Finn Richard B. Winners in Peace. MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan
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37. Memo of conversation between Narahashi and several GS officers, Feb. 25, 1946, Hussey
Papers, NDLT. [BACK]
38. Memo of meeting, Feb. 22, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT. The GS drafters opposed an
amendment procedure requiring a two-thirds vote of all members of each house of the Diet and
favored a two-thirds vote of the members of each house present and voting. Kades was at a loss
to explain how the final version of the constitution came out with the more stringent provision
and thought that General Whitney must have decided to go along with the Meiji Constitution
version and Matsumoto Joji's position (CLKL). At the meeting with Matsumoto on February 22,
1946, Whitney had seemed amenable to compromise on this issue. [BACK]
39. PRJ , 625-630; int. with Kades. The Americans claimed that the Japanese used translation
devices to change the meanings of Japanese words. For example, they tried and failed to
substitute the word seiji , meaning "politics," for the word seifu , meaning "government," and
shiko , meaning "supremacy," for shuken , meaning "sovereignty." (See Koseki, "Japanizing the
Constitution," 239.) [BACK]
40. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 236; ints. with Kades and Poole; CLKL. The first part of
the thirty-hour session on March 4-5 was stormy. Not only did Matsumoto walk out of the
meeting after his quarrel with Kades about translation points, but they had a curious tiff earlier
over an unusual provision in the SCAP draft providing that "the ultimate fee to the land and to all
natural resources reposes in the state as the collective responsibility of the people." Matsumoto
opposed this. Williams called it the "Red Clause." The Americans agreed to delete the clause. (J.
Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 115-116.) In land-short Japan, especially in urban areas,
this provision might have helped control large private holdings of real estate and exorbitant
prices. See comment of Tsuru, "Nihon senryo," 208. [BACK]
41. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 174; PRJ, 657 ; Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 259-279, 279-288.
When Shidehara showed the Tenno the final draft, he expressed the hope that the peerage could
be retained, and Shidehara replied that would be quite impossible (int. with Eto). SCAP's original
plan had been that the peerage would disappear as living peers died off, but when the Japanese
side proposed immediate abolition, SCAP agreed (Takemae, "Kades Memoir," 284-285).
[BACK]
42. Borton, Japan's Modern Century , 424, fn. 7. [BACK]
43. Blakeslee, The FEC , 48-55. [BACK]
44. Ibid., 49. [BACK]
45. Ibid., 50-51. [BACK]
46. Ibid., 52. [BACK]
47. Eto (ed.), Senyo shiroku , vol. 3, 43. [BACK]
48. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 302-303; McNelly, "The Renunciation of War." [BACK]
49. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 411; U.S. Congress, Selected Speeches — Douglas MacArthur ,
86; McNelly, "General MacArthur's Pacifism." [BACK]
50. Borton, Japan's Modem Century , 419-421; FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 153-155; FRUS, 1947 , vol.
6, 221. [BACK]
51. Williams ltr. to author, Nov. 17, 1983; int. with Shirasu. [BACK]
Chapter 8 The Emergence of Yoshida Shigeru
1. DOS, Occupation , 136; Blakeslee, The FEC , 58, 59-63. [BACK]
2. SCAPIN 677, PRJ , 477; Reischauer, My Life , 107-108. General MacArthur assumed all
powers of government over Korea south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel on September 7, 1945, as
commander of U.S. Army forces in the Far East but delegated operational command to
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the commanding general of U.S. Army forces in Korea. All
Japanese administrative authority there was terminated by a SCAP order of October 2, 1945,
following a storm of protest in Korea that Japanese officials were being permitted to continue
administrative functions. Nevertheless, both GS and POLAD in Tokyo were for some months
involved in advising on policy for Korea. U.S. military government was established in the
Ryukyus (Okinawa) soon after the surrender of Japan; the Ryukyus were administered by the
United States separately from Japan until 1972. [BACK]
3. PRJ , 719-720. [BACK]
4. Sone, Watakushi no memoaru , 138. [BACK]
5. Ltrs. of May 4, 1947, JWC; PRJ , 494-495. The outstanding authority on the purge program in
occupied Japan, Hans Baerwald, who served in GS, wrote that the purge of Hatoyama seemed to
exemplify the view the "a case could be made supporting the purge of almost anyone" on the
basis of the broad definitions in the January 4, 1946, purge directive ( The Purge , 24). [BACK]
6. YM , 72. [BACK]
7. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 144-152; YM , 72-74. Yoshida suggested several other
possible candidates. One of these was Kojima Kazuo, an old-guard politician, who rejected the
offer because of his age. The other was Matsudaira Tsuneo, a well-born former ambassador to
the United States and minister of the imperial household, whom Hatoyama rejected. Some
machine politicans in the Liberal Party opposed Yoshida as a political neophyte too old to be an
effective leader. [BACK]
8. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 149-150; YM , 72-74. [BACK]
9. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 150-151; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 105-106; Takemi, Nihon
ishakai , 12-14; YM , 75; Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 87; int. with Aso Kazuko.
[BACK]
10. YM , 75; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 105-106; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 106. [BACK]
11. Yoshida ltr., May 15, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida. [BACK]
12. For the Japanese, the occupation was "primarily a MacArthur operation, secondarily an
American operation, and only remotely an Allied operation" (Kawai, Japan's American
Interlude , 18 ). [BACK]
13. Yoshida's service as prime minister in five cabinets: May 22, 1946-May 24, 1947; October
19, 1948-February 16, 1949; February 16, 1949-October 30, 1952; October 30, 1952-May 21,
1953; May 21, 1953-December 10, 1954. He also served concurrently as foreign minister to the
end of April 1952, when the San Francisco peace treaty came into force. [BACK]
14. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 186. [BACK]
15. YM , 205; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 108; Iriye Sukemasa, Diary, entry of May 19, 1946,
Asahi shimbun , Jan. 27, 1989, 4. [BACK]
16. Sodei, Makkasa , 97-122; YM , 200-201. [BACK]
17. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 165; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 110-111; Inoki, Hyoden
Yoshida , vol. 3, 166. [BACK]
18. Gayn, Japan Diary , 223. [BACK]
19. Blakeslee, The FEC , 176. [BACK]
20. Blakeslee, The FEC , 178; PRJ , 749; Draper ltr. to secretary of agriculture, Oct. 22, 1947,
NRAS, Draper file, RG 335, Box 54; POLAD desp. 403, July 1, 1948, NRAS, RG 84, Box 2290;
SCAP, History of the Non-Military Activities , monograph 4, 89; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan ,
143-146. [BACK]
21. Ladejinsky, "The Occupation and Japanese Agriculture, Oct. 1945 to Apr. 1952," desp. 164,
June 3, 1952, NRAW, DOS file 894.20/6-352; Ball, Japan , 87-90. According to Nanto, "The
United States' Role," U.S. aid in the form not only of food but also of grains and agricultural
supplies and fertilizer during the occupation totaled about $1.8 billion. [BACK]
22. Kosaka, One Hundred Million Japanese , 92. [BACK]
23. PRJ , 750. [BACK]
24. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 301; Maki (trans. and ed.), Japan's Commission , 80; PRJ , 110-
111; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 188; Koseki, Shinkempo no tanjo , 166-172. [BACK]
25. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 191, 195-197. [BACK]
26. Ibid., 198-199; YM , 140. [BACK]
27. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 236-238, states that recent research has established
that Kanamori Tokujiro, not Ashida, was the author of the revised language approved by the
House Subcommittee on the Constitution. Kades was certain, however, that Ashida, who was
chairman of the subcommittee, brought the revision to him for approval, which he readily gave
(int. with Kades). Earlier writers had all ascribed the concept and wording to Ashida. (See Inoki,
Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 200-202; Hata, Nihon saigumbi , 71-74.) [BACK]
28. Int. with Hata; Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 236-238. [BACK]
29. Kades, "The American Role," 238. [BACK]
30. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," 235-236. See Takemae, "Kedeisu Nihon," 276. Kades
later explained that because aliens in the United States did not in all cases in 1946 receive equal
treatment with that of citizens, SCAP felt it would have been hypocritical to oppose the Japanese
amendment (Kades ltr. of July 5, 1989, to author). [BACK]
31. Whitney memo to MacArthur, July 17, 1946, Hussey Papers, NDLT; J. Williams, "Making
the Japanese Constitution," 677. Williams staunchly defends the role of MacArthur and GS and
lauds Yoshida's contribution; he makes only passing reference to the FEC. [BACK]
32. Oppler, Legal Reform , 50. [BACK]
33. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 65-67; Blakeslee, The FEC , 52-54; PRJ , 660. [BACK]
34. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 65-66; Blakeslee, The FEC , 54-55. [BACK]
35. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 65-66; Blakeslee, The FEC , 57; Koseki, "Japanizing the
Constitution," 238; Kades, "The American Role," 30. [BACK]
36. DOS, Activities of the FEC , 67; Blakeslee, The FEC , 58-61. [BACK]
37. YM , 144-145; FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 626-627. The Ashida government, which was in office
when SCAP suggested the constitution be reviewed, started an examination but soon left office.
The incoming Yoshida cabinet did not pursue the matter. [BACK]
38. Eto (ed.), Senryo shiroku , vol. 3, 143; Bisson, Nihon senryo , 239. [BACK]
39. J. Williams, "Making the Japanese Constitution," 676-678; PRJ , 111; Oppler, Legal
Reform , 48. [BACK]
40. SCAP Monthly Summation (Nov. 1946): 22-23. [BACK]
41. PRJ , 682-683. [BACK]
42. Maki (trans. and ed.), Japan's Commission ; Ward, "The Commission." [BACK]
43. MacArthur's letter is quoted in an article by commission chairman Takayanagi Kenzo in the
Japan Times , Mar. 16, 1959, 8. [BACK]
44. Yoshida ltr. to commission, "Kempo chosakai daihachi-kai sokai gijiroku'' (Commission on
the constitution, minutes of 8th plenary meeting), Dec. 17, 1957, 1-11. [BACK]
45. Maki (trans. and ed.), Japan's Commission , 85-86. [BACK]
46. Kawashima T, Nihonjin no hoishiki , 39. [BACK]
47. "Emperor Vows to Remain 'At One with the People,'" Japan Times (Weekly overseas ed.),
Jan. 28, 1989. [BACK]
Chapter 9 The Second Reform Wave
1. Yoshida-MacArthur ltrs., Sept. 27, 1947, MMA, RG 10, Box 11. [BACK]
2. KJ , vol. 1, 114-116; memo by Yamada, Sept. 17, 1946, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Records
Office, reel 0226, Tokyo; YM , 54. [BACK]
3. MacArthur said in Reminiscences (294), no doubt speaking for the record, that "the whole
occupation would fail if we did not proceed from this one basic assumption—the reform had to
come from the Japanese." [BACK]
4. Sodei and Fukushima (eds.), Makkasa no kiroku , 176; Hussey/Tilton memo to Whitney, Feb.
14, 1947, Hussey Papers, NDLT; Sodei, Senryo , 200. [BACK]
5. Int. with Kades. [BACK]
6. G-2 memo to chief of staff, June 7, 1947, "Leftist Personnel in GHQ," MMA, RG 23, Box 18,
describes the background and activities of eleven alleged leftists in SCAP. Some of them were
foreign born, and most reportedly had some connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Suspicion was also aroused because some were said to be friendly with American newsmen
thought to be leftists. The memos were drafted by C. Nelson Spinks, a Stanford University Ph.D.
and specialist in extremist movements in prewar Japan, who was then serving in G-2 and later
became a senior officer in the State Department. Interestingly, Sir George Sansom remarked in
his notes on his trip to Japan in 1946 that "many of ... the younger men in SCAP drawn from
civilian life have communistic leanings" and "these are visible in their work" (F 3595/2/23, FO
371/54086, Mar. 9, 1946). Only in very few cases was hard evidence produced that there were
communists in SCAP. [BACK]
7. Ozaki Shinae, the daughter of the famed octagenarian liberal and Diet member, Ozaki Yukio,
once called Bunker to ask if her father could ride in the passenger car set aside for occupation
personnel on Japanese trains when he traveled back and forth from his home in the country to
Tokyo for Diet sessions. Bunker fixed this up (Bunker memo to MacArthur, Feb. 5, 1947, MMA,
RG 5, Box 63). [BACK]
8. PRJ , 30-31, 48, 435; Bisson, Nihon senryo , 122. [BACK]
9. See Sodei and Fukushima (eds.), Makkasa no kiroku , 191-202; Sodei, Haikei makkasa
Gensui-sama , an analysis of letters to MacArthur from Japanese. MacArthur received about one
thousand letters a day, which the translation section scanned and sometimes translated (Mainichi
[ed.], Ichiokunin no showashi , vol. 2, 106). [BACK]
10. Yoshida ltr. to the supreme commander, Oct. 22, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida.
[BACK]
11. Whitney memo to CINC, Nov. 8, 1946, GS file, NRAS, RG 331, Box 2055. [BACK]
12. PRJ , 496-498. [BACK]
13. YM , 155-156; Yamada, Beranme gaikokan , 86-89. [BACK]
14. PRJ , 499, 500. [BACK]
15. F 17621, FO 371/54163, Gascoigne ltr. to FO, Nov. 14, 1946. MacArthur also told
Gascoigne he was planning to order a new election in the spring. [BACK]
16. Ibid. [BACK]
17. PRJ , 501-548; Baerwald, The Purge , 92, 94. [BACK]
18. FJ 1017/44, FO 371/83807, Gascoigne desp. no. 162, June 7, 1950. [BACK]
19. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 429; Yoshida-MacArthur ltrs., July 16, 19, and 25, 1946, MMA,
RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida. The two tax laws enacted in October and November 1946 were the
Wartime Indemnity Special Measures Law and the Capital Levy Law. [BACK]
20. PRJ , 40; GS memo for record, Apr. 30, 1947, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2151; memo
from Kades to Whitney, Oct. 25, 1947, Ishibashi file, GS (B) 03110, NDLT; Nolte, Liberalism ,
305-320. [BACK]
21. DOS, Report of the Mission on Japanese Combines , part 1. (Edwards Report) [BACK]
22. T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 368-369, 364. FEC-230 was sent to SCAP "for information" but
not as an "interim directive" from the U.S. government. For various SCAP reservations about the
Edwards report, see Hadley, Antitrust , 126-127. [BACK]
23. Hadley, Antitrust , 163-165; remarks by Tristan Beplat, in Redford (ed.), The Occupation ,
236-244; C. Johnson, MITI , 174-175. [BACK]
24. Ball, Japan , 113-120. [BACK]
25. PRJ , 753; YM , 200. [BACK]
26. YM , 200. [BACK]
27. PRJ , 577; Dore, Land Reform , 172-173. See Dore, Shinohata , 57-61, for a case study of the
land reform program. [BACK]
28. PRJ , 760; YM , 201-203; int. with Kades. [BACK]
29. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 215; F 3595/2/23, FO 371/54086, Mar. 9, 1946, Sansom
diary, 34; YM , 168. [BACK]
30. "6-3-3 System Not Imposed," Japan Times Weekly (International ed.), Oct. 4, 1986. [BACK]
31. Wray, "The Trilateral Relationship"; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 214-219; Kosaka, One
Hundred Million Japanese , 91; YM , 168-169. [BACK]
32. Atcheson ltr. to Hilldring, Dec. 14, 1946, DOS file 840.2, NRAW. According to Reischauer,
use of Chinese ideographs "is likely to fade slowly into primarily scholarly and official use," but
even so language barriers contribute to making Japan "an isolated, inward-looking country
beneath its cosmopolitan sheen," thus helping to create a psychological problem that "is probably
the most significant fact about Japan today'' ( The Japanese Today , 384, 394). [BACK]
33. Nishi, Unconditional Democracy , 196-198. In June 1948, at the instigation of GS, the Diet
passed a resolution declaring that the imperial rescript on education was without effect and
should be withdrawn from the education system, which would thereafter be governed by the
concepts of the fundamental Law of Education (J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 49).
[BACK]
34. YM , 167-175. [BACK]
35. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 279; ltr. of Aug. 15, 1946, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—Yoshida;
KJ , vol. 1, 117. When American newsmen later criticized Yoshida for opposing MacArthur and
his reforms, Yoshida reportedly denied the charge and stated that he followed Admiral Suzuki's
advice—namely, go along with the general (Matsumoto, "Kaiso"). [BACK]
36. Naganuma, "Tenno-Makkasa," 27-30. [BACK]
37. Toyoshita, "Tenno-Makkasa." [BACK]
38. F 13031/2/23, FO 371/54105, Gascoigne tel. 177 to Bevin, Sept. 9, 1946. [BACK]
Chapter 10 The 1947 Labor Crisis and the Defeat of Yoshida
1. See Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 157-177; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 115-135, for
accounts of the 1947 strike threat. [BACK]
2. PRJ , 762; T. Cohen, Remaking Japan , 294. Although Cohen claimed he and Marquat wrote
MacArthur's statement (286), MacArthur did it himself, according to Frank Sackton, then a
colonel who was secretary of the joint SCAP/FEC staff (int. with Sackton). [BACK]
3. Borton, "The Allied Occupation," 397-398; Farley, Aspects , 39, 190. [BACK]
4. DOS, Activities of the FEC , vol. 1, 91-93; Takemae, "GHQ Labor Policy," 102. [BACK]
5. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 113-115; Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 158; J. Moore, Japanese
Workers , 229-233. [BACK]
6. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 271-272; F 15640 G, FO 317/54109, Gascoigne tel. to FO,
Oct. 25, 1946; Farley, Aspects , 186. [BACK]
7. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 161-162. [BACK]
8. T. Cohen, "Labor Democratization," 187. [BACK]
9. The unions were asking for a ¥1,800 monthly wage, about equal to $22.50; Masumi, Postwar
Politics , 119. [BACK]
10. RLED, Jan. 26, 29, and 30, 1947, May 10, 1947. [BACK]
11. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 130-132; Asahi Shimbun (ed.), The Pacific Rivals , 174-177; J.
Moore, Japanese Workers , 239. [BACK]
12. PRJ , 424, 436, 433; Bisson, Nihon senryo , 174; Garon, "The Imperial Bureaucracy," 450.
[BACK]
13. Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3,273. [BACK]
14. KJ , vol. 1, 146; Shinobu, Sengo Nihon seiji-shi , vol. 2, 458; int. with Inoki; Farley,
Aspects , 154. [BACK]
15. F 1618, FO 371/63690, Gascoigne tel. to FO, Feb. 6, 1947; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3,
268. [BACK]
16. J. Moore, Japanese Workers , 241-243. [BACK]
17. Gluck, "Entangling Illusions," 206. "Reverse course" has various meanings for students of
the occupation. Interpreted narrowly, its meaning is generally accepted as emphasis on economic
recovery over reform, beginning in about 1947. The extreme interpretation by some scholars—
Japanese and American—is that the occupation began in about 1947 to abandon reform, or even
cancel some reforms, and increasingly sought to involve Japan in cold war politics as a partner of
the United States and its allies. See Dower, "Rethinking World War II," 166, for a moderate
revisionist interpretation of shifting trends during the occupation. [BACK]
18. Whitney, MacArthur's Rendezvous , 246-247. See Ohtake, "Postwar Politics"; J. Moore,
"Production Control," 2-3; J. Moore, Japanese Workers , 101-108. [BACK]
19. Garon, The State and Labor , 237. [BACK]
20. PRJ , 721. [BACK]
21. F 15640, F0371/54109, Gascoigne tel. to FO, Oct. 25, 1946; F 17576, FO 371/54163,
Gascoigne tel. 1454. to FO, Dec. 7, 1946. [BACK]
22. F 1618, FO 371/63696, Gascoigne tel. 163, Feb. 9, 1947; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Feb. 10,
1947, JWC. [BACK]
23. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution , 175-177; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 281-282.
The view in SCAP, and probably that of General MacArthur, seemed to be that neither of the
two electoral systems the Japanese had used could be said to be dearly more democratic than the
other (Takemae, "Kedeisu Nihon," 286-288). [BACK]
24. KJ , vol. 1, 151-152; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 283-284. [BACK]
25. GS files states that Yoshida was "screened and passed" on Mar. 12, 1947, because he had
retired to private life in 1938 and was not drawn into any wartime or nationalist activities "that
might compromise his present position" as president of the Democratic Liberal Party (GS name
file, NDLT). [BACK]
26. Kawashima T., Nihonjin no boishiki , 39. [BACK]
27. Blakeslee, The FEC , 61-63; James, The Years of MacArthur , vol. 3, 139-141. [BACK]
28. PRJ , 196-198, 679, 680, 724-725; Oppler, Legal Reform , 75, 165-168; Oppler memo to
Whitney, Apr. 30, 1947, NRAS, GS file, RG 331, Box 2142; J. Williams, Japan's Political
Revolution , 273-279; Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan , vol. 5, 65-66; Yamada, Beranme
gaikokan , 102-105. [BACK]
29. MacArthur ltr. to Yoshida, Mar. 22, 1947, MMA, RG 10, VIP file— Yoshida; Inoki, Hoyden
Yoshida , vol. 3, 296. [BACK]
30. Int. with Tsuru; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Mar. 28, 1947, MMA, RG 10, VIP file—
Yoshida. [BACK]
31. C. Johnson, MITI , 181-183; J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 448; Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen,"
306. [BACK]
32. Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 3, 1946, MMA, RG 10, Box 11; Arisawa (ed.), Showa
keizaishi , vol. 2, 55-59; Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy , 36-37; Okita, Watakushi no
rirekisho , 70-74; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 11, 1946, MMA, RG 10, Box 11. [BACK]
33. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy , 470; Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, Dec. 11, 1946, MMA, RG 10,
VIP file—Yoshida; C. Johnson, MITI , 185. [BACK]
34. Dickover letter to McCoy, file of U.S. delegation to FEC, NRAW, RG 43, Box 239;
Schonberger, Aftermath of War , 99-102; Tsurumi, Japanese Business , 84-85. [BACK]
35. Takemae, Sengo rodo kaikaku , 343. [BACK]
36. PRJ , 323-337; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 289-290; Masumi, Postwar Politics , 139-
141. [BACK]
37. PRJ , 767. [BACK]
38. Ibid., 348-349; YM , 85-86. [BACK]
39. Masumi, Postwar Politics , 141-146; Inoki, Hyoden Yoshida , vol. 3, 291-292; Katayama
Naikaku, Katayama Tetsu , 222-223. [BACK]
40. Yoshida ltr. to MacArthur, May 24, 1947, MMA, RG 5, Box 62, military secretary
correspondence . [BACK]
41. Yoshida-Whitney exchange, JWC. [BACK]
42. YM , 83-84. [BACK]
43. Borton, "Proposals," 19. [BACK]
Chapter 11 MacArthur, the Allies, and Washington
1. PRJ , 422, 746-748. The supreme commander instructed that all directives to the Japanese
government on substantive matters be sent in advance to the ACJ for comment or concurrence
(CofS memo, Apr. 19, 1946, CIE file, RG 84, Box 5148, NDLT). The Australian member of the
ACJ also represented the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and India. [BACK]
2. Early in the occupation MacArthur considered that he held the protocol rank of "semi-
sovereign," equal to that of a viceroy (MacArthur tel. to Steyer, June, 26, 1946, MMA, RG 5,
Box 2). In remarks to the political adviser in 1950, MacArthur gave himself a promotion; he said
he did not see why he should meet with the chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions in Tokyo. "And
why, as a sovereign, should I? President Truman doesn't do so, nor does the King of England"
(Sebald, With MacArthur , 119). [BACK]
3. F 13031/2/23, FO 371/54105, Gascoigne ltr. 177 to Bevin, Sept. 9, 1946. Malik was a Japan
specialist in the Soviet diplomatic service. He played a key role in negotiations at the United
Nations in 1949 to end the Berlin airlift. [BACK]
4. Minutes of second ACJ meeting, NRAW, RG 59, Box 3815; Ball, Japan , 25-26; memo
entitled "Allied Council—General Whitney," Apr. 25, 1946, JWC. [BACK]
5. POLAD cable 3353 to Washington, Apr. 5, 1946, NRAW, file 740.0019—Japan. [BACK]
6. See Sebald, With MacArthur , 126-150, for an authoritative account of ACJ proceedings.
[BACK]
7. Ibid., 136-137. The Soviet government stated on May 20, 1949, that only 594,000 Japanese
military personnel were taken prisoner at the end of the war. The Soviets added that 70,880 were
immediately freed, 418,166 were repatriated to Japan between December 1, 1946, and May 1,
1949, and the remaining 95,000 [ sic ] would be returned by November 1949, except for a few
war crimes suspects still under investigation ( FRUS, 1949 , vol. 7, 754). In 1990 a Soviet
official stated that 60,000 Japanese prisoners of war had died in captivity and that the USSR
would give Japan a list of their names and gravesites ( Japan Times [Weekly international ed.],
Dec. 3-9, 1990, 4). [BACK]
8. FRUS, 1947 , vol. 7, 177-179. [BACK]
9. Ibid., 323-325. [BACK]
10. Tucker, "Gen. S. M. Chu"; Dingman, "The View"; Atcheson ltr. to Acheson, Dec. 6, 1946,
NRAW, file 740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-646; Atcheson letter to Penfield, NRAW, 740.00119
Control (Japan)/12-1046; FRUS , 1946, vol. 8, 354-356. [BACK]
11. MacArthur, Reminiscences , 292. MacArthur thought the United States should have used its
veto power freely to prevent undesirable FEC actions. U.S. representatives wished to avoid use
of the veto as far as was practical. [BACK]
12. Asakai, Shoki tainichi , vol. 1, 211-252. [BACK]
13. FRUS , 1945 , vol. 6, 603-609; DOS, Occupation , 89-94; Willoughby (ed.), The Reports of
General MacArthur , vol. 1, supplement, 62-63. [BACK]
14. DOS memo for record by Green, Jan. 25, 1949, NRAW, RG 84, Box 2293. [BACK]
15. FRUS, 1946 , vol. 8, 329-332; War Dept. memo to DOS, May 23, 1946, DOS general file.
[BACK]
16. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy , 533-534 ; Blakeslee, The FEC , 132. [BACK]
17. DOS, Activities of the FEC , vol. 1, 68-76; ltrs. of Oct. 23 and Nov. 10, 1946, MMA, RG 10,
VIP file—Yoshida. [BACK]
18. Blakeslee, The FEC , 135-141. The United States used its authority under the terms of
reference of the FEC to issue interim directives only a few times. [BACK]
19. PRJ , 765-767; Sebald, With MacArthur , 244. [BACK]
20. F 15640 G, FO 371/54109, tel. 1257 to London, Oct. 26, 1946. [BACK]
21. F 3970/1/23, FO 371/63646, tel. 364 to London, Mar. 20, 1947. [BACK]