Campbell P. Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745

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He has thought of finding supporters…These have been the house of Condé

which he hoped to use to counterbalance that of M.the comte de Toulouse

and the Noailles; of trying to make himself agreeable to the King in person; of

bringing about an intrigue of valets and courtiers who dine with the King at

La Muette and in private [aux cabinets]; and of joining in the s[cheme] of little

Mailly, whom he provided with allowances out of secret funds.

Apart from establishing these links at court, Chauvelin put into practice a technique

used by Fleury himself in 1725 and 1726. As Secretary of State he was responsible

for writing the instructions to the French ambassadors abroad before or after their

discussion in the conseil d’état. At least four of these ambassadors were his allies,

perhaps because they favoured a more belligerent foreign policy than the one

practised by Fleury. They included Fénelon in the Dutch Republic, Chavigny in the

Empire, Senneterre in Piedmont-Savoy and Froulay at Venice.

In 1737 he was

proved to have won over the Spanish ambassador to France to the extent that La

Mina quite exceeded his instructions and intimated that the dismissal of the

minister would not be favourably regarded in Spain. Pecquet fils, a premier commis

of foreign affairs, a man won over to his superior’s views on French policy and

regarded as a very strong supporter, is known to have had a secret correspondence

with Rottembourg, the French ambassador to Spain, with a view to having

Chauvelin succeed Fleury in the early 1730s.

Chauvelin himself was said to have

had a private correspondence with Chavigny, Rottembourg and Vaulgrenant, the

new ambassador to Spain. That this system dated from before August 1735 is

proved by a letter from the British ambassador to his government.

In the course of my conversation my friend [Bussy, an informer in the

department] told me there had been of late a considerable coldness between

the cardinal and his adjunct; his eminency having of late discovered several of

the other’s practices to make himself master of all the foreign ministers, and

consequently of the negotiations, by the secret correspondence he has with

the ministers.

Thus Chauvelin was making diplomatic preparations for his eventual succession to

Fleury. The discovery by the Cardinal of these intrigues inevitably affected the

position of the minister in the government.

Fleury’s confidence in him began to diminish in late 1734 or in 1735 at the latest,

although this was not public knowledge until 1736. At the end of May 1736, the

Parisian gossips could still believe that Chauvelin would be the only possible

successor to the Cardinal if he were to die soon, and that the latter even trusted his

minister with the most delicate and secret affairs.

No sooner was Chauvelin’s loss

of credit with Fleury noticed than his enemies united to provoke his fall. Of this

often repeated court practice, Richer d’Aube wrote: ‘These people were even joined

by others, who had the greatest obligations to M.Chauvelin; having been attacked

at first in July 1736, things were on his account at the point that on the last day of the

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year it was not doubted that news of his fall must burst upon us at any moment’.

The standard reasons for his fall, put forward by contemporaries and historians

alike, were all invented by the court factions and spread about in Paris. Richer

d’Aube continued:

M.Chauvelin’s enemies have spread amongst the public vague accusations

against him, that he had wanted to secretly upset the system of politics that

M.de Fleury had had the King adopt, and that he had given diverse proofs

of a vile and sordid self interest which had motivated him, they said, and

which had with justice caused his fall. But none of this has been brought to

light, despite some fairly scandalous tentatives that have been made to

acquire proofs.

Chauvelin was accused of corruption over the bargain price of his estate at Grosbois

bought from Samuel Bernard whose son was deeply indebted (and whose case

came before a royal commission headed by Chauvelin). He was said to have made

profits from the sale of crown jewels and undue profits from army supplies during

the war. ‘Since Chauvelin’s enemies could not deny his great ability and devotion to

his work, they fell back on vague accusations of corruption against him in order to

blacken his character and further alienate the parsimonious Fleury from him.’

was even accused of that old stratagem of stirring up the parlement so that he could

prove himself indispensable by solving the problem.

That there was a concerted

campaign of calumny against the minister by his enemies is confirmed by the

reports of the Bavarian ambassador, who proved to be one of the most astute

observers of the court—and the best informed because of French obligations to his

ruler.

He reasoned that since a word from the Cardinal could have put a stop to

the campaign, he must have desired it to continue.

Fleury gave not the slightest

indication of any change in attitude to Chauvelin in the months preceding his

disgrace, a phenomenon much remarked upon afterwards. There is no need to

point out that had he decided in 1736 to dismiss him but to wait on events first, it

would have been sheer folly to make his intentions known; so, proof of their good

relations at this stage cannot be used to imply anything about the intentions of the

Cardinal.

Not only would Chauvelin have had time to prepare a counter-attack,

but also foreign confidence in the strength of the French ministry at a critical

moment in the peace negotiations would have evaporated. On 15 February 1737,

five days before the event, the Bavarian ambassador wrote:

The affair of the Keeper of the Seals is a real phenomenon, for if the discourse

of the public were not occurring, and if one relied solely upon one’s eyes, and

the manner in which the cardinal is seen to treat him, which is precisely the

same as it has always been, it would be impossible to suspect anything,

because one could hardly perceive any difference. However, given everything

they are saying, and the certainty with which certain people speak

affirmatively about the imminent fall of this minister, one hardly knows what

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to think, although the replies that the cardinal has made not only to certain

people to reassure them, but also the obliging things that he has said to the

Keeper of the Seals in person to calm them, ought to be certain guarantees of

his favourable way of thinking about him.

Such reports, together with those collected by the police mouches of Paris in the cafés

and squares, in the palais de justice and on the promenades, illustrate one of the

ways in which political battles were fought in this period. As will be shown later, the

fall of Chauvelin was turned to good effect by the First President of the parlement,

who frightened those counsellors associated with the minister into moderating their

opposition to his refusal to allow them to deliberate the Douai affair. Maurepas,

who was said to be in league with the First President against Chauvelin, may have

been involved in this.

The dismissal of Chauvelin on 20 February was in its actual organisation very

similar to the dismissal of the duc de Bourbon. ‘Everyone knows that Mr Chauvelin

has been arrested and conducted to his château of Grosbois by M.de Jubillac, an

officer in the musketeeers, accompanied by Mr le Marquis de Bissy’.

Nor was

Fleury’s strategy very dissimilar from the one which he had practised in 1726. Even

when the public outcry had already gathered momentum Fleury had lulled

Bourbon into a false sense of security. Only at the height of the clamour did he

carry through his coup. There had been no warning for Bourbon and there was to

be none for Chauvelin. For six months the Cardinal allowed rumours to spread,

knowing all the while that the final decision was his own. Then, when he finally did

act, he had reduced the number of supporters of Chauvelin to a minimum, since

most courtiers abandoned him, and appeared only to be sacrificing his minister to

the general clamour.

The circumstances surrounding the fall of Chauvelin are tolerably well

documented, and the story is an instructive one on the nature of court practices.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the precise causes of the disgrace will ever be

known. We know for certain that Fleury knew of Chauvelin’s intrigues with

foreign ministers; that he also knew of his formation of a party at court to support

him; that there was a campaign of rumours launched against the minister by

opponents, once it was known that he did not retain Fleury’s entire confidence;

and that there was a difference of views on foreign policy. What is not known is

for which of these reasons, or for what combination of all of them, the cardinal de

Fleury took his final decision to exile his aide. It is to be presumed, since it can be

shown that the affair in the parlement was not essential to his fall, that Fleury had

already made up his mind not to allow Chauvelin to become his successor. Did

Fleury intend to make new arrangements for a successor and then retain

Chauvelin as secrétaire d’état, which seems unlikely? Or did he intend to make

these arrangements and then dismiss him, perhaps after arranging for d’Orléans

to play a more important role, or was he influenced by the accusations that

Chauvelin was trying to disrupt his foreign policy and add fuel to the flames of

the Jansenist controversy?

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It is often remarked that the answers to these and other questions related to the

dismissal lie in the lost papers of the exiled minister. These would perhaps provide

further proof of the activities of Chauvelin, but we already have enough. The

answer to these questions can never be known unless the papers not of Chauvelin

but of Fleury come to light. Even then it is doubtful whether they would provide

any clues. The final decision was taken by Fleury alone, and he did not wish his

reasons to be known. He deliberately obscured the issue: he led Waldegrave, the

British ambassador, to believe that the British attitude to Chauvelin had played a

part in his decision.

In fact, he quite simply led each questioner to believe what he

liked regarding his motives. The Bavarian ambassador had a long conversation

with him which accurately conveys the flavour of his diplomatic language.

I was very sorry for the unhappy and disgraced minister. ‘And I’, replied the

Cardinal, ‘but I was forced to do it, and leaving aside what was particular to

me and the ingratitude he has had towards his benefactor, the interest of the

state obliged me to’; ‘but, Monseigneur,’ I continued, ‘for the rest he has failed

the King and would have betrayed him’: ‘I do not say that’, replied the

Cardinal, ‘but I was forced to do what I did’; ‘so he’s to be regarded as dead

and vilely so’, said I. ‘I hope for the love of God’, answered the Cardinal, ‘that

he sees himself as such…’. He never wanted to open up clearly enough for

me to arrive at a true judgement from his replies, and he confined himself to

putting me in the way of believing what I wished.

The fullest explanation comes from the same source, quoting ‘people worthy of

confidence’. It confirms these general motives but adds two more of significance.

Not only was Chauvelin haughty in his dealings with other ministers, wanting his

opinion to prevail at all times, but he had become incompatible with them. Fleury

regarded it as a matter of honour, duty and conscience not to leave the state in his

hands when he came to die.

The fall of Chauvelin saw the commencement of new problems for Fleury who now

needed a new aide and perhaps a successor. In fact, although his letters to Tencin in 1741

and 1742 give reason for the conjecture that Fleury hoped the Cardinal would inherit a

large measure of his power, it is not known for certain whether he ever seriously

contemplated the idea of a single successor. He must have decided not to allow

Chauvelin even the possibility of succeeding him by 1736 at the latest, otherwise he

would hardly have permitted the chorus of disapproval to rise to such a high pitch in the

last six months of the year. If he had contemplated arranging for d’Antin to take his place

the death of the Duke on 2 November 1736 must have left the field open again.

From the Condé and the princesse de Conti (who was Bourbon’s sister) there

was a wail of indignation at the dismissal of Chauvelin; both dowager duchesses

wrote strongly worded letters marking their discomfiture.

Louise Françoise de

Bourbon-Condé, the indomitable old duchesse, was ‘proud, despotic, violent,

vindictive, turbulent, jealous of her rank’, an excellent composer of vicious songs

and astute in the arts of trickery.

She announced her intention of sending Fleury

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her reflections on developments, in order as she said, to safeguard the interests of

the House of Condé against the légitimés and the Orleanists. By her reference, in one

letter, to the appointment of Amelot de Chaillou it is plain that, if she did not see the

dismissal as the work of the Orleanists, she certainly saw that appointment as a

triumph for their cabal. This, of course, was the same group which figured so

prominently in the politics of the 1720s, ‘One would have to have as blind a faith as

I have in you’, she wrote ironically, ‘to believe that Mr Amelot de Chaillou, having

been put in by Mr de Forts (as intendant des finances) and being his relation, is

really not [a member] of the cabal’.

There are several reports that Fleury did consider inviting Toulouse to assume a

much more important role in the government, perhaps with a view to his becoming

a successor to Fleury as unofficial premier ministre or special confidant of Louis

XV. When this situation is seen not in isolation but as a part of the longer factional

struggles dating from the 1720s, then a different perspective emerges.

Concerned to protect the interests of the House of Condé, the dowager duchesse

de Bourbon exerted as much pressure as she could over Fleury at this time. From a

number of interesting letters to Fleury during the spring and summer of 1737, one in

particular merits close attention. A neglected document, and one that provides a

real insight into the explicit way in which the concerns of clans were articulated, it is

important for the details of the situation in the immediate aftermath of the fall of

Chauvelin. It sheds light on the intentions of Fleury with regard to the Orleanists,

and these need explaining. As with all the letters in her own hand, the spelling and

punctuation are more than usually idiosyncratic.

Paris, 8 March 1737

Although I well remember, Sir, what you said to me many a time about Mr

the duc d’orleans and about the justice he did himself, I cannot help but be

alarmed by the rumours which are abroad not only amongst the public but

in his own household, for it is from within his own house that I know that

he is working to bring himself up to date on affairs, and that it is suggested

that you will have him attend your travail with the King in order to put him

in a fit state to fill your place after you. If these rumours have any

foundation, you’ll not be surprised at our disquiet and you will easily

understand that the spectre of the first prince of the blood will not make us

mistake Mr the count of Toulouse and the Noailles who are behind him.

You have too much justice to want to make these people our masters and

you love the King and the state too much to want them to be governed by

madame the duchesse de Villars, Madame Darmagnac and Madame de

gontaut, which would not fail to happen if you think as they say you do

about M.the duc d’orleans. The knowledge I have of your sentiments

reassures me, but I [need] say nothing, touched by the opinion that you

have been given about the devotion of Mme the cont. de toulouse and all

that lot, I believe it to be true but it seems to me that she restrains their

ambition not in the slightest, and I fear your goodness. That is why I

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wanted to speak to you early on about what is being said publicly, and

remind you of the repeated promises you gave my son and I to make no

arrangement without concerting with us; our lack of involvement in this

affair puts me in a position to speak more freely than I would if you were

not assured that my son wishes nothing. But in truth, when he thinks as he

should he is right to want to know which master you want to give him, and

to be in a position to have you admire the reasons he has to fear those who

absolutely want to be so; and he [d’Orléans] will perhaps succeed in spite of

yourself if you do not put things on a firm footing. You have asked me for

six months to think about it, but if in six months you communicate nothing

to us, and if at the end you reveal to us a finished arrangement the day

before it’s declared, you’ll admit that that wouldn’t be acting in concert with

us, and we could find ourselves with our throats cut without having

suspected a thing.

She is clearly quite determined to make her continued opposition more than clear to

the Cardinal. Her letter barely conceals the threat that the House of Condé would

feel it had just cause for opposition should the duc d’Orléans end up in a position of

real power over them. She continues:

To avoid this my project is to tell you or to write to you what I think on

everything I hear and as Mr the duc d’orleans is the Saint of the day it is right

that I remind you that he has always hated my son since his mother and he

decided after the death of the late mr the d d’orleans that he’d been done a

great injustice in not giving him at twenty years old a Kingdom to govern;

that he has always been for the legitimised [bastards of Louis XIV] against

the princes of the blood; that he is against them on every occasion, that what

he has done about Madame de Modena is absolutely part of this and lastly

that he is one of those we have most to fear. After having told you our

reasons, I’ll repeat that no subjects are more devoted and obedient to the King

than we are, that we would be more than happy if we could flatter ourselves

that he wanted to govern like the late King but without putting his trust in a

favourite minister [sans homme de confiance], who if he does want to take one, it

isn’t right that he should choose him so close to us [in rank], nor above or

below, because either way we’ll be crushed in the middle and you surely don’t

want us to be. You see that I am fair with you and I flatter myself that you’ll

be fair with me about my way of thinking. It is not entirely without interest

for you, for I see only horrors after you if you don’t put some order into it, for

the state as well as for us.

This plan must have been a new one developed in the two weeks after 20 February.

Proof that d’Orléans was not aware of these projects before the exile or immediately

afterwards lies in the letter he wrote to Fleury when he was informed of the news of

the fall: ‘I left Versailles knowing nothing of it’, he wrote. The tone of the letter is

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one almost of insouciance and therefore not that of a man who knows he is destined

to play a greater part in the government.

He had displayed a similar lack of vigour

in 1723 when he could have tried to succeed his father.

The plan itself was not unreasonable, given the circumstances of the royal

family. Louis XV showed no strong desire to govern and by taking a mistress

openly he had demonstrated that the chances of the Queen giving birth to a second

legitimate son were reduced. Should Louis himself die there would be another

Regency under d’Orléans; if both he and his son died there was again a good

chance that the House of Orléans would rule France; in either event the d’Orléans

seemed bound to play a part in the government. The marquis d’Argenson had

found the plan difficult to believe at first, but when he had sounded out his brother

who was the chancellor of the d’Orléans household, he detected the confirmation of

what he had heard through the vociferous denials.

For reasons which are unclear

the project was dropped during the spring of 1737. Probably the resistance of the

Condé was so great that a revival of the strife of the 1720s seemed likely. Having

taken power partly in order to preserve the inheritance of his pupil from the

consequences of just such a state of affairs, Fleury can hardly have wanted to

recreate the situation as his own political legacy.

Another plan was formed which was something of a compromise. This too is

recounted in a letter from the dowager duchesse. She wrote on 3 July that there was

now a faction of the Toulouse and Noailles who intended to persuade Fleury to give

Toulouse a place in the conseil d’état, arguing that in view of the comte’s poor health

it would do him good. Inspired by the comtesse de Toulouse (a Noailles), the faction

hoped to have him appointed premier ministre later, ‘and make him master of the

Kingdom and as a result of the princes of the blood, which means the Noailles in his

name’. Then the King would be persuaded to agree,

by making him see that a place in the council is necessary for the health and

even the life of Mr the comte de Toulouse who is eaten up with vapours, he’ll

be told that he can put no more honnête homme who is more attached to

him, nor one to whom he is more accustomed, that in return for this place he

will never leave him and will only go to Rambouillet [the Toulouse residence

Louis liked to visit] when he himself goes there. If they succeed in getting this

for him then there will be other ways of gaining the rest, and as the King is

thought to be timid, they’ll begin by ignoring him and by making him think that

Rambouillet, the only place he is thought to enjoy himself, will no longer be

so agreeable if he doesn’t accord Mr and Mme the comtesse de Toulouse

everything they want, which is nothing less than the government of the state.

That’s their plan and I need add no reflections.

A corollary of this plan was the removal of Chauvelin to more distant Bourges in early

June. ‘Mr Chauvelin’s enemies…soon came to fear that the Public might come to

sympathise with him as a victim of persecution, and that that might increase the

strength of the party he still had at court, against them. They have succeeded in

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having him sent from Grosbois [his own château] to Bourges …and wanting to have

the Public see M.Chauvelin as a man lost and without recourse, they are constantly

acting as if his return with the greatest favour of the King really seemed to them to be

both plausible and imminent’.

A report was published in the Amsterdam Gazette which

said that he had been exiled because of his secret correspondence with the due de

Bourbon, an implication which was hotly denied by the dowager duchess.

In the

autumn of 1737 steps were taken to make the comte de Toulouse a minister, but he

was already ill and died on 1 December after an operation. The question of successors

then fell into abeyance. After 1738 there seemed little hope that Fleury would himself

be able to find a suitable aide or successor. The best that he could do to pacify the

factions was to appoint Breteuil to be secretary of state for war when d’Angervilliers

died in early 1740. He was the same man who had served as minister during the

ascendancy of the duc de Bourbon, had been dispossessed of his post by the return of

Le Blanc in 1726, and was an adherent of the Condé faction. This appointment

represented a policy of balancing the two factions against one another.

Supporters of Chauvelin were still much in evidence in 1737 and 1738. The

House of Bourbon-Condé had by no means lost all political influence, as the British

ambassador recorded in 1740. Wrote Waldegrave, ‘the number of people of the

highest rank and distinction that continually resorted to him gave him a sort of

credit in the nation and a liberty to find fault, which by our enemies was made use

of to the cardinal, to engage him, under pretence of the “honour of France”, in

measures he would not otherwise have chosen’.

In late 1737 support for Chauvelin manifested itself in the conspiracy of the

‘marmidons’. This was a nebulous business that involved the young duc d’Antin,

La Trémoille, who was a first gentleman of the bedchamber, both intimates of Louis

XV, and Bachelier, his valet. The plot was too inept to pose a serious threat, but it

must have kept Fleury on his toes and encouraged him to dismantle the support for

the exiled minister. Fleury naturally refused patronage to those associated with the

minister, like the marquis d’Argenson and the Spanish ambassador.

The farmers

general of the postal service, were dispossessed of their farm in 1738 owing to

suspicions of their aiding Chauvelin with his secret correspondence.

Pecquet, a

premier commis of foreign affairs, shared Chauvelin’s anti-Austrian views on

policy, but in 1738 Amelot was too new to the job to conduct administrative affairs

without the help of the experienced Pecquet. In 1740 though, Pecquet presented an

anti-Austrian memoir on policy directly to Fleury, over the head of Amelot; he was

then arrested and dismissed for his connections.

The Cardinal was ill during much of 1738, probably as a result of having to cope

with the heavy burden of affairs. His serious physical decline may be dated from then;

although he seemed to make a remarkable recovery and remained well enough to

work, his mind was cloudy at times and he lacked energy. He was said to trust Orry

and Maurepas more and he perhaps gave them a freer rein in the making of policy in

their departments. He kept a grip on foreign policy, however. His foreign policy from

1737 to 1740 was directed at achieving the isolation of Britain while keeping a balance

in Europe, and he seemed about to launch a maritime war against her in 1740.

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FACTION AND FOREIGN POLICY

The death of the Emperor on 20 October 1740 not only put a stop to this but also

created a diplomatic situation which proved to be beyond the forces of Fleury to

deal with. On 2 December 1740, just after the invasion of Silesia by Frederick, he

wrote to Tencin: ‘My head is spinning with all the nebulous affairs that are

appearing on all sides and which would need a much stronger head than mine. I

could almost believe that we are nearing the end of the world when I see a good

number of the dreadful portents that ought to precede it’.

This period saw Fleury abandon the formulation of policy to subordinates first

willingly, because he misjudged their reliability, and later unwillingly against his

better judgement. His policy on central Europe was suggested by the two experts on

imperial affairs, Blondel and Chavigny, and it was a reasonable one. It consisted of

recognising the succession of Maria Theresa and bringing about the election of

Charles Albert of Bavaria as Emperor. Frederick II’s action in invading Silesia

disrupted his plans, for, at a time when France could safely have pursued an anti-

Austrian policy, Fleury had hoped to arrange everything by negotiation. French

policy from December 1740 until the summer of 1741 was half-hearted and

vacillating: Fleury could choose neither to pursue his own peaceful policy nor adopt

the belligerent policy advocated by his sole negotiator in Germany, Belle-Isle, for he

disliked war and was wedded to a policy of financial economy.

There was strong

pressure at court for a war with Austria. As Millot wrote,

Le cardinal de Fleury, a friend of equity and peace by nature, restrained by the

guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and being in his extreme old age

incapable of grand designs, feared the war they wanted him to engage in all

the more because the last one had seemed to him to be an unbearable burden.

But the clamour of a part of the nation, the almost general wish of the officers,

the advice of the maréchal [de Noailles] and of the comte de Belle-Isle, carried

the day against the arguments of this powerful minister.

The failure of Fleury to conduct French foreign policy successfully at this stage in

his life reflects more than his declining strength; it reflects his failure to control the

factions at the court of France. Wilson suggested as much—‘he lost control over his

subordinates’—with reference to Belle-Isle, but the full circumstances have yet to be

explained.

Let us therefore examine the links between the aristocratic factions and

foreign policy more closely, beginning with the state of the factions.

From 1737 to 1741 some important changes occurred that altered the

composition and influence of the factions. Up to the late 1730s there had been

great continuity with the divisions during the Regency and the 1720s. It was not

quite the same in 1740. Some of Chauvelin’s supporters had been discouraged.

The due de Bourbon died in 1740 and in 1741 the due d’Orléans retired from the

council, to go into religious seclusion. With the figureheads of the two opposing

factions absent, those with political aspirations formed new groups. The

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candidates for office who had formerly attached themselves to one or other of

these now emerged as powerful individuals in their own right. A grouping of the

factions in terms of their actual existence rather than in terms of the potential

successors to Fleury, would reveal three. They were apparently led by Chauvelin,

the due de Noailles and Belle-Isle, but it must be remembered that powerful clans

were behind these individuals as candidates. It could not be said that Tencin, at

one time a serious contender for the mantle of Fleury, or the Secretaries of State,

who would eventually win the struggle for succession, were leaders of factions,

although they had some supporters.

There is an anonymous memoir in the archives which describes three factions

contending for the succession. It is dated November 1741 and notes that the public

was convinced that the King on his own would not choose a premier ministre, but

that intrigues and cabals were at work to make him do so. ‘Intrigues and court

cabals…are thinking only of bringing to the prime ministership, someone to their

liking whom they imagine they will be able to manipulate. And there are already

three different cabals ready formed with respect to three different subjects. That of

Chauvelin, that of Cardinal Tencin, and that of M.de Belleisle.’

The argument of

the memoir is that the King should choose no premier ministre after Fleury, but that

he should govern himself with the aid of a sound council.

These factions do not correspond to those enumerated above, and this must be

accounted for. An explanation suggests itself when the motive for the memoir is

taken into account. It is evident from the past and subsequent conduct of both the

duc de Richelieu and the duc de Noailles, who were close friends, that both hoped

to exercise great influence upon Louis XV after the death of Fleury. In 1741 and

1742 Richelieu was busy intriguing with the King’s future mistress, Mme de La

Tournelle, to acquire this power. Noailles, excluded from the ministry by Fleury,

although often consulted on affairs, certainly hoped to acquire a ministerial post,

but only after the demise of the Cardinal. It was in the interests of both of these

men, each of whom had followers, to avoid the creation of a formal successor to

Fleury and to encourage Louis to govern as his own first minister. Neither of them

is mentioned in the memoir, which is surprising since Noailles had for a long time

been proposed as a minister. Richelieu had recently acquired his governorship and

could have had no pressing ambition in 1741. Therefore it can be concluded that

the memoir, since it was written by someone very well informed about politics,

represents a blow in the struggle for succession on behalf of Noailles. Tencin was

undoubtedly a potential successor to Fleury, but was widely disliked and could only

hope to succeed as a direct result of the approbation of Fleury. The Noailles, on the

other hand, formed a very well-organised group.

The first of the three factions was that of the former Keeper of the Seals,

Chauvelin, and it was perhaps the most numerous. Cruickshanks provides a most

useful scrutiny of the components of this group.

Fleury himself provided the

names of some in a letter to Tencin which is doubly valuable because it explains

why Fleury had been anxious about the Spanish reaction to his dismissal of the

minister in 1737.