Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745

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THE RISE TO POWER OF

ANDRE-HERCULE DE FLEURY

An ecclesiastical career: a family strategy; provincial patrons; royal almoner; bishop of Fréjus;

appointment as preceptor. From preceptor to religious adviser, 1715–21: educating Louis XV; court

politics in 1720; the conseil ecclésiastique; the affair of Louis’ betrothal; Fleury’s strong position.

AN ECCLESIASTICAL CAREER

In 1720, when the political career of the future cardinal de Fleury began in

earnest, he had been preceptor to Louis XV for five years, actively educating

the young King since 1717. His rise to this position of trust in the royal

entourage had been anything but swift; and yet, contrary to expectations, this

appointment was to be the beginning of a great career as a statesman. By 1723

he was a minister of state, and in 1726—just before his seventy-third birthday—

he took over the reins of government from a prince of the blood, the due de

Bourbon. When he died in 1743 he had exercised all the functions of a premier

ministre for nearly seventeen years: managing the court, distributing patronage,

deciding on foreign, domestic and religious policy and choosing ministers,

members of the episcopate and court officers. In foreign affairs his deft but

traditional policies saw French emancipation from English tutelage, the

acquisition of Lorraine, a province long desired by the kings of France, and the

reluctant entry into the War of the Austrian Succession. Within France he was

successful in limiting the scope of the religious problems associated with

Jansenism and involving the Paris parlement, and in containing the disruptive

effects of faction. In 1743 Louis XV sat firmly on the throne, having benefited

from a period secure from the worst excesses of factional rivalry that threatened

to undermine consistent policies and create internal turmoil. The failures of

Louis XV during the later part of the reign to 1774 only serve to highlight the

earlier successes of Fleury.

This was an achievement by any standards, but for an outsider whose origins lay

with a family of modest provincial origins, it was extraordinary. The rise to power

of the cardinal de Fleury is an instructive example of social mobility within the

parameters of the socio-political system of the ancien régime. Unusual in that he came

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

further on a longer trajectory than his contemporaries, it nevertheless involved all

those elements necessary, in that political system, for advancement.

Unlike Fleury, most ministers in the later sevententh and the eighteenth

centuries were born to wield a measure of power. Many nobles were destined for

high office from birth, whether as members of the noblesse de robe or the noblesse de

cour. Elder sons in families such as the Phélypeaux with its branches of

Pontchartrain and La Vrillière, or the Noailles, the Lévis-Ventadour, the Rohan, or

even on a lower echelon the d’Aligre, the d’Argenson, and the Daguesseau, all

formed a part of that inner core of the nobility that exercised real power and

influence under Louis XIV or even before his reign. Of those families which were

not already of high rank and influence in the mid-sixteenth century, their successful

ascension had almost invariably begun in the late sixteenth century.

Loyalty to the

monarchy at three critical stages, in the wars of religion, in the reign of Louis XIII

and during the Frondes was an important factor in their rise, for Louis XIV seemed

to chose his servants from this group.

André-Hercule de Fleury is therefore untypical in that he was an outsider: his

family was small-fry in Languedoc, barely discernible before the 1630s. He also had

to climb many more rungs of the ladder before he arrived at a position of power. He

was not born with courtly protectors, he had to acquire or earn them. For that very

reason the story of his rise has much to reveal about a wider range of aspects than

the history of most other individuals. He and his family had to negotiate all the

‘bottlenecks’ that normally held up social mobility in this period. If a comparison is

to be made with anyone, it would not be with Mazarin, nor with Richelieu; it would

have to be with cardinal Dubois, whose political career began as preceptor to the

future Regent.

Fleury was born in Languedoc on 22 June 1653.

His family was of that ‘ancient

and illustrious nobility’ which abounded in Languedoc

and was of considerable

stature in the town of Lodève and modestly successful in provincial terms. The

prosperity of this cathedral town was based upon the manufacture of cloth, a

manufacture in which the Fleury had been involved for generations. Lucrèce de

Rosset, his maternal grandmother, was descended from the foremost drapers of

Lodève and her husband was of merchant stock. On his father’s side the family was

involved with the financial administration of the province. His uncle, Pierre de

Fleury, was the leading light of the family, being chief treasurer general of the

finances of Montpellier, and intendant for the gabelles of Languedoc.

Fleury’s

father held the office of receiver of tithes for the diocese of Lodève, for which a

certain degree of wealth was essential.

These two families, united in the parents of André-Hercule, appear to have had

a definite policy of marriage alliances designed to link their mutual wealth

indissolubly.

The shrewd family was about to attempt to enlarge its sphere of

action by sending a representative to court. More than usual effort was made to

further André-Hercule the second son. The family made full use of its important

connections to advance their son’s career, probably because he was seen to be

exceptionally bright.

THE RISE TO POWER OF ANDRE-HERCULE DE FLEURY

The education of Fleury was therefore a matter for strategic planning. Rather

than send him to one of the provincial colleges that were opening their doors, his

rich uncle sent him to the collège de Navarre in Paris, the only school to give its

students a full general education comprising theology, philosophy and the

humanities. He went on to attend the collège d’Harcourt and continued his

education at the Sorbonne.

His intellectual merit is attested by a letter from a fellow

canon of Montpellier, who remarked that he combined ‘an acute and penetrating

intelligence with the greatest finesse and subtlety of observation’; he was popular

and much praised.

He obtained his licence in theology in January 1676 and in July of

the same year was ordained first a deacon and then a priest.

Civility was now

recognised as an essential element in a noble’s education, and true civility could

only be acquired in the company of the higher nobility. In a sense, salon culture was

the very essence of civility.

He was in frequent attendance at the salons of

Guillaume de Lamoignon, and at the hôtel de Bouillon,

also at the house of the

Noailles.

Provincial families had restricted opportunities for advancement beyond the

confines of the province. Patronage and the active intervention of courtiers was

therefore crucially important. A talented young man could hope to be helped by

influential courtiers who did not necessarily expect to receive anything more

tangible than prestige in return. Saint-Simon’s memoirs are peppered with instances

of courtiers giving a helping hand to clients, if not for altruistic reasons, then

because it was a source of personal honour. In Fleury’s case, the patrons came from

the natural allies of lesser provincial families: the governing elite. Fleury’s own

experience reveals an interlocking network of patronage brokers with leading

positions in the governance of the province and influence at court. These families

were the Castries,

the Noailles

and the Bonsy.

Every stage of his education and career reveals the importance of patronage—and

at first his career progressed well. Most of the evidence indicates that Bonsy was the

principal patron of the youthful Fleury, especially in the 1670s.

The Italian-born

Bonsy, later to become a cardinal and, as archbishop of Narbonne, president of the

estates of Languedoc, was at this time a successful ambassador and bishop of

Béziers. Bonsy was responsible for his becoming in 1667 a canon in the cathedral of

Montpellier; in 1675 he was allowed to purchase one of the eight offices of Queen’s

almoner;

and before 1680 Bonsy had him preferred to the King’s chapel, still as an

almoner.

He thus gained a new patron in the person of the cardinal de Bouillon,

Grand Almoner, director of the King’s chapel.

In 1680 the Queen solicited his

deputation to the Assembly of Clergy, invaluable experience for a future bishop.

In 1690 Fleury left for Rome with the cardinal de Forbin-Janson who had been

raised to the purple in February of that year by the new Pope, Alexander VIII. It

transpires from a letter by the marquis de Lassay to Madame de La Fayette, on the

subject of her son’s visit to Italy, that such a visit was necessary for any cleric hoping

to succeed in his career: ‘Nearly all those of his quality and profession take the time

to see Italy; the voyage is almost vital to them later in life; for on a thousand

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

occasions it is a question of the Court of Rome, which it is most useful to have

known.’

The rise of the young cleric had been unusually rapid. The office as almoner

was generally regarded as providing a sure entry to the episcopate, as the

duchesse de Brancas explains in her memoirs.

Fleury would normally have

expected to move on rapidly to a distinguished episcopal career. But capricious

conduct by Louis XIV made him waste certainly above a decade before he was

able to acquire a bishopric. The ultimate importance of Louis XIV is amply

demonstrated by Fleury’s experience. At a time when Dubois, preceptor to the

due de Chartres, was able to accumulate rich abbeys without even being a priest,

Fleury was constantly overlooked. However, it was not unknown for the

sovereign to delay the reward of some meritorious subject merely to emphasise

his own ultimate authority.

Upon the cleric’s return from Rome, he was granted

his first benefice, the abbey of La Rivoure, worth 8,000 livres a year. Only in

1699, at the age of 47, was he able to acquire a bishopric, through the determined

efforts of influential and devout women. Mme de Caylus, who was Maintenon’s

niece, and the maréchale de Villeroy, approached Maintenon, and madame de

Noailles urged her brother-in-law, Noailles, the archbishop of Paris, to make

another attempt to persuade the King. Louis agreed to grant the see of Fréjus, on

the coast in Provence.

The manner of his appointment reveals the truth of

Mousnier’s dictum about the absolute necessity of courtly patronage to get

through the bottleneck of seekers of office.

Bishops, of course, during the ancien régime often fulfilled administrative functions

on behalf of the monarchy ranging from the management of a town or province (as

in the case of the archbishop of Aix for Provence or of Narbonne for Languedoc) to

more humble tasks such as providing information for the central government.

There is little documentation of this in the case of Fleury, except for 1707–8 and an

interesting attempt by Villars in 1713 to have him made procureur joint for the

Assembly of Communities of Provence.

We do know that in 1707 when Provence

was invaded he played an honourable role. His correspondence with the secrétaire

d’état reveals him doing his best for Fréjus and for France, giving details of the

foreign army and collecting money for the occupied town from Aix and Marseille.

Chamillart’s letter to Fleury shows how well thought of he was by Louis XIV: ‘it

appears to me that He [Louis XIV] is very happy with all you are sending me, and

with your conduct’.

In his episcopal activities, Fleury displayed his religious orthodoxy. In Fréjus

he proved himself to be one of the many members of the Catholic reform

movement now well under way in France, expanding the seminary and attacking

‘paganism’ in the diocese.

Contrary to what has long been written, Fleury was

not a religious bigot, nor was he ultramontane or ‘Molinist’ in his anti-Jansenist

stance. Anti-Jansenist Fleury certainly was, but he was not entirely in sympathy

with the Jesuits, and his position might be described as ‘politique’. Surviving

original letters and minutes to his former patron cardinal de Noailles, from 1711

to 1714, and his own pastoral letter of 1714, reveal his attitude clearly.

The

THE RISE TO POWER OF ANDRE-HERCULE DE FLEURY

following passage from a letter of 11 July 1711 is the clearest expression of his

views at the time:

I can assure you with the utmost sincerity that I distanced myself from all

prejudice when reading Father Quesnel, and that I am no less on my guard

against Molinist opinions than against Jansenist ones. I am quite convinced

that the decisions of the Church alone should guide us in everything, and that

we should proscribe anything to the contrary…[the Church] is attacked from

many sides, and that should oblige those who are truly obedient to come

together and do no more than defend its decisions without entering into

contested decisions. That is the only effective way to support it, as we ought,

for there’ll be no end to it otherwise.

One of the focal points of political tension in France for the first two thirds of the

century was the controversy over Jansenism. Fleury felt that the church in France

was threatened, and so the developments of the policy of Louis XIV over the next

two years had his support. When the cardinal de Noailles, in temporary

submission to the will of Louis XIV, issued a mandement against Quesnel’s Moral

Reflections on the New Testament, now the text most symbolic of Jansenism, the

bishop of Fréjus was quick to congratulate him. His letter reveals his support for

the papal Bull Unigenitus of 1713 which condemned 101 propositions to be found

in Quesnel’s book.

Fleury was among the first bishops to publish the Bull

Unigenitus in his diocese. Shortly afterwards he published his own severe criticism

of the Moral Reflections, in which he expressed himself in perfect agreement with

the recent Assembly of Clergy and condemned what he regarded as Jansenist

poison.

His eloquent exhortation attracted public attention and he was asked for

many copies. His activity brought him into contact with the cardinal de Rohan at

Versailles.

The religious position of Fleury before the 1720s can therefore be summarised as

follows. He regarded a united episcopate as being of fundamental importance for

the church of France, which risked schism because of differences of opinion over

Jansenism. The best way to ensure the safety of the church was to be found in

supporting the policy of Louis XIV against the Jansenists, and therefore in

condemning Quesnel and accepting without question the Bull Unigenitus. Fleury

was expressing a strong belief in the hierarchy of power in the church. He felt that

bishops should use their power over the lower clergy to prevent them from

espousing the Jansenist cause.

There is no clear and accurate account of the exact steps Fleury took to

become tutor to Louis XV. His appointment cannot be explained without

understanding the growing vehemence of the conflict over Jansenism in the

French church and the importance of this issue at court. His attitude to Jansenism

is a thread that runs through the whole of his ministerial career from 1723

onwards. During the later years of Louis XIV’s life, the Very Christian King

became increasingly determined to bequeath to his heirs one entirely united

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

Catholic church. This desire, combined with his personal devotion which became

more pronounced with age, led him to try to eradicate the last vestiges of

Jansenism; it was a sect regarded by himself and many of his religious advisers as

schismatic and heretical. The dispersal of the remaining nuns at Port-Royal in

1709 and its razing to the ground in 1711 were a prelude to what Louis XIV

supposed to be the ‘coup de grâce’, a Bull from Rome. In 1713 a somewhat

reluctant Pope finally produced the Bull Unigenitus which condemned the ideas

put forward in Quesnel’s work. For a combination of theological and political

reasons, the Bull Unigenitus sparked off a controversy that was to remain bitter for

more than half a century. The problem of Jansenism thus became one of the

major political problems of the age, and is contentious and complex enough to

warrant a full exploration in a later chapter.

At the forefront of the anti-Jansenist

campaign were the Jesuits who were led at Versailles by Père Le Tellier, the King’s

confessor. From 1713 the cardinal de Rohan, who was appointed Grand Almoner

in June, also distinguished himself as a supporter of the policy of Louis XIV. As

the issue became more embittered, it became more and more important for

courtiers to be on the right side—especially ecclesiastics. Saint-Simon, relating how

the duc de Tallard pushed Rohan into assuming the leadership of the anti-

Jansenist party by allying with Le Tellier, leaves no doubt about the attitude of the

King to the Jesuits and their opponents.

The King, who had vigorously adopted this [the Jesuits’] opinion, who was

entirely resolved to listen to none but the most heated of them, who had

invested his authority and conscience in it, who busied and sustained himself

with nothing else, regarded the opposing parti [the Jansenists] as enemies of

church and State, as republicans, as enemies of his authority and his person.

Once again, the mobilisation of patrons was essential to success. Several visits to

Paris and the court had enabled him to conserve and enlarge his circle of friends

and patrons during his wilderness years in Provence. The office of preceptor was,

like all offices at Versailles, the object of some intrigue. On the one hand were the

Jesuits led by Père Le Tellier who wanted to choose the preceptor himself in order to

increase his religious control over the future King; in view of the religious attitudes

of Louis XIV, Le Tellier must have felt confident of success. On the other hand,

there was a strong group of more moderate courtiers who, fearing to see Le Tellier

acquire any more power, supported a less extreme candidate. This party included

some dévots such as the due du Maine, Mme de Ventadour, Mme de Lévis, and the

Villeroy, and had the closest connections with Mme de Maintenon who was herself

opposed to the designs of Le Tellier. For them, Fleury was a good choice because he

was not a Jesuit and did not get on well with Le Tellier, yet his distinguished career

as a bishop proved him sufficiently religious to impress the King.

Moreover, the

cabal included several personal friends of Fleury—the Villars, the Villeroy, the

Dangeau and Mme de Lévis, who could all vouch for the erudition of their protégé

and for his suitability for the post.

THE RISE TO POWER OF ANDRE-HERCULE DE FLEURY

FROM PRECEPTOR TO RELIGIOUS ADVISER, 1715–21

With the help of a wide circle of important friends and patrons, Fleury had acquired

the office which was to lead to greater power for him than he could possibly have

envisaged in 1715. Although the political designs of Louis XIV were quickly

abandoned by the Regent and the Paris parlement by setting aside the will of the late

King, the personnel appointed in the codicil for the education of Louis XV was not

changed. Villeroy was the governor of the boy, the duc du Maine, deprived of

political power, remained superintendant of the King’s education and Fleury was to

organise its academic aspects. He was aided in this from April 1716, when his own

appointment was confirmed, by the highly respected abbé Vittement, who had been

Lecteur to the new king of Spain before his departure from France and formerly

rector of the Sorbonne. Between 1717 and 1723 Louis XV was to form a close

attachment to his aged preceptor which was to last until the death of the Prelate, and

this, combined with the revelation of hitherto unsuspected political talents, was to

be the basis of Fleury’s future power.

Louis XV had such defects of character and his attachment to Fleury in later

years was so strong that contemporaries and historians alike have tended to

attribute both to clever manipulation of the King by Fleury.

Such tales are given

the lie by the evidence of the lessons. Fleury certainly took his duties as preceptor

seriously and conscientiously.

Dangeau testifies that the King was never allowed

to miss his studies in the morning and evening each day; Villars noted that ‘the

bishop of Fréjus, an intelligent man, was assiduous in his duties’; that well-

informed author of the Memoirs of the Life wrote that ‘Never any man executed his

charge with greater Application than this Prelate’.

There still exist whole

volumes of exercises set for Louis XV and often corrected by Fleury himself, who

also wrote a history of France in three volumes for the use of his pupil.

Fleury

devised a wide-ranging and thorough programme of education for the King. It

comprised reading and writing, Latin, history, mathematics and geography. Louis

was obliged to translate numerous maxims of personal piety and political

conduct. Like most French schoolchildren he was taught to respect the life of his

ancestor Saint Louis. This was the occasion to instruct him in Christian and

kingly virtues. Distinguished scholars like the abbés Jean Vittement, Robert

Perot, Louis Dufour de Longuerue and Claude Fleury, with distinguished

authorities such as François Chevallier, the mathematician and engineer, and

Guillaume Delisle, the celebrated geographer and cartographer, all conjoined in

their efforts to give him the best education possible.

It is true that Louis XV had few endearing characteristics—but he was after all in

training to be a king. He was lazy, rude, selfish, gluttonous, almost incapable of love

and excessively shy, but the fault lay not with Fleury. Even before the King’s formal

education began when he left the care of women in the spring of 1717, Mme de

Ventadour his governess had found Louis badly brought up, and Villeroy certainly

made things worse. Himself vain and haughty to the point of ridicule, the Duke

inculcated the same sentiments in his charge and let Louis develop unrestrained. It

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

is the verdict of the historian of the education of Louis XV that the fault lay with

Villeroy. It seems certain that Louis, who had few playmates of his own age and no

close relations, came to regard Fleury almost as a grandfather precisely because he

was the only person to enforce real discipline upon him.

Louis was growing steadily fonder of his tutor, and no one else was as close to

him, while he displayed a marked dislike for Villeroy. The preceptor was given

several honours and marks of respect, such as election to the Académie fraçaise in

1717, and the right, usually restricted to the royal family, to travel in the King’s

carriage.

In these final years of the decade Fleury was a model of good conduct at

court, taking no part in the intrigues against the duc d’Orléans, especially after the

warning provided in 1718 by the exile of the duc and duchesse du Maine and the

dismissal of Noailles from control over the finances.

It was better to remain in the

background or to win the esteem of the Regent, for his grip on affairs was firm and

his early death in 1723 could not have been foreseen. At the same time Fleury made

approaches to Saint-Simon, who was an intimate of the duc d’Orléans.

friendship developed that would help Fleury to survive in the increasingly

complicated world of court politics.

From about 1720 the politics of the Regency became very complex and it is not

always easy to discern them clearly By this stage the attempt at aristocratic councils

known as the Polysynodie had been abandoned, and the Regent’s favourite,

Dubois, had acquired a preponderance in foreign policy-making. The fiscal and

financial experiments of John Law, known as the ‘System’, had collapsed in an

enormous stockjobbing scandal, with a collapse in the shares of the East India

Company, and the speculative bubble had burst. In the atmosphere created by new

developments in the foreign and religious policies of the ministry, the manœuvres of

political groups at court in opposition to Dubois came to a head. It was by weaving

his way successfully and in masterly fashion through the complicated web of

intrigue that Fleury was able to emerge as a leading minister even before the end of

the Regency. Interestingly, it can be shown that the factions which fought for power

towards the end of the Regency continued to exist and to play a part in ministerial

politics in the 1720s until Fleury finally established full control by the end of the

decade. Even after this, the principal faction survived in a modified form and was to

make its influence felt during the declining years of Fleury when the struggle for his

succession took shape.

The defeat of Spain by France and Britain in the war of 1719 had demonstrated

the impracticability of the Spanish policy, motivated by the dynastic ambitions of

the Spanish rulers towards the Regency government. The dismissal of the Spanish

minister Alberoni in January 1720 opened the way for a Franco-Spanish

rapprochement which could seek to take advantage of the fact that a Bourbon sat on

each throne. Peace was finally signed in March 1721 and a Triple Alliance

concluded among Great Britain, Spain and France in June 1721. A full discussion of

the diplomatic implications of these arrangements can be found in works on the

foreign policy of the period.

Suffice it to say that the Franco-Spanish treaty was of

great benefit to the duc d’Orléans, because it entailed the surrender by Philippe V of

THE RISE TO POWER OF ANDRE-HERCULE DE FLEURY

his claims to the succession to the throne of France leaving, in the event of the early

death of Louis XV, the Regent as undisputed heir. Whether or not a treaty could

alter the fundamental law of the French succession was not a question considered in

the treaty—and in 1727 it was clear that many regarded fundamental law as

unalterable.

These developments in foreign policy had repercussions upon the religious

policy pursued by the Regent. In 1720, when it could be seen that a rapprochement

with Spain was feasible, the desire to ease relations with a staunchly Catholic

nation prompted a revision of attitudes towards the Bull Unigenitus. The Regency

had witnessed a change from the policy of Louis XIV on Unigenitus and the

‘appellant’ bishops (those who appealed for a council of the gallican church to

discuss the Bull) led by the cardinal de Noailles and the chancellor Daguesseau,

were given the opportunity by the Regent to try to negotiate with Rome

‘explanations’ of the contested points which would be designed to promote

acceptance of the Bull by modifying its meaning. This policy had been met with

papal intransigence; in November 1716 the Pope declared that he regarded the

search for ‘explanations’ as a ‘culpable curiosity’, and in 1718 he declared that all

who refused to accept the ‘constitution’ would be excommunicated. In spite of

attempts by the Regent to impose silence in October 1717 and June 1719, the

quarrel deepened between the Jansenists and the ‘constitutionnaires’ (those who

accepted the Bull). Finally, the failure of the policy of ‘explanations’ became clear.

Renewed enforcement of Unigenitus and persecution of the Jansenists commended

itself to the Regent because it was necessary for his foreign policy towards Spain

and Rome, whose support meant greater emancipation from the British alliance.

It was thus for a combination of political and religious reasons that on 4 August

1720 a declaration was issued imposing acceptance of the Bull Unigenitus upon all

members of the French church and silence upon the protagonists. In fact, the

Declaration of Silence was then, as it was to be later for the cardinal de Fleury,

merely the occasion for legalised persection of all Jansenist publicists, while all

except the most vehement constitutionnaires who broke the silence were left

unmolested.

For Fleury the importance of the change of policy lay in the opportunity it gave

him to take part in the government. A council, variously known as the conseil

ecclésiastique or the conseil de conscience was established to co-ordinate and control the

activities of clerics with regard to the dispute, in order to ensure ‘the conservation of

the doctrine and good order that it is intended to uphold’. This was a council of

much greater significance than the council for church affairs which had formed part

of the Polysynodie until 1718, a council of which Fleury had become a member

towards the end of 1717 or in 1718.

The activities of the first council had been

limited to the conferment of benefices and to matters of ecclesiastical discipline,

while policy was discussed in an unofficial body in the presence of the Regent.

The new conseil de conscience was to be the real instrument and instigator of the

religious policy of the ministry which was discussed there and not in the ineffective

council of regency. The former bishop of Fréjus, whose moderate anti-Jansenist