respect for local religious traditions. Adopting the name
Thakin (a polite term in the Burmese language meaning
‘‘lord’’ or ‘‘master,’’ thus emphasizing their demand for the
right to rule themselves), they protested against British
arrogance and failure to observe local customs in Bud-
dhist temples (such as failing to remove their footwear).
Only in the 1930s did the Thakins begin to focus spe-
cifically on national independence.
In the Dutch East Indies, the Sarekat Islam (Islamic
Association) began as a self-help society among Muslim
merchants to fight against domination of the local
economy by Chinese interests. Eventually, activist ele-
ments began to realize that the source of the problem was
not the Chinese merchants but the colonial presence, and
in the 1920s, Sarekat Islam was transformed into a new
organization, the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI),
that focused on national independence. Like the Thakins
in Burma, this party would eventually lead the country to
independence after World War II.
The Nationalist Quandary: Independence or Moderni-
zation?
Building a new nation, however, requires more
than a shared sense of grievances against the foreign in-
vader. A host of other issues also had to be resolved. Soon
patriots throughout the colonial world were engaged in a
lively and sometimes acrimonious debate over such
questions as whether independence or modernization
should be their primary objective. The answer depended
in part on how the colonial regime was perceived. If it was
viewed as a source of needed reforms in a traditional
society, a gradualist approach made sense. But if it was
seen primarily as an impediment to change, the first
priority, in the minds of many, was to bring it to an end.
The vast majority of patriotic individuals were convinced
that to survive, their societies must adopt much of the
Western way of life; yet many were equally determined
that the local culture would not, and should not, become
a carbon copy of the West. What was the national iden-
tity, after all, if it did not incorporate some elements from
the traditional way of life?
Another reason for using traditional values was to
provide ideological symbols that the common people
could understand and would rally around. Though aware
that they needed to enlist the mass of the population in
the common struggle, most urban intellectuals had dif-
ficulty communicating with the teeming population in
the countryside who did not understand such compli-
cated and unfamiliar concepts as democracy and na-
tionhood. As the Indonesian intellectual Sutan Sjahrir
lamented, many Westernized intellectuals had more in
common with their colonial rulers than with the native
population in the rural villages (see the box on p. 592). As
one French colonial official remarked in some surprise to
a French-educated Vietnamese reformist, ‘‘Why, Monsieur,
you are more French than I am!’’
Gandhi and the Indian National Congress
Nowhere in the colonial world were these issues debated
more vigorously than in India. Before the Sepoy Rebellion
(see Chapter 21), Indian consciousness had focused
mainly on the question of religious identity. But in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, a stronger sense of
national consciousness began to arise, provoked by the
conservative policies and racial arrogance of the British
colonial authorities.
The first Indian nationalists were almost invariably
upper class and educated. Many of them were from urban
areas such as Bombay (Mumbai), Madras (Chennai), and
Calcutta. Some were trained in law and were members of
the civil service. At first, many tended to prefer reform to
revolution and believed that India needed modernization
before it could handle the problems of independence.
Such reformists did have some effect. In the 1880s, the
government introduced a measure of self-government for
the first time. All too often, however, such efforts were
sabotaged by local British officials.
The slow pace of reform convinced many Indian
nationalists that relying on British benevolence was futile.
In 1885, a small group of Indians, with some British
participation, met in Bombay to form the Indian National
Congress (INC). They hoped to speak for all India, but
most were high-class English-trained Hindus. Like their
reformist predecessors, members of the INC did not de-
mand immediate independence and accepted the need for
reforms to end traditional abuses like child marriage and
sati. At the same time, they called for an Indian share in
the governing process and more spending on economic
development and less on military campaigns along the
frontier. The British responded with a few concessions, but
change was glacially slow.
The INC also had difficulty reconciling religious
differences within its ranks. The stated goal of the INC
was to seek self-determination for all Indians regardless of
class or religious affiliation, but many of its leaders were
Hindu and inevitably reflected Hindu concerns. In the
first decade of the twentieth century, the separate Muslim
League was created to represent the interests of the mil-
lions of Muslims in Indian society.
Nonviolent Resistance In 1915, a young Hindu lawyer
returned from South Africa to become active in the INC.
He transformed the movement and galvanized India’s
struggle for independence and identity. Mohandas Gan-
dhi was born in 1869 in Gujarat, in western India, the son
of a government minister. In the late nineteenth century,
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