XI. Conclusion 35. Conclusion: What We
bonds sell for lower prices than Treasury bonds—companies have the option to
walk away from their debts. However, the differences between the prices of cor-
porate bonds and Treasury bonds are too large to be explained just by the com-
pany’s default option. It seems likely that the price difference is partly due to the
fact that corporate bonds are less liquid than Treasury bonds. But, until we know
how to price differences in liquidity, we can’t really say much more than this.
Investors seem to value liquidity much more highly at some times than at oth-
ers. When liquidity suddenly dries up, asset prices can become very volatile. This
happened in 1998 when Long-Term Capital Management, a large hedge fund, col-
lapsed.
9
Since its formation four years earlier LTCM had generated high returns by
holding large positions in “cheap” illiquid assets, which it hedged by selling liquid
assets. LTCM, therefore, served as a supplier of liquidity to other investors. When
Russia defaulted on its debt in 1998, there was a rush by investors to get out of illiq-
uid assets. As the value of LTCM’s holdings declined, its banks demanded addi-
tional collateral for their loans and LTCM was forced to liquidate its positions in a
market that was already short of liquidity. Eventually, the New York Fed encour-
aged a group of institutions to take over LTCM, but not before there had been very
sharp swings in asset prices.
9. How Can We Explain Merger Waves?
In 1968 at the first peak of the postwar merger movement, Joel Segall noted: “There is
no single hypothesis which is both plausible and general and which shows promise
of explaining the current merger movement. If so, it is correct to say that there is noth-
ing known about mergers; there are no useful generalizations.”
10
Of course there are
many plausible motives for merging. If you single out a particular merger, it is usually
possible to think up a reason why that merger could make sense. But that leaves us
with a special hypothesis for each merger. What we need is a general hypothesis to
explain merger waves. For example, in the late 1990s everybody seemed to be merg-
ing, while at the beginning of the twenty-first century mergers were out of fashion.
There are other instances of apparent financial fashions. For example, from time
to time there are hot new-issue periods when there seems to be an insatiable sup-
ply of speculative new issues and an equally insatiable demand for them. We don’t
understand why hard-headed businessmen sometimes seem to behave like a flock
of sheep, but the following story may contain the seeds of an explanation.
It is early evening and George is trying to decide between two restaurants, the
Hungry Horse and the Golden Trough. Both are empty and, since there seems to be
little reason to prefer one to the other, George tosses a coin and opts for the Hungry
Horse. Shortly afterward Georgina pauses outside the two restaurants. She some-
what prefers the Golden Trough, but observing George inside the Hungry Horse
while the other restaurant is empty, she decides that George may know something
that she doesn’t and therefore the rational decision is to copy George. Fred is the third
person to arrive. He sees that George and Georgina have both chosen the Hungry
Horse, and, putting aside his own judgment, decides to go with the flow. And so it
is with subsequent diners, who simply look at the packed tables in the one restau-
rant and the empty tables elsewhere and draw the obvious conclusions. Each diner
CHAPTER 35
Conclusion: What We Do and Do Not Know About Finance 1003
9
Hedge funds attempt to buy underpriced securities and to sell short overpriced ones. They are typi-
cally organized as partnerships and owned by a small number of institutions or wealthy individuals.
10
J. Segall, “Merging for Fun and Profit,” Industrial Management Review 9 (Winter 1968), pp. 17–30.