It was in fact surprising that traditional peace treaty issues, such as property claims and
economic rights, received so little attention in the entire peace negotiations with Japan. Several
of the Allied powers emphatically disagreed with the U.S. insistence on a short and nonpunitive
treaty, as Dulles was to find out. But during his talks in Tokyo in early 1951, security was the
dominant issue, and the others were minor. Several technical issues were discussed, such as
fisheries, war damage claims, and dumping of exports, and side agreements were
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reached on two of them. But they were considered to be of lesser importance.[34]
The security issue had not yet run its course. On February 3 the Japanese had given the
Americans some comments on the U.S. draft of February 2, seeking to shorten it, tighten the
U.S. commitment to defend Japan, and omit language about Japanese undertakings in case of
emergency. Dulles did not like these changes and redrafted the entire security agreement; the
redraft was remarkably like the treaty finally signed six months later in San Francisco. Dulles
clearly had in mind a short, simple text for the collective defense agreement, relegating the rights
and duties of U.S. forces stationed in Japan to a long, detailed document called an administrative
agreement. On February 6 the Japanese accepted the U.S. proposals "practically without
change." Thus, the basic approach for the security documents to be negotiated in the peace
settlement was clearly laid out.[35]
On January 31 Dulles, who always maintained steady contact with the news media, held a press
conference and on February 2 made a speech to the America-Japan Society of Tokyo. His
speeches were invariably direct, unadorned, and tough-minded. He told the Japanese that if they
wished they could "share collective protection against direct aggression....The choice must be
Japan's own choice." The peace sought by the United States would give Japan "the opportunity
to share in collective security, to raise its standard of living and to achieve moral stature and
respected leadership."[36]
Yoshida called on MacArthur on February 6. Japanese reports indicate the general was
sympathetic with the prime minister's concern for the fate of Okinawa and with his desire to
avoid all references in the treaty documents to the word rearmament . Yoshida seemed to rely on
MacArthur almost as a confidant, and MacArthur responded with understanding, even when
Yoshida's intentions went counter to U.S. policy. In a later remark to a U.S. senator, Yoshida
said that he had a special arrangement for meetings with the general and that MacArthur was
very useful to him and to Japan. The quality of this relationship was evident in Yoshida's resort
to MacArthur in the meetings of January and February 1951. The general was in fact an
invaluable go-between, certainly for the Japanese.[37]
Dulles had not been idle while the staff experts negotiated in early February. He saw the British
ambassador twice to inform him in a general way of what the United States was doing and to
consult him on the concept of a Pacific pact. The United States had picked this idea up
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from Australia and the Philippines, which were nervous, if not terrified, at the prospect of a
rearmed Japan. The two countries were far less confident than the United States that Japan had
become a peace-loving society only five years after World War II ended. To cope with this
dilemma, they had conceived the idea of a multinational treaty in which all the members would
agree to defend and protect one another against outside attack from any quarter. According to the
usual formulation of the plan, the participants would include the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, and possibly Indonesia and Japan. The Asian nations, fearing Japan at