Interstate conflicts
Over the next 15 years, the international system will have to adjust to changing power
relationships in key regions.
• China's potential. Estimates of China beyond five years are unpredictable. Some
projections indicate that Chinese power will rise because of the growth of its
economic and military capabilities. Other projections indicate that political,
social, and economic pressures will increasingly challenge the stability and
legitimacy of the regime. Mostassessments today argue that China will seek to
avoid conflict in the region to promote stable economic growth and to ensure
internal stability. A strong China, others assert, would seek to adjust regional
power arrangements to its advantage, risking conflict with neighbors and some
powers external to the region. A weak China would increase prospects for
criminality, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, WMD proliferation, and
widespread social instability.
• Russia's decline. By 2015, Russia will be challenged even more than today to
adjust its expectations for world leadership to the sharply reduced resources it
will have to play that role. The quality of Russian governance is an open question
as is whether the country will be able to make the transition in a manner that
preserves rather than breaks regional stability.
• Japan's uncertainty. In the view of many experts, Japan will have difficulty
maintaining its current position as the world's third largest economy by 2015.
Tokyo has so far not shown a willingness to carry through the painful economic
reforms necessary to slow the erosion of its leadership role in Asia. In the
absence of an external shock, Japan is similarly unlikely to accelerate changes in
security policy.
• India's prospects. India will strengthen its role as a regional power, hut many
uncertainties about the effects of global trends on its society cast doubt on how
far India will go. India faces growing extremes between wealth and poverty, a
mixed picture on natural resources, and problems with internal governance.
The changing dynamics of state power will combine with other factors to affect the risk
of conflict in various regions. Changing military capabilities will be prominent among the
factors that determine the risk of war. In South Asia, for example, that risk will remain
fairly high over the next 15 years. India and Pakistan are both prone tomiscalculation.
Both will continue to build up their nuclear and missile forces.
India most likely will expand the size of its nuclear-capable force. Pakistan's nuclear and
missile forces also will continue to increase. Islamabad has publicly claimed that the
number of nuclear weapons and missiles it deploys will be based on «minimum»
deterrence, and will be independent of the size of India's arsenal. A noticeable increase
in the size of India's arsenal, however, would prompt Pakistan to further increase the
size of its own arsenal.
Russia will be unable to maintain conventional forces, that are both sufficient and
modern or to project significant in Hilary power with conventional means. The Russian
military will increasingly rely on its declining strategic and theater nuclear arsenals to
deter or, if deterrence fails, to counter large-scale conventional assaults on Russian
territory.
• Moscow will maintain as many strategic missiles and associated nuclear
warheads as it believes it can afford but well below START I or II
5
limitations.
The total Russian force by 2015, including air launched cruise missiles, probably
will be below 2,500 warheads.
• Russia will invest scarce resources in selected and secretive military technology
programs, especially WMD, hoping to counter Western conventional and strategic
superiority,
China by 2015 will have deployed tens to several lens of missiles with nuclear warheads
targeted against the Dinted Stales, mostly more survivable land- and sea-based mobile
missiles. It also will have hundreds of shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles for use