Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745
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I had reason to believe that M.de Chauvelin was not well regarded in Spain,
but M.de la Mina declared so strongly for him here and became so involved,
that I had suspected that he would not have dared to declare himself so
openly if he had not been certain of not displeasing his own court. He had
become closely linked with the Condé, M.de Carignan, the Matignon, and
down to the subalterns who were attached to M.Chauvelin. He was no less so
with the abbé Franchine, who is blindly dependent upon M.de Carignan.
48
Supporters of Chauvelin among the princely families were therefore the Condé,
the Carignan, the prince de Chalais and the Matignon. His candidature was
favoured by several ducal houses: the ducs de Villeroy, d’Aumont, Biron, Crequi,
Balleroi, the marquis de La Fare and the marquis de Beringhen.
49
Finally, he had
a vital ally, the King’s first valet, Bachelier. The latter was described by d’Aube as
having ‘the principal and perhaps the sole confidence of the King for those few
things that H.M. takes to heart and does without consulting the Cardinal, and
often without him’.
50
He had been an ‘intimate friend’ of Chauvelin before his fall
and, in spite of his links with Chauvelin’s enemies later, he seemed to lose no
opportunity to strengthen the position of Chauvelin in the eyes of the King.
Fleury had attempted to send him away from the King, but soon came to realise
that this was impossible and that sooner or later Louis was bound to require
someone to conduct his more delicate affairs. Nevertheless, while Fleury lived the
faction had little hope of success, and with Chauvelin at Bourges he was out of
sight and in 1741, almost out of mind.
51
We have noted the power of the Noailles clan under Louis XIV, when it
contributed to Fleury’s own ascension, and during the Regency. Adrien-Maurice,
due de Noailles was born in 1678 and, of twenty children borne by his mother,
was the only son to reach maturity.
52
He married mademoiselle d’Aubigné, the
sole heiress of Mme de Maintenon. Two daughters were the product of this
union, one of whom married prince Charles de Lorraine and the other the duc de
Villars, and both became favourites of Queen Marie Lezcinska. His two sons, the
duc d’Ayen and the comte de Noailles were both intimates of Louis XV. The duc
himself had inherited the wealth and power of the clan, with its prestigious and
influential offices, being governor of Roussillon, governor of the royal houses of
Versailles and Marly, and captain of the garde du corps. His career during the
Regency saw him acquire ministerial experience as president of the council of
finance. As we have seen, he was opposed to the advancement of Dubois, was
exiled from 1722 to 1723, but returned to favour under Fleury. He was made a
maréchal de France in 1734 and given command of the Army of Italy the
following year.
The marriages of his sisters reveal a family strategy to preserve wealth and
influence. One of his nine sisters, Marie-Christine, was married to the duc de
Guiche, who later became the maréchal de Gramont; another, Lucie-Félicité, wed
the duc d’Estrées, who by 1740 was a maréchal de France; a third, MarieThérèse,
married the duc de La Vallière; the last really important marriage alliance was the
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169
most brilliant: in 1723, in her second marriage, Marie-Victoire-Sophie wed the
comte de Toulouse, prince légitimé. From 1737 to 1742, the comtesse de Toulouse’s
circle included Mme de Mailly, the King’s mistress. Of the other sisters, four
married well, and one became a nun. The whole clan was directed by the dowager
duchess. Although no less astute, she was quite a contrast to the dowager duchesse
de Bourbon-Condé, being well liked, witty and good natured. She managed to
control this vast clan, encouraging them to act in concert when the family fortunes
required it. ‘The Noailles were like a troup of country players, who only come
together to play their rôles.’
53
The faction of the comte de Belle-Isle too had a long history, some of which
has already been considered. The comte’s family connection with Mme de
Lévis and the Castries had proved useful in a number of occasions, and he
managed to acquire the patronage of the maréchal de Boufflers and the cardinal
de Rohan during the War of the Spanish Succession, in which he distinguished
himself. His close association with the cabal made Fleury suspicious after 1726
of this tendency to intrigue, but the Cardinal was prevailed upon by Mme de
Lévis to promote him to lieutenant-general in 1731, and the comte was
accorded the governorship of Metz two years later. During these years he
maintained and expanded his network of friends and clients.
54
Chavigny in
particular remained in close contact with him and Silly told Richelieu in 1726
that in the time of Dubois he was ‘closely linked with Belle-Isle, and
consequently with the whole cabal’ and that since the disgrace of the leaders (in
1723) ‘Chavigny has always kept in close contact with the duchess de Lévy and
this has remained more than ever [the case]’.
55
The comte’s marriage in 1729 to Marie Casimire de Béthune meant that he
was henceforth related to two of the most important houses in Germany, and was
a cousin of the elector of Bavaria. Together with the experience acquired through
his governorship, these extensive connections gave him knowledge of Germany
which he was to put to good use in the early 1740s. He was an indefatigable
worker who fully appreciated the value of information and used six secretaries to
keep up a vast correspondence in France and abroad. He was said to be
charming, ‘honnête homme’, but also extremely calculating, never taking a step,
nor making a visit, nor even attending a pleasure party, except by ‘reflection, for
the advancement of his aims and fortune, and, in so doing, ceaselessly applies
himself to his own instruction without having the slightest appearance of doing
so’.
56
At his country house at Bizy in Normandy he met his clients and political
friends: Fagon, a talented intendant des finances who had refused the office of
controller-general, La Fare, and Hérault de Séchelles, whom Chauvelin feared
they wanted to have replace d’Angervilliers.
57
Both his wife and his younger
brother, the chevalier de Belle-Isle, were an indispensable help to the comte. The
chevalier, who was perhaps more intelligent and discerning, realised his own
ambitions through the success of the head of the family. Both brothers further
added to their gloire during the War of the Polish Succession, such that in 1735
Fleury began to regard him more favourably.
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Thus the Belle-Isle faction had been built up over a long period and retained its
original members from the 1720s until the 1740s. Unlike the clans of the Condé and
the Noailles, this group was based first and foremost upon the talent of its leader,
who was able to emerge from the Orleanist cabal in the 1720s and gradually
enhance his position by constructing rather than inheriting a network. Its leader was
extremely intelligent and ambitious and he had equally intelligent associates. One
of these was the duc de Richelieu (another who owed his position of influence to
both family and his own achievements), whose correspondence with Belle-Isle has
in part survived.
58
Such a connection between leaders of factions, like the links
between Noailles and Richelieu, or Tencin and Richelieu, indicates a certain fluidity
in the groups, which makes it unwise to represent too neat a division between them.
Perhaps the lines only became sharply drawn when competition arose over a
particular policy or post. Conflict over policy was fairly rare among groups, none of
which was in a position to make the final decision, since policy represented a vehicle
for their advancement rather than an end in itself. In that situation the interests of
France could be, and frequently were, sacrificed to the exigencies of family or
factional ambitions.
The composition of the Noailles and Belle-Isle factions prompts a reflection on
the nature of faction itself. Family connections were all-important in their
composition. Although individual animosities might cut across family ties, it was
generally true that among the factions of the higher aristocracy it was the network
of the extended family, and not the individual alone, which formed the basis of their
power. The Noailles are the finest, perhaps the purest, example of this. At this date
they formed a vast political clan over three generations with marriage alliances into
many of the most important families of the peerage, including the legitimised
bastards of Louis XIV.
The rise of Belle-Isle at court from December 1740 is well documented.
59
With
the advantage of his marriage and a profound knowledge of German affairs
developed over the years by his vast correspondence, he was able to secure his
appointment by Fleury as ambassador to the Imperial Diet.
60
Yet he had
concealed the fact that his policy was more belligerent than that of Fleury.
Although the Cardinal waited on events for several months before sending his
specific instructions, it soon became clear that Belle-Isle wanted war in support of
Bavaria against Austria. The height of his influence was in the summer of 1741
when he returned from Frankfurt to Versailles in order to urge the ministry to
adopt his plans wholeheartedly. In his memoirs of the affair he left a description of
the way in which decisions were taken. On 10 July he spent two-and-a-half hours
alone with Fleury, discussing the situation, then, on 11 July, a committee of
ministers was held without Fleury:
We assembled at five o’clock at M.Amelot’s, namely: Messieurs de
Maurepas, Orry and Breteuil, who make up the whole of the King’s council
with His Eminence, who had asked us to debate all matters, to draw up a
single plan and opinion, so as to spare him the importunity and length of the
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details, given his weak head, and to give an account to him when the matter
had been thoroughly debated and the general plan agreed.
61
The plans of Belle-Isle were adopted in toto by the other ministers who, according to
Saint-Simon, dared not challenge his power. However, it must not be assumed that
Fleury had entirely abdicated his role as premier ministre. On 19 July he read and
annotated a long memoir by Belle-Isle on his plans, but once they were approved
Fleury played surprisingly little part in the organisation of the military campaign.
‘Belle-Isle decides everything, nominates everyone, rules on the details and political
and military mechanics, the ministers do no more than expedite things on his
command’.
62
He had been allowed to choose his own officers for the campaign, which
explains why he was accompanied around Versailles by a lengthy suite of officers
hoping for patronage. Even more unusually, he had played a part in selecting the
envoys to the German courts. Importantly for his campaign, he had chosen Hérault
de Séchelles as his intendant of the army, and through Chavigny had effected a
reconciliation with those expert military suppliers the Pâris brothers.
63
At first the campaign went well, and in January 1742 after the election of Charles
Albert of Bavaria as Emperor, Fleury would have liked to make peace. Just then the
Austrians won their first military success and the tide began to turn. Military
campaigns were themselves linked closely to the fortunes and tactics of factions.
Success brought credit, consideration and support, while failure or even committing
an error that could be exploited by its publication or misrepresentation back at court
could undermine future chances. The consequence at the court of the successful
prosecution of the war was the increased influence of those factions whose policy
was fundamentally anti-Austrian.
64
The King was wearying of Fleury and the
Chauvelin faction was seen to be making great advances.
65
After the capture of
Prague it was thought at court that Belle-Isle ‘would quite naturally become master
of the Government’.
66
The courtiers began to abandon Fleury and his power began
to evaporate:
Probably everyone had reason to believe that at the least the Cardinal’s
influence over the King’s mind has been greatly reduced, and that the
maréchal de Belle-Isle has gained in their respect all that the cardinal had lost;
while among the King’s subjects some began to detach themselves from him,
others were able to stop fearing him, or to begin to fear him less; some
foreigners came to lose or at least to lessen their previous confidence in him,
while others hoped to profit at the same time from the unhappy situation of
the affairs of the Kingdom and from the divisions that reigned at court.
67
But if France seemed to be in a satisfactory position, Belle-Isle’s star had passed its
peak. His very success provoked the secretaries of state to hostility, and the
disastrous appointment, to command the army of Bohemia, of the old maréchal de
Broglie, an unpopular commander who had never approved of the plan of
campaign. When the Austrian advance led to their capture of Linz, open criticisms
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172
of Belle-Isle were made.
68
It took a visit from Belle-Isle to court in March 1742 to
restore his position, and although France’s allies trusted him, Fleury was against the
war and now disliked him. Belle-Isle returned to Germany, was unable to agree
with Broglie, tried to keep Frederick II in the alliance, but the defection of Frederick
on 11 June was made public in the Preliminaries of Breslau. This left the army
isolated in Prague. At court a battle raged between the partisans of Belle-Isle and
those of Broglie, with the ministers on Broglie’s side.
Fleury began to find difficulty in having his decisions prevail in the conseil d’état.
69
He wanted peace at any price. The lowest point of his influence came when Maria
Theresa published a letter he had foolishly sent to her foreign minister on 11 July
1742, throwing the blame for the war on Belle-Isle. It was an attempted finesse by
the Cardinal that went badly wrong. The weakness of Fleury and the divisions in
the French government then became public knowledge in Europe.
70
All the more surprising, therefore, was the appointment of two new ministers
who were regarded as protégés of Fleury, on 26 August 1742. The appointments
represented the re-establishment of the Cardinal’s power in the council and a
decisive blow against the rival factions.
71
No one would now believe that the King
had the slightest intention of entrusting principal authority to either Belle-Isle or
Chauvelin, for the two ministers were avowed enemies of both of them. At a time
when France needed a firm direction to policy, Louis XV failed to step in, and
Fleury seems to have looked to Tencin as a man of talent who would carry on his
own vacillating policy.
The two new ministers, the comte d’Argenson and the cardinal de Tencin, were
without portfolio.
72
Tencin was the more important. Fleury had written to offer the
post on 24 July, but Tencin had refused on the grounds of incapacity and the fact
that it would distance him from his diocese of Lyon. His recent biographer, Sareil,
thought that this refusal was from genuine timidity although he later admits that it
was the strategy of Tencin after September 1742 to be Fleury’s creature, dissembling
all ambition under an air of modesty.
73
In fact, in August 1742, Fleury had finally
found a man who could equal him in ruse and subtlety. In the light of Fleury’s own
career, it is ironic that the refusal by Tencin of a place in the council should have
provoked the following reply.
I have already had the honour of telling Your Excellence that I could only
praise and admire the motives that had prevented him from surrendering to
the first overtures that I made to him, and I am not unhappy about his
discretion, which is known to no one in the world without exception. But I do
not believe that Your Excellency should push modesty to the point of refusing
a place in the King’s council as a minister, which engages him to do nothing
more than give his opinion. You will soon be up to date on current issues, and
I admit that I would be very relieved to become both your colleague and to
find in you useful and disinterested counsels in the present circumstances.
This new place would distance you even less from your diocese and nothing
will prevent you from time to time to make brief visits. I will gain much for
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173
my part, and Your Excellency will lose nothing for his part. I await a
consoling reply…
Mortemart is being grossly unfaithful to his court and his court is happy to
be deceived. Spain is no less unfaithful to us and is offering London a carte
blanche for a settlement. In a word, there is a general defection to destroy us.
The means of combating this are lacking, not the courage. I usually end
conversations with M.the Nuncio by saying to him that God is the master and
that we should put our trust in him alone.
74
In spite of this ‘coup d’autorité’ by Fleury to reaffirm his power in the summer of
1742, it is from then that the origins of a new period of government must be dated.
The correspondence of Tencin and his sister Mme de Tencin with the due de
Richelieu makes this plain.
75
Although Belle-Isle was shut up in Prague with a
beleaguered French army, and Fleury appeared to have re-established his power, the
cardinal de Fleury was quite incapable of directing French policy with vigour. His
health was poor and in the autumn he was unable to attend meetings of the conseil
d’état. Only a brilliant retreat from Prague by Belle-Isle in December saved the
French army, but Fleury’s dying grip on policy still pressed in the direction of an
unrealistic peace. The factional strife continued with a renewed sense of urgency,
the more so since the political situation was complicated by the emergence of a new
royal mistress with political aspirations, directed by Richelieu, and by the
determination of the four established secretaries of state to preserve and increase
their independence.
From September until the death of Fleury the two new ministers were
ostracised at court by their rivals and alienated from their ministerial colleagues.
76
If Amelot and Breteuil remained subservient to Fleury, Orry and Maurepas
gained in independence. The contrôleur général developed a particular and
unexpected ascendancy in the ministry and he had ‘a special travail with the King,
and that on matters that the King well understands’.
77
In November Mme de
Tencin described the state of affairs to Richelieu: ‘Things are still the same
between the new ministers and the older ones, if they are not worse. The elders
have their little special committees, and say what they want only at the one held at
the cardinal’s’.
78
Fleury was not in a position to name a successor in the final months of his life.
Louis had already expressed the desire to become his own first minister after Fleury,
so all that could be done was to recommend to him those whose judgement might
be relied upon. Towards the end of November Fleury had a long interview with the
King during which he probably discussed such counsellors.
79
He then announced
his intention of retiring to Issy for the month of December, from where he
nevertheless made two trips to Versailles and where he continued to receive the
ministers. His strength was weakening steadily and in early January he went into an
irreversible decline.
His death on 29 January put an end to a period of ministerial control which was
not to be equalled during the rest of the regime. Unsurprisingly, the courtiers,
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174
weary of the restrictions on their power and influence, and the reformers were
anxious to see the advent of a new order:
Everyone agreed that it was a precious moment that should not have been
lost, to give the French Government a new face, and a very different one from
the one seen for too long. Those capable of reflection, well informed and
sensible, also agree, and unanimously, that France resembled a fine building,
soundly constructed, but whose foundations undermined from afar give
reason to fear the ruin of the whole edifice.
80
FACTION ASCEN DANT
The announcement by Louis XV that he intended to be his own premier ministre
opened the way for the consolidation of a new system of government in France:
ministerial anarchy. This situation developed from the factional struggles which
already beset the court in 1742, and it has been described by Cruickshanks as the
victory of the secretaries of state.
81
The factional struggles which led to this have
been described elsewhere, but here the concern is with the effect of the change upon
politics. It is therefore important to be precise about the significance of the change.
In the immediate circumstances of 1743 and 1744 it signifies the victory of the
secretaries of state not in their role as administrators, but in their role as members of
a faction. Their method was to exploit their privileges as ministers in order to
deprive rivals of information and the ability to take part in the process of making
decisions in the royal council. They were able to use their spies to spread rumours
in cafés and public places in order to discredit their rivals.
82
When Belle-Isle
returned to court, his health broken from the hardships of war, he found the
ministers against him, his friends passed over for commands in the new campaign
and himself the scapegoat for the failure of French policy.
83
It seems that factional
manœuvres overflowed into the conduct of the war, both in the sense that factional
interests came perilously close to taking precedence over sound policy, and in the
way reports, news and rumours were manipulated in order to discredit rivals.
84
The reflections of Tencin, who was regarded by Luynes as the only minister to
put the interests of France before those of his faction, constitute an invaluable
insight into the unfortunate manner of conducting business in 1743 and 1744.
85
In
August 1743, after six months of what can only very loosely be called ‘royal control’
he wrote to Richelieu:
You may count upon it, my dear duke, that the government will subsist as it is,
there is no good to be done. Whoever works with the King has the last
word…As long as the council remains as it is, it is impossible that it will ever
work well. The Secretaries of State only bring what they want to it. There is
never any notice of what is to be discussed. Who, in these circumstances, could
and would dare take upon himself to give an opinion? Besides, I have no doubt
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175
that the ministers are hiding from me some aspects of the business under
discussion, and that consequently I should run the risk of speaking
inappropriately…The way things are, I declare to you that I would refuse [the
ministry for] foreign affairs. What is more, I’ll admit to you that I am beginning
to agree with the maréchal de Belle-Isle that it is impossible to do any good,
without a clean sweep. I see no minister who is not far beneath his place.
86
The power of the ministers lasted throughout 1743 and 1744. Their rivals for the
succession to Fleury were unsuccessful. Richelieu’s hopes were based on his role as
counsellor to the King’s mistresses from the Nesle family. According to
Cruickshanks, between the winter of 1742 and the spring of 1744, the ambitious
mistress and Richelieu had ‘secured for themselves and their friends some of the
most prized and lucrative court offices’, as well as influence over financial offices
and arrangements, paricularly through the Pâris brothers.
87
But the due saw his
immediate influence decline when Louis XV fell ill at Metz, with the result that the
dévôt party was able to bring about the withdrawal of the duchesse de Châteauroux.
She died in December 1744, just after arranging a return to court. The maréchal
duc de Noailles too found his power eclipsed during the summer of 1744, just when
he seemed most likely to succeed in controlling foreign affairs. Made a minister of
state on 10 March 1743, he had become a trusted counsellor of the King.
88
On 12
May 1744, Tencin wrote that Noailles was aiming at the secretaryship of state for
foreign affairs and that he also wanted to direct the finances so as to become premier
ministre. ‘The King knows Mr de Noailles as we do, and yet he is all-powerful, as
we all are vis-à-vis the King when we work with him: you could get him to sign his
own death warrant.’
89
During the illness of Louis at Metz, Noailles failed to give
battle to the enemy army, which caused a rift with France’s Prussian ally and
revealed him a better maker of memoirs than man of action. His credit with Louis
went into swift decline, and in November the marquis d’Argenson was given
control of foreign affairs. Thus by late 1744 the secretaries of state had emerged
victorious in their struggle to retain power.
Louis XV was too weak-willed to impose himself upon his ministers, with the result
that policy lacked direction and manoeuvring for influence encouraged inactivity or
even the sabotage of policies. In the long term, it was not so much a question of a victory
of the secretaries of state as a triumph of the spirit of faction itself. Henceforth, policy in
France was not to be made by the secretaries per se, but by the secretaries as candidates of
aristocratic factions who had the ministers in their power. The marquis d’Argenson was
an acute observer of the ministerial situation, having held office briefly himself. He
characterised their situation in just such a way, and is confirmed in his views by Richer
d’Aube.
90
In the absence of a firmer system of government,
The ministers will be drawn into doing badly by all sorts of interests that will
be keenly upheld by courtiers and others with influence; these, never content
with what has been done out of deference to them, are always ready to make
use of bad means, into which the ministers let themselves be dragged, to bring
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176
them down if they can, whenever the said ministers fail to defer to new and
unreasonable demands.
91
The most damaging feature of this ‘ministerial anarchy’ was its failure as a system to
control financial expenditure. Fleury had not permitted his ministers to spend
without his supervision. Now it became possible for each minister to have the King
authorise expenditure without its being subjected to any overall control, even by the
controller-general, who was only one minister among several. This was exactly the
situation that Necker unsuccessfully tried to challenge in 1781, and his failure led to
the continuation of Castries’ vast overspending on the navy. For a brief period
during the Seven Years’ War, Cardinal Bernis instituted a plan whereby the council
of state acted as a collective first minister.
92
In fact, this was to be a comité des finances
such as Joly de Fleury and Vergennes attempted, with equal lack of success, in
1783.
93
Bernis was accused of trying to become a first minister, and was dismissed.
From 1743 until the collapse of the regime in 1789, there were to be only brief
periods of concerted direction in the government of France. Paradoxically enough,
one of the longest of those periods was from 1775 to 1781, during the ascendancy of
Maurepas, former secretary of state during the ministry of the cardinal de Fleury
and one of the victors in 1743. In comparison with this lamentable state of affairs in
the French government, the long years of control by the cardinal de Fleury were a
remarkable achievement. ‘The cardinal de Fleury had perpetually seemed to
deprive the ministers who were under him of the respect due their offices, and he
had succeeded only too well.’
94
177
8
CONCLUSION TO PART 1
The political culture of court society
Role of the King; role of a first minister; definition of the court; socio-political importance of the court;
patronage and clientage; attitude of a minister; interweaving of ministerial rivalries and politics;
attitude of a courtier; strategies of ambition; importance of ministerial unity; outside influences on
politics.
The nearly seventeen years of the ascendancy of Fleury were years of stability. This
was largely attributable to his policies, and was not due to weakness as critics have
said. Faction was kept under control until the very end of his life, in spite of the
machinations of the Orléans and the Condé families, the Noailles, the Tencin, Belle-
Isle and Richelieu. The almost unwavering support for Fleury from Louis XV was
crucial in enabling the Cardinal to preserve a balance between the factions and
among the ministers. This support also ensured that instead of there being a
struggle to replace the aged prelate, in which there seemed little prospect of success,
there was a struggle to succeed him when he died. The contrast between this period
and the one immediately following it is deeply revealing of the strengths and
weaknesses of the political culture of the court society. On the basis of the previous
discussion, we can now consider in more general terms the characteristics of politics
in a court society.
During the old regime the noble art of politics was far from synonymous with
bureaucracy and administration. Sometimes politics and administration were
interwoven, sometimes they ran in parallel. Within the culture of the socio-political
regime, although the boundaries of politics may have been ill-defined, it can be
regarded as a sphere of activity that was more or less separate from bureaucratic
processes. Politics was the preserve of a restricted elite in France, encompassing no
more than the upper echelons of provincial society and those with real power at
court and in the Paris parlement.
The political culture of this world of court and bureaucracy is extremely hard to
define or pin down. It is important to practice a broad definition of politics and
dangerous to conceive of political culture as either singular or anachronistically
‘political’. We must beware of transferring back our own definition from an age
when politics is of relatively open access, usually a legitimate career, and often
democratic. The reality of life at court, the politics of achieving goals, may be