VIII. Risk Management 28. Managing International
improve your bargaining position with foreign governments. For example, Ford
has integrated its overseas operations so that the manufacture of components, sub-
assemblies, and complete automobiles is spread across plants in a number of coun-
tries. None of these plants would have much value on its own, and Ford can switch
production between plants if the political climate in one country deteriorates.
Multinational corporations have also devised financing arrangements to help
keep foreign governments honest. For example, suppose your firm is contemplat-
ing an investment of $500 million to reopen the San Tomé silver mine in Costaguana
with modern machinery, smelting equipment, and shipping facilities.
27
The
Costaguanan government agrees to invest in roads and other infrastructure and to
take 20 percent of the silver produced by the mine in lieu of taxes. The agreement is
to run for 25 years.
The project’s NPV on these assumptions is quite attractive. But what happens if
a new government comes into power five years from now and imposes a 50 per-
cent tax on “any precious metals exported from the Republic of Costaguana”? Or
changes the government’s share of output from 20 to 50 percent? Or simply takes
over the mine “with fair compensation to be determined in due course by the Min-
ister of Natural Resources of the Republic of Costaguana”?
No contract can absolutely restrain sovereign power. But you can arrange proj-
ect financing to make these acts as painful as possible for the foreign government.
For example, you might set up the mine as a subsidiary corporation, which then
borrows a large fraction of the required investment from a consortium of major in-
ternational banks. If your firm guarantees the loan, make sure the guarantee stands
only if the Costaguanan government honors its contract. The government will be
reluctant to break the contract if that causes a default on the loans and undercuts
the country’s credit standing with the international banking system.
If possible, you should arrange for the World Bank (or one of its affiliates) to fi-
nance part of the project or to guarantee your loans against political risk.
28
Few
governments have the guts to take on the World Bank. Here is another variation on
the same theme. Arrange to borrow, say, $450 million through the Costaguanan De-
velopment Agency. In other words, the development agency borrows in interna-
tional capital markets and relends to the San Tomé mine. Your firm agrees to stand
behind the loan as long as the government keeps its promises. If it does keep them,
the loan is your liability. If not, the loan is its liability.
Political risk is not confined to the risk of expropriation. Multinational compa-
nies are always exposed to the criticism that they siphon funds out of countries in
which they do business, and, therefore, governments are tempted to limit their
freedom to repatriate profits. This is most likely to happen when there is consider-
able uncertainty about the rate of exchange, which is usually when you would
most like to get your money out. Here again a little forethought can help. For ex-
ample, there are often more onerous restrictions on the payment of dividends to
the parent than on the payment of interest or principal on debt. Royalty payments
and management fees are less sensitive than dividends, particularly if they are
levied equally on all foreign operations. A company can also, within limits, alter
the price of goods that are bought or sold within the group, and it can require more
or less prompt payment for such goods.
CHAPTER 28
Managing International Risks 805
27
The early history of the San Tomé mine is described in Joseph Conrad’s Nostromo.
28
In Section 25.7 we described how the World Bank provided the Hubco power project with a guaran-
tee against political risk.