6.1. Improperly Posed Problems
347
the deterministic point of view and to obtain information by other means
(e.g., by probabilistic arguments). This was known to the creators of
probability theory and was explicitly stated by Poincare almost a century
ago. In the words of Hadamard [1923: 1, p. 38]. "But in any concrete
application, "known," of course, signifies "known with a certain approxi-
mation," all kinds of errors being possible, provided that their magnitude
remains smaller than a certain quantity; and, on the other hand, we have
seen that the mere replacing of the value zero for u, by the (however small)
value (15) [here Hadamard refers to the "initial velocity" u, in the Cauchy
problem for the Laplace equation] changes the solution not by very small
but by very great quantities. Everything takes place, physically speaking, as
if the knowledge of Cauchy's data would not determine the unknown
function."
"This shows how very differently things behave in this case and in
those that correspond to physical questions. If a physical phenomenon were
to be dependent on such an analytical problem as Cauchy's for p 2 u = 0, it
would appear to us as being governed by pure chance (which, since
Poincare, has been known to consist precisely in such a discontinuity in
determinism) and not obeying any law whatever."' Earlier in [1923: 1] (p.
32) Hadamard concludes: "But it is remarkable, on the other hand, that a
sure guide is found in physical interpretation: an analytical problem always
being correctly set, in our use of the phrase, when it is the translation of
some mechanical or physical question; and we have seen this to be the case
for Cauchy's problem in the instances quoted in the first place."
"On the contrary, none of the physical problems connected with
p 2 u = 0 is formulated analytically in Cauchy's way." 2
A look at the vast amount of literature produced during the last two
decades on deterministic treatment of improperly posed problems (including
numerical schemes for the computation of solutions) would appear to prove
Hadamard's dictum wrong. However, it may be said to remain true in the
sense that, many times, a physical phenomenon appears to be improperly
posed not due to its intrinsic character but to unjustified use of the model
that describes it; for instance, the model may have " unphysical" solutions
in addition to the ones representing actual trajectories of the system, bounds
and constraints implicit in the phenomenon may be ignored in the model,
the initial or boundary value problems imposed on the equation may be
incorrect translations of physical requirements, and so on. We present in
this section a number of examples where seemingly improperly posed
problems result from neglecting physical considerations, but where the
"discontinuity in determinism" can be removed by careful examination of
'From J. Hadamard, Lectures on Cauchy's Problem in Linear Partial Differential
Equations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923).
2Ibid.