Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745

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POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

Although Chartres was intelligent and ambitious, he is generally reported to have

been quite lacking in political talents, and his extreme youth made him a prestigious

puppet to be manipulated by clever men. The real leaders of the cabal were Belle-

Isle and Le Blanc, formerly so intimate with Dubois but recently less willing to play

second fiddle. A memoir on the faction describes the leadership thus: ‘Belle-Isle is

the driver, the soul, the leader and the motor of this whole machine. Active, vigilant,

bold, wealthy, he alone maintains by his intrigues M.Le Blanc, tottering on the

verge of disgrace, who, neglecting his duties and wasting his time in cabals, pays the

officers with respects and fine words, and uses the greater part of the military budget

for his own expenses, and for the particular aims of himself and his counsellors’.

The comte de Belle-Isle was the grandson of Fouquet; he threw himself into a

successful military career and a life of intrigue that was to be crowned with

considerable success during the last years of the ministry of Fleury.

Although he

was already wealthy by inheritance, during the Regency he effected the immensely

profitable exchange of his domain, the strategically important island-fortress of

Belle-Isle just off the coast of Brittany, for the greater part of the estates of the late

duc de Berry and for huge life pensions. In spite of the obvious strategic importance

of the fortress many at the time regarded this exchange, which was the result of his

good relations with the ministers, as a scandalous over-estimation of its value. Yet if

Belle-Isle was not popular, he nevertheless acquired wealth to equal that of the

greatest seigneurs of the realm. With all his fortune he remained an ambitious

young man who aspired to lead either in the army or in the state, and so with

conspicuous extravagance and voluminous correspondence he tried to make

himself agreeable to the government.

Having no administrative office, he

associated himself with Le Blanc who did hold an office and the two of them

became confidants of Dubois, particularly during and after the Cellamare

investigations in which Le Blanc seconded Dubois and became one of the very few

to know the whole saga.

Belle-Isle is usually credited with being the power behind Le Blanc; but if the

status of Belle-Isle as a born member of the court aristocracy made him more

influential in some circles (and his aunt Mme de Lévis was a particularly helpful

protector), the power and talents of Le Blanc should not be underestimated in spite

of his more recent and less prestigious robe origins.

His employment as secrétaire

d’état for war itself entailed a large share of patronage in military circles, especially as

the short war with Spain in 1719 gave him a chance to display his administrative

abilities and to increase his prestige. With the confidence bestowed upon him by

Dubois he can fairly be said to have been a power in his own right. He is an

interesting character whose activities did much to affect the politics in the 1720s.

Like Belle-Isle, he was dominated by his ambition and inclined to further his

interests by unscrupulous means. The description by the president Hénault in his

memoirs is generally confirmed by other evidence:

It cannot be denied, this man had great capacity; a sovereign ambition

formed the basis of his character; the gentleness of his manners and his ease

THE ACQUISITION OF A MINISTERIAL POST

of approach did him great service, all the more so because ministers had

always been proud and imperious and, if he had had a choice of means to

increase his fortune, he would surely have preferred those which led him to

be loved. But, as he was ruled by the desire for advancement, as soon as a

quicker way presented itself to him, he did not refuse it. Whence came all the

rigours he practised, during the Regency, under the authority of a Prince who

had been born as gentle as him…His spying on all aspects of government,

which he was reproached for, made him interfere in all its details, he used to

meddle in everybody’s business.

These ambitious men had several important associates. The maréchal de Berwick,

a natural son of James II of England who had long been in the service of France,

was described by Villars as essentially devoted to Le Blanc.

This connection

probably explains the attempts made by Dubois in 1723 to bring about a

rehabilitation of Berwick’s reputation in Spain in order to dispose of him with an

honesta legatione as ambassador there. Since 1716 he had been the trusted and

conscientious commandant of Guyenne, where d’Orléans wanted to have a reliable

and competent man on the Spanish border who also had connections with Spain,

and he had also commanded the French forces in the short war of 1719.

Another

prominent member of the dissatisfied group was the cardinal de Rohan, with his

powerful family who virtually governed Alsace. That he also incurred the disfavour

of Dubois between the summer of 1722 and February 1723 is shown by his

significant omission from the list of members of the council of state newly

reinstituted upon the majority—an omission which is surprising considering his

services to France at the papal conclaves and his aid in facilitating the entry of

Dubois to the Regency council a year before. Had he not already been opposed to

Dubois the insult would surely have been great enough to align him with the cabal.

Perhaps the duc de Noailles too was prepared to support the cabal in their attack on

Dubois. It is also interesting to observe that among the papers of Le Blanc’s spy

Margon there is an undated letter to Arnaud de Bouex, an ambitious maître des

requêtes, which indicates that the duc de Noailles during his exile kept in contact with

Le Blanc by means of various servants.

In September and October 1722 the cabal was actively working to destroy the

predominance of Dubois. Belle-Isle was heard declaring that they had allowed

Dubois to become premier ministre the better to attack him. He confided to another

courtier ‘that this had been discussed and that they had at first wanted to prevent it;

but that they had at length concluded that as long as the cardinal remained a

secretary of state responsible for a single department and supported by foreign

affairs, they would never make an end of it, and that he would rein them all in; but

that by letting him take on the burden of everything they would rather find a way to

overcome him.’

The plan was to try to remove the actual authority of affairs from

Dubois whilst leaving him with all the blame, taking advantage of the naivety of the

duc de Chartres to remove the departments for war and the marine from the first

minister. This was to be done by overworking Dubois by a ‘concerted attempt to

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

occupy his time so as to leave him none for his work, and so that with expeditions

languishing, he will be overcome by work and detail…they intend to have the

blame for unsuitable decisions in the direction of affairs fall on him, without him

having actual authority’.

At this stage, in September and early October, the cabal would seem to have

been directed exclusively against the power of the premier ministre. However, two

weeks later a further memoir states that the plan seems to be for the group to

besiege the King, after the declaration of his majority and the consequent end of the

Regency, in order to persuade him to put his trust in a different ministry. This

would allow the faction to install a puppet premier ministre and to govern the

state.

This faction, therefore, appears to have been motivated by a combination of

family conflict, unfulfilled political ambitions and the hope of the usual financial

rewards of office, and to have aimed at nothing less than a change of ministry. Le

Blanc, whose involvement in the embezzlement of funds from the war treasury was

beginning to be suspected, may have been acting on the premise that attack is the

best form of defence.

The existence of such powerful and dangerous factions as the cabal and the ‘old

court’ is a clear indication that the position of the ministry of the duc d’Orléans was

increasingly precarious. Louis XV, crowned in October 1722, was nearing his

thirteenth birthday and the consequent declaration of his legal majority. If

d’Orléans and Dubois counted on their own continued tenure of power, the factions

hoped for an opportunity to bring about a change more to their own advantage.

Saint-Simon shows us how courtiers were thinking at this time. He pointed out to

Belle-Isle in April 1722 the dangers, or the advantages of the majority of this

impressionable youth.

I invited Belle-Isle to consider the proximity of the King’s majority, and all

that M. the duc d’Orléans would have to fear from all those whose posts gave

them the right to approach the King at any time, a King whose mind could

yet not be formed, less still his judgement, and who would be a prey to

flatteries, to slanders, to the attempts by all interested parties to discredit in his

eyes the Regent and the Regency; they would have so many contentious

issues to get up between them, to put in the unsuspecting head of the King,

about finances, about the marine, about England, on the war against Spain,

on the private life of M. the duc d’Orléans, and on so many of those other

points that come so easily to mind when one wants to be a nuisance, and

someone with much to gain is behind it, without considering the other

dissatisfied courtiers.

Certainly, an adroit courtier would not have had to look far to find material that

could be used to discredit the Regency. The moral laxity which began during the

last few years of the reign of Louis XIV and reached the heights of scandal during

the Regency years reflected badly on Philippe whose habit was to spend the better

part of his evenings with his circle of roués and mistresses. Indeed, his reputation

THE ACQUISITION OF A MINISTERIAL POST

was so bespattered that for more than two centuries historical evaluation of his

politics suffered from the moral indignation aroused by his activities. More strictly

in the realm of politics, the blame for the adoption of a financial administration

which had ruined many with its collapse could easily, if somewhat unfairly, be laid

on the government doorstep. Scarcely more popular than this law system was the

operation, after September 1721, of the ‘visa’, the name given to the government-

managed liquidation of the ‘system’ by reduction of the debts of John Law’s bank

and the Compagnie des Indes, the conversion of shares and paper money at a

discount into rentes (annuities), and the introduction of an extraordinary surtax on

those who had gained millions.

Furthermore, with so many important individuals in opposition, the basis of

support for the ministry had become rather narrow. Nor was the Paris

parlement—such an important ally in 1715—likely to display any enthusiasm for

the ministry which had recently exiled it to Pontoise, and it was well known that

the parlementaires disliked both the Law system and the new policy pursued by

Dubois on Unigenitus.

Recently too, a number of new men had been brought

into the ministry, men who owed their position solely to the favour of Dubois and

d’Orléans and who lacked any sort of clientage which could match the factions.

The future for the dominant faction did not look bright. The exilings in 1722, the

promotion of Dubois, the reports on the faction of the duc de Chartres, all

indicate that the Regent and his premier ministre were not unaware of the dangers

of their position.

Forewarned was forearmed, and if the confidence of the King was the key to

continued power, the duc d’Orléans had obvious advantages, having already

spent several years in close contact with Louis. One useful step was to use the

education of the King as a means of accustoming him to the discussion of political

matters with the principal ministers. Beginning directly after the appointment of

Dubois as premier ministre, half-an-hour a day, six days a week, was devoted to

the political education of the King. Those present were the due d’Orléans, the duc

de Bourbon, the duc de Charost (who had replaced Villeroy as governor), Fleury

and Dubois. The procedure was that Dubois read aloud a memoir explaining

some aspect of government, and if further explanations were required they were

provided by the duc d’Orléans. Louis was thus given a concise introduction to the

financial system of France, the royal domains and the political configuration of

Europe, drawn up by experts.

In addition to the formal sessions noted in the

diary of Dubois the Regent gave many private periods of instruction to Louis, his

first valet told Clairambault, the official genealogist, and sometimes these ran into

several hours of conversation about politics.

The Dutch ambassador considered

that the lessons on government were really given to accustom the King to

working with Bourbon, d’Orléans and Dubois in the hope that this would

continue during the majority, with d’Orléans taking the opportunity to

strengthen his personal links with the King.

It is in the immediate context of the attempt by the government to secure the

confidence of the King that the surprising rise of Fleury came about. His close

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

relations with several members of both groups of the factional opposition made him

a man to be respected. He was too much liked by Louis to be removed from court,

and too much trusted by Louis to be allowed to side with the opposition. Therefore,

it is easy to infer, the best policy for the ministry was to buy his loyalty: if he could

be a dangerous enemy he might equally be an invaluable ally. In March 1723 the

opportunity arose to put such a design into effect. The declaration of the majority

heralded changes in the structure of the government because the Regency ended

and with it the long powerless council of Regency.

The principal changes are

related in the following extract of a letter from Dubois to the marquis de Rossi, 8

March 1723.

Since the King has declared in his lit de justice…that he wished M.the duc

d’Orléans to preside after him over all the councils, and confirmed the choice

he had made on 22 August last, of M.the cardinal Dubois as first minister of

the State, the order of the council at which His Majesty will be present has

been determined. [His Majesty] will hold on Sundays and Wednesdays a

Council of State composed of His Majesty, M.the duc d’Orléans, M.the duc

de Chartres, of M.le Duc [de Bourbon], of the Minister and Bishop of Fréjus,

in which all foreign affairs will be deliberated, and grand resolutions on the

principal affairs of government whatsoever they may be, be they war, finance,

marine, commerce, justice and the general administration [police] of the

Kingdom, and M.the cardinal Dubois is the sole rapporteur in the Council.

According to the contemporary theory, the King’s council (known collectively as

the conseil du roi or conseil d’en haut) was one body whose members met in different

groups on separate occasions to deal with various aspects of government.

These

groups were referred to by titles according to their sphere of action, such as the conseil

de conscience, the conseil des finances, or conseil des dépêches. Of the many royal councillors

only those who were invited to attend the meetings on Sundays and Wednesdays—

the conseil d’état—had the honorary title of ministre, and it was this group which

decided upon matters of general policy during the 1720s, while the other groups

concerned themselves more with details. (By the early 1730s aspects of this

institutional structure had changed by usage and the conseil d’état tended to deal not

with religion but principally with foreign affairs and a few highly important

domestic issues, because the fiercer religious controversy and the crisis with the

Paris parlement had increased the volume of business. Correspondingly, matters of

greater importance were dealt with in the meetings of the conseil de conscience and in

particular in the conseil des dépêches which then organised internal affairs.) In March

1723, therefore, Fleury became a minister of state as a member of the conseil d’état,

and as such was concerned with all the most important decisions in the

government.

To have arrived at this point, to have become a member of the council in the

company only of Philippe d’Orléans and his heir, with Bourbon who ranked after

them as a prince of the blood, and the premier ministre Dubois, was a

THE ACQUISITION OF A MINISTERIAL POST

considerable achievement. There was even talk of making him a cardinal, and

Dubois composed a letter on behalf of Louis to recommend Fleury for a future

appointment.

Certainly, all this is a reflection of the special consideration owed

to Fleury as the price he merited and to some extent exacted from both his

personal abilities and that relationship with the King which for Dubois and

d’Orléans gave him key importance. However, it is hard to know how far his

membership of the conseil d’état also reflected his share in the conduct of the

business that came before the council. It is reasonable to assume that for the first

few months of the new regime affairs were conducted in much the same way as

before the end of the Regency, with Dubois doing the lion’s share of the work.

This must have been so if the acquisition of lucrative offices, the usual reward for

a successful and loyal administrator, is anything to judge from. Besides having

had his office of premier ministre confirmed, Dubois became the director general

of the bridges and highways of France in May, he was president of the Assembly

of Clergy which had been deferred from 1720, and in June he strongly pressed the

Pope to accord him a valuable abbey as a reward for his strenuous support of the

true religion.

In the same month he felt firmly enough in control to take action against the

leaders of the cabal. The perfect opportunity, which was by no means a pretext,

arose a short while after the inauguration of the ‘visa’ under the financial direction

of the Pâris brothers and the overall political direction of Dubois. They proceeded

to a verification of the state of the finances with the aim of drawing up a budget in

order to balance expenditure against revenue. The idea of a formal budget was new,

and it was amidst an atmosphere of affronted resistance that the treasurers and

secretaries of state were obliged to submit an account showing their debts. Le Blanc

allowed, or was responsible for, the submitting of an account which presented a

debt of 50,800,000 livres tournois owed by the war treasury. Such a huge debt in so

vital a department led to the accusations of mismanagement made by the Pâris

brothers, which Le Blanc returned with vehemence. To vindicate their claims and

to defend themselves from attack, as well as to bring the truth to light, asserts Paris

de La Montagne in a memoir, they pressed strongly for a royal commission to

investigate the matter.

One was set up on 10 June 1723, ‘to proceed to the

discovery and verification of abuses and peculations committed in the exercise of

the extraordinary [funds] for war and of the Order of St Louis during 1719, 1720,

1721 and 1722’.

A number of men had already been imprisoned pending the

findings of the commission, most notably the treasurer La Jonchère—another

treasurer had already been murdered. During the month of July the scandal of the

‘malversations’ was pursued with some vigour by the government. On 1 July Le

Blanc was exiled to Douai by lettre de cachet, but when the affair first came before the

Paris parlement he escaped imprisonment while awaiting trial by one vote. The two

Belle-Isle brothers were not so lucky and they were confined to the Bastille. The

affair was by no means finished, and the analysis of politics in the following chapters

will show how the fate of Le Blanc and Belle-Isle, because they had powerful

factional support, became bound up with the resistance to the financial policies of

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

the Bourbon ministry and had deep political consequences in 1726. In the autumn

of 1723, however, the leaders of the cabal were in no position to affect the ministry.

Dubois was at the apogee of his power when his avaricious and splendidly

successful career was cut short by his death as a result of a fever contracted after

a serious operation in August. The following day, on 11 August, the duc

d’Orléans himself took the oath and became principal or premier ministre d’état, ‘a

title that assures our subjects the continuation of such great help’, according to the

letters of commission.

There is room for speculation on his motives in taking

this step, but it is probable that he took it because he considered himself both

duty-bound to do so and the only person capable of organising affairs at that

time. Saint-Simon certainly exaggerated the power of Fleury when he wrote that

‘such a swift declaration, that M.the duc d’Orléans had not prepared for at all,

was the result of M.de Fréjus’ fear of seeing a man who was not a prince [un

particulier] become first minister’.

It is true that Fleury had gained considerably in

power since the summer of 1722, but there is no reason whatsoever to credit the

idea that the tables had been turned so that the duc now deferred to Fleury. If

Fleury had been in a position to claim the office, as he later said that he had, he

would have been accepting at the age of 70, together with the undeniable increase

in power, a burden of work that had certainly affected the health of Dubois and

might easily do the same to him, while d’Orléans would have continued to have

the final word in matters of policy. When he finally took upon himself the

direction of affairs in 1726, it was under very different conditions, in a situation

much more to his advantage; it therefore seems certain that even if he had been

offered the commission he must have refused.

The death of Dubois was obviously an important event for Fleury and Bourbon

in that it removed a man with whom they had both felt uneasy and whose favour

with d’Orléans so out-distanced all rivals that he had survived the several attempts

of court conspiracies to displace him. No one new took his place as a minister, but

the balance of influence in the ministry did change with the recall from exile of two

friends of the Regent—Nocé and Noailles.

It is interesting to note that, when the

future British ambassador Horatio Walpole arrived in Paris in October 1723, it was

not Fleury (on whom he came to rely rather later) but Nocé whom he regarded as

the most useful and important man that he could approach.

This new state of affairs did not last long. D’Orléans died suddenly of apoplexy

on 2 December 1723 and his place was promptly taken by the due de Bourbon. To

provide a more complete answer to the question of how it was that Bourbon, and

not Fleury, who was unquestionably in a better position with Louis XV, came to

occupy the post of premier ministre, it would be necessary to know a great deal

more in detail about the career, character and attitudes of the duke himself.

Unfortunately, this seemingly ideally compact topic has never attracted the

attention of a researcher, although it is hoped that the following chapter of this work

will provide some illumination in certain areas.

From 1722 he was in some

measure an ally of Fleury, as shown by his letter expressing surprise that Fleury had

not communicated to him his plan to leave court in August 1722.

Both he and

THE ACQUISITION OF A MINISTERIAL POST

Fleury had reacted in the same way to the unpopularity of the administration of

d’Orléans during that year: they stood apart from the factions and made capital

from the Regent’s need for support. As head of the House of Condé, which

traditionally rivalled the other cadet branch of Bourbon, the Orléans, he had to

uphold his family interests and prestige and this could be done only by taking an

active role in politics. His career from 1717 bears testimony not only to these

ambitions but also to the fact that the Regent considered them legitimate, never

discouraging him and even preferring his involvement to that of his own son

Chartres, or the prince de Conti.

The death of d’Orléans in 1723 was a far from unexpected event. His

deteriorating health has already been identified above as one cause of the

intensification of factional conflicts in 1722. If other courtiers could direct their

course in the light of this, it was not beyond Bourbon to do the same. The

manner in which he grasped the opportunity presented by the demise of the

premier ministre gives good reason to believe that he had prepared his move

beforehand with Fleury. The evidence on this point requires careful attention

because at first sight this does not appear to have been the case. Boislisle quite

rightly questioned the accuracy of the assertion by Saint-Simon that ‘Fréjus, from

the first news of the apoplectic fit, had arranged the matter of M.the Duc with the

King’. Apparently, this could not be correct because according to other sources—

Hénault, Marais, Barbier, Villars and an unpublished note of the duc de Maine—

it was Bourbon who brought the news of the death to the King while he was alone

with Fleury.

There and then Bourbon requested his own appointment as

premier ministre, and a surprised Fleury advised Louis, who was by then shocked

and tearful at the news about his uncle, to agree. ‘The duke requested the office of

prime minister, the King made no reply; but fixed his eyes on Fleury, who

instantly nodding approbation, declared he would answer for the duke’s loyalty

and attachment, and that his majesty would consult his interests by appointing

him first minister.’ He added ‘M.de la Vrilliere is in the ante-chamber, and if your

majesty is willing, I will call him to receive your orders to expedite the patent’.

The King said ‘yes’: La Vrilliere was admitted; the patent was signed, and a ‘chair

of state being introduced, his majesty seated himself in it and received the

customary oaths from the duke of Bourbon’.

It is impossible not to feel that

these were indeed the precise circumstances, and thus Fleury, ignorant of the

death of d’Orléans until Bourbon told him, would have had very little choice in

the matter.

The speed with which Bourbon reacted surprised everyone and led

them to believe that he had acted on the spur of the moment. But more evidence,

both direct from memoirs, and circumstantial, which is sometimes more

convincing, points to the collaboration of Fleury and Bourbon some time before

the sudden death.

Time for reflection and the clear evidence of the subsequent ministerial situation

led at least one contemporary to the conclusion that appearances had been

deceptive. Aware of the strength of the position of Fleury in the new ministry, the

due du Maine wrote a few days later, ‘From all that can be seen, it is quite hard not

POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE

to believe that he [Fleury] was not already in concert with M.the Duc’.

The fact is

that Fleury was the principal actor in the scene of 2 December, because without his

advice Louis XV would not have signed the letters of commission for Bourbon. At

the same time, Fleury came to the arrangement with his pupil that Bourbon would

never work alone with his king, he himself always being present. This is the sort of

action that would have been taken by a man who had carefully considered the

possibilities and had made up his mind in advance. In support of this argument

there is a passage from the memoirs of Saint-Simon in which he noted a

conversation held with Fleury in November 1723. Having been deeply shocked one

morning by the purple face and dull, vacant look of the duc d’Orléans, he went to

see Fleury to impress upon him this dangerous state of health and to urge him to

consider his own position. He pointed out that Fleury had considerable advantages,

being the sole person with the confidence of the King and also being in the position

of having frequent tête-à-tête with him by the nature of his educational functions.

He urged him to consider seriously the possibilities of his succession to d’Orléans.

I found a man who appeared to be very grateful for this opinion and this

wish, but modest, measured, a man who thought the place above his station

and out of his reach. This was not the first time I had spoken to him of it as a

pressing matter. He said that he had thought about it, and that he saw no one

but a Prince of the Blood who could be declared first minister without

[creating] envy, jealousy and provoking a public outcry; that he saw only M.

the Duc in the post,…that all in all the gap between M.the duc d’Orléans and

a particulier was so great, that the weight of the office would crush any

particulier who might succeed to it, that he would never [be able to] stand up to

the generalised envy and the problems created by everyone’s jealousy.

Even if the report of this conversation is not to be taken too literally, for the direct

speech may only be the author’s way of dramatising the situation and of attributing

to himself some small part in the proceedings, it must still be accepted as a way of

saying that the manœuvre of 2 December was obviously prepared in advance,

although the precise circumstances could never have been foreseen.

The duc de Bourbon must have coveted the political responsibilities that he

accepted in 1723, and this was one reason why Fleury declined the opportunity to

take advantage of his relationship with the King to appoint himself. An analysis of

the situation in December as it might have appeared to an informed contemporary

can provide a still fuller explanation of Fleury’s refusal to take power.

By having joined Dubois and the Regent in order to become a minister, Fleury

had alienated the cabal with whom he had formerly had more or less close contact.

Their opposition in itself would present a formidable threat to his power, especially

since the most dangerous aspect of their plotting was that they wanted to use a

figurehead in government while acquiring the power for themselves. In spite of the

blow dealt to their fortunes by the financial scandal their abeyance could not be

guaranteed for long. Just as the ‘old court’ had not been totally excluded from

THE ACQUISITION OF A MINISTERIAL POST

influence in 1721 because its members retained privileges, royal entrées and their

own patronage, they too had a network of influence at their disposal. The death of

the Regent not only left a place free at the head of the government, but it also made

the former duc de Chartres the head of the House of Orléans. This legitimised the

cabal by allowing it to adopt the Orleanist cause in politics, and meant that its

leaders had at their disposal the Orleanist patronage that had been denied them

while the Regent was alive.

The factional position was still more complicated than it was during the

Regency. Freed from ties to the late due d’Orléans who had taken care not to offend

the Condé interests, Bourbon was now obliged to embark upon a new course in

order to safeguard the interests of his House. Whichever family occupied the post

of premier ministre was bound to provoke the rivalry of the other; indeed, in 1724

the Orléans family felt very bitter about the coup by which Bourbon had pre-

empted them in order to seize what they considered to be their rightful place in the

ministry. The duc de Bourbon therefore opposed his own party, which his position

in the government enabled him to augment, to that of the Orleanists.

This awkward situation was further complicated by the connection between

factional rivalry and foreign policy in the shape of a succession problem. Louis XV

had no heirs and would not have some for a few years at the earliest if he were to

marry his fiancée, and he was still a sickly child. There was always a possibility that

he might die, leaving a disputed succession. According to fundamental law Philippe

V of Spain was the rightful heir, but according to two international treaties solemnly

ratified by Philippe V the head of the House of Orléans was the heir presumptive.

For this reason French policy towards Spain was difficult to formulate objectively

because friendship or hostility might affect the succession. In the event of the death

of Louis XV, Bourbon’s only hope of saving his family from total eclipse by the

d’Orléans was to further the cause of Philippe V, or so it appeared late in 1723 and

early in 1724.

In addition to the problems posed by the existence of such a formidable

collection of factions, there were serious political problems besetting France in 1723.

In particular, the finances were in disorder and the government faced a serious

economic crisis. The collapse of Law’s financial projects as a result of a wave of

speculation had shattered public confidence, driven hard cash from circulation and

led to a steep and rapid rise in prices—in many cases they had tripled—and the

confusion of debts and bankruptcies had to be cleared up.

The ‘visa’ was highly

unpopular with many since gains were taxed and banknotes and shares were repaid

at a very low rate by the creation of interest-bearing loans to the state. With the

exception of the Pâris brothers there were few who were prepared to take the risk of

becoming scapegoats by directing unpopular policies. Villars remarked in his

memoirs that there had been considerable reluctance to serve on the commission

for the ‘visa’.

The parlement refused to have anything to do with the question of

the recovery from the ‘système’, and a contemporary writing in 1727 made the

following interesting comment: ‘There is one thing to note about the financial

operations undertaken since [the collapse of the Law system]. It is that thay have