Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745

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it was so, like the reduction of the taille which was introduced as soon as the shadow

of war seemed to have passed. ‘The peace, followed by the suppression of the

cinquantième and the reduction in the taille has given the public a grand idea of the

cardinal-minister and has rendered him as respectable and dear as ever the cardinal

d’Amboise once was’, observed the author of a memoir on finances.

Another popular measure was the persecution of the Pâris brothers who were

deeply unpopular with public opinion: the Parisian masses and the cabal alike.

Immediately on the change of ministry the four of them were exiled to four different

towns. In July 1726 Pâris Duvernay was imprisoned in the Bastille, in one of the

more disagreeable dungeons. After several months charges were trumped up

against him concerning the alleged illegal use of funds. During the case the

authorities made use of many of those methods so typical of ancien régime

monarchies: he was deprived of company, of legitimate means of defence in the case

and allowed no access to his papers to prove his innocence. As the historian

Ravaisson points out, ‘the legal pursuit of the traitants charmed the bitterness of the

tax-payers and made the often misleading mirage of a disinterested government

shine before their eyes’.

Duvernay was acquitted on 11 March 1728 when one of

the other accused disclosed in court that he had been offered his liberty if he would

accuse Duvernay.

The acquittal was not in itself an important failure, but it does

show that Fleury’s ministry was no better at handling a political trial than Bourbon

had been in the case of Le Blanc.

A further important measure was the reversal of the system of the government

régie for tax collection and the selling of this function to a body of general farmers.

The administration for the collection of several of the more important indirect taxes

that were farmed out as the ‘General Farm’ was a royal bureaucracy. The difference

between a régie and administration by a company of general farmers was that under

a régie commissioners directed this bureaucracy and received a salary while the

government assumed the costs of collection, whereas the alternative was

management by a company which also guaranteed the government a certain tax

receipt every year and paid the costs of collection. From the ministerial point of view

the chief advantage of a company was that the general farmers represented a source

of credit for the government.

The régie had been particularly espoused by

Duvernay, so again this step represented an attack in retrospect on previous policies.

Historians have long recognised that the new lease, sold at 80 million livres, was

about 10 million undervalued, but this was for reasons which have been ignored. In

the ancien régime, every time there was a war, the government needed money quickly

and was not in a position to bargain. Villars, who was present at the council

meeting, wrote that ‘the lease was indisputably necessary to re-establish the

circulation of specie which had utterly ceased’.

Most of the members of the

company which took on the new lease were the very same commissioners who had

administered the régie intéressée since 1723. The change in 1726, therefore, did not

represent a change of personnel but reflected a dislike of reform and the urgent need

of the government for credit. In the long run the government wanted to re-establish

a group of financiers capable of supplying the state with large amounts of credit in

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an emergency. Under the ancien régime, in the absence of a state bank, such a class

was considered necessary.

In short, the financial policy of the ministry of Fleury represented a complete

reversal of the policy of reform pursued for four years under the direction of the

Pâris brothers. Moreover, there are great similarities between Fleury’s financial

policy and the policy of the ministries in the seventeenth century when

government was driven from expedient to expedient. Several of the chief

characteristics are present: an arbitrary reduction of rentes, the leasing of the

general farm, the caressing of the hommes de finances and the persecution of a

leading financier in order to raise public confidence in the government. The

return to the old financial system was popular, and as it gave Fleury popularity it

provided him with strength and security. Having decided not to pursue reform of

the long-term financial problems of the state and thus having reduced the risk of

internal disorder in a way which brought him ‘credit’, Fleury was in a better

position to exert his authority and buy off those groups at court who threatened

to circumscribe his freedom of action.

The Cardinal did not make ministerial concessions to Le Blanc and Desforts

over the summer of 1726. In fact, by a stroke of good fortune, the secretary of state

for war was seriously ill and underwent two operations in August. Far from being a

pliable figurehead for an ambitious group, Fleury, whose true character had

remained something of a mystery to courtiers until then, proved determined to

establish a firm grip on power and brook no interference. Since 1723 he had always

been present when others worked with the King at the business of government, and

he arranged with Louis to continue this practice. Louis made it clear on a number of

occasions that he would not deal with matters unless they were brought to his

attention in the presence of his former preceptor. This system applied equally to the

distribution of favours and so, having taken on the feuille des bénéfices, Fleury was

master of both ecclesiastical and lay patronage at court.

Although Fleury had the final say in these matters, it would have been

impossible for him to find candidates for places and ideas for policies had he not

been aided by advisers. His choice of counsellors was therefore of great importance

at court. Were Le Blanc and Desforts to play a part in the formulation of policies, as

they were hoping, or would Fleury look elsewhere? In the event, it was soon noticed

that d’Huxelles was the adviser with the most influence. One of Richelieu’s

correspondents reported that ‘Foreign affairs are dealt with twice a week by the

maréchal d’Huxelles in M.de Fréjus’s apartment where Morville is also present; this

maréchal will have a seat in the Council only when M.de Fréjus has received the

cardinal’s cap’.

It would appear that the council of state met in its old form, without the presence

of the due de Bourbon of course, during the summer of 1726. It seems certain that,

during the interim period before Fleury was raised to the purple, the council of state

was reduced to a body which merely endorsed the decisions taken in private

consultations, usually at the residence of Fleury. This avoided the problem of

precedence.

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By late July it seemed to Richelieu that the Orleanists would not gain by the

change of ministry, for Fleury was relying on the King and displayed only devotion

to the state.

In September he wrote to Silly commenting on the relative lack of

influence which had accrued to Le Blanc and Desforts. By his strength and

determination, and aided by the constancy of the young King, the Cardinal had put

himself in a position where he could afford to ignore their ambitions. Most courtiers

were probably caught unawares by this side of Fleury, as Richelieu implied in a

letter of 24 September 1726:

M.de Fréjus’s conduct towards that of M.Desforts and Le Blanc doesn’t

surprise me at all; it conforms exactly to what I know of his character and

what I told you, and probably no one will have credit over him except in

those matters that he cannot do himself, for he has principles that are entirely

his own, and he has more than enough intelligence to understand those

matters that he has the time and the strength to examine and will not consider

his humour, nor will he ever act from anything but a sense of justice; thus he

will not be led by anyone else.

Although still seriously ill, Le Blanc tried to give the impression of a miraculous

recovery and worked for five or six hours a day during the week before the first

meeting of the council of state after Fleury had received his promotion.

Nevertheless, his hopes were dashed, as the King called only two men to the

council: Tallard and d’Huxelles.

Fleury was not prepared to make concessions on foreign policy to the cabal, but

he was prepared to make other concessions. The most important of these

concerned the financial affairs of Le Blanc and the Belle-Isle. In spite of the

resistance of the maréchal de Villars, Desforts was allowed to push through the

royal council of finances the ratification of a very favourable exchange for Belle-Isle.

In return for the island of Belle-Isle the comte had received a large part of the former

domain of the late duc de Berry. The ratification of this affair, begun under the

Regency, had been delayed during the Bourbon ministry, but now it was

confirmed.

This settlement assured for Belle-Isle the income, rank and status of a

very great lord and enabled him to retain a large number of secretaries and

construct a network of correspondents which he hoped would enable him to be

useful to the ministry. Furthermore, by means of the influence of Le Blanc, the

judgement on Belle-Isle for fraud, delivered in 1725, was reversed—a decision which

saved him the 600,000 livres which he had been condemned to pay as an

indemnity.

It was all a manoeuvre that well illustrates that neglected but

indissoluble link between the family fortunes of the court aristocracy and

ministerial politics.

By 1727 the situation for Fleury had improved considerably. He had allies in the

council so that he did not need to fear the reversal of any decisions which were

important to his foreign policy. Since his character had remained such a mystery to

most observers until well after the coup, opponents had been taken by surprise both

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by his unexpected intransigence and by the exceptional confidence which the King

displayed in him. Le Blanc and Desforts had made many enemies by their attitude

to other courtiers. People now reported to Fleury their faults which had not been

mentioned before and their prestige at court went into decline.

Le Blanc was no

longer a serious contender for influence.

However, the power of Fleury had to survive one more test before it could be

described as secure. Letters analysing the intrigues in 1727, written by the comte

de Marcillac, a client of d’Huxelles, were sent to Philippe V and were preserved in

the archives. From them, as the historian Baudrillart says, it is easy to see that ‘the

Cardinal de Fleury, in spite of the major concessions at the beginning, was far

from an understanding with the House of Orleans’.

The cabal was worried at

the developing reconciliation between France and Spain and hoped to upset it.

Apart from arguing for war, they hoped either to replace Fleury with one of the

princes légitimés (du Maine or Toulouse) or to induce him to share power with the

duc du Maine. Probably the royal visits to the château of Rambouillet, the

Toulouse residence much liked by Louis XV for its informal atmosphere,

encouraged these hopes.

It was natural for courtiers to suppose that even in 1727 these visits reflected their

influence, but this was not so. Louis was extremely wary of all who approached

him, letting no one into his confidence and dispensing no graces and favours of any

significance. According to Silly, he went to Rambouillet to escape work and to enjoy

himself with a few courtiers he was familiar with. ‘Those who have the honour of

accompanying him are no more solidly advanced for it; no preference, no mark of

confidence for a single one of them: his valets and all those who approach him more

closely, are in the same situation, and up to now no one can boast of having received

either friendship or confidence, which is a most extra-ordinary phenomenon from

someone who is only seventeen.’

With this kind of constancy from his master,

Fleury had the freedom to outmanœuvre his opponents.

Until this point, Fleury had appeared to want to placate everybody, but now he

struck back.

He retaliated with a dramatic concession which was designed to

deprive the Orleanists of their figureheads, the princes légitimés. On 14 April 1727,

Fleury surprised everyone by restoring the privileges which they had lost in 1715.

They were to be equal in all honorific ways with the princes of the blood, except

that within this enlarged group the princes of the blood retained precedence.

Not

only did this decision demonstrate clearly that no one apart from Fleury and the

King would ever have a part in the distribution of favours, but it was also

completely successful in drawing du Maine away from the Orleanists. The letter

which he wrote to Mme de Caylus on 18 April is proof enough of this.

The cabal

was thus a party without a candidate of sufficient ministerial status and experience.

Henceforth the position of Fleury could be regarded as secure. Silly explained to

Richelieu in early May:

The cardinal is more than ever the master, and only confides in each of the

ministers or underministers as much as the details they are charged with

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require; until now he has conserved full control over all business, in a word,

no one governs him. Maréchal d’Huxelles has fallen considerably in esteem

…Le Blanc’s credit is diminishing every day, he sees it, he feels it, it is draining

him away. Desforts maintains himself, but the cardinal knows that. Morville

is one of the most in favour and, whatever anyone might tell you, I believe his

situation to be most solid…No one but the King has any influence over him,

and no one but the cardinal has any credit with the King, and important

matters are decided between them.

Having thus successfully defended his position and emancipated himself from the

intrigues of court factions, Fleury was now sufficiently powerful to begin the

reconstruction of the ministry in accordance with his own aims. This he did

between the summer of 1727 and March 1730. The reorganisation involved the

replacement of the Keeper of the Seals, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, the

Secretary of State for war, and the Controller-general, and also the recall of the

exiled Chancellor. The only ministerial appointments which were confirmed were

the two jointly held secretaryships for the marine and the King’s household, the one

relatively unimportant secretaryship of state which had only provincial

responsibilities, and the lieutenance général for the police. The holders of these posts

remained in place because Fleury was satisfied with their talents and felt no

objection to the views they expressed. He had a liking for the young and talented

Maurepas, Saint-Florentin was a mere administrator, and Hérault the lieutenant-

general of police worked very closely with him. Their role in the government will be

discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

The ministerial changes began with the pressure for the recall of Chancellor

Daguesseau. He was spoken for by the Noailles, a large family with ambitions to

power, who were at this time helping Fleury by exerting pressure on the recalcitrant

pro-Jansenist cardinal de Noailles to accept Unigenitus, and thus were maintaining

their influence.

Fleury agreed to the return of Daguesseau provided that he was

not repossessed of the Seals, because the Chancellor was reputed to be pro-

Jansenist. His arrival on Thursday, 14 August was the occasion for the voluntary

resignation of d’Armenonville, the Keeper of the Seals, who presumed that by

resigning he would honourably facilitate the return of the Seals to their former

guardian. D’Armenonville was obviously unaware of the arrangement between

Fleury and the Noailles and the minister did not enlighten him. Neither the Keeper

of the Seals nor his son Morville had the full confidence of Fleury, who told the

Bavarian ambassador that he felt obliged to conceal much of his intentions from

both of them. The offer of resignation, brought to the King on his father’s behalf by

Morville on 15 August 1727, was therefore accepted. No doubt the Cardinal-

minister had already considered the question of who was to be made Keeper of the

Seals, for on Sunday, 17 August Germain Louis Chauvelin was appointed, and on

Monday morning he took his oath.

Although many thought that this appointment was the work of a faction, since

d’Huxelles and Tallard had been recommending him for ministerial office for some

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time, the choice was probably uniquely that of Fleury. It is said that he had known

Chauvelin since the time of the Regency and there is a definite record of contacts

between them in 1722.

Fleury is reported to have had a very high opinion of him

and undoubtedly Chauvelin was a man to be respected, as all the descriptions

attest.

Born in 1685, Germain Louis Chauvelin had made his career as a royal

lawyer, becoming master of requests in 1711 and an avocat général in the Paris

parlement in 1715. Richer d’Aube paints a fascinating picture of how Chauvelin’s

ambition carried him up the ladder to power. As master of requests, late in the reign

of Louis XIV, he willingly risked royal displeasure by speaking out against the

Jesuits at a hearing held in the King’s presence. This bold action distinguished him

from his brother who was then avocat général and had spoken more dutifully for the

Jesuits. (Perhaps this is a good example of family strategy to ensure that at least one

of them was on the winning side.) This put Chauvelin in favour with the majority

of the robe judges, who were staunchly anti-Jesuit. In the role of avocat général after

his brother’s and the King’s death he made a good reputation, although he was less

of an orator than his brother. The next step in his career would be to become

president à mortier in the parlement, a post he accordingly sought to buy. There was

only one possibility—a disreputable magistrate of good birth held such a post. He

used every means, ‘even the lowest’, to convince him to sell, and was successful.

Such an office could be bought even by a magistrate without a great deal of money,

banking on the rich marriage he would be able to make and which Chauvelin

accordingly made. Still driven by ambition when most men would have sat back to

enjoy the fruits of office and reputation, Chauvelin tried to become First President

of the parlement. ‘He could think of no other way than to intrigue for it at court and

to reveal the secrets of his company.

President Hénault, then one of his colleagues,

says that he was on the point of success when the Regent died and Bourbon

appointed another candidate. There now being no hope of success in the parlement,

‘he saw that all that was left was to turn his ambitions towards ministerial office, and

did this keenly. He attached and devoted himself to persons who appeared to have

the most effective credit with M.le cardinal de Fleury’.

He demonstrated his

capacity for work by serving the interests of important allies, and by cataloguing

and studying a huge collection of manuscripts on public law bequeathed to him by

Harlay, former First President of the parlement. ‘It was bruited that president

Chauvelin worked at nothing but public law’

Everyone agreed that he was

intelligent, even Walpole who disliked him. ‘He was extremely good at politics,

with the gift of superior intelligence, but to be feared.’

Chauvelin was therefore

appointed because he had the necessary knowledge and knew how to profit from

the Cardinal’s need for his legal erudition, energy and intelligence.

It has usually been thought that his appointment was partly a step designed

to facilitate relations with the Paris parlement because of the connections which

he must have retained there. This is no doubt correct and in the crisis of 1732 he

was able to provide the government with several agents in the courts who

relayed invaluable information. However, although the first reaction of the

parlementaires in 1727 was one of pleasure because it was thought that he

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would render them services with the ministry, in the long run the judges came

to detest him and his appointment was ultimately to arouse considerable

animosity. It was thought, quite rightly, that he had betrayed the code of the

institution and sold himself to the government. Maupeou was to do the same a

generation later.

If the selection of Chauvelin as Keeper of the Seals is easy to comprehend, that

he should, only two days later, be appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs is

not. The circumstances were perhaps fortuitous, the occasion being the acceptance

of the resignation of Morville on Tuesday morning. He had decided to resign

because he was insulted by the disregarding of his father’s honourable intentions

towards Daguesseau. At 9 p.m. that evening his office was given to Chauvelin. As

Richer d’Aube remarked, it was not surprising to appoint a leading magistrate to be

garde des sceaux—but that he should be appointed to the department for foreign affairs

was a great surprise, since he had no experience in the field at all, never having been

even an ambassador.

The explanation is simple—it was precisely because Chauvelin had no

experience that Fleury wanted him. The Cardinal would have known that he could

rely upon his capacity for work and could have complete confidence in his secrecy,

and that was enough. The appointment is proof of Fleury’s ideas on the

government: Chauvelin was to carry on the detail of the department while Fleury

was to reserve for himself the formulation of policy. Thus he left himself with more

free time to devote himself to policy-making in other areas.

The recall of Daguesseau and the appointment of Chauvelin were the first

important steps in the reconstruction of the ministry to the taste of the Cardinal.

At that time there was no doubt of the subservience of Chauvelin to the will of the

unofficial premier ministre. Such was the delicacy of his position that Chauvelin

could not afford to cultivate an independent line and still hope to remain in office:

Fleury was his only support. After the fall of Chauvelin in 1737, Richer d’Aube

pointed out in his commentary that the minister had failed to appreciate the

realities of his position and the paramount importance of remaining in submission

to the will of Fleury.

At the time of his appointment, the Prussian ambassador

came to the same conclusions. ‘So long as M.le cardinal is the master as he is,

there is every appearance that this new minister can only conserve his position, in

so far as he gives no hint of wanting to stray from his principles and a great

submission to his wishes.’

In the person of the new garde des sceaux and secrétaire d’état Fleury had a man

likely to execute his plans; in the reinstated Chancellor he acquired another. The

circumstances of his recall were such that Daguesseau was unlikely to have the

opportunity to display the independence for which he had become famous as an

avocat général. Precedence in the council of state was given to Chauvelin by means of

conferring on the Keeper of the Seals the survivance of the chancellorship: this was a

clear indication of the terms of his recall. In any case, the Chancellor was a changed

man in 1727, for five years of exile had left their mark. Having immersed himself in

study he had lost his desire to plead causes and was ready to make compromises in

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order to preserve his position at court: ‘he’s just a well of learning, that’s all’,

observed Barbier.’

During 1727 the ‘credit’ of Le Blanc declined steadily thanks to the hostility

which he had aroused among jealous, politically inclined courtiers who took care to

emphasise his faults to Fleury. ‘His discredit increased daily and all that he did that

was lowly and perhaps unjust towards persons most obviously in favour would

probably not have prevented him from being shamefully displaced had his poor

health not indicated an early death. Having returned to court in June 1726 covered

in glory, he died despised in May 1728. And convicted of having at the least been

lacking in economy with the expenditure of his department.’

Thus the ministry of

Fleury led to dashed hopes, frustrated ambitions and an inglorious end to the career

of one of the most intelligent of the political intriguers to be involved in politics since

the Regency.

His successor was Bauyn d’Angervilliers, who at 53 already had twenty-five

years of experience as an intendant. He was well acquainted with military affairs

because his main posts had been in the frontier provinces, at Grenoble and

Strasbourg. He had administered Grenoble during the wars of Louis XIV, when

the généralité was very important for the Italian campaigns, and he had learned to

surmount enormous logistical problems. Next he had taken up the intendancy of

Alsace, with its large garrisons and fortified towns. According to Richer d’Aube,

d’Angervilliers was a man who well understood the need to deal with the various

provinces in his department in a manner which took account of their differing

customs and laws and he was consequently prepared to accept modifications in the

execution of general policies or particular arrêts. He also appreciated the fact that it

was unwise to attach equal weight to the reports of all the intendants, since they

were not all equally trustworthy. Although he was intelligent, he had an air of

flippancy which told against him in court politics.

His appointment was generally

applauded and a month after d’Huxelles retired from the council of state on 29

November 1729, he became a minister of state. Like the other appointees he was

neither of the noblesse de cour nor an adherent to any powerful faction, and

consequently was indebted to Fleury for his place.

The final ministerial change during the period when Fleury was establishing his

grip on power, was the departure of the contrôleur général Desforts and the

substitution of Philibert Orry. Publicly, Desforts remained firmly in favour until

1730 but discerning courtiers speculated on a decline in his ‘credit’ from early in

1727. It was impolitic to discredit a contrôleur général entirely, observed Richer

d’Aube, and unwise to change the holder of the office too often.

Such changes

could have an adverse effect on the supply of financial credit to the government. A

controller-general would build up his own financial clan upon whom he would rely

for sustaining the finances in difficult times, in return for channelling profits their

way. These reasons, combined with the fact that there was no suitable successor to

hand, persuaded Fleury to retain him for some time.

Yet the Cardinal was said to

be unimpressed by his performance.

Desforts had proposed no more than temporary expedients to right the financial

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situation and his years in power had seen little or no improvement in the availability

and circulation of specie in France. In addition, he had against him the animosity of

Chauvelin.

In 1730 his fall became almost inevitable when a stockjobbing scandal

came to light in which he was certainly, but perhaps unwittingly, implicated. There

was at that time a steady market in the shares of the Compagnie des Indes which

had been exploited by a group of stockjobbers for about two years. But, on 10

March 1730, these people were due to pay for a large number of shares of which a

sum equal to half the share capital ought to have been deposited as surety with the

commissioner of the company. The latter was corrupt and had allowed (or had

been ordered to allow) them not to deposit their security and so on that date they

would have been obliged to sell a lot of shares quickly in a market which had

suffered from their previous manipulations, incurring a large loss. On 9 March the

contrôleur général issued an arrêt making this sort of stockjobbing illegal, but the arrêt

also cancelled all outstanding contracts. That meant that the sellers and not the

stockjobbing buyers would have to sell their shares at a loss, or keep them with their

fallen value, and the stockjobbers would lose nothing. A number of people were

sent to the Bastille when this was discovered. At this juncture Desforts asked to

resign and was taken at his word. The scandal was handled in secret, the prisoners

were at last set free and the whole affair died down without anyone being either

exonerated or punished.

The appointment of Orry on 20 March 1730 seems to reflect the preference of

Fleury for ministers lacking in both originality and the desire for independence.

Although he was the son of Jean Orry who had managed the Spanish finances after

1708, he had not pursued his father’s vocation. After an undistinguished career as

master of requests, the younger Orry had become intendant at Soissons, which was

a post requiring no more than routine administration. In 1727 he had acquired what

he thought was a more important généralité, Perpignan, because it was a frontier

province and was therefore threatened with invasion.

In 1730, when passing

through Paris on his way to take up a third post at Lille, ‘the best in the kingdom’,

he was given instead the commission of contrôleur général des finances. Apart from his

obvious favour with Fleury, Orry also had the support of Chauvelin. The latter,

‘who busies himself only with the care he takes to invade everyone else’s authority’,

was only too pleased to have the administration of finances in the hands of someone

who was likely to be subject to his will and to that of the faction which supported

him in his position of favour with Fleury.

In the event, Orry was to display all the

lack of originality predicted of him, but considerably more independence than

Chauvelin might have hoped for.

The above account of the establishment of a ministry in accordance with his own

views and nature shows how long it took Fleury to free himself from the web of

court intrigues which had been spun during the 1720s. It would certainly be a

mistake to conclude that he could rest assured that his position was secure from

attack or that the later policies were entirely free from influence by the political

configuration at court. That was never the case—as was to be demonstrated by a

plot in 1730, and by the resurgence of powerful intrigues in the last three years of his

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life during the Austrian war. Nevertheless, from the late 1720s it was apparent that

he wielded all the powers of a premier ministre and that he had emerged as a fully

independent force in politics.

Taken in their entirety, the effects of the ministerial coup did not represent a

radical change in either the form of the government or of its personnel. In legal

terms the commission of premier ministre had been suppressed and Louis XV

had become his own first minister. That is to say, he consulted directly with the

ministers of the various departments without the intermediary of an official

premier ministre. In practice, as will be seen, he was always attended by the

cardinal de Fleury during his travail. This arrangement meant that the Cardinal

was de facto premier ministre. By mid-1727, certainly by 1728, most groups at

court had little choice but to acquiesce in the power of Fleury and sought

thenceforth to come to terms with him in order to preserve their power and

status. It is notable that none of the new appointments after 1726 was forced

upon Fleury. Even though he relied to some extent on recommendations, which

was inevitable, and agreed to the return of Daguesseau who was a candidate of

the Noailles faction, all of the new ministers were appointed on his terms and as

new men they depended for security in their posts on him alone. The

appointment of Chauvelin was the first and most striking gesture of

independence in this domain, while the later changes served only to emphasise

the strength of his position.

The evidence left by observers of the court accords well with this interpretation.

In 1728 the court of Spain was sufficiently persuaded of his power to have sent him

a document to be used in the event of the death of Louis XV, then ill, which

conferred on him full powers to govern France until Philippe V arrived. One of the

letters of Richelieu provides further evidence of the degree of ascendency of Fleury

at that time.

I’ll admit to you that the wisest course for me, would be to have a good office

at court, that would put me in frequent contact with the master (Louis XV).

In the light of what you write to me and what others write, he will always be

inclined to be governed, and it would be most unfortunate if I were unable to

get into his good graces. I do not look for a place in the ministry, because they

are all subordinated to the cardinal, and I do not believe them to be very

stable with a master who could easily be turned against one. One would so to

speak only drop in at court, and I want to stay there. Without having a

department, being on good terms with the king, I will have influence

everywhere, and I shall not fear disgrace so easily. I hope also to have a post

as commandant or a governorship, and I’ll do what I like there; being on

good terms with the master, no one will dare to contradict me, and I have a

great penchant for not being a subordinate.

The conclusions to be drawn from this letter are that adroit and ambitious

courtiers were by 1728 obliged to seek other routes to power than the one