxford, 1996); P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism:
Crisis and Deconstruction 1914–1990 (London, 1993); James Belich, Making
Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders, 2 vols (Auckland, 2001); John Gooch,
“The Politics of Strategy: Great Britain, Australia and the War Against Japan”,
War in History, 10 (2003) pp. 424–447; Lorna Lloyd, “ ‘Us and Them’: The
Changing Nature of Commonwealth Diplomacy, 1880–1973”, Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics, 39 (2001), pp. 9–30; Paul Twomey, “Small Power Secur-
ity Through Great Power Arms Control? – Australian Perceptions of Disarma-
ment, 1919–1930”, War and Society, 8 (1990), pp. 71–99; John D. Meehan,
“Steering Clear of Great Britain: Canada’s Debate over Collective Security in
the Far Eastern Crisis of 1937”, The International History Review, 25 (2003),
pp. 253–281.
8 John B. Hattendorf ed., Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean, Past, Present
and Future (London, 2000), pp. 51–147; Reynolds M. Salerno, Vital Crossroads:
Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935–1940 (Ithaca, NY, and
146 G. Kennedy
London, 2002); Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism
1935–1940 (London, 1998); G. Bruce Strang, “Imperial Dreams: The Mussolini-
Laval Accords of January 1935”, Historical Journal, 44 (2002), pp. 799–809; Brock
Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934–1940 (Montreal,
1998); W.C. Mills, “The Nyon Conference: Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden,
and the Appeasement of Italy in 1937”, International History Review, 15 (1993),
pp. 1–22.
9 Jon Robb-Webb, “ ‘Light Two Lanterns, the British are Coming by Sea’: Royal
Navy Participation in the Pacific 1944–1945”, in Greg Kennedy, ed., British
Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000 (London, 2005), pp. 128–153; Kevin
Smith, Conflict over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World
War (Cambridge, 1996).
10 Richard Moore, The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons (London, 2001); J. Lewis,
Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Postwar Strategic Defence, 1942–47
(London, 1988); Ian Speller, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence
Policy, 1945–56 (London, 2001).
11 Jon T. Sumida, “British Naval Procuement and Technological Change,
1919–39” in Philip P. O’Brien, ed., Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth
Century and Beyond (London, 2002), pp. 128–148; John Ferris, “The Last
Decade of British Maritime Spremacy, 1919–1929”, Keith Neilson and Greg
Kennedy, eds, Far Flung Lines, pp. 63–82.
12 John B. Hattendorf ed., Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean; Greg
Kennedy, “Depression and Security: Aspects Influencing the United States Navy
During the Hoover Administration”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 6 (1995), pp.
342–372; Ferris, John Robert, Men, Money, and Diplomacy. The Evolution of British
Strategic Foreign Policy, 1919–1926 (Ithaca, NY, 1989); B.R. Sullivan, “A Fleet in
Being: The Rise and Fall of Italian Seapower, 1861–1943”, The International
History Review, 10 (1988), pp. 111–132; S. Morewood, “Anglo-Italian Rivalry in
the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1935–1940” in R. Boyce and E.M. Robert-
son, eds, Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (London,
1989); Keith Neilson, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and British Strategic
Foreign Policy, 1902–1914” in O’Brien, Phillips Payson, ed., The Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, 1902–1922 (London, 2004), pp. 48–64.
13 Letter from Chatfield to Keyes, 28 October 1921 in Paul Halpern ed., The Keyes
Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet
Baron Keyes of Zeeburge, Vol. II, 1919–1938 (London, 1979) p. 57.
14 On the Washington Naval Conference 1921–1922 and various aspects of imper-
ial defence issues, see, Erik Goldstein and John Maurer, eds, “Special Issue on
the Washington Conference, 1921–1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and
the Road to Pearl Harbor”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4 (1993); John Ferris, “ ‘The
Greatest Power on Earth’: Great Britain in the 1920s”, The International History
Review, 13 (1991), pp. 726–750.
15 O’Brien, Phillips Payson, ed., The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 (London,
2004).
16 J. Blatt, “The Parity that Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy Towards Italy
at the Washington Naval Conference, 1921–22, and Interwar French Foreign
Policy”, French Historical Studies, 12 (1981), pp. 54–72; B.R. Sullivan, “Italian
Naval Power and the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–1922”,
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4 (1993), pp. 87–101.
17 Phillips P. O’Brien, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policies,
1900–1936 (Westport, 1998).
18 Letter from Chatfield to Keyes, 28 October 1921 in Paul Halpern, ed., The Keyes
Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet
Baron Keyes of Zeeburge, Vol. II, 1919–1938, p. 57.
The Royal Navy and imperial defence 147
19 Bryan M. Ranft, “Admiral David Earl Beatty (1919–1927)”, in Malcolm H.
Murfett, ed., The First Sea Lords: From Fisher to Mountbatten (Westport, 1995),
p. 138.
20 B.M. Ranft, ed., The Beatty Papers, vol. 2 (London, 1993), Doc. 192.
21 Ralph Harrington, “ ‘The Mighty Hood’: Navy, Empire, War at Sea and the
British National Imagination, 1920–60”, Journal of Contemporary History, 38
(2003), pp. 171–185; Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy
Between the Wars, pp. 162–180; John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire
(Manchester, 1986); J.A. Mangan, ed., Making Imperial Mentalities: Socialisation
and British Imperialism (Manchester, 1990); Anthony Clayton, The British Empire
as a Superpower, 1919–39 (Athens, 1986), pp. 1–15; Richard English and
Michael Kenny, “Public Intellectuals and the Question of British Decline”,
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3 (2001), pp. 259–283; Ann
Trotter, “The Dominions and Imperial Defence: Hankey’s Tour in 1934”,
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2 (1973), pp. 318–332. It is inter-
esting to note that some of the recent flavours of the week, in terms of the
study of British imperialism and self-perception, David Cannadine, Orientalism:
How the British saw their Empire (London, 2000); Bernard Porter, The Absent-
Minded Imperialists: What the British Really Thought About Empire (Oxford, 2004);
Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London, 2003) have
no significant references to this relationship at all, revealing just how much
help “serious” scholars of the British empire need to be corrected by those who
can rightfully mix military/naval aspects of the British imperial experience
into this wider framework and methodological approach.
22 Here, the model that students of the interwar intellectual mind of the RN
could follow with good effect is that set out by Donald M. Schurman, The Edu-
cation of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867–1914
(London, 1965); Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox
Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession (London, 1998); Jon T.
Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of
Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD, 1997); Peter Hore, ed.,
Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist, Socialist (London, 2003). Modern works that
attempt to grapple with the ideas of identity and culture in the British Imperial
world often make no attempt to involve the military/naval aspects: see Linda
Colley, “The difficulties of empire: present, past and future”, Historical Research,
79 (2006), pp. 367–382; John Gascoigne, “The Expanding Historiography of
British Imperialism”, Historical Journal, 49 (2006), pp. 577–592; Richard Price,
“One Big Thing: Britain, Its Empire, and Their Imperial Culture”, Journal of
British Studies, 45 (2006), pp. 602–627.
23 Joseph Moretz, The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Oper-
ational Perspective (London, 2002); Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far
East, 1919–1939: Planning for War Against Japan (London, 2004), pp. 97–123; G.
Till, Air Power in the Royal Navy, 1914–1945 (London, 1979); B. Ranft, ed., Tech-
nical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860–1939 (London, 1977); Philip P.
O’Brien, ed., Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond
(London, 2002); W. Murray and A.R. Millett, eds, Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period (Cambridge, 1996); D. Edgerton, Science, Technology and British
Industrial Decline, 1870–1970 (Cambridge, 1996); Ian Speller, ed., The Royal
Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century (London, 2005).
24 Keith Neilson, “The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, British Strategic
Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement”, English
Historical Review, 118 (2003), pp. 651–684; Steven Morewood, “Protecting
the Jugular Vein of Empire; The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy,
1919–1941”, War in Society, 10 (1992), pp. 81–107; Donald F. Bittner, “Britannia’s
148 G. Kennedy
Sheathed Sword: The Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar
Years – A Passive Response”, The Journal of Military History, 55 (1991). pp.
345–364.
25 Charles Bloch, “Great Britain, German Rearmament, and the Naval Agreement
of 1935”, in Hans W. Gatke, ed., European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919–39
(Chicago, IL, 1972); D.C. Watt, “Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An
Interim Judgment”, Journal of Military History, 28 (1956), pp. 155–175; R.A.
Best, “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Aspect of Appease-
ment”, Naval War College Review, 34 (1981), pp. 68–85; Williamson Murray,
“The Role of Italy in British Strategy, 1938–1939”, Journal of the Royal United Ser-
vices Institute, 124 (1979), pp. 13–32, R.A. Salerno, “Multilateral Strategy and
Diplomacy: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Mediterranean
Crisis, 1935–1936”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17 (1994), pp. 42–60; E. Grove, “A
War Fleet Built for Peace: British Naval Rearmament in the 1930s and the
Dilemma of Deterrence Versus Defence”, Naval War College Review, 44 (1991),
pp. 3–16; Richard Harding, The Royal Navy, 1930–2000: Innovation and Defence
(London, 2005).
26 Patricia Clavin, The Failure of Economic Diplomacy, pp. 55–80; R.F. Holland,
Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918–1939 (London, 1981); Ian M.
Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919–1939 (London, 1972);
Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the
Economy and Empire, 1926–1932 (Cambridge, 1992); J. Henry Richardson,
British Economic Foreign Policy (London, 1936); Greg Kennedy, “ ‘Rat in Power’:
Neville Chamberlain and the Creation of British Foreign Policy, 1931–1939” in
Thomas Otte, ed., Makers of British Foreign Policy. From Pitt to Thatcher (Bas-
ingstoke, 2002), pp. 173–189; Michael Roi, Alternative to Appeasement: Sir Robert
Vansittart and Alliance Diplomacy (Westport, 1997).
27 At this point, there is still no overarching, scholarly study of the investment
and upgrades to the global basing structure required by the RN in the inter-
war. Individual studies exist, most of them focused on Singapore. But none
look comprehensively at the political, fiscal, economic, technical, and military
aspects of the entire basing system. L. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s
Mediterranean Crisis, 1936–39 (Cambridge, 1975); R. Pritchard, Far Eastern Influ-
ences upon British Strategy Towards the Great Powers, 1937–1939 (London, 1987);
Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War (Cam-
bridge, 1996); Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia,
1914–1941 (London, 2002); Greg Kennedy, “Symbol of Imperial Defence: The
Role of Singapore in British and American Far Eastern Strategic Relations,
1933–1941”, in Brian P. Farrell and Sandy Hunter, eds, Sixty Years On: The Fall
of Singapore Revisited (Singapore, 2002); G.A.H. Gordon, British Seapower and
Procurement Between the Wars; A Reappraisal of Rearmament (London, 1988);
Nicholas Tracy, ed., The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900–1940
(London, 1997), pp. 425–604.
28 Christopher Bell, “ ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far
Eastern Strategy, 1921–1941”, Journal of Military History, 60 (1996), pp. 61–88;
Christopher Bell, “The ‘Singapore Strategy’ and the Deterrence of Japan:
Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z”, English Histor-
ical Review, 116 (2001), pp. 604–634; Antony Best, “Constructing an Image:
British Intelligence and Whitehall’s Perception of Japan, 1931–1939”, Intelli-
gence and National Security, 11 (1996), pp. 345–364; Timothy Wilford, “Watching
the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence before Pearl
Harbor”, Intelligence and National Security, 17 (2002), pp. 131–164.
29 Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Airpower in the Interwar Period: The Information
Dimension”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27 (2004), pp. 298–323; Ong Chit
The Royal Navy and imperial defence 149
150 G. Kennedy
Chung, Operation Matador: Britain’s War Plans Against the Japanese, 1918–1941
(Singapore, 1997); Jon Sumida, “The Royal Navy and Technological Change,
1915–1945”, in Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson, eds, Men, Machines, and
War (Waterloo, ON, 1988); Orest Babij, “The Advisory Committee on Trade
Questions in Time of War”, The Northern Mariner, 7 (1997) pp. 1–10; Orest
Babij, “The Royal Navy and Inter-war Plans for War Against Japan: The
Problem of Oil Supply”, in Greg Kennedy, ed., The Merchant Marine in Inter-
national Affairs, 1850–1950 (London, 2000), pp. 84–106; I.M. Gow, “The Royal
Navy and Japan, 1921–1941”, in Ian Gow and Yoichi Hirama, eds, The History of
Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, vol. III: The Military Dimension (London,
2003), pp. 109–126.
30 Greg Kennedy, “Becoming Reliant on the Kindness of Strangers: Britain’s Stra-
tegic Foreign Policy, Naval Arms Limitation and the Soviet Factor, 1935–1937”,
War in History, 11 (2004), pp. 79–105; Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and
the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 166–212; David K. Varey, “The Politics of Naval
Aid: The Foreign Office, the Admiralty, and Anglo-Soviet Technical Coopera-
tion, 1936–37”, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 14 (2003), pp. 50–68.
31 Tracy, Collective Naval Defence of Empire, pp. 484–485; Sean Greenwood,
“ ‘Caligula’s Horse’ Revisted: Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for the Co-ordina-
tion of Defence, 1936–1939”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17 (1994), pp. 17–38.
32 Salerno, Vital Crossroads, pp. 101–102; Greg Kennedy, Intelligence and National
Security (2006).
33 Ibid., pp. 101–102; Paul G. Halpern, “French and Italian Naval Policy in the
Mediterranean, 1898–1945”, in Hattendorf, ed., Naval Strategy and Policy in the
Mediterranean, pp. 78–106.
34 Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939.
35 Ian Cowman, Dominion and Decline, pp. 25–36; Merrill Bartlett and Robert
William Love, Jr, “Anglo-American Naval Diplomacy and the British Pacific
Fleet, 1942–1945” American Neptune, 42 (1982), pp. 203–216; David A. Day,
“Promise and Performance: Britain’s Pacific Pledge, 1943–45”, War and Society,
4 (1986), pp. 71–93; Thomas Hall, “ ‘Mere Drops in the Ocean’: The Politics
and Planning of the Contribution of the British Commonwealth to the Final
Defeat of Japan, 1944–45”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 16 (2005), pp. 93–115;
Christopher Bell, “Winston Churchill, Pacific Security, and the Limits of British
Power, 1921–41”, in John H. Mauer, ed., Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before
the World Wars: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (London and Portland, OR,
2003), pp. 51–87.
36 Greg Kennedy, “Symbol of Imperial Defence: The Role of Singapore in British
and American Far Eastern Strategic Relations, 1933–1941”, in Brian P. Farrell
and Sandy Hunter, eds, Sixty Years On; Greg Kennedy, “What Worth the Ameri-
cans? The British Strategic Foreign Policy-making Elite’s View of American
Maritime Power in the Far East, 1933–1941”, in Greg Kennedy, ed., British
Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000 (London, 2005), pp. 90–118; Galen Roger
Perras, “ ‘Our Position in the Far East Would be Stronger Without this Unsatis-
factory Commitment’: Britain and the Reinforcement of Hong Kong, 1941”,
Canadian Journal of History, 30 (1995), pp. 232–259.
37 Greg Kennedy, “What Worth the Americans?”, p. 103.
38 W.N. Medlicott, History of the Second World War, The Economic Blockade, Vols. I &
II (London, 1959); CAB 96/4, War Cabinet, Far Eastern Committee, FE(41)
Paper 217, Feb. 1941.
39 David Stevens, ed., The Royal Australian Navy in World War II (Sydney, 1996);
G. Hermon Gill, “The Official History of Australia in the War of 1939–1945”,
Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1945 (Canberra, 1957, 1968) 2 Vols; T.R. Frame,
J.V.P. Goldrick, and P.D. Jones, Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy (Sydney,
1991); Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run (Toronto, 1985); J. Boutilier, ed., The
RCN in Retrospect (Vancouver, 1982); W.A.B. Douglas, ed., The RCN in Transition
(Vancouver, 1988); Ian McGibbon, Blue-water Rationale, The Naval Defence of New
Zealand 1914–1942 (Wellington, 1991); W. David McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares
for War, Defence Policy, 1919–39 (Christchurch, 1988). Good works combining the
nationalistic naval histories with the core histories of the British Empire and RN
as central to those nation’s naval development are areas where graduate students
from the United Kingdom and abroad could still make significant contributions
to the understanding of the maritime nature of the pre-Commonwealth world.
40 Michael A. Simpson, A Life of Admiral of the Fleet, Andrew Cunningham: A Twen-
tieth Century Naval Leader (London, 2004), pp. 188–208; Michael A. Simpson,
The Somerville Papers (Aldershot, 1995); H.P. Willmott, Grave of a Dozen Schemes
(Annapolis, MD, 1996); Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “ ‘One Last Crusade’: The
British Pacific Fleet and its Impact on the Anglo-American Alliance”, English
Historical Review, 12 (2005), pp. 429–466.
41 Ian Speller, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy; Eric Grove,
Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II (London, 1987);
N.A.M. Rodger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 1996);
S. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World?
(Basingstoke, 2002); G. Till, Seapower at the Millennium (Stroud, 2001); Admi-
ralty Board Memo, June 1949, in John B. Hattendorf, R.J.B. Knight, A.W.H.
Pearsall, N.A.M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till, eds, British Naval Documents,
1204–1960 (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 803–808.
42 Peter Nash, “The Royal Navy in Korea: Replenishment and Sustainability”, in
Kennedy, ed., British Naval Strategy East of Suez, pp. 154–178; Norman Friedman,
“Electronics and the Royal Navy”, in Harding, ed., The Royal Navy, pp. 246–286;
Malcolm Llewellyn Jones, “The Royal Navy and the Challenge of the Fast
Submarine, 1945–1954”, in Harding, ed., The Royal Navy, pp. 135–170; C. Hamp-
shire, The Royal Navy Since 1945 (London, 1990); Letter from Vice-Admiral W.W.
Davis, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, to Admiral, the Earl Mountbatten of Burma,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, 12 February 1955, in Hattendorf, Knight,
Pearsall, Rodger, and Till, eds, British Naval Documents, pp. 814–816.
43 David Stevens, “The British Naval Role East of Suez: An Australian Perspect-
ive”, in Kennedy, ed., British Naval Strategy East of Suez, pp. 221–243; K. Hack,
Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore,
1941–68 (Richmond, 2001); M.H. Murfett, In Jeopardy: The Royal Navy and
British Far Eastern Defence Policy, 1945–1951 (Kuala Lumpur, 1995); Geoffrey
Till, “Quarantine Operations: The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol”,
in Speller, ed., The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century,
pp. 129–147.
44 “A speech by Lord Chatfield, House of Lords, 2 December 1954” in Hattendorf,
Knight, Pearsall, Rodger, and Till, eds., British Naval Documents, pp. 814.
The Royal Navy and imperial defence 151