Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745

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POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

been admitted to by no one, and that they have always been referred to someone

else, without anyone ever having dared to proclaim himself their author, and this

discretion certainly does not stem from modesty’.

Nobody could have hoped to

tackle the economic problems altogether successfully, consequently there was great

reluctance to do so at all.

The problems of office, then, were such that a shrewd man would have been

inclined to leave well alone. Bourbon was not especially intelligent and lacked

political foresight, but he was driven by family honour and a genuine desire to do

his best. Fleury, on the other hand, was a patient man with highly developed skills

in court politics: he could see the position and knew how to take advantage of it. He

had acquired enough power over Louis XV to have himself appointed premier

ministre, but not enough support at court to remain so without unacceptable

interference from other ambitious groups. The history of the fortunes of the

ministry of the due de Bourbon is the story of the way in which Fleury acquired his

political experience, built up the basis of a potential government and gained the

important support of the cabal. The role of Fleury in the administration of the duc

de Bourbon is not a prominent one, and paradoxically enough, this is precisely why

it was important. By his subtle politics he was able to dissociate himself from some

of the necessary but none the less unpopular measures inaugurated by Bourbon,

and to reap the benefit from Bourbon’s unpopularity.

THE MINISTRY OF THE DUC DE

BOURBON, 1723–6

Introduction; Bourbon and Fleury; the situation of Bourbon; Fleury’s position; foreign affairs; the

marriage of Louis XV; the religious issue; financial policy.

INTRODUCTION

No analysis of the political structure, attitudes and policies which prevailed during the

ministry of Fleury can afford to ignore the importance of those crucial years in his rise

to power, the years of the government of the duc de Bourbon. By studying the

activities of Fleury from December 1723 until June 1726, and by relating his actions to

the factional conflicts between the Orleanist faction and the ever insecure Bourbon

group, it is possible to trace the development of the policies which were to be pursued

by Fleury during his own ministry. This is particularly true in the spheres of religious

and foreign policy, for both of these were areas in which he developed his own line in

contrast to the system of Bourbon. New light on the opinions and activities of Fleury

can help to explain the abandonment of a reforming financial policy after Bourbon’s

fall in 1726 and at the same time to provide a deeper understanding of the character of

the prelate who governed France from 1726 until 1743.

It is impossible for us to determine precisely at what point Fleury made up his mind

to take over the reins of government. Such an important question about the career of

Fleury is obscured by a deep characteristic of the courtier. La Bruyère wrote: ‘A man

who knows the court is master of his gestures, of his eyes and face; he is profound,

impenetrable. He conceals his bad offices, smiles at his enemies, constrains his moods,

disguises his passions, goes against his better feelings, speaks, and acts against his

sentiments…To leave court for a single moment, is to renounce it’.

By this he meant

that discretion and dissimulation were so essential to the survival of a man at court that

to let slip the mask for even a moment could have disastrous results, and absence was

nullity. Hence it is rarely possible to fathom the mind of a successful courtier.

Nevertheless, a full reconstruction of his role in the ministry does enable us to come as

close to an answer as possible. What is particularly interesting is the way in which he

rose to power in a complex world of policy and faction. A detailed reconstruction of the

context in which this rise took place has much to teach us about politics in this era.

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

Even so, a re-examination of the Bourbon administration is not without interest

in its own right. Early historians of this short period, focusing their attention on the

political failure of Bourbon, and taking their evidence too much from memoirs and

not enough from archives, have generally been content with condemning what they

saw as his ineptitude or stupidity. His government has been characterised as the

reign of a dissolute mistress, Mme de Prie, and corrupt financiers, the Pâris

brothers. The textbook myths in history die hard and, in spite of the now dated but

still excellent study of foreign policy by Dureng, which does much to revise these

opinions, more recent works have adhered to the original interpretation. The

present chapter has therefore been written in the awareness that this administration

is in need of a general reassessment. With the integration of a considerable body of

new evidence into the broad explanation of the fall of Bourbon (or rise of Fleury),

some old judgements are bound to be revised. From under the archival dust, a new

picture emerges.

This prompts a further reflection upon the relevance of a study of the ministry of

the duc de Bourbon to the study of eighteenth-century French politics in general.

When this period of governmental instability is compared with the most recent

analyses of the ministerial crises of 1742–5, 1770 and the permanent crisis from

1781 to 1789, it is impossible not to notice the general similarity in each situation, in

that each crisis is the product of the struggle to gain control of an unstable ministry,

with the result that the struggle for power takes precedence over the debate on

policy. The following examination of the development of a ministerial crisis and its

subsequent influence upon the policies adopted by the succeeding ministry may

therefore be taken to have wider significance.

BOURBON AND FLEURY

Despite his brief period of prominence in French history, the duc de Bourbon

remains a shadowy figure whose character has never been well defined. The

disparaging comments by the lawyer Barbier, by the royal historiographer Duclos

and by Lacretelle, one of the earliest historians of eighteenth-century France whose

history reads like a moral crusade against the ancien régime, portray mediocrity as

stupidity, and they have found an echo in more recent works. For A.M. Wilson the

duke had a ‘very limited capacity’, and by its general incompetence compounded

by a particular lack of ability in foreign policy, ‘the administration of the duc de

Bourbon was, in the way of contrast, the best possible introduction to [Fleury’s]’.

Alfred Gobban went further: ‘the duc de Bourbon was ugly, blind in one eye,

bandy-legged, and stupid…’!

A more moderate judgement has been made by

Dureng, for whom Bourbon was well-meaning but quite lacking in capacity, and he

is prepared to concede to him ‘the merit of his intentions’. All these assessments

have been made on the basis of rather slim evidence, for there is no accessible

collection of Bourbon correspondence through which the historian may trace a

convincing portrait. What is most significant about the more reliable contemporary

THE MINISTRY OF THE DUC DE BOURBON, 1723–6

views is that they emphasise not the lack of intelligence of Bourbon, but his lack of

capacity for dealing with the complex political situation in which he found himself.

For Richer d’Aube, a maître des requêtes and former intendant in Normandy, whose

voluminous manuscript reflections are one of the most useful sources for the

ministry of Fleury Bourbon’s fault lay in his misplaced confidence:

His intentions have always been good and one cannot refuse him the praise

due to his honesty of heart, to the great fund of justice and Religion that can

be seen by anyone who has had the honour of approaching him… He

would have needed a bit more talent and breadth of vision, or at least

excellent subalterns in whom he might have placed his confidence, but the

ministers who were subordinate to him did not have his confidence, which

was given only to two persons who were in every way unworthy of it.

Therein lies the source of the problems that the ministry of Monsieur le duc

has caused.

As his contemporary the marquis de Lassay said, ‘he found the Kingdom in a

deplorable situation’.

It would have required extraordinary capacity to emerge

unscathed from an attempt to tackle the problems which Bourbon had to face in

1723. Quite apart from the economic and financial difficulties (which, when

combined with the need to handle a delicate situation in foreign policy as the

Congress at Cambrai ground to a standstill, would have been enough to tax any

statesman) there remained the problem of building up a secure position at court.

Failure to do this, far more than the pursuit of several unsuccessful policies, is the

key to understanding his downfall in 1726. A well-established minister like Philippe

d’Orléans could, albeit with difficulty at times, survive the collapse and reversal of

policies, but that was because he had been given time to build up his position by the

use of patronage. Although Bourbon had at his disposal all the patronage that

accrued to a principal minister, unlike d’Orléans he had neither the wholehearted

support of his own family, nor an unshakeable claim to his office. Nor did he

possess the affable charm and civility that the Regent had been able to turn on at

will, and his experience of government was slight. Certain almost majestic and

charismatic qualities were required of a man who was the repository of the royal

authority by virtue of his office. He had a role to play and the image which he

projected to the court and the country was an integral part of the successful tenure

of that office. Ceremonial safeguards existed of course, such as dress and etiquette,

which were designed to enhance prestige, but bearing, air and civil conversation

were still vitally important, especially during audiences. Bourbon’s ugliness,

inexperience and lack of personal charm, together with his apparent delegation of

the management of the court to a woman, his mistress, may have undermined his

position in the arena that was Versailles.

The change of ministry brought some new men into the government, or to

positions of influence, and induced some former servants of the Regent to leave it—

although all the secretaries of state remained in their posts. Some of the most

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

ambitious courtiers saw the new ministry as a fine opportunity to increase their own

influence, but they were to be bitterly disappointed because Bourbon made few

changes in the personnel of the government. The only major change in the council

of state was the admission of the maréchal de Villars, who combined the advantage

of being a military expert with that of a lengthy opposition to the Orleanists. This

appointment in itself led to a deal of resentment against Bourbon, as the British

chargé d’affaires reported to his government on 6 December 1723:

All this creates a lot of bad feeling at court amongst the Princesses and other

Lords, who believe themselves to be of the council by right, just as much as

M.de Villars; moreover, Monsieur le Duc has several intrigues on his

hands, from men of distinction, for employments and vacant offices that

were left undecided by M.the Duke of Orleans, all of whom he would

prefer to gratify at the start of his ministry, which is however an

impossibility. This, together with the claims of M.de Chartres, renders his

situation very tricky, having almost no one of good counsel with him. But

however things develop it seems clear to me that the parties will seek the

friendship of the King our master.

The result of these jealousies was an isolation for Bourbon that was increased by the

reaction of the other princes of the blood. From the first, Bourbon had hoped for a

reconciliation between himself and the prince de Conti. He was rebuffed by Conti

who, on the day after the death of the Regent, visited Chartres in order, says

Barbier, to pay his respects and offer his services, but he did not take the trouble to

congratulate the new premier ministre. Chartres, henceforth the new duc

d’Orléans, also persisted in his violent antipathy towards Bourbon and so there was

little hope for success in the attempts to arrange a reconciliation between them by

the two dowager duchesses de Bourbon and d’Orléans (each of whom had

acquired considerable influence over her son, just as the old maréchale de Noailles

had over her huge family). In the spring of 1724 any hope for a rapprochement

evaporated, because the vague project for a marriage between a sister of Bourbon

and d’Orléans was dropped and the latter was promptly betrothed to the princess of

Baden.

Contemporaries were well aware that this marriage to a ward of the

Emperor was a bid to secure the support of Austria and Britain over the ever-present

French succession problem.

In this uneasy situation the obvious course for Bourbon to follow was to take full

advantage of his control over governmental patronage, in order to reduce the

influence of his rivals. He was given an immediate advantage by the foolishness of

d’Orléans, for the young prince, refusing to work with Bourbon, gave up the

considerable patronage he exercised as colonel général of the infantry, and

compounded his error by snubbing about two hundred officers who had come to

pay their respects. Bourbon began by suppressing the post of military commandant

in the provinces, ‘on the pretext of economy’, as Berwick, a leading Orleanist,

wrote.

In February 1724 Chambrier observed that the young King was ‘constantly

THE MINISTRY OF THE DUC DE BOURBON, 1723–6

surrounded by people who are attached to the Duc de Bourbon in particular and to

the Comte de Clermont his younger brother’.

In May 1724 Bourbon took the opportunity to reward some supporters with

the honour of a promotion to the rank of Chevalier de 1’Ordre de Saint-Louis.

There were far too many aspirants for the coveted cordon bleu and refusing

some was a delicate matter. The ministry had to be careful in its distribution of

favours because it was such an important consideration in politics. Lasting

bitterness could be the product of too exclusive a policy, as Bourbon was to find

out to his cost (as did Marie-Antoinette later). It was owing to the patronage

policy that the fate of Bourbon became dependent upon that of his mistress,

who became the object of a campaign of hateful vilificaton at court. Historians

have often accepted the judgement of Barbier and d’Argenson who both

asserted that she virtually ruled France by means of her influence over

Bourbon. This was not in fact the case, and so once again we are reminded that

it is not enough to take the opinions of the memoir-writers for facts unless

supported by other evidence. Indeed, it is impossible to identify her as the cause

of a single political measure, and it may be added that her role was principally

one of defending Bourbon in the infighting at court where it was essential to

master the intrigues. To do this, she played a leading part in the allocation of

favours.

However, this picture of Bourbon’s system of patronage scarcely accords with

the usual idea of the role of Fleury. He is supposed to have entirely dominated the

distribution of ecclesiastical benefices and to have reserved for himself, by virtue of

his special relationship with the King, the control of all other patronage. But if

Fleury really had control over appointments then it is very hard to explain why he

should have allowed his declared enemy, Mme de Prie, to surround the young

Queen in 1725 with her creatures in order to block all other access to her. It was

obvious that, having a young and impressionable husband, the Queen might be led

to play a political role detrimental to any favourite. Indeed, in December 1725 the

Queen actually became the instrument of Prie and Bourbon in an attempt to

undermine Fleury’s right to be present during the travail.

To clarify the process of appointments the case of the duc de Richelieu is a

useful example. It is known that he acquired his embassy in Vienna by virtue of

his relations with Fleury. But, at the same time as Richelieu had paid court to

Fleury, he had made himself agreeable to Bourbon and Mme de Prie by

supporting the ministry in the trial of Le Blanc and by writing a memoir on the

marriage of Louis XV. He was also favoured by Villars, who wrote a letter of

recommendation for him to Prince Eugène of Savoy who was in Vienna. Thus,

although he was one man’s protégé, he was favoured by all. The real situation,

one suspects, was that there were relatively few disagreements over the

appointments, and that when there were problems neither Fleury nor Bourbon

was prepared to take a line which might lead to an open split between them, with

the result that a compromise was reached.

In fact, the whole relationship between the two ministers in the first year of the

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

administration was characterised by moderation and compromise. Bourbon found

irksome the restraints on his power caused by the more advantageous position of

Fleury in the esteem of the young King, who was the fountain-head of all authority.

But the only reasonable policy was for him to accept the situation: ‘be sensible and

don’t quarrel with the bishop’, he counselled Villars.

Fleury too seemed

determined to allow nothing to come between them, particularly because he was

aware that Bourbon and Morville suspected him of wanting to encroach upon their

powers. In 1724 the dispatches of Horatio Walpole make frequent analyses of their

relationship. In April he wrote to Newcastle that ‘As to the present situation of Mr

le Duc in regard to 672 [the code for Fleury], I am of the opinion that those are

mistaken who think that they are in any open or secret intrigue against one

another’.

In May he reported a conversation with his friend Fleury in which the

bishop candidly expressed his view of the premier ministre. ‘He said that Mr le Duc

was an honest man, that his authority as being the King’s ought to be maintained,

but with a bridle, lest by getting too great a loose, the influence of his administration

should fall into the wrong hands, meaning Madame de Prie and the ladies, that in

other respects he should concur in supporting his authority, and that the young

King was well enough pleased with him.’

Fleury was of the same opinion in June,

when a further dispatch from Walpole clarified the situation for the British

government.

I found by him that he is already apprised of and entirely despises all the little

malicious insinuations about himself, seems resolved to live well with 520

[Bourbon] making him sensible at the same time, that it is in his interest to

have a confidence in him 672 [Fleury]: and it is certain that 672 has the sole

power and influence over the mind of 1107 [Louis XV], with whom he is

frequently alone, but M.le Duc never is; without the presence of 672, nor

does he so much pretend to it.

Even the half-hearted attempt by Bourbon in July to persuade Louis to conduct

business in the absence of his preceptor (which failed owing to the determination of

Louis) could not induce Fleury to alter his conduct. It is a fact that, as president

Hénault indicated, the authority of Bourbon in matters of state was not directly

reduced or interfered with by Fleury until late 1725, and even then Fleury betrayed

no desire to supplant Bourbon.

An answer to the question of why Fleury was content to be so accommodating

lies partly in the difficulties of the political situation for the ministry—opposed at

court and having to deal with divisive problems—which necessitated co-operation.

The answer also lies in the character, views and ambitions of Fleury. An often

repeated view has been that Fleury was insatiably ambitious but the possessor of

enough guile and patience to await the right moment to dispense with Bourbon.

Thus the ministry of Bourbon has been relegated to appearing as no more than

an unhappy interlude between the Regency and the ministry of Fleury. The

contemporary expression of this view, held by several authors who benefited

THE MINISTRY OF THE DUC DE BOURBON, 1723–6

from hindsight, was most neatly expressed by Barbier: ‘because he refused the

archbishopric of Reims five years ago, which is a nice morsel, good people have

thought that it was out of humility, whilst he really had no other aim than to

remain at court and grab the position he holds today [in June 1726]’.

This view

really has very little to recommend it, because for Fleury to have aimed from the

first at so high a post he would have needed nothing less than clairvoyance to see

that there would be an opening for him. It has already been shown above that his

rise until 1723 is to be understood as the result of several particular and

unforeseeable conditions, as much a product of self-defence as of ambition.

Difficult though the political situation was in 1724, it would have needed equally

remarkable foresight to predict the unpopularity of a financial policy and taxes yet

to be conceived, not to mention the change of policy towards Unigenitus that was

made possible only by the accession of a new Pope in 1724. Therefore, the

argument for Machiavellian ambition must be disregarded as the product of

hindsight. Not until mid-1725 did the working relationship between Bourbon and

Fleury begin to break down, and not until mid-1725 did Bourbon become

unpopular in Paris and in the country at large. Fleury may well have hoped for

more power, but the final decision to disgrace Bourbon is to be understood as

having been taken as the result of a particular set of circumstances. It was

probably the product both of a sense of duty towards Louis XV and of the

apparent need for change in the light of the growing domestic and international

pressure in 1726. As the abbé Millot put it in 1756, ‘his ambition was born of

circumstances rather than a matter of character’.

Ambition is a difficult issue to deal with: in the world of the court where so much

depended upon favour, including wealth and standing, the man who was patently

unambitious was far more unusual than he who displayed unrestrained greed. The

values of the courtiers were such that a refusal to participate in the scramble for new

honours, favours and place was tantamount to renouncing honour and esteem

themselves. If all courtiers were ambitious, as La Bruyère and d’Argenson

observed, then Fleury should be seen as only a more successful participant in a

game which everyone played to some extent. However, he was not a simple

courtier, because he was also an ecclesiastic. This was an age when qualities of

individualism were less important than the successful fulfilment of a role which was

determined by rank and function in society. A display of ambition was considered

inappropriate for a prelate and extra qualities of decorum and moderation were

expected. This was especially true of a man whose ecclesiastical offices had not been

granted as a matter of financial or ceremonial convenience as had been the case

with the cardinal Dubois, for example. Necessarily the environment and the calling

were in conflict and it would have been surprising for a man in Fleury’s position to

have emerged as a leading minister in the government if he had not been capable of

reconciling the two. Ultimately, therefore, it is only by a close examination of

Fleury’s conduct and methods that it is possible to come to a firm conclusion about

his character and his aims.

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For an analysis of the part he played in the conduct of foreign relations historians are

fortunate in having the important body of evidence which is made up of the detailed

reports of the British ambassador to France, Horatio Walpole. He became a particular

friend to Fleury whom he first met, upon invitation, about ten days after the death of the

Regent. At this first encounter Fleury assured him that, with regard to the preservation

of the peaceful state of Europe and especially to the continuation of the firm alliance with

Britain, his sentiments were identical to those of Morville and Bourbon. Such was

Fleury’s charm and air of frankness that from once having considered Fleury to be a

‘mighty bigot’ Walpole came to revise his opinion entirely, and subsequently regarded

him as his most valuable confidant and trusted friend. His reports to Newcastle and

Townshend portray Fleury as the firmest supporter of the British alliance in the French

council of state, and, trusting in Walpole, as the willing agent of the ambassador,

prepared to intercede in the council on behalf of British interests.

Some scholars have already noted that Walpole’s faith in Fleury was rather too

strong.

It is also possible that the reports merely reflect the usual tendency of the

ambassador to over-emphasise the accuracy of his sources of information and his

proximity to the springs of government, in the hope of giving the impression that he

is an indispensable agent. It does look very much as if the ambassador was duped

by Fleury. Certainly, there were times when Fleury was useful to Walpole, in that he

brought to council some matters that might have caused ruffled feelings if broached

by an ambassador. On the other hand, Fleury personally gained the confidence of

England while doing really very little for her. Saint-Simon, sure that Walpole was

taking advantage of Fleury, thought it very ironic to quote Fleury, probably

speaking after June 1726, on the subject of his dealings with the ambassador. But

there is more truth in the statement than the cynical duke cared to see.

On [the question of] his confidence in Walpole, and in his brother, and

towards the dominating English, he began to smile: ‘You don’t know

everything’, he replied. ‘Do you know what Horace has done for me?…Do

you know’, he told me, ‘that he shows me all his dispatches, that I dictate his

to him, that he writes only what I want? Now there’s a fact that isn’t known,

and that I am happy to entrust you with. Horace is my intimate friend, he has

every confidence in me, I mean the blindest. He is a very clever man. He tells

me everything, he is at one with Robert, who is one of the most talented men

of Europe and who governs everything in England. We concert our actions,

we do everything together, and we let them chatter.

Fleury might well smile. Walpole not only showed dispatches to Fleury, which after

all is not unusual between allies, but he also gave him a commentary on what

Morville told him in the ambassadorial audiences. He was thus a valuable source of

information for Fleury on the conduct of foreign affairs by the ministry.

Fleury was able to carry on rather intricate and duplicitous manœuvres because

THE MINISTRY OF THE DUC DE BOURBON, 1723–6

he was for Walpole the sole source of information on what was said in the council.

When in doubt as to the honesty of Fleury, Walpole had recourse to the Dutch

ambassador, Van Hoey, who was, be it noted, also on friendly terms with the

Bishop. If this hints at a conduct too adroit to be possible, it should be remembered

that it is entirely in accordance with what we know of his character and methods at

a later date. For several years he managed to convince the British that he was

dominated by Chauvelin in the formulation of foreign policy, and he was therefore

able to oblige them to accept certain unpalatable decisions in the belief that they

sprang from the temporary domination of Chauvelin in the council. He had a talent

for dissimulating his strengths, for talking about one subject to find out how

someone thought on another.

Fleury also used his relationship with Walpole, who felt that, ultimately, his friend

had the greatest power in the French government, to make it clear that he had a

systematic view of French interests in Europe, based fundamentally upon friendship

with the British government. This was to a certain extent true, especially during the

difficult year of 1725 when France lost Spain as an ally, but the conduct of Fleury after

1726 was designed to modify this picture considerably, revealing that his view of the

necessity of the British alliance was that it served a temporary purpose only. During

his own ministry he was to work steadily to increase French freedom of action and

avoid, in 1727, the war which Britain seemed determined to provoke against Spain

and Austria. At that time the trust that he had won from the British government

probably gave him the extra leeway that he needed to bring the Congress of Soissons

to a successful conclusion. The same confidence would enable him to emancipate

France from the British alliance by 1733. Before this, in 1726, having ensured that he

was favourably regarded by his allies, Fleury was able to effect a change of ministry

with the minimum of disruption during an extremely tense international crisis.

There can be no doubt that Fleury had a good understanding of foreign policy.

From Walpole’s voluminous references to him the following astute assessment may

be extracted.

Villars called, and interrupted a series of as good reasoning and judgement

and with as great a compass relating to the whole system of Europe as ever I

heard, and indeed beyond what I expected from him in so short a time from

his application to foreign affairs; from whence I think it may be inferred that,

although his proceedings are calm and soft, yet his way of thinking is strong

and vigorous.

Others dominated the formation of foreign policy during the Bourbon ministry.

The foreign secretary and the premier ministre decided upon the measures to be

taken before ever they were brought to the council, although as a minister Fleury

was present when dispatches were read and the important decisions taken. He

seems to have written no diplomatic correspondence for the government during this

period, although by his connections with prince Eugène in Vienna and Victor

Amadeus of Savoy (connections made when they dealt with him during the