Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745
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POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE
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You can be sure that this affair was conducted in the utmost secrecy, no
one suspected it, not even those whose interests were most at stake. It was
arranged between the King and Mr de Fréjus, who played a better game than
those who wished to destroy him: the King was as secret as ever, but he joined
to this a deep dissimulation, for two days beforehand, and on the day of Mr le
Duc’s disgrace, he covered him with attentions; he joked with Mr de Charost
about there probably being no room for him at Rambouillet, he appeared
very gay, and as no one had supped because everyone was waiting for Mr le
Duc, he pulled his watch from his pocket without a word, and called for
supper; everyone was surprised, but knew nothing; they say that he told
Madame the countess of Toulouse as he went to bed. Mr le Duc shewed
much firmness, he asked to see the Queen, which was refused him; he has
been upset only since he learned of Mme de Prie’s exile. The King’s letter to
Mr le Duc was written out in his own hand, [and] he wrote a few lines on
Madame the Duchess’s; the Queen cried a lot; the King has written to her; it
is thought that Mademoiselle de Clermont might well receive an order to stay
at Chantilly Reflect carefully upon this whole manœuvre, there is a lot to
consider because it’s a very delicate business; I beg you as a favour to share
with me, to count on me and to always make use of my services as you think
necessary whatever happens, nothing can ever change my sentiments; they
say that the office of superintendant of the posts has been suppressed, but I
think it more than ever necessary to take care of one’s letters…Madame de
Duras has charged me to tell you that she is not writing to you because she
will rely on me to, and that she counsels you to stay in Vienna as long as you
can, and not to make an effort with those with whom you are on bad terms:
those were her very words. The Orleans and the Du Maine are ecstatic.
47
The motives of the duc de Richelieu for engaging in politics were not by any means
the same as those of Pallu. Richelieu came from a different world from the
counsellor, and politics meant something different to him. There is no need to draw
a picture of the world of the salons, badinage, the indirect but pointed conversations
and the insistence on etiquette that made up the life of a courtier. Enough studies of
that nature have been written with the result that the political world has been almost
ignored. Having so often noted the acuteness of Richelieu’s observations, and the
soundness of his judgement, it is interesting to see him lay bare the springs of his
conduct in the following letter. Speaking of his embassy, he writes:
Only two things persuaded me to do this; the first is the hope of improving
my situation with an office at court or a governorship, the second is selfish
desire to believe myself capable of the most serious matters, I have perhaps
succeeded because I give of my all and conduct myself with vivacity and even
fury in all that I do, but for me that is a violent and unnatural state, and
consequently one that can only be shortlived. Understand, I beg you, and
approve this way of thinking since I understand yours, and do not disapprove
THE DISGRACING OF BOURBON
109
my indifference as to whether the Duchy of Schleswig belongs to the duc
d’Holstein or the King of Denmark, and the crown of Sweden in the House of
Hesse or Hostein, and even Gibraltar to whomsoever, provided that I have an
office that will shelter me from the tyranny of the secretaries of state, and
leave me to read whatever I like in peace, amuse myself with my friends and
render them services with the King, look to my health from time to time and
amuse myself with simple things, or even a governorship that would let me
lead the life of a little sovereign, that is to say do what I want from morn till
night.
48
The attitude of Richelieu is evidence that politics and the social world were not only
inseparable but for some almost identical. But if for Richelieu politics was a means
to an end, for Fleury politics was a passion and a duty. From its first days his
ministry promised to be conducted on very different principles from those of the
duc de Bourbon. In foretelling the success of Fleury in dominating his ministers, the
ambassador in Vienna left an interesting proof of the shrewdness of his
observations:
The burden that M.de Fréjus has taken on would appear heavy to any man;
consider what it must appear to someone as gentle and lazy as he is, and I am
convinced that he is very annoyed to be carrying it, and that he believed it
unavoidable, sure as I am that no ambition entered into what he has done, but
as he is a man with friends, who do not influence him in the principles he
holds to and in the little arrangements he has, I am not at all surprised by
what he has done to the maréchal de Berwick, and a lot of people who think
all they have to do is bend down to pick up the rewards will be caught out and
unhappy. For this is a man who wants the good, and upon whom friends will
prevail a lot less than they think, apart from the details of finance and war
which I think he will govern all alone, and that a lot of people will be mistaken
in what he will do; for I think I know him, and that everyone else doesn’t,
you’ll see if I’m not right.
49
110
5
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE
MINISTRY OF FLEURY
Fleury, his character and situation; ministerial changes; Le Blanc and Desforts; the state of the
factions: the Orleanists and the Spanish party; financial measures; concessions to the cabal; Fleury
reconstructs his ministry; his position consolidated.
At the advanced age of 73, Fleury came to hold the reins of government in France.
Yet the burden of affairs was heavy and it remained to be seen whether Fleury could
carry it, for how long and with how much help. Fortunately, despite his years, in
1726 he was in the best of health: ‘He was still a man of handsome features. He had
a fresh complexion, bright eyes, a penetrating regard, a high forehead, a well made
nose, red lips, his height was above average, straight and easy, his step was firm and
his carriage was noble’.
1
This contemporary description reveals a man scarcely
changed in aspect from the famous portrait of 1705 by Rigaud. The years at least
weighed lightly on him.
As far as his character is concerned, descriptions of him can generally be divided
into two groups according to the date of their composition. Those assessments
written at the time of his death or shortly afterwards tend to betray an ill-concealed
hostility and a marked tendency to denigrate his better qualities or even to ignore
them altogether. As a rule this is to be accounted for not because certain traits of
character had been revealed and defined more clearly, as one would expect, but
because his long rule had led to disappointed hopes of advancement. People in 1743
had wearied of the rule of the cardinal-minister and looked forward to the personal
rule of Louis XV. ‘Subtlety’ became ‘dishonesty’; ‘patience’ was portrayed as ‘lack
of expedition’; ‘economy’ was now ‘avarice’; and a preference for diplomatic
solutions was seen as inglorious pacifism.
2
The subtlety and success of his foreign policy until 1737 gives the lie to the
description of him by ‘An Impartial Hand’ that ‘Fleury had not the best head for
conceiving projects’.
3
On surer ground perhaps was Frederick II who saw him in
1740 as ‘clerical, politic, a very stubborn man’.
4
A much earlier portrait, and by
far the most convincing, came from the pen of the Prussian ambassador in 1726.
This description of Fleury and his government is confirmed in its broad lines not
only by the letters of Richelieu and Silly but also by his political conduct over the
next decade.
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This prelate, although advanced in years, nevertheless enjoyed good health
and appears able to push his career still further, because he leads a well
ordered life and is of a healthy constitution; he is even tempered and of a
gentle, calm disposition, though not lacking in strength and courage; but he
does not show the latter by fits of anger and haughtiness as was the case with
most of the cardinals who have been first minister; the interests of his master
and the well-being of the state appear to be his only concerns, and he will
neglect nothing to arrive at both; those who profess to have fathomed his
character, accord him the talent necessary to do great things and to do them
with justice.
5
All observers are agreed that he was an extremely civil and agreeable courtier
with a sense of humour, who never needlessly offended anyone. But allied to
these qualities was the distrustful and wary approach of one who did not like to
be caught out. In an interview he had a special talent for finding out how
someone thought: ‘a dangerous aspect for anyone not knowing him’, remarked
Silly, ‘is his way of uncovering the character and way of thinking of those he
treats with, by adroit questions that are often far removed from the matter in
hand’.
6
Although Bourbon had been premier ministre, Fleury did not succeed him
to the commission. That had been suppressed at the time of the exile of the
Duke and there was no attempt to revive it. Keen observers had to await the
royal speech to the conseil d’état for a clue as to the legal arrangements for the
new ministry. Yet this told them nothing very concrete. The 16-year-old King
declared that he intended to take the administration into his own hands, as his
great-grandfather had done. He would deal individually with the ministers
concerning the affairs of their departments but always in the presence of the
former bishop of Fréjus, who was to be given entry to all the councils.
7
The
whole speech was, of course, a fiction designed to enhance royal prestige,
behind which sheltered the reality of the power of Fleury. The true order of
government remained as it had been expressed in the confidential letter to the
ministers written on 10 June and signed by Louis: ‘I order…to do and expedite
all that the former bishop of Fréjus shall order on my behalf, to obey him and
give him an account of all matters’.
8
It is impossible to be specific about the reason for the suppression of the
commission of premier ministre, but a number of considerations must have been
taken into account. First, the office as held by princes of the blood did no credit to
royal authority, which could only be weaker if formally delegated, and this was
certainly contrary to the policy of Louis XIV towards the grands. Second, the social
etiquette of the ancien régime did not permit Fleury, as a man of provincial noble
extraction, to succeed to an office held by a prince of the blood. This would have
reflected grave dishonour on the prince de Condé. That the suppression thus
represented a more diplomatic solution is confirmed by the very mild tone of the
references to Bourbon in the royal speech. Third, Fleury was thus left free to
POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE
112
exercise power as he chose, unrestrained by precedents formed over the previous
four years. As will be seen, this less official position gave him a useful advantage in
politics because he was more easily able to shift the blame for unpopular policies on
to the secretaries of state. Nevertheless, Fleury did take over one office which had
become associated with the commission of premier ministre. This was the
surintendance générate des postes, a position which was indispensable for control over the
court, since it gave its incumbent access, through the cabinet noir, to private
correspondence.
9
The fall of Bourbon was not the only ministerial change to come about at this
juncture. On 13 June the secretary of state for war, Breteuil, was asked to resign,
though not in disgrace, and he was replaced by Le Blanc who was recalled from
exile.
10
On the same day Dodun, the controller-general, resigned and Le Peletier
Desforts was appointed. Neither of these men became a minister in the council of
state—indeed, the final composition of that body was a matter for considerable
speculation for some months after the palace revolution. During the summer the
conseil d’état was composed of Fleury, Morville, Villars (who sat in Bourbon’s former
place at the table), and the duc d’Orléans.
In spite of the changes at court the business of government suffered little or no
interruption. Le Blanc and Desforts were at work from 15 June, the latter issuing
his first arrêts through the conseil royal des finances. Villars records that Desforts
worked with the King in the presence of Fleury on 21 June. Both the Bavarian
and Prussian ambassadors noted with some surprise that the change of ministry
had led to so little disruption of government business.
11
Although Fleury did not
very much like Morville for personal reasons, as he had been a creature of
Bourbon, he remained in place because he could be relied upon to do as he was
told and had won the confidence of France’s allies. In this way, continuity was
preserved in the most important department of state, foreign affairs, at a time
when this was especially important owing to the exceptionally tense international
situation. Either by private letter to heads of state or by interview with
ambassadors, Fleury took care to assure all the powers that France would remain
on the same course.
Problems of organisation remained, most notably for the conseil d’état into which
Fleury wished to introduce two new ministers, the maréchaux de Tallard and
d’Huxelles, both regarded as members of the ‘old court’.
12
If youthful impetuosity
had been the hallmark of the previous ministry, the same could hardly be said for
that of Fleury, for the composition of the conseil d’état was to give France in the late
1720s the appearance of a gerontocracy. The four most important members were all
in their seventies, Tallard and d’Huxelles both having been born in 1652. But this is
to anticipate, for the composition of the reformed council was not to be known until
late September 1726. There were other contenders for these posts.
For Fleury to be able to direct the government, even with the simple title of
minister of state, it was necessary for him to become a cardinal. As a mere bishop
he would not have had precedence in the council of state, which in turn meant
that he would not, according to the traditional order of the council, have the right
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FLEURY
113
to opine until those members of higher rank had done so. The inconvenience of
this was obvious and it was highlighted by the refusal of d’Huxelles to waive his
right of precedence in favour of a bishop. For the maréchal it was not a question
of personal considerations; it was simply that the contemporary social ethic did
not permit him to set any precedent which might later prove detrimental to the
prestige of his house and rank. Fleury may have had a personal ambition to
become a cardinal, although he repeatedly denied it, but there were other
problems posed by his lowly rank. In European politics it was not customary for
heads of state to enter into direct relations with men of greatly inferior standing,
and therefore the personal conduct of foreign affairs which he favoured
demanded that he be raised to a rank which would enable him to negotiate
directly with rulers. The usual solution to this problem in France had been for the
monarch to acquire for his minister a cardinal’s red hat.
13
In this case Louis XV,
not without some skilful negotiations by Richelieu and Fleury’s old friend Prince
Eugène in Vienna, secured the nomination of Fleury by Austria to one of the
vacancies in the sacred college, which by custom were in the patronage of the
Catholic monarchs. But if the main reasons for the promotion were the conduct
of foreign policy and precedence in the councils, the other scarcely less important
advantages connected to the rank of cardinal should also be noted. Much of the
career of Fleury had been built on his attitude to the religious problems besetting
the French church, and the prestige of this position was indispensable if he were to
be able to take the lead in religious matters. In a hierarchical organisation he
would be in a better position to impose his authority on the bishops if need be,
and could enter into direct relations with the Pope.
The papal endorsement was received in France by 4 July, but not until late
September could Richelieu secure the agreement of the Emperor. On 20 September
after receiving a further letter from the Pope, Louis XV was able to give Fleury the
red cap in anticipation of the arrival of the formal documents. The anticipation was
necessary because the arrangements for dealing with domestic and foreign affairs
were then in some turmoil, owing to the difficulty in organising the councils before
the promotion of Fleury.
14
From this survey of the character of Fleury and of his position in the councils, it
emerges that he was certainly capable of directing the affairs of France, if he were to
be allowed to. But was he to be allowed to? This was the question which dominated
the thinking of courtiers in 1726. Capable though he was, the only firm basis of his
position was the favour of the young King. It was not yet apparent that this was to
remain secure and the history of courts taught that it was rarely an unshakeable
foundation. In France, basing a position in the government solely on royal favour
was often like building a house on sand. To rivals for power in 1726 there seemed
every possibility that Louis might be led either to abandon his old preceptor or to
develop a preference for a successor to him. It would be a mistake to think that
Fleury could be sure of his position at this early stage.
The only other study of faction in this period has concentrated upon the struggle
for the succession to Fleury, which occurred in the last years of his ministry. The
POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE
114
period of struggle in the early 1740s and its outcome were to set the tone for politics
to the end of the reign, but it is also true that a very real struggle was taking place
during the two years after 1726, whose outcome determined the shape of court
politics for more than a decade. For those interested in political structures, the
factional struggles of these early years should not be divorced from those in the later
period because the relations between the various groups and the configuration of
the factions themselves owed a lot to their earlier history. The subsequent ambitions
of a Richelieu, a Belle-Isle, a Noailles or those of the Secretaries of State as a group
take on colour and significance only in the light of earlier reverses or of their degree
of influence under the political system of Fleury. Faction was always present, and
there was a remarkable continuity in the principal factions over a generation.
Viewed in the long term, faction in politics emerges as a phenomenon which has
general characteristics and which can be shown to have constituted a tendency in
the political system of the French court.
15
It must be an integral part of discussions
of the politics of the ancien régime both because it represented precise interest groups
which influenced policies and because faction in general formed a permanent threat
to stability.
The politics of the late 1720s were deeply affected by two factors which have so
far been ignored by historians. Besides the obvious aims of Fleury to direct policy
in the interests of the French state, we should take into account the need to
popularise a new ministry and the desire of Fleury to emancipate himself from the
tutelage of a dangerous faction. It will be remembered that the previous ministry
had given rise to a great deal of opposition led principally by the House of
Orléans in alliance with the princes légitimés. The Orleanists supported the
ministerial aspirations of Le Blanc and the Belle-Isle. The members of this group
had hoped that by lending their support to Fleury they might gain a considerable
advantage from the change of ministry and even put pressure on him to
implement policies favourable to them. In order to be sure of the success of his
ministerial coup the cardinal had been obliged to come to terms with them. He
almost certainly realised that however powerful his position with Louis XV might
be, he could not govern alone: he had no large household, no parti, no fund of
patronage to tie men to himself, and without this, few courtiers would be
prepared to take the risk of becoming closely tied to his government. Yet he
needed ministers. Furthermore, would the confidence that Louis XV had in
Fleury survive a concentrated attack by the two most powerful groups at court,
the Condé and the d’Orléans, if he allowed them to ally against him? There is no
evidence that Bourbon was actively intriguing against Fleury at this time,
although the House of Condé remained a serious potential threat to Fleury. By
breaking with Bourbon, Fleury had to march with the Orleanist cabal.
These considerations were behind the appointment of two representatives of the
cabal to office in 1726—Le Blanc and Desforts. To confirm this view, derived from
the logic of the political scene and the Richelieu correspondence, in the Spanish
archives there is a twenty-seven page memoir on the court of France. It said that
Fleury had been obliged to share power with the two men ‘because he found it
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FLEURY
115
necessary to buy the support of the Orleanist faction to protect himself against that
of the duc de Bourbon’.
16
There is plenty of evidence that these men were likely to
be dangerous allies, whose aim was nothing less than the control of the government.
Le Blanc was extremely ambitious. Richelieu, analysing the new ministry, was not
happy about the return of Le Blanc to the war office: ‘the latter is not a man to be led
as one wishes, and I count on his friendship, but I do however know the danger
there is in having against one a minister who is as scheming as this one, and how
much that can lead to annoyances’.
17
The author of the memoir in the Spanish
archives was in entire agreement with Richelieu; Le Blanc, he wrote, is ‘a man who
joins to a mind that is extremely determined, active, penetrating and capable of a
great deal of work, who has affable and insinuating manners that have attracted the
friendship of all the officers, the most complete and declared devotion to the duc
d’Orléans’.
18
There was a plot by the cabal to introduce the two new secretaries of state into
the conseil d’état and substitute one or other of them in the confidence of the King
to replace Fleury ‘when he leaves us’.
19
In his reply to the letter from Silly
reporting this, Richelieu agreed about the efforts which ‘Le Blanc and Belle-Isle,
fertile in schemes, are going to invent to try to make themselves masters of the
Council…’ [The position of Morville the Foreign Secretary was therefore
important, he wrote], ‘you know what schemers the Belle-Isle and the whole cabal
are, he [Morville] has everything to fear, as I see it, for they will be well aware that
as M.de Fréjus is seventy years old, they can never assure their position perfectly
without being master of foreign affairs, so they will want to put in somebody of
their choice’.
20
Another observer, Richer d’Aube, came to very similar
conclusions, although being absent from court in this period he was unaware of
the d’Orléans connection:
Such were these two new ministers that if they had been good politicians they
would have soon been in a position to subjugate their superior, and to have
the major part in influencing all the operations of government, since their
departments were the most important, since they were the creatures of the
first minister alone, the public voice being favourable to them, and they had
been close friends for a long time.
21
Fleury therefore had to cope with ambitious men who sought to exercise real
authority in office. Behind them lay the power and influence of the Orleanists and
all who held to them: ‘the Luynes, the Chaulnes, the Mortemart, the Charost, the
duc d’Humièries, the Saint-Simon, the Luxembourg and all those who hold to these
families directly or indirectly are for M.Le Blanc and Desforts, under the mask of
being allied to M.de Fréjus. The Maréchal de Berwick who has always been linked
to him, is no less so with M.Le Blanc’.
22
The policies of the factions remained as they were before the fall of Bourbon,
and have been outlined above. The aims of the Orleanists dictated the choice of the
foreign policy which they would have liked to see practised. That was the main
POWER AND POLITICS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE
116
motive, and it is an interesting comment on the relative importance of factions and
policy in the eighteenth century. Foreign policy was an area where the princely
houses had a personal view, having links with foreign houses and consequently
their own international priorities. This was particularly offensive to the crown
because it violated the time-honoured principle that subjects should not make
alliances or have direct dealings with foreign powers. Thus, for the House of
Orléans foreign policy was to serve factional interests, although this need not
necessarily imply that their policy was automatically against French interests. More
precisely, the House of Orléans wished to provide for itself the best chance of
succeeding to the throne of France in the event of the death of Louis XV. This
seemed not unlikely in 1726, given that Louis had as yet no heirs, was prone to fall
ill with a certain regularity, was addicted to the dangerous sport of hunting and, still
more worrying, had not yet caught that great scourge of the early modern period,
smallpox. These circumstances were to remain unchanged until Louis contracted
and rapidly recovered from the disease in November 1728, and a dauphin was
finally born in 1729. Even then the succession could not be regarded as completely
assured. So for these years the principal obstacle to the Orleanist succession seemed
to be the person of Philippe V of Spain who, according to the fundamental law of
France, it will be remembered, would inherit the throne before the d’Orléans. Some
jurists would have claimed that the fundamental law of succession superseded all
civil acts affecting the succession to the throne.
If Philippe had doubts himself, he was nevertheless interested enough to try to
prepare a group of supporters in France in 1727 and 1728, and a great number of
the French aristocracy considered this fundamental law to be above any
renunciation. This situation dictated a foreign policy for the Orleanists. If a war
were to be fought with Spain, then Philippe would become so unpopular that their
chances would be much improved. Therefore the cabal was anti-Spanish in the
1720s and formed much of the war party in France. In June 1727 Silly noted that ‘Le
Blanc, Maréchal de Berwick, the whole military party favoured by them earnestly
wished that France might attack the Vienna alliance’.
23
It was hardly surprising that
the war minister should have a large following because his ministry was ‘the one on
whom the whole French nobility depends in some way’.
24
Fleury obviously had a good deal to fear from this group. Le Blanc and Desforts
openly divided people into two classes: if they were not friends they were enemies.
(This was a mistake from which Fleury was to profit later.) To emancipate himself
from the support of such dangerous allies, Fleury had to make concessions and
popularise his government at court and in the country at large, in order to give
himself time to establish his own firm control over the court. At the same time he
had to provide for the execution of policies which would secure the interests of the
French state. Such a mixture of considerations reflects the true nature of French
politics in this period.
It is therefore in the context of the aims and position of Fleury, as well as different
ideas on the economic situation, that the financial policy of these years is to be
explained. The financial measures represented an attempt to placate the cabal,
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FLEURY
117
avoid the mounting opposition of the church and provide for the finance which
would be urgently needed if a war were to be fought. It is clear from the reports of
Richelieu to both Noailles and the ministry that the degree of Austrian belligerence
was directly related to the state of French preparedness for war. If France could give
the impression of having solved her financial problems, the chances of avoiding war
would be immeasurably increased.
Almost the first step taken by the ministry of Fleury was to suspend the
collection of the cinquantième, whose unpopularity has already been noted. The
imposition of this tax had been justified in constitutional terms by the fact that it was
a time of great necessity and government indebtedness and that it was to be only a
temporary levy with a fixed expiry date. Consequently, there had been no
resistance in principle from the parlements. Difficulties of collection were evident
and, to judge from the reports of the intendants (it remains to be seen whether some
of these might not have been inspired by the factional opponents of the Bourbon
ministry), these were due as much to the economic state of France as to the nature
of the tax itself. Unwillingness to pay during an economic recession, it seems, led to
widespread non-co-operation by the proprietors who would have gladly seized on
any opportunity to avoid declaring their wealth.
25
But it was the Assembly of Clergy which did most to undermine the tax in its
principle of taxing all orders regardless of traditional immunities. This tax was a
much more vigorous attempt to pursue the principle than the taxes of 1695 and
1710, when the government had been only too pleased to effect a compromise. As it
was still to be in 1787, the real fear of the church in France was of the cadastre, the
register of landed wealth which was necessary if the tax was to be equitably levied.
Even before the fall of Bourbon, Pâris Duvernay in his private memoir to the Duke
pointed out that their resistance, and the state of doctrinal divisions, were valid
reasons for abandoning this course.
26
With Rome adding its weight to the protests,
the continuation of the tax promised to be risky. Perhaps a certain measure of
success could have been expected from the pressure of a determined ministry, even
if it took a few years. In fact, Fleury was obliged to suppress the cinquantième on
church wealth as much because of his political position as because it was proving
difficult to collect. With a serious threat of foreign war, the risk of disorder and non-
co-operation could not be taken, and as a cardinal he would have been expected to
protect the First Estate from the depredations of the state. It was wise to fulfil these
expectations if he were to avoid conflict with Rome and retain the support of the
French clergy for his policy on Jansenism. For Fleury was continuing the policy of
persecuting the recalcitrant Jansenists and trying to unite the bishops behind him in
order to moderate the violence of the extreme constitutionnaires; to do this he had
himself elected president of the Asssembly of Clergy which met in September 1726.
Consequently, the preamble to the declaration on the clergy at Fontainebleau on 8
October 1726 confirmed entirely and for future ministries the immunity of church
wealth from any tax on property.
For the rest of the population, the cinquantième was modified in 1726 and
abandoned in 1727. This was a popular measure undertaken in full awareness that