Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745

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POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

only the due and Fleury waited upon him. Fleury opposed this on the grounds that

no queen had ever enjoyed that right. Later the same day, using the dependence of

the Queen as a means to his end, by obliging her to influence the King, Bourbon

approached Louis when Fleury was absent. He read to him the description sent by

Polignac of the angry reaction by the Pope to Fleury’s recent intervention in

ecclesiastical policy. This appeal to religious sentiment was no doubt the best way to

shake the confidence that Louis had in Fleury, for at this stage in his life Louis had

a highly developed sense of piety. However, Fleury, who must have suspected some

coup by Bourbon when Louis failed to keep his appointment with him, decided to

re-enact the ‘schoolboy’s trick’ he had played in 1722. Early the following morning

he departed for the seminary of Saint-Sulpice at Issy, where he had quarters; he left

a letter for Louis which said that, as apparently there was no further need for him,

he was retiring from court. Louis was naturally quite distraught by the emotional

shock administered by his beloved preceptor and he closeted himself in his garde-

robe. By all accounts, it was the action of his first gentleman of the bedchamber, the

duc de Mortemart, which ensured the failure of Bourbon’s plan—or the success of

Fleury’s. He suggested to Louis that he order his premier ministre to recall Fleury at

once, and Louis did so. In the annals of the reign of Louis XV this is often cited as

the first occasion on which the King exerted himself, but before too much credit is

given Louis it should be noted that Mortemart virtually put the words into his

mouth.

The departure and speedy recall of Fleury was indeed an ignominious episode

for Bourbon. The consequences of the event were far reaching because it had

brought the formerly more or less covert rift between them to public attention. The

‘credibility’ of Bourbon suffered the more from his failure because of its timing. The

month of December already saw his popularity very low due to the financial steps

taken by the ministry: there was a further reduction in the value of specie and a

large reduction in court pensions. The economic depression reached its worst point

in the last quarter of 1725 with, in northern France, textile unemployment and grain

prices at their highest, and contemporaries could not know that the depression was

not to worsen. There were riots in many towns, notably Paris, Rouen and Caen.

In the light of this, it was imperative to take the greatest care in handling the

court. Richelieu could see the dangers for Bourbon from any exploitation of his

unpopularity by court intriguers whom Bourbon was making no attempt to

conciliate. On 31 December 1725, he wrote of this in a coded letter to Silly.

I agree that the neglect of learning is pushed to the limit by our courtiers, and

that there are few people capable of upholding the roles they could play, but I

fear greatly for M.le Duc, that there are only too many in a position to trouble

him. The duc de Noailles is certainly one of those able to play a leading role

and sustain it…

The way in which the clergy has revolted as much on the business of the

fiftieth as on that of the Constitution is a very great matter, especially with the

number of discontented there is and the way affairs are going. For myself, I

THE DISGRACING OF BOURBON

am sorry but I’ve never seen anything so irregular as what’s being done and

the last reduction [in the value of specie] is quite astonishing. The reduction in

pensions is in itself an excellent thing, but certainly rather dangerous for the

one who does it, and pensions ought not to have been given at the same time

to Chabanne and Sabran. In truth, I still don’t know how it will all end, for I

see strange things, and this reduction that is made with the prospect of a war

that the English and the Orleanists want to put us out of measure with Spain,

which perhaps won’t happen, all this I say, is done so extraordinarily as to be

incomprehensible.

These ominous reflections were written before Richelieu received news of the Issy

incident. His letter to Silly in January shows how Bourbon’s failure to remove

Fleury increased the already general doubts abroad as to his ability to survive in

power.

Not only could the ambiguity in the ministry prove a perplexing problem for

those with business to conduct, but it could also have repercussions in international

diplomacy. The French ship of state appeared to be drifting out of control, and this

was an encouragement to the Austrians to take a more belligerent line towards

France. ‘All the reports they hear of the sorry state of France and of the interior of

the kingdom only encourage them to take this course [war] and by making them

foresee greater ease in the execution of their plans, diminishes the personal

antipathy the ministers have for war’, Richelieu reported to Noailles at this time.

The court of Vienna certainly leaned towards negotiation, but if pushed would not

hesitate to fight a war, he wrote.

For all but the most acute observers, the uncertainty about the state of politics

in France was soon settled. Fleury was too cautious, too intelligent, to vaunt his

minor triumph over Bourbon, the more so because his move had been forced on

him in self-defence. Bourbon was too proud and too much a courtier not to

conceal his defeat as best he could. When questioned discreetly by Walpole on

the divisions at court, Bourbon replied, ‘M.Frejus and I…have always been very

good friends. I do not doubt but we shall always continue so; although I am very

sensible of the endeavours of some to divide us, if possible, but they will not be

able to have their end’.

Nevertheless, in spite of the attempts in the winter and spring by the two

ministers to give an outward impression that perfect accord reigned between

them, the keenest observers were not deceived. The Prussian envoy could see that

the rift between them, although glossed over, remained and would subsist as long

as Mme de Prie and Paris Duvernay were still in favour.

The December débâcle

had actually been symptomatic of a definite change in the balance of power at

court, a change away from Bourbon but, until the Issy incident, not necessarily

towards Fleury.

If, before this event, Richelieu and Silly had been able to speculate on the various

possible successors to Bourbon, by January such speculations were unnecessary.

Fleury had emerged as the only possible alternative, for it was he who, more than

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100

anyone, held the favour of the King. Interestingly, like Maurepas in 1774, he was

not the leader of a faction: by emphasising his impartiality he had risen above the

fray and was courted by the numerous opponents of Bourbon. From January, for

those with political ambitions the real question was, did Fleury wish to replace

Bourbon?

In historical accounts the answer has usually been given in the affirmative:

Fleury was a schemer who was merely biding his time in the first half of 1726, until

finally in June the dismissal of Spain’s anti-French minister, Ripperda, gave him the

perfect occasion to dismiss an equally unpopular minister in France, Bourbon.

The chief evidence for this view which emphasises the primacy of foreign policy is

that Bourbon was dismissed just after the news of the dismissal of Ripperda reached

Paris and that Spain had long wanted the dismissal of Bourbon. (Post hoc ergo

propter hoc?)

The Spanish court was undoubtedly pleased. However, there is more than a little

evidence that this interpretation does not do justice to the full range of evidence. It

is always tempting for historians of policy to assume that this was a prime motive in

politics, when in fact, in this period at least, power and prestige were easily as

important motives—indeed, policy was often simply a vehicle for individuals or

factions. The motive from foreign policy was at most one element in a complex

array of motives and schemes that has to be fitted into its proper context in the

structure of politics. Taking into account the psychology of Fleury, a man to act with

care and after suitable reflection, we might think that the broadest explanation of the

ministerial changes is the most useful. Fleury would have liked his contemporaries

to have believed that he alone was responsible for the change of ministry on 11 June

1726, but there are plenty of indications that, although he made the final

preparations himself, he was acting in the knowledge that he had the support of a

particular group at court. This group was the Orleanists, whose power had been in

abeyance since 1723 when they had greatly suffered from the change of ministry

and the continuing prosecution of its leading lights, Belle-Isle and Le Blanc.

There are two possible versions of the persecution of the Belle-Isle and Le Blanc

during the ministry of Bourbon. The one which is most often repeated is that the

imprisonment and trial for corruption were the result of an intrigue by a spiteful

Mme de Prie, for Le Blanc was reputed to be the lover of Mme de Pleneuf who was

Prie’s mother and with whom she had quarrelled. Ravaisson, editor of the archives

of the Bastille, put it thus:

M.le Duc, having arrived at the pinnacle of power, would willingly have

pardoned M.Le Blanc, whom he no longer feared, but this minister had

been the fortunate lover of Mme de Pleneuf, Madame de Prie’s mother, and

the latter, who hated her mother, seized the occasion to mortify her, by

insisting on the imprisonment of Le Blanc, who until then had been

confined to his estates.

A frequently repeated story typical of ‘la petite histoire’ that reduces all in the

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eighteenth century to the love affairs of the men in power! None of the historians

who repeat this story has taken into account the evidence provided either by the

documents in the foreign affairs archives of the intrigues carried on by these men

nor the testimony of Paris de La Montagne, nor have they put the prosecution into

the context of the power struggle at court. In fact, Le Blanc and the Belle-Isle were

almost undoubtedly, at the very least indirectly, involved in the embezzlement of

funds and in their misuse to further their own factional ends. As these men were the

leaders of the Orleanist cabal it was expedient for Bourbon to continue the

prosecution that had begun with the setting up of a commission in the time of

Dubois. As Marais saw it, ‘this is one of the most important cases we’ve seen for a

long time in the kingdom. It is no less a matter than to decry the House of Orleans,

vilify the memory of the Regent and have his son despised’.

Unfortunately for Bourbon, what was therefore largely a political trial was badly

conducted. As an honorary maître des requêtes, Le Blanc could insist on being tried

before the whole Paris parlement, and the Belle-Isle, as high aristocrats, would be

judged by the grand’chambre de la tournelle.

Bourbon could have imposed a royal

commission but did not wish to be seen to have selected those judging men

regarded as his enemies.

The difference between trial by commission and by the

parlement is nicely illustrated by the different fate of LaJonchère from that of his

superiors. La Jonchère was condemned by the commission held in the Bastille to

repay 2,400,000 livres, with the comte de Belle-Isle held guarantor for 600,000

livres of this sum.

Not until January 1725 did the trial of the others come up in the

Paris parlement, but the Orleanists were able to influence the decision. While

Bourbon’s supporters were obliged to stay away from the trial—Richelieu, La

Feuillade and Villars-Brancas at first attended the sessions but had to withdraw

because it looked like government pressure—the prince de Conti and the duc

d’Orléans attended every day in their capacity as peers and openly canvassed

opinion in favour of Le Blanc. The result was that Le Blanc was unanimously

acquitted and the case against the Belle-Isle dismissed.

Subsequently, Bourbon

continued their confinement by lettre de cachet, and they were not released until early

in May 1725. This looked like unjust persecution and disposed the public in their

favour. The return of Le Blanc to his former employment after the fall of Bourbon

was tremendously popular.

When Fleury had agreed to become a minister he had antagonised the Orleanist

cabal. The predicament of the Orleanist prisoners gave him the chance to make

amends. Early in 1724 it was rumoured that he counselled Bourbon to bring the

affair to a speedy close.

When, after their release from prison, the Belle-Isle

brothers and Le Blanc were exiled, Fleury used his influence to procure for them a

less distant exile than the one envisaged. To judge from the letter by Belle-Isle to

Fleury, it was a deed which earned him the gratitude and support of the family.

The Orleanists, with or without the presence of the Belle-Isle and Le Blanc, were

the most important and the most consistent opponents of the ministry. The precise

aims of its members varied according to the individual, but their general aim may be

summed up in the ancien régime motto, ‘Ote-toi de là, que je m’y mette’. For the House of

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102

Orléans, opposition to the power of the Bourbon-Condé was a natural consequence

of the pre-eminence of Bourbon, and has already been discussed. In terms of policy,

their views may be put under three heads.

First, they were in favour of the Spanish

marriage until the break with Spain, after which it was in their interests to be anti-

Spanish in the hope that a war with Spain would destroy any chance Philippe V might

have of gaining French support for his rights to the throne of France. Second, they

were opposed to the financial policy of the ministry. This was a policy inspired by

hatred for the Pâris brothers whose examination of the treasurers’ accounts had led to

the corruption charges. Finally, some members of the group represented the dévot

interest at court which was opposed to the policy of explanations of Unigenitus and was

in favour of the constitutionnaires. The duc d’Orléans himself was extremely devout

and so were Mme de Dangeau and Mme de Lévis, the latter being an important

intriguer through her relations with Fleury and her nephews the Belle-Isle.

There is evidence that Fleury could not have had Bourbon dismissed without

their support.

It is a reflection both of the discretion of Fleury and of the

importance of the other opposition elements that the rise of Fleury was seen by

several contemporaries not as the emergence of a new power in politics—Fleury—but

as the eventual triumph of the House of Orléans and the Toulouse. Richer d’Aube

was one of those who interpreted the rise of Fleury as the rise of the cabal:

For a long time his ambition went no further than to gain him entire power in

ecclesiastical matters; that was enough for him as he was not ambitious, but

that was not sufficient for those who, believing themselves certain to control

him always, wished for their own ends to see him master of all. These

persons, helped by the poor success of the government of M.le Duc,

convinced the prelate that 1. M.le Duc was ruining everything, 2. that only he

the prelate, by having the Prince replaced, could replace him successfully, 3.

that he knew enough to govern the Kingdom, and that he could not fail to

have himself appointed first minister.

Fleury was seen as a tool in hands of cleverer men whose ambitions were to

dominate him once he was in power. These men can be identified as Le Blanc and

the comte de Belle-Isle. Fleury was by early 1726 obviously the only person with the

full confidence of the King, while his age led most courtiers to suppose that he

would die soon: both of these qualities were attractive to the ambitious plotters. The

fall of Bourbon was thus brought about by Fleury with the help of the opposition

that the premier ministre had either aroused or failed to subdue.

The story of the last few months of the ministry reveals much about political

tactics and throws some new light on the methods of Fleury. It is possible to go some

way towards solving the problem of the ambition of Fleury discussed earlier in the

chapter. The prelate was in a more powerful position at court after December 1725,

but Voltaire is certainly incorrect when he states that ‘he contented himself at first

with being the master of affairs in secret’.

The Walpole correspondence shows

only a slight increase in the importance accorded to Fleury by the British

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government with regard to the conduct of French affairs. The evidence suggests

that the bishop agreed with the policy currently pursued by his government and

found no reason to intervene. Fleury’s letter to Richelieu on 12 February 1726

contains a very precise expression of his views and also reveals that his

correspondence with the ambassador continued to be secret. His letter makes one

wonder if Fleury is defining his policy in advance of taking power or merely

explaining his own views to a protégé.

During January and February 1726 Fleury continued to complain to Bourbon

about the presence of Madame de Prie and Duvernay at court and about their

supposed influence. Villars, a confidant of Bourbon, noted that since Issy his attacks

were in more authoritative terms. Fleury was attacking the object of public hatred in

order to increase his own credit: ‘he wants the public to be aware that it is not his fault

if the two persons who displease the public are not dismissed from court’.

Richelieu it appeared that Fleury was really determined to bring about the removal of

Mme de Prie and Duvernay.

But Bourbon was equally determined to retain his

mistress and financial expert at court. His obstinacy ensured that his own fate became

tied to their own. Fleury then ceased his attacks for a while. At this stage, Silly wrote

a report for Richelieu and both this letter and its reply merit attention. ‘Here is the true

state of the court; I am well informed’, he wrote. The duc de Bourbon no longer fears

that the financier will have to be disgraced. Bourbon has still the same confidence and

attachment to Mme de Prie, and fears nothing from Fleury and the King.

On the other hand, M.de Fréjus appears ever closer with the King; the most

subtle courtiers, who have noticed this, redouble their attentions towards

him. Friends and the cabal are becoming impatient at his lack of decision; the

most keen are afraid he might weaken, the others flatter themselves that he is

acting prudently and with reason; but as he speaks his mind to no one, one

can comment only on appearances.

Richelieu replied on 18 March 1726:

I admit that I fear greatly the outcome for M.le Duc. I cannot imagine that he

could ever resolve himself to abandon M.du Verneys, and as I imagine his head

is spinning, that he has no ability even naturally for getting out of trouble, that

besides he has no friends at court and doesn’t know how to make them, I do

fear that all this will bring down M.le Duc when M.de Fréjus sees a bit more

strength of character in the King; but I believe Madame de Prie will get herself

out it, because besides the difference in her situation from that of M.du Verneys,

she is more intelligent and knows how to make decisions better.

Their view is that it was only a matter of time before Fleury had Bourbon’s remaining

friends dismissed, but they were unsure as to the extent of Fleury’s ambition. Mme de

Prie and the Pâris brothers could see the situation and decided to forestall the

opposition by a voluntary retirement from court. Their aim was probably to

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104

demonstrate to the world that the accusations made against them were groundless, no

more than a ploy used to attack the power of Bourbon. They certainly appreciated

that their presence endangered the position of the premier ministre, and were no

doubt also motivated by a healthy instinct of self-preservation. Mme de Prie retired to

Paris where she resumed her patronage of the arts.

The situation remained static during the spring of 1726. As late as 23 May

courtiers were unable to fathom Fleury’s position, although some thought they

could detect signs of a gathering storm.

Richelieu wrote on 4 June that he did not

think that the storm would break very soon, and was of the opinion that Mme de

Prie was slowly retreating from politics in order to avoid the catastrophe. Yet the

very day after writing this, he was obliged to add a postscript to his letter: ‘We have

just heard about what has happened to Ripperda…this adventure seems to be the

moment for the dénouement of the whole comedy being played out in Europe, and

might bring about our accommodation with Spain’.

The circumstances did not really warrant this optimism, since the British

government had recently resorted to force in the diplomatic quarrel with Spain. A

British fleet had been sent to blockade the Spanish treasure convoy in the West

Indies, and the danger of war was greater than ever. Richelieu did not yet know this.

He was also probably unaware of the desperate financial straits which the

government financial policy had produced for the French treasury. The lack of

circulation of specie was a grave problem and public confidence was so low that

there was a credit crisis. Every delay on payments granted to avoid the bankruptcy

of one creditor, said Villars, produced a bankruptcy by the debtor of the fortunate

creditor. After a number of conferences it was decided to abandon the policy of

deflation and to fix the value of the currency, with a revaluation which was decreed

on 26 May 1726.

The financial problems meant that the government had no

money to finance the war which seemed more than likely, in view of the British

belligerency. However, the decisions to modify the monetary policy could not alter

the fact that many people regarded Bourbon as responsible for the crisis.

So at the end of May and the beginning of June a number of events coincided to

create a dramatic situation, and for Fleury a moment of decisive activity. News of

the dismissal of Ripperda reached Paris on 2 or 3 June, and just at that moment

Mme de Prie returned to court at the insistence of Bourbon, to fulfil her week as

dame du palais. Fleury may not have wanted to assume the burden of office, but

circumstances contrived to leave him very little choice.

THE DISGRACE OF THE DUC DE BOURBON

Exactly at what stage Fleury made up his mind to assume the role of premier

ministre is hard to tell. Many contemporaries felt him to be the most ambitious of

men who beneath a modest exterior was always a schemer waiting for the right

moment to seize power. This seems unlikely, given his great age. It is more probable

that he preferred the role of ‘grey eminence’ during Bourbon’s ministry, but found

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105

that Bourbon resented his pretensions. Always a careful and astute man, Fleury had

naturally, by that instinct which blesses the successful politician, dissociated himself

from the unpopular ministry without necessarily intending to overthrow the Duke.

As the premier ministre, pushed by his associates, moved towards overt hostility to

Fleury in late 1725, it is possible that Fleury was forced to make a decision.

However, in the spring of 1726 he gave the impression of having decided to

continue supporting Bourbon—he even dissuaded him from resigning his office. It

may have been as late as June 1726 when Mme de Prie returned to court that he

finally made up his mind.

Certainly, there existed in June all the elements necessary for Fleury’s

successful assumption of the business of government. He had managed to remain

untainted by the unpopularity which Bourbon had attracted to himself. He had

defined his position on the foreign policy to be pursued by France by establishing

contacts in Spain, with the British ambassador in Paris, and with the French

representative in the key court of Vienna. He was not too involved with the

unpopular marriage project. For his religious policy he had the support of most of

the French church, through his control over ecclesiastical appointments, and he

had the support of the dévôts at court. The Orleanists, the faction most averse to

Bourbon, supported him in the hope of dominating his government later. By his

circumspection and modesty he had created for himself a position at court which

was apparently above faction, as befitted an ecclesiastic and a royal preceptor. In

June 1726 he was therefore in the position of being the only person whom people

could see as fit to govern.

A brief summary of events of 10 and 11 June 1726 must suffice here.

By all

accounts the matter was arranged, almost certainly on 10 June, and conducted

with the greatest care and secrecy. During the night of 11 June, Louis XV wrote

letters of commission to the duc de Charost, his governor, instructing him to

arrest the duc de Bourbon and have him conducted to Chantilly, and a set of

letters to the Queen and ministers ordering them to obey the orders of the bishop

of Fréjus as if they were his own. The royal entourage then repaired to

Rambouillet for supper, where Bourbon was intending to join them later. The

arrest itself took place at Versailles in the cabinet of the premier ministre, by

Charost, and it was not until the evening of the next day that the news began to

be generally known. The security preparations—musketeers at every doorway, on

the balconies and in the gardens of Versailles—are particularly noteworthy, for

they indicate that this was an affair of state of the first importance: Bourbon was

to be given no opportunity to resist or rebel against royal authority The conduct

of Louis is also to be remarked upon for, still at an early age, he succeeded in

displaying great qualities of dissimulation and in preserving the utmost secrecy

while the affair was being arranged and executed. The exile also set a pattern

which was to be repeated in 1737 when the secretary of state for foreign affairs

was arrested and exiled to Grosbois. This manifested itself both in the

organisation of the arrest itself and in the quiet period of good relations

beforehand when the minister was lulled into a false sense of security.

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Only two days after the exile of the premier ministre Fleury wrote to Bourbon to

tell him why he had had him dismissed. Perhaps the letter was intended to be the

‘official version’ of the truth, but some parts of it do ring true, while the fact that it

was written at all reveals not just civility but the building of bridges for the future.

The House of Bourbon-Condé would remain a powerful force in politics. Noble

honour clearly played a part in that to draw back would have discredited Fleury.

The letter is long, but nothing will be lost if it is summarised while retaining the

most important statements in quotation.

Fleury began by saying that he bore no grudge for the events which had led

him to retire to Issy, which he attributed solely to the malice of the ‘esprits

dangereux’ who were close to him. He had never ceased to warn Bourbon of the

considerable wrong that these ‘such odious persons’ were doing him.

Overlooking their calumnies of him he could not pardon their dissimulation in

convincing the Duke that the public hated them only for being his devoted

servants and that he would consequently be dishonoured if he dismissed them.

They pretended to want to retire, Fleury said, ‘and nothing matches the secret

stratagems that they are using to prevent you from allowing them to’. Fourth, less

pardonable was their advice to surround the King with creatures of whom he was

sure, and to remove those whose loyalty was suspect. Fifth, Fleury continued, he

had repeatedly spoken of the public clamour against the government: nothing

had succeeded and the kingdom was in danger,

I was told often that I was the only person who might bring some remedy

through the honour that I have of approaching the King, and when I replied

nothing to all that was said to me I was accused of weakness and

cowardice…although all these remonstrances were cloaked at least with the

semblance of truth, Your Highness knows whether I did not lend myself any

the less sincerely to all that he desired of me, whether I combatted his plans in

the presence of the King, although often I did not approve of them, whether I

derided them in public, and whether I did not give the most helpful and most

honourable advice to Your Highness, when you did me the honour to ask

me. The foreign ambassadors could tell you in what manner I spoke of you to

them when they believed they had some matter of complaint with the

government.

Fleury denies ever having wanted to be premier ministre, and protests that

Bourbon, far from being worried by any ambitions which he might have feared,

seemed even to fear his retirement and begged him not to retire without notice.

He himself would have liked to retire but the King wanted him to remain and so

he could not leave without giving rise to a second scene which would have looked

like vanity on his part, and everyone said that it would be betrayal to leave the

King. He was distressed to see affairs in their present state: no specie available, no

confidence, discontent in all the orders of the state. He saw that the final remedy

proposed by the premier ministre was almost as bad as the ill it was designed to

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cure (this is presumably a reference to the cinquantième). The ‘loss of the state’

seemed very probable and he therefore decided that continued inaction would

have merited the just reproaches of the King. Louis was ‘much better informed

than I had thought’; he appears to pay no attention to what is said but in fact he

retains it all and reflects upon it very soundly. Fleury goes on to present the exile

to Chantilly as the result of the will of the King who ‘wants time to inaugurate a

new style of governing. A change was necessary to try to alter attitudes, and this

means has always appeared necessary in times of great disorders in the State. It

was even less possible to avoid having recourse to this, given the unfortunate, if

unjust, prejudice, of the public against Your Highness, because it was to be feared

that everything proposed by you might not be favourably received…That Sir is a

faithful account of all that has happened, and a sincere expose of the motives that

made me act’.

A full consideration of the implications of the fall of Bourbon and of the rise of

Fleury must take into account the extent to which the political system and policies

pursued were affected by the change of ministry. In the next chapter, therefore, these

aspects will be fully discussed as a necessary introduction to the analysis of the

political system at the centre presided over by Fleury and of his relations with his

ministers. However, the work of the present chapter is not yet done because there

remains some evidence which illustrates an aspect of the political mentality that has

neither been discussed nor illustrated. In spite of the cynicism and baseness that is

revealed in the exploitation of every political mistake by a rival, in spite of the

faithlessness of allies, traits which all strike a contemporary note, there are aspects of

the power struggle which are peculiar to the eighteenth century in France.

The following letter on the subject of the exiling of the Duke is extremely

valuable for the way in which it reveals the mentality, the ambitions and the patron-

client relations that existed in this period. The fact that it was written by a counsellor

of the third chamber of enquêtes of the Paris parlement to the duc de Richelieu, a

member of the higher aristocracy, serves as a reminder that there existed a political

class which crossed the supposed social divisions within the nobility. From the

change of ministry Bertrand René II de Pallu received a commission to become

maître des requêtes. Quite what his services had been is unclear.

I believe that you do not doubt the role I am playing in the new governmental

arrangements: for my own concerns, I am more than happy, for you know

how well in I am with all who have the most credit at the moment, but I’ll

admit to you that I’m really pained for you; it completely spoils all your plans.

I have no doubt that you are on the worst of terms with Mr Le Blanc, who by

all appearances is going to play a major role; but I’d like to know how you are

with Mr de Fréjus. I know that being a great lord, employed and doing very

well, you can’t help but fall on your feet, but it is always very different to be

well in with the master, and closely allied with those who rule him, or to find

yourself in your position which appears to close the door on favours, which

of course you greatly need.