Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745
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He had even obtained two most eminent expectative titles, one was the letters
patent as principal minister, entirely written out in the King’s handwriting,
and signed by H.M., to exercise these functions alone upon the death of
M.the Cardinal de Fleury. The other was the letters of succession [survivance]
which guaranteed him the office of Chancellor of France upon the death of
M.Daguesseau, written out from beginning to end in the hand of the
Cardinal and signed by the King.
106
The study of the parlementaire crisis of 1730–2 below will reveal further details of
him in his role as aide to Fleury.
107
A report on the court of January 1732 asserted
that ‘although according to the public he has several times been in a shaky position,
he is the Cardinal’s intimate confidant, and the right arm of his ministry …Only the
cardinal Minister, the Chancellor, and the Keeper of the Seals, are the pillars of all
affairs of state in the council’.
108
However, after his elevation in 1732 he began to fall
foul of a particular characteristic of the old Cardinal, who tended to become
increasingly distrustful of his subordinates as they acquired more power and who
perhaps had a natural tendency to become less enamoured of those he came to
know well.
The marquis d’Argenson wrote for Chauvelin a report on the state of the
parlement and the court in which he made a number of interesting observations.
He pointed out that since the minister’s promotion one would have imagined him
to have become more powerful, but that in fact his power seems to have been
reduced: ‘None of the main business seems to be credited to you; neither the late
troubles in the parlement, nor their solution, seems to be the result of your talent
and your proposals; the court intrigues, the favours which are accorded, even the
ministers who work with you do not for the most part appear to be in the
dependence nor even the attachment they ought to be’.
109
If facets of internal administration in which Chauvelin was so involved have
been generally ignored by historians, his involvement in formulation of foreign
policy has been greatly exaggerated. There existed a historical myth that Chauvelin
was principally responsible for the conduct of foreign policy during his period of
office and that the successes of France were due to his vigour and not to the
diplomacy of the cardinal de Fleury.
110
The origin of this idea lies perhaps with the
methods of the Cardinal himself, for he persuaded the British ambassador at least
that French foreign policy, during the period when it was necessary to give affront
to Britain, was led by Chauvelin. The secrétaire d’état appeared vigorous and
dynamic, while the Cardinal employed a language ‘which at first affects grand
sentiments of moderation and disinterest, to lull others to sleep, prevent them from
taking steps and to gain time to prepare things in small ways, so as to strike his blow
the more surely before it is expected’.
111
Thus Fleury appeared to be led by
Chauvelin, especially during the War of the Polish Succession. In his influential
article on the ministry of Chauvelin, Driault in 1893 concluded that policy was
made by Chauvelin. However, it would appear that he consulted only a small part
of the archives. When examining the conduct of French foreign policy towards
THE CONTROL OF PATRONAGE AND POLICY
149
Austria from 1733 to 1737, he cites only the series of papers entitled
‘Correspondance politique, Autriche’. Naturally, almost all of this correspondence
was written by Chauvelin, who concerned himself with the detail of affairs. Wilson
examined the archives in greater detail and also consulted the papers in the series of
‘Mémoires et Documents, France’, which contain the memoirs drawn up to aid in
the preparation of policy. These, especially those of Chauvelin, are annotated by
Fleury, sometimes in great detail, as Wilson had remarked. After the study of
Fleury’s foreign policy by Wilson no doubt should remain about the ultimate
responsibility for this policy.
There is proof that Fleury’s esteem for Chauvelin began to decline at least from
1734. In November of that year Fleury entered into a correspondence with
Waldegrave at The Hague, which he kept secret from his secrétaire d’état.
112
In 1735
Chavigny, a friend of Chauvelin, returned to France and noted that ‘the credit and
confidence of M.Chauvelin were in decline, for straight away I observed his
decadence only too clearly. M.the Cardinal left me no room to doubt it with some
of the things he said; all that made me realise only too well that it was time to come
to settle the peace’.
113
Cruickshanks discovered that Fleury began to write certain
important ambassadorial instructions in his own hand, rather than entrust them to
Chauvelin. The latter had built up a secret correspondence with ambassadors who
supported his own strongly anti-Austrian views.
114
It is perhaps for this reason that
Fleury kept such tight control over the negotiations for the peace of 1737. This is
clearly evident from the correspondence exchanged between Chauvelin and Fleury
in 1736 and 1737.
115
In December 1736 the secrétaire d’état himself told the Bavarian
ambassador that as far as the policy towards Bavaria was concerned, a policy which
had been communicated in a recent letter: ‘he had written it only on approbation,
that he could add nothing himself, nor change anything without another
approbation from Monsieur the Cardinal, that I should therefore address myself to
him for any subsequent representations I might wish to make’.
116
It may fairly be
concluded that the foreign policy of France during this period was that of the
cardinal de Fleury and not of his minister.
Richer d’Aube noted that in 1737 it was not easy to choose a successor to
Chauvelin for the secretaryship of foreign affairs, not because of the number of
candidates but rather because of the lack of them. The man chosen, Amelot de
Chaillou, would normally have been considered more suited for the post of
contrôleur général than that of Foreign Secretary. He had spent six years as intendant at
La Rochelle, then in 1726 had become an intendant des finances. He was intelligent
and eloquent, although he had an unfortunate stutter.
117
‘He was intelligent, was
hardworking, quick and ambitious, and jealous…To help him in the functions of
his office he had the good fortune to find excellent workers [the four first clerks],
who had for a long time been attending to the detail of affairs, and who were
perfectly aware of the interests of France and the foreign powers’.
118
This
description lends weight to the view that Fleury wanted a man utterly subordinate
to his will.
119
There is a memoir on his role in the ministry. It was obviously written as an
POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE
150
apology for Amelot shortly after his dismissal in 1744 when he had proved himself
incapable of directing the foreign policy of France in wartime.
Although the Cardinal de Fleury continued to carry out the functions of first
minister up to 1743 when he died, and political operations were directed by
His Eminence, M.Amelot, minister and Secretary of State for foreign affairs
can however be regarded as having had great influence in the negotiations
which were conducted on behalf of France up to the death of M.the Cardinal,
since the ambassadors and other persons employed by the King at different
courts corresponded with M.Amelot.
120
The assertion that he influenced the negotiations may be challenged. An
examination of the dispatches from the ambassadors to Rome and to the Porte
reveals that they reported on the detail of affairs to the Foreign Secretary but
reserved matters which regarded policy for the attention of Fleury, to whom they
also wrote broad summaries of events and of the general trend of affairs. Fleury’s
frequent and detailed letters to the Elector of Bavaria show how closely he directed
policy in that sphere.
121
Sareil, having read the correspondence between Tencin in
Rome and the ministry, commented that dispatches concerning commerce were
always addressed to Amelot, while information about people and religion was sent
to Fleury.
122
A similar comparison can be made between the letters from Villeneuve
in Constantinople from 1738 to 1740 to Fleury and Amelot.
123
The letters to Fleury
concentrate upon policy and are more the product of reflection than an account of
events. ‘I am reporting to M.Amelot about the way matters stand in this country. I
would not wish to take up Your Eminence’s time unnecessarily, by going into details
in this letter.’
124
Since the creation of his commission in 1671, the lieutenant-general of police had
played an increasingly important part in the government. From 1725 until just
before his death in 1739 Hérault held this post and clearly contributed to the
development of the office. From the beginning of his tenure the nature of the reports
on the population of Paris changed from being principally a record of the ‘menu
peuple’ to one which incorporated detailed descriptions of the political gossip from
the promenades and cafés.
125
The resurgence of the religious controversy, much of
which centred on the activities of the Parisian clergy and parlementaires, also led to
an increase in his importance in the government. Daily reports were sent or given
personally to Fleury who made very extensive use of the lieutenant-general.
The Cardinal wanted to be assiduously and minutely informed of the
smallest facts. Once a week, M.Hérault brought his portfolio to him: after
each session, he would write a detailed letter to M.the cardinal, containing
the affairs he had reported on, and the opinions of His Eminence on each
matter; when the King came see M.the Cardinal, His Eminence presented
to him M.Hérault’s portfolio from the week before, and the King would
sign it.
126
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151
The police had a dual role to play in politics: an active one in the suppression of all
kinds of disorders and the execution of orders for arrests or intimidation, and a
passive one in the collection of information which could be of use to the Cardinal
and his government. In particular, the reports on the court must have aided Fleury
in the maintenance of his own position there, by revealing to him the aims and
scope of the intrigues. The reports on the activities of the Paris parlement were of
great use, particularly during the brief period of crisis when it became imperative
for the ministry to know how the parlementaires were thinking. Many letters from
Hérault have survived from this period and they mostly summarise the debates and
decisions of the various chambers.
127
As far as the formulation of ministerial policy
is concerned, he therefore played an important role in providing information and
advice without which erroneous decisions might have been made. His activity was
thus an essential counterpart to the expert counsel of Daguesseau and Chauvelin.
The similar activities of his successor (and son-in-law) from 1740, Feydeau de
Marville, are better known thanks to several volumes of surviving correspondence
with the minister for Paris, Maurepas.
The police of Paris was the main arm of Fleury’s anti-Jansenist policies. This
role involved gathering information both from spies and the interrogations of
prisoners in the Bastille, tracking illegal printers and arresting the producers and
vendors of the stream of banned pamphlets and prints that was sustaining
religious opposition. In this extensive task, Hérault was aided by forty inspectors
(reduced by Marville to twenty in 1740), forty-eight commissioners, together with
lesser employees, but for much of his law enforcement he had recourse to the
watch and companies of archers. To gather information, he employed a large
number of mouchards or spies, coming from all walks of life, even at court, some of
whom were in receipt of official funds from his budget. From 1732 to 1737 8,000
livres a month were spent on gathering information, but he also had to have
recourse to giving ‘places and rewards’.
128
If it had not been for the fines from the
gambling houses that he had the right to distribute, and if he had not been in a
position to oblige or punish people, then he would never have been able to make
use of this great number of spies.
129
Unfortunately, his success was severely
hampered, for those on whom he had to rely were less than enthusiastic. As
Barbier remarked in November 1731, ‘he does what he can, according to his
charge, against the Jansenists; but three quarters of his commis, three quarters of
his commissioners and even his exempts [there were fifty in 1754] sympathise
with this parti; and, as all these people act according to conscience and religion, it
is not surprising that they haven’t yet found all they could’.
130
His situation was
worsened by frequent conflicts of jurisdiction with the Paris parlement on whom
he had to rely for judgements of major importance, though himself a magistrate,
and by the continued existence of areas of privileged immunity, such as the
Temple, where the master Jansenist Louis Adrien Le Paige resided under the
protection of the prince de Conti.
There remains one area of ministerial policy which has been discussed only in
the context of the general treatment of patronage, with regard to the feuille des
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152
bénéfices—religious policy. Fleury had begun his ministerial career as an expert on
ecclesiastical affairs and they had remained in the forefront of his activities during
the 1720s. The feuille des bénéfices was described in 1743 as almost a department in
itself, since it conferred authority in religious appointments, and Fleury had done
much to make it so.
131
If his relationships with the archbishop of Paris and with the
bishop of Laon can be regarded as typical, the extent of his correspondence with the
bishops must have been enormous. The voluminous correspondence with the latter
has survived in its entirety among the papers of Maurepas and is a first-rate source
for the religious policy of Fleury.
132
The examination of these letters makes possible
very new conclusions on the nature of the cardinal’s policy towards Unigenitus
during his ministry.
133
The work of G.Hardy on Fleury and the Jansenist movement
provides a great volume of evidence of the personal conduct of religious affairs by
the cardinal, although the details of the account are more acceptable than some of
the wider judgements. Fleury himself orchestrated the successful attempt to induce
the cardinal de Noailles to accept Unigenitus unreservedly. When the question of the
Legend of Gregory arose in the Paris parlement in 1729 the Cardinal persuaded
Gilbert de Voisins, an avocat général, to show him his speech and permit corrections
to be made to it.
134
The question of his collaborators in the general affairs of the
clergy has already been discussed; suffice it to add that it is clear from their
correspondence with Fleury and Chauvelin that it was the Cardinal-minister who
remained firmly in control of policy.
It must be concluded that the power and independence of the secretaries of state
was limited by the tight control exercised by Fleury over both patronage and the
making of policy. It was further limited by a network of influence which was often
ignored by those institutional historians who based their research solely on legal
documents. Although it is often claimed that this was an age when the noblesse de robe
had almost monopolised the power of government, some members of the court
nobility actually retained considerable influence. This does not refer to their
involvement in factional intrigues, which has already been discussed and which will
be considered further below. Here it is a question of their direct participation in
politics. For just as Louis XIV had called upon certain trusted members of the
higher aristocracy to advise him in the taking of decisions, so too did Fleury.
135
Where Louis XIV had consulted the ducs de Beauvillier, Chaulnes, Chevreuse and
Noailles, the cardinal de Fleury made use of Villars, d’Antin, Noailles, the maréchal
d’Estrées and the two legitimised bastards of Louis XIV, the duc du Maine and the
comte de Toulouse, while the young due d’Orléans remained in the conseil d’état until
1740. Of these the most influential were Noailles, d’Antin and Toulouse.
Under Louis XIV the star of the Noailles had shone brightly. The duchess it was
who arranged for her children the most worthy and advantageous matches at court.
In 1698 the favour of her family could not have been higher, for her eldest son was
encouraged to marry the niece and sole heiress to Maintenon, Mlle d’Aubigné.
Such a match was almost of the same status as a marriage with a prince of the blood.
The duc de Noailles was the governor of Roussillon and lieutenant governor of
Languedoc which he ruled from 1682. His brother was a confidant of Mme de
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153
Maintenon and was archbishop of Paris from 1695. Clearly Louis XIV viewed the
family with particular favour. In a letter of 1694 to the maréchale he was not only
complimentary but effusive. To the Duc he said in 1694 and repeated in 1695,
‘believe that one cannot have more friendship than I have for you’. There was
certainly no decline in the position of the clan in the eighteenth century. The
maréchal-duc de Noailles had acquired a wide experience in affairs and in the 1720s
he remained in favour although he was not given an administrative office.
136
A
report on the court in 1730 evaluated his position as follows:
The duc de Noailles continues to have frequent têtes-à-têtes with the King
and the Cardinal Minister, but it is doubted that he will reach his goal. The
Cardinal still mistrusts him, and although he consults his understanding on
numerous matters, they are confident that he has inspired the same
sentiments in H.M., such that it is only to profit from his opinions that His
Eminence admits him to these discussions.
137
The duc d’Antin had exercised some influence during the Regency, a period which
is covered by his manuscript memoirs.
138
Unfortunately, the manuscript stops in
1723, so later political influence can be measured only through the rare references to
him in published memoirs and by the quantity of memoirs on policy which he
prepared for Fleury and which have survived.
139
He was a supporter of Chauvelin
and after his death in December 1736 the position of the secrétaire d’état was
significantly weakened.
Of the activity of du Maine little is known, except for a brief reference in 1730
which reads thus: ‘The duc de Maine is still a close counsellor of His Majesty and
His Eminence’.
140
D’Estrées does not figure in the evidence or memoirs at all,
although he was a ministre d’état from 1733 until his death in 1737. It was about this
period too that the influence of Toulouse was at its height. There is evidence that
after the fall of Chauvelin in 1737 Fleury looked to him to be his designated
successor, such was his respect for his views. He was about to become a ministre d’état
shortly before his death in December 1737.
141
For a policy to be enacted or a decision to be executed it had to be given a legal
form and the assent of the King. This meant that, in order to control the
government, it was vital to control the processes by which this formulation and
ratification took place. Two areas were involved, the conseil du roi and the travail.
Fleury had the right to attend all the councils of government, but he rarely went to
the conseil des parties or to the conseil des finances. For the latter he was informed in
advance of the affairs to be discussed by a premier commis of the contrôleur général. In
this way, he could decide to attend the council if the affair was an important one.
One set of documents reveals this process in detail.
142
Most of the discussions in the
council were of small consequence. For example, on 26 October 1728 it was a
question of giving permission to cut wood usually reserved for royal use, and relief
from taxes for a certain individual.
143
However, remarks by the premier commis
enable us to judge which sort of matters the Cardinal considered important enough
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154
to supervise. On 15 March 1729 the council was to discuss the cahiers of the estates
of Burgundy, Bresse, Bugey, Valromey and Gex, but, the document continues,
‘they contain nothing very important, it being a question of neither a don gratuit, an
increase nor a reduction in taxes. That is why it has not been thought necessary to
send a minute to Your Eminence’.
144
Two weeks later the commis wrote: ‘A number
of matters from the last two councils remained [to be dealt with], whose
memoranda have been sent to Your Eminence’.
145
One report is annotated by
Fleury in the manner which he had developed to deal with most letters and
memoirs. Regarding the question of the ‘municipal officers of the town of Poligny in
the Franche-Comté’, he wrote ‘ask the reasons’, and for his record noted ‘dossier
sent back to M.de Gaumain on 13 Xer 1730’.
146
It is easy to see that Fleury liked to
be kept abreast of the discussions and decisions of the conseil royal. Sometimes he
became involved in the details of affairs, but generally reserved his attention for
affairs of consequence for the state.
Antoine implies that there was a great deal of continuity between the methods of
the cardinal Dubois and Fleury in this sort of activity, but the fact is that the
evidence for the later period is rather more sparse and the analogies are difficult to
substantiate.
147
However, for the conseil d’état the diaries of Villars are an invaluable
source, although they extend only to 1733. A series of quotations will serve to
illustrate the methods of Fleury, which were characterised by a dislike of discussion
in council and by a tendency to decide upon important affairs in consultation with
a few individuals.
December 1728: The Cardinal de Fleury has said nothing to either me or to
the maréchal d’Uxelles about his dealings with the comte de Sinzendorff
…We are surprised not to be consulted on such important matters.
148
April 1729: The Cardinal de Fleury still keeps up the same silence with M.
d’Uxelles and me on matters concerning war, and he is no more open with
the sires d’Angervilliers and Desforts, the ministers for war and the finances;
which is very surprising.
149
8 May 1729: In the Council of State on the 8th, the Keeper of the Seals has
reported on important matters that until then had been known only to
himself and the Cardinal.
150
30 July 1730: There were conferences between the Dutch and English
ambassadors at the Cardinal’s, to which M.d’Angervilliers and I were not
called. To be sure, the Cardinal and the Keeper of the Seals are not at all fond
of deliberations.
151
It is impossible to know which affairs were discussed after 1733 because the
registers of the conseil d’état did not survive the Revolution. However, after the
dismissal of Chauvelin, when Fleury was more frequently ill and unable to devote
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155
so much energy to the conduct of business, an expedient was introduced in order to
alleviate the burden of work and still enable him to retain control. Committees of
ministers had been used by Louis XIV, but Fleury set them up on a regular basis in
1737. Every Monday from March 1737 until 1744 the ministers met together in the
presence of Fleury (or Tencin from the end of 1742) to prepare the affairs which
were to be deliberated upon in council. By this method Fleury was spared the
rigours, or often the sheer tedium, of attending all the council meetings but was still
able to control the business of government. In most cases the vital decisions would
have been taken in advance. D’Argenson has left a brief description of this system
in operation.
The Cardinal de Fleury had created what were called committees, in which
the ministers assembled, often in the cabinet of His Eminence. Affairs
common to their responsibilities were dealt with before the eyes of the old
minister, who said nothing and let them get on with it. Foreign affairs and
the most important other matters took up most of the time, and the
Secretary of State for that department scarcely fulfilled any greater function
than that of a clerk.
152
It has been suggested that this system represented an increase in the independence
of the secretaries of state. Only a close study of the functions of the individual
secretaries could reveal the answer, although it is hard to believe that Fleury ‘said
nothing and let them get on with it’, unless he was very ill.
The second way in which he ensured his pre-eminence in decision-making was
through the institution of the travail. This was a system whereby the sovereign was
kept abreast of affairs by his ministers, who came to work with him in his cabinet.
During his administration Fleury was always present at these discussions between
the King and his ministers. In reality, the discussions took place between the
cardinal and the ministers except during much of 1738. In that year Louis played a
more active role than usual owing to the extended illnesses of Fleury, but he again
refrained from interfering when Fleury had recovered. The travail was an important
aspect of government, as Antoine has observed: ‘the travail was a serious rival to the
councils, the more so because numerous decisions taken during its meetings were
drawn up in the form of arrêts du conseil’.
153
Evidently, the power of the cardinal de
Fleury was very extensive. A fuller understanding of the way in which he was able
to preserve his position must take account of the political influence of factions,
which is the subject of the next chapter.
156
7
THE POLITICS OF FACTION
The need to master faction; the case of Chauvelin; Chauvelin’s dismissal; the situation
after Chauvelin’s fall; the Toulouse affair; the foreign policy crisis in 1740; the factions in
1740; the Chauvelin faction; the Noailles; the Belle-Isle faction; Belle-Isle triumphs;
military campaigns and factions; two new ministers; the death of Fleury; ministerial
anarchy.
Exercising close control over ministerial policies and over the activity of his
ministers, Fleury governed France as much as one man could. But an eighteenth-
century statesman had not only to conduct affairs; he had also to remain master
of the court if he were to survive in power. How did he do this? As Elias has
argued, the kingship mechanism depended upon the King keeping a balance
between rival groups at court, playing one off against another in order to remain
the arbiter. As the King’s favourite, Fleury took on this role on Louis XV’s behalf.
Access to the King was controlled as closely as possible, appointments subjected
to the approval of Fleury himself, policy discussed only in his presence. This was
the basis of his position. But his task was far from being simple, and much can be
learnt about the nature of politics in a court society from a investigation of his
strategies.
Factional intrigue was an essential feature of court politics. Even though Fleury
had won a victory over the factions by establishing a ministry and then further
reconstructing it to his taste, he was still not entirely free from attack. In 1730
there was a nebulous conspiracy against him at court, known as the conspiracy of
the marmosets, which resulted in the presentation to the King of a memoir in
which his administration was blackened.
1
Louis XV promptly handed it over to
Fleury and agreed to the exile of its presenters, who were two of the King’s
hunting intimates, the young ducs de Gesvres and d’Epernon.
2
There were
perhaps unfounded suspicions that the Noailles were manipulating them because
the memoir suggested that du Maine and Noailles were more fit to conduct the
government than Fleury. On the other hand, it was also said that Chauvelin was
involved in an attempt to persuade Fleury to retire.
3
In 1731 a secret report on the
‘State of the court’ represented the comtesse de Toulouse as the moving force
behind the opposition to Fleury.
4
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157
Soon it became apparent that Louis was not to be persuaded to abandon the old
Cardinal. This brought about a change of strategy for the factions. Instead of trying
to supplant Fleury immediately, they came to terms with his power and planned for
the situation which would arise after his death. Since he was 80 in 1733, the event
was presumed to be not very far off. Thus the factions began to participate in the
struggle for the succession to Fleury. Either as actors or as targets the ministers
inevitably became involved.
What, then, was the nature of factional activity? Those groups at court who
would have liked to have supplanted Fleury remained powerful but less active.
Their task was to make effective preparation for the day when the Cardinal died, by
building up a network of influences and candidates through whom they might hope
to govern. The principal factions remained as they had been in the late 1720s,
basically representing a division of interests between the House of Orléans and the
House of Condé.
5
The princes légitimés and the Noailles were reconciled to some
extent with the Orleanists, although they may also be regarded as having developed
into a separate faction.
THE CASE OF CHAUVELIN
The experience of Chauvelin is the most important illustration of their dilemma.
An analysis of his position and the circumstances of his fall from power is very
revealing about the nature of court politics. From the moment when Chauvelin was
appointed aide to Fleury and, as it was assumed, his successor, his position became
more difficult. The problem for Chauvelin was how to ensure his position after the
death of Fleury, as he was the most likely candidate for the role of premier ministre.
After all, unless he placed his trust entirely in Louis XV, with whom he had no
particularly close ties, he would be without a protector at court.
6
As a man of the
robe in an environment suited to the higher aristocracy, it was important for him to
make powerful allies who would support him later. A related problem was that
Fleury would not accept anything less than total devotion to himself, being jealous
of his authority and naturally sensitive about the question of his death.
Furthermore, wrote d’Argenson of Chauvelin, ‘his association to the office of first
minister has made him the butt of all the ministers. He has taken all the refusals
upon himself and left the cardinal with the honour of successes and favours’.
7
The
result of this was that Fleury retained his popularity.
8
The garde des sceaux had little choice but to adhere to the Condé faction because
the other groups were already opposed to him. He was cordially disliked by
Noailles, who supported the Chancellor; the duc d’Orléans actually resigned his
place in the council when he heard of the elevation of Chauvelin in 1732 and was
only persuaded to remain with great difficulty.
9
The beleaguered secrétaire d’état tried
to make himself agreeable to the King and is said to have cultivated the marmosets
and Mme de Mailly, the King’s first mistress, supplying her with funds from the
foreign affairs budget without the knowledge of Fleury.